After Gettysburg

[5fish]

Yes attack Lee in a fortified position of his choosing and preparation. That worked out well throughout the war.

When Meade did finally assault the rear guard position it seem to go well so maybe the fortified position was not as well fortified as history wants us to believe. Meade assaulted the position with cavalry...

 

[Bee]

For those interested in the Battle at Falling Waters, some important points to note:

As Buford soon learned, with the exception of a rearguard Lee's army had finally made its escape across the Potomac. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, page pg 282.​

Setting the scene: the fortifications/breastworks are irrelevant at this time as Lee's army had fully evacuated, and there was none but a rearguard present at the Falling Waters crossing point.

The premature crossing of the river by Fitz Lee and the rest of the mounted soldiers meant only Harry Heth's and Dorsey Pender's infantry remained north of the river - and there was no cavalry screen to shield them from Meade's troopers. Ibid
​

It is a misrepresentation to compare the small force that was encountered at Falling Waters by Buford and Kilpatrick vs. a fully armed and dug in AoNV that had occupied the breastworks/fortifications from Hagarstown to Falling Waters Road (along a tributary). The small, unscreened rearguard was all that was left of Lee's army on the north side of the Potomac. Suffice to say, the battle did not go as well as it could have, as once again, Kill-cavalry lived up to his reputation.

​

 

[Jamieva]

Don't bother he's not reading it nor is he interested in facts or an intellectual discussion.

 

[5fish]

For those interested in the Battle at Falling Waters

I like what Bee posted she argues that the ANV had pulled out of there positions at the time of the union cavalry assault around 8am in the morning. Only a small, rear guard was still north of the River.

Don't bother he's not reading

You are incorrect...

Here is Kirkpatrick's report that supports Bee... but question Lee truthfulness... Article from the N Y Times...

WASHINGTON, Wednesday, Aug. 12.

The following dispatch has been received at the Headquarters of the Army here:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Aug. 9, 1863.

Major-Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief, Washington:

My attention has been called to what purports to be an official dispatch of Gen. R.E. LEE, commanding the Confederate army, to Gen. S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector-General, denying the accuracy of my telegram to you of July 14, announcing the result of the cavalry affair at Falling Waters.

I have delayed taking any notice of Gen. LEE's report until the return of Brig.-Gen. KILPATRICK, absent on leave, who commanded the cavalry on the occasion referred to, and on whose report from the field my telegram was based. I now inclose the official report of Brig.-Gen. KILPATRICK, made after his attention had been called to Gen. LEE's report. You will see that he reiterates and confirms all that my dispatch averred, and proves most conclusively that Gen. LEE has been deceived by his subordinates, or he would never, in the face of the facts now alleged, have made the assertions his report contains.

It appears that I was in error in stating that the body of Gen. PETTIGREW was left in our hands, although I did not communicate that fact until an officer from the field reported to me he had seen the body.

It is now ascertained from the Richmond papers that Gen. PETTIGREW, though mortally wounded in the affair, was taken to Winchester, where he subsequently died.

The three battle-flags captured on this occasion, and sent to Washington, belonged to the Fortieth, Forty-seventh and Fifty-fifth Virginia regiments of infantry. Gen. LEE will surely acknowledge these were not left in the hands of stragglers "asleep in barns."

Respectfully yours, GEORGE G. MEADE, Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION CAVALRY CORPS, WARRENTON JUNCTION, Va., Aug. 7, 1863.

To Col. A.J. Alexander, Chief of Staff of Cavalry Corps:

COLONEL: In compliance with a letter just received from the headquarters of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, directing me to give the facts connected with my fight at Falling Waters, I have the honor to state that at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 14th ult., I learned that the enemy's pickets were retiring on my front. Having been previously ordered to attack, at 7 A.M., I was ready to move at once. At daylight I had reached the crest of hills occupied by the enemy an hour before, and at a few minutes before 6 o�clock Gen. CUSTER drove the rear guard of the enemy into the river at Williamsport. Learning from citizens that a portion of the enemy had retreated in the direction of Falling Waters, I at once moved rapidly for that point, and came up with the rear guard of the enemy at 7 1/2 A.M., at a point two miles distant from Failing Waters. We pressed on, driving them before us, capturing many prisoners and guns. When within one and a half miles of Falling Waters, the enemy was found in large force drawn up in line of battle on the crest of a hill, commanding the road on which I was advancing. His left was protected by earthworks, and his right extending to the woods far on my left. The enemy was, when first seen, in two lines of battle, with arms stacked.

Within less than one thousand yards of this large force, a second piece of artillery with its support, consisting of infantry, was captured while attempting to get into position. A portion of the Sixth Michigan cavalry, seeing only that portion of the enemy behind the earthworks, charged.

This charge, led by Major WEBER, was the most gallant ever made. At a trot he passed up the hill, received the fire from the whole line, and the next moment rode through and over the earthworks, passed to the right, sabering rebels along the entire line, and returned with a less of thirty killed, wounded and missing, including the gallant Major WEBER, killed.

I directed Gen. CUSTER to send forward one regiment of skirmishers. They were repulsed before support could be sent them, and driven back, closely followed by the rebels, until checked by the First Michigan and a squadron of the Eighth New-York.

The Second brigade having come up, it was quickly thrown into position, and after a fight of two hours and thirty minutes, routed the enemy at all points and drove them toward the river.

When within a short distance of the bridge, Gen. BUFORD's command came up and took the advance.

We lost 29 killed, 36 wounded and 40 missing. We found upon the field 125 dead rebels, and brought away upward of 50 wounded.

A large number of the enemy's wounded were left upon the field, in charge of their own Surgeons.

We captured two guns, three battle flags, and upward of 1,300 prisoners.

To Gen. CUSTER and his brigade, Lieut. RENNINGTON and his battery, and one squadron of the Eighth New-York cavalry, of Gen. BUFORD's command, all praise is due.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. KILPATRICK,

Brig.-Gen. of Volunteers, commanding a division.

Information was received today from the Army of the Potomac, saying that Brig.-Gen. GOUVERNEUR K. WARREN, Chief of the Topographical Engineers, has been promoted to a Major-General. This appointment is generally conceded by all to be justly due to this distinguished and accomplished officer.

A new rebel camp was discovered on Pony Mountain, near Culpepper, on Sunday. It is believed the rebels came from the south side of the Rapidan.

Wm.T. HOWELL, of Philadelphia, for a long time Chief Clerk to the Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, has been rewarded for his ability and fide ??? by the appointment of Captain in the same Department.

Brig.-Gen. PATRICK, Provost-Marshal-General, has obtained a short leave of absence to attend to private business, it being the first time since his entry into the volunteer service he has been absent from his arduous duties. Deputy-Provost-Marshal SHARPE acts in his stead.

No movements of a general character have transpired for some time in the Army of the Potomac. The weather is intensely hot -- the earth is dry and parched -- and man and beast are glad to seek the cooling shade.

Last night MOSBY's guerrillas captured twelve sutiers' wagons a short distance beyond Accotink Creek south of Mount Vernon. A detachment of Federal troops is in pursuit.


A final note: Falling Waters/ Williamsport was Lee's Dunkirk, he was trapped against a body of water and only luck and incompetent leadership by his foes save him from annihilation.

 

[Bee]

Don't bother he's not reading it nor is he interested in facts or an intellectual discussion.

When I first starting posting here, there was a guy -- Horace Porter -- who used to tirelessly defend against certain historical myths/inaccuracies, seemingly to me, to folks who were not listening. One day I asked him, "Why are you wasting time trying to convince people who are not interested in the truth?" He said something important that I have not forgotten (paraphrased from memory) "I am not talking to them, I am talking to people like you who may not know the difference, and are interested in learning".

As you may have noticed, the post was put up late at night, after I had given it some thought. I liken it to a Shakespearean actor who turns away from his fellow actors and speaks directly to the audience

 

[Legion Para]

I don't know you, so I have no idea what efforts you've taken to study these events. Consequently, I'm simply going to ask: have you ever seen the ground that made up Lee's position at Williamsport? Have you seen Salisbury Ridge? Have you seen the entrenchments that Lee's engineers designed and his army constructed? Personally, I have been walking that ground for the better part of 20 years now, and I know that terrain like the back of my hand. I've written one well-regarded monograph on the retreat from Gettysburg (with two friends) and am now finishing a very lengthy discussion of these events for my Meade manuscript. It's fair to say that I know all of the sources AND I know the ground.

If you have not walked that ground, then, with all due respect, you have no idea what you're talking about. I will let those men who actually saw Lee's defensive works resolve this issue once and for all. I have extracted a small excerpt from the book project that I am completing:

The men of the Army of Northern Virginia were already confident of their success. "As we got things into shape, oh! How we all did wish that the enemy would come out in the open & attack us, as we had done them at Gettysburg," declared Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, who was the acting chief of artillery for Longstreet's First Corps. "Our troops are drawn up in a line of battle on a splendid range of hills," declared a supremely confident Virginia artillerist, "and as we have received a large supply of ammunition, I think we will give the enemy a big whipping, notwithstanding the large superiority of their numbers. Everything seems to indicate a large battle in which it is necessary that we should prove victorious, as our rations are running low with but little chance of getting more, until we take them from the enemy." Make no mistake about it: the Army of Northern Virginia was just as full of fighting spirit as it had ever been, and it was itching for Meade to attack it in such a dominating defensive position of its own choosing.

Most importantly, the defensive position chosen and developed by Lee and his engineers was formidable. It ran along Salisbury Ridge, a prominent north-south ridge, and was anchored on the banks of the Potomac River on either end, meaning that it could not be flanked. While there were some low spots where creeks or marshy ground lay, the Confederate engineering staff built in interlocking fields of fire to ensure that these positions were defensible. The position featured a compact line of battle, with a complete road network with lines of retreat, supply, and communication behind it that allowed resources to be shifted to meet threats. The line bristled with artillery. In short, the strong defensive position atop Salisbury Ridge made the Confederate position on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg seem like a poor choice by comparison.

"The Rebel lines crossed the road from St. James' College to Williamsport, near a large white house, about half a mile (south?) west of the college. The country occupied by the Rebels is undoubtedly very strongly defensible," wrote John Watts DePeyster. "As a military position it is superior to Antietam or Sharpsburg. The latter is, for this country, comparatively clear and rolling rather than strictly hilly. The position assumed by the Rebels in July 1863 is broken, rocky, marshy, and densely wooded in many places. The district occupied by Lee is known as the 'marsh land,' and is said to extend northward to the Pennsylvania line. In this neighborhood, a little to the north of the college, it is drained by Marsh Run, a little stream which crosses the Sharpsburg Pike about a mile south of Hagerstown, while another Marsh Creek finds its way into the Potomac, south-southeast of Williamsport, between Foreman's Ford and Mercerville."

"The greatest part of it was on top of a range of hills on the left bank of Marsh Run, a small creek which flows through a swampy valley into the Potomac," described a clergyman assigned to St. James College, a private boys' school located in the middle of Lee's line. "On the right bank of the creek is a similar range of hills, nearly parallel, but somewhat lower, than the first. There the main army was entrenched. The hills are gently sloping down to the creek, the distance between them varies from one to two miles, and the space between them is almost an entirely open field. The attacking party would have been from the first moment, when they left their entrenchments, exposed to the artillery and musketry fire, of a well-protected and concealed enemy. The key of the rebel position was, according to their own statements, a prominent hill on the farm of John L. Roland, about three-fourths of a mile behind the College of St. James. The rebels had, of course, strong batteries, on top of it and in the neighborhood. The College itself was held as a kind of a out-post and strongly occupied by sharp-shooters." This position was well chosen, well designed, and formidable. There is no other way to describe it.

The breastworks consisted of two parallel lines of trenches. The front line was apparently fairly weak and was positioned along the forward slopes of the ridge. It consisted of trenches with forward bastions made of packed earth and wheat sheaves covered by dirt, built up along a long ditch. Near the crest of the ridgeline lay the main line of works, constructed of fence rails, rocks, and packed earth, prompting one observer to call it a "very strong line of gopher holes and rifle pits."

Indeed, the men of the Army of the Potomac remembered the debacle at Fredericksburg seven months earlier, and they had little stomach for a repeat, or to attack such a strong position anchored on commanding high ground. "It was thought not to risk a battle here as we have not over 50,000 efficient troops and the enemy to be equal to that if not more, with advantage of position and troops concentrated," said a Union signalman. Nevertheless, Meade was confident. Normally reticent around reporters, he was positively giddy on the night of July 13. "We shall have a great battle tomorrow," he declared to a reporter. "The reinforcements are coming up, and as soon as they come we shall pitch in."

Despite their commander's confidence, the men in the ranks who would have to make that assault had every reason to be concerned. The Confederate defensive position was formidable. Referring to the long line of earthworks in front of them, Col. Charles Wainwright, the chief of artillery for the I Corps, said, "These were by far the strongest I have seen yet, evidently laid out by engineers and built as if they meant to stand a month's siege." The parapets were nearly six feet wide on top, and the engineers had placed their guns perfectly to create converging fields of fire that could sweep the entire front of the position. After inspecting the position, Wainwright concluded, "My own opinion is under the circumstances and with the knowledge General Meade then had he was justified in putting off the attack."

Humphreys, who had spent thirty years as a topographical engineer and knew a strong position when he saw one, declared, "Wherever seen, the position was naturally strong, and was perfectly entrenched. It presented no vulnerable points, but much of it was concealed from view…its flanks were secure and could not be turned." He concluded, "A careful survey of the entrenched position of the enemy was made, and showed that an assault upon it would have resulted disastrously to us." He also observed, "On the other hand, General Burnside was severely criticized for attacking at Fredericksburg, where the entrenchments were not as formidable than those at Williamsport."

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, the Army of the Potomac's highly respected chief of artillery, echoed a similar note. "A careful survey of the enemy's entrenched line after it was abandoned justified the opinion of the corps commanders against the attack, as it showed that an assault would have been disastrous to us. It proved also that Meade in overriding their opinion did not shrink from a great responsibility, notwithstanding his own recent experience at Gettysburg where all the enemy's attacks on even partially entrenched lines had failed. If he erred on this occasion it was on the side of temerity." As one former Fifth Corps staff officer correctly put it, "One thing we do know, in our long association with Gen. Meade, we always found him to be a careful, cautious commander, who never would consent to the useless sacrifice of his soldiers in battle." A similar situation played out a few months later at Mine Run, where Meade again made the correct choice not to assault Lee's very strong defensive works.

Lt. Col. Rufus Dawes, commander of the 6th Wisconsin of the First Corps, examined Lee's fortifications and found them "strong and well constructed." With that in mind, he declared, "I think General Meade would have certainly failed to carry them by direct assault. I take no stock in the stuff printed in the newspapers about the demoralization of the rebel army after Gettysburg. They were worn out and tired as we were, but their cartridge boxes had plenty of ammunition, and they would quietly have lain in their rifle pits and shot us down with the same coolness and desperation they showed at Gettysburg." Dawes, a well-respected combat leader who fought in most of the heaviest battles of the Civil War, did not lack courage. He was known for his fearlessness, and his opinion must carry weight as such.

Lieutenant Haskell, who, as noted previously, was a remarkably astute observer for a young, junior officer, believed that an assault on Lee's works "would have been repulsed with heavy loss, with little damage to the enemy." He believed that the vote of the council of war on July 12 reflected the belief of the commanders agreed with his own opinion. "Such a result might have satisfied the bloody politicians better than the end of the campaign as it was; but I think the country did not need the sacrifice of the Army of the Potomac at that time,--enough odor of sacrifice came up to its nostrils from the 1st Fredericksburg field, to stop their snuffling for some time." He stated, "I felt the probability of defeat strongly at the time, when we all supposed that a conflict would certainly ensue." Haskell concluded, "Of course the army, both officers, and men, had very great disappointment, and very great sorrow, that the Rebels escaped—so it was called—across the river;--the disappointment was genuine, at least to the extent that disappointment is like surprise; but the sorrow, to judge by looks, tones, and actions, rather than by words, was not of that deep, sable character, for which there is no balm. Would it be an imputation upon the courage or patriotism of this army, if it was not rampant for fight at this particular time, and under the existing circumstances? Had the enemy stayed upon the left bank of the Potomac twelve hours longer, there would have been a great battle there near Williamsport on the 14th of July." However, the outcome of that great battle would have been uncertain for the reasons stated by Haskell.


Again, and with all due respect, I will take the words of those who were there and saw those works with their own eyes as the word on this subject.

Well said Mr. Wittenberg. I greatly appreciate your participation in forums like this. Thank you.

Walking the terrain is critical to understanding any battle. I spent decades studying Dien Bien Phu and this includes talking to hundreds of veterans who participated in the battle. Dien Bien Phu veterans accompanied me on my trips to DBP. Walking the terrain with them put things in a different perspective.

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, we don't know because Meade didn't order an attack; quite plausibly, given how the Army of the Potomac was organized by McClellan and company, there never was any capability for a pursuit with any energy, and if so, that was not Meade's doing - but again, we'll never know.

It certainly was a benefit to the United States that Grant was ordered east; he was, after all, the only general who ever managed to get the Army of the Potomac to move far enough and fast enough to take the initiative away from Lee.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

It certainly was a benefit to the United States that Grant was ordered east; he was, after all, the only general who ever managed to get the Army of the Potomac to move far enough and fast enough to take the initiative away from Lee.

Can we have miles per day? The results will surprise you....

 

[cash]

Can we have miles per day? The results will surprise you....

Instead, let's look at the point he made. Compare number of days Lee held the initiative vs. number of days Lee didn't hold the initiative.

 

[TFSmith121]

Instead, let's look at the point he made. Compare number of days Lee held the initiative vs. number of days Lee didn't hold the initiative.

Edited by Chellers opinion of GBM notwithstanding, the reality is Grant won the war in the east in two campaign seasons in 1864-65, which was an accomplishment that none of his contemporaries - as general-in-chief or de facto theater commander, and most definitely including McClellan - came within an astronomical unit of accomplishing in the previous three years of the war.

And, along the way, the troops Grant led destroyed three enemy armies - including that of Lee - while on the offensive, and defeated two others, one on the offensive and one on the defensive. Presumably that should count for something.

McClellan, at most, can be credited with one army-level victory, and that the defensive one in Maryland in 1862. He also gets credit for the defeat on the Peninsula, of course; and maybe half-credit, split with Rosecrans, for West Virginia in 1861. He gets credit for his defeat in 1864, as well.

One can pretend otherwise, of course (and many do) but the historical record is quite clear.

Best,