After Gettysburg

[jackt62]

Grant would have had Lee on the north side of the Potomac and I just don't think he would have let him escape. If there was a fourth day of Gettysburg with the union attacking and then staying constantly engaged like the Summer of '64 how would Lee of been resupplied? Grant would have attacked and attacked till Lee ran out of men and ammunition. At least that's how I see it

You are correct that Grant's style of campaigning was more aggressive than Meade's. However, the AOTP would have had to switch from a defensive to offensive position after the 3rd day at Gettysburg, a daunting challenge even if Grant were in command, given the losses in men and supplies that that army had suffered in three days of fighting. Lee, on the other hand, with its smaller number of corps and leading commanders, had only to carry out a successful withdrawal of the ANV, a feat which in his brilliant hands did in fact occur.

 

[cash]

You are correct that Grant's style of campaigning was more aggressive than Meade's. However, the AOTP would have had to switch from a defensive to offensive position after the 3rd day at Gettysburg, a daunting challenge even if Grant were in command, given the losses in men and supplies that that army had suffered in three days of fighting. Lee, on the other hand, with its smaller number of corps and leading commanders, had only to carry out a successful withdrawal of the ANV, a feat which in his brilliant hands did in fact occur.

We should consider the Sixth Corps, the largest corps in the Army of the Potomac was practically unengaged during the battle of Gettysburg and were therefore comparatively fresh.

 

[James_tiberous]

Did Lees army get resupplied with artillery ammunition after the third day's attack? If they didn't there would have been hell to pay stopping a counter attack

 

[cash]

Did Lees army get resupplied with artillery ammunition after the third day's attack? If they didn't there would have been hell to pay stopping a counter attack

No, they didn't get resupplied, but they had ammunition left over. Pendleton had moved their ammunition trains further back during the bombardment and so there was ammunition that wasn't used up prior to the charge. How quickly they could have gotten it up to the artillery guns in the event of a counterattack is a big question.

 

[Dilba]

Not quite sure I agree with that. Grant and the AOTP would still have faced the same obstacles that Meade faced and as previous posts have noted (exhausted forces, formidable foe still kicking, etc.). Grant wasn't able to annihilate the ANV despite maneuvering and battling that foe during the Overland Campaign. One can only say that at its conclusion, Grant forced the ANV into a 10 month war of attrition and stalemate along the Petersburg front.

I agree. And Grant had stable lines of supply during both the Overland Campaign and Petersburg siege from the protected Chesapeake and its contributing waterways. I doubt Meade could have established anything comparable to support a hasty pursuit of Lee southwest of Gettysburg.

 

[James_tiberous]

I agree. And Grant had stable lines of supply during both the Overland Campaign and Petersburg siege from the protected Chesapeake and its contributing waterways. I doubt Meade could have established anything comparable to support a hasty pursuit of Lee southwest of Gettysburg.

Meade had the man power advantage, the logistic advantage and the situational advantage. Grant told Meade in '64 wherever Lee goes, you will go also. He latched onto the ANV and did not let go and won. Had that strategy been followed after Gettysburg it would have worked even better and would not have taken " all summer" to grind down a trapped foe that was diminishing in strength every day. Could Lee have pulled off a river crossing with the enemy pressing him? Perhaps, but Meade should have made him at least pay a very dear price for coming North that summer

 

[major bill]

Did Lees army get resupplied with artillery ammunition after the third day's attack? If they didn't there would have been hell to pay stopping a counter attack

An ordnance train arrived on July 6th. So for a couple of days Lee would have had limited artillery ammunition. The issue is that Lee had expected that most artillery work would be at medium range and so had not taken very much long range ammunition with him and also had not taken much for short range work. The issue being that Lee had used up perhaps 31,400 rounds of artillery out of 40,000 or 50,000 (I have seen both figures used). This left Lee with between 8,000 and 18,000 rounds of artillery. This does not mean he had the right number or the type of rounds he needed for each size of cannon nor the proper rounds to use at the proper distance. To this one could add the extra ammunition Lee carried in a small army ordnance train he had with him. I have seen the number of rounds in that train as about 3,810 round if it carried its full load.

So perhaps 12,000 to 22,000 rounds. He had used around 31,000 to 32,000 during the battle so probably had enough to continue the fight for a couple of days until the approaching ordinance train arrived. Again some types of artillery may have ran dry sooner than that,

 

[Dilba]

Meade had the man power advantage, the logistic advantage and the situational advantage. Grant told Meade in '64 wherever Lee goes, you will go also. He latched onto the ANV and did not let go and won. Had that strategy been followed after Gettysburg it would have worked even better and would not have taken " all summer" to grind down a trapped foe that was diminishing in strength every day. Could Lee have pulled off a river crossing with the enemy pressing him? Perhaps, but Meade should have made him at least pay a very dear price for coming North that summer

Fair enough. But my opinion remains the same. Meade's army on July 4, '63 was in a very different situation than on May 4, '64 after months of rest and preparation.

 

[James_tiberous]

Fair enough. But my opinion remains the same. Meade's army on July 4, '63 was in a very different situation than on May 4, '64 after months of rest and preparation.

I think much the same argument we are having was had by Lincoln and McClellan after Antietam. Mac said the horses were worn out and Lincoln said so were Lees. Yes, Meades army was hurt, but Lees was in worse shape and it was away from home. I also take the view that the South might win the war, and as such there may be future wars between the two countries. If so, I'd want, if I was in charge of Northern army, to show as much aggressiveness as possible taking on a CSA army on northern soil to make them think twice before ever invading again.

 

[James_tiberous]

An ordnance train arrived on July 6th. So for a couple of days Lee would have had limited artillery ammunition. The issue is that Lee had expected that most artillery work would be at medium range and so had not taken very much long range ammunition with him and also had not taken much for short range work. The issue being that Lee had used up perhaps 31,400 rounds of artillery out of 40,000 or 50,000 (I have seen both figures used). This left Lee with between 8,000 and 18,000 rounds of artillery. This does not mean he had the right number or the type of rounds he needed for each size of cannon nor the proper rounds to use at the proper distance. To this one could add the extra ammunition Lee carried in a small army ordnance train he had with him. I have seen the number of rounds in that train as about 3,810 round if it carried its full load.

So perhaps 12,000 to 22,000 rounds. He had used around 31,000 to 32,000 during the battle so probably had enough to continue the fight for a couple of days until the approaching ordinance train arrived. Again some types of artillery may have ran dry sooner than that,

So it seems reasonable that Lee might have had to conserve ammunition, a terrible thing for an army fighting for its life. Great post, btw

 

[major bill]

Meade had only used up about 1/3 of his artillery supply and would have had a large supply of rounds left. (59,000?). The only issue being the battle had put a dent in his long range ammunitions, but he still had much more long range shells than Lee. Lee probably had not used much canister but would probably had to avoid major long range duals with Union artillery.

 

[James_tiberous]

Lincoln's opinion on this:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 14, 1863.

Major General Meade

I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not aninch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.
Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, andI do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, andI am distressed immeasurably because of it.
I beg you will not consider this a prossecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

Abraham Lincoln

 

[TFSmith121]

One thing worth considering, of course, is that Meade had won - unequivocally - a defensive battle in loyal territory against the rebels in 1863 by remaining on the defensive, and yet was unable to do much with it. MacClellan had - arguably - won a defensive battle in loyal territory against the rebels in 1862 by a mixed strategy (offensive tactics, defensive strategy), and yet he also was unable to do much with it.

Meade was a better combat commander than MacClellan, obviously - he didn't literally throw away his troops' victories, as Mac had done on the Peninsula - but neither one of them were who one would select to wage a sucessful offensive campaign at the army group/theater level.

Should Meade have done more after Gettysburg? Yes, of course.

But whether he could have done so with the Army of the Potomac as it was in 1863 is an open question. As the Lincoln quote points out, it's not like Meade was alone in his pace after the battle among the senior officers in the field at the time.

Best,

 

[Yankeedave]

Meade won against lee in the time after gettysburg. On Oct 14 at Bristoe Station Warren bested Hill. On Nov 7th at the 2nd battle of the rappahannock confederate trenches are overrun. Ten days later on the 17th the battle of paynes farm ends in a draw tacticaly, but lee retreats to the mine run. Meade will fight and win and their wont be the casualties Grant pushes it to. Grant is the end of an era.

 

[TFSmith121]

Meade won against lee in the time after gettysburg. On Oct 14 at Bristoe Station Warren bested Hill. On Nov 7th at the 2nd battle of the rappahannock confederate trenches are overrun. Ten days later on the 17th the battle of paynes farm ends in a draw tacticaly, but lee retreats to the mine run. Meade will fight and win and their wont be the casualties Grant pushes it to. Grant is the end of an era.

Sure, but that's not Lincoln's point, or the criticism, which is that an immediate and continuing counter-offensive could have pushed the ANV into a sack north of the Potomac, or at least a precipitate retreat that would have caused even more attritional losses of men and equipment.

Whether any CG could have accomplished that with the AotP as it was in July, 1863, however, after the losses at Gettysburg and - frankly - the previous 27 months or so of war, is a different question.

Best,

 

[Yankeedave]

I missed the lincoln quote. My point is Meade will fight offense defense and win. It just wont be the bloodbath of Grant.

 

[Rebforever]

Lincoln's opinion on this:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 14, 1863.

Major General Meade

I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not aninch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.
Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, andI do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, andI am distressed immeasurably because of it.
I beg you will not consider this a prossecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

Abraham Lincoln

In my opinion, Meade would have beat Lee at Falling Waters if he had pulled out all the stops for an attack. But the odds are Meade would have no army left after the fighting was over.

 

[James_tiberous]

Could Meade have actually of trapped Lee in a siege situation north of the Potomac? Where he would have been cut off and unable to retreat? Even Lee couldn't fight if he ran out of ammunition

 

[rpkennedy]

Meade won against lee in the time after gettysburg. On Oct 14 at Bristoe Station Warren bested Hill. On Nov 7th at the 2nd battle of the rappahannock confederate trenches are overrun. Ten days later on the 17th the battle of paynes farm ends in a draw tacticaly, but lee retreats to the mine run. Meade will fight and win and their wont be the casualties Grant pushes it to. Grant is the end of an era.

Those offensives were fairly limited in scope. They weren't the full-scale ones conducted in 1864. It's comparing two different things.

R

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Lincoln's opinion on this:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, July 14, 1863.

Major General Meade

I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not aninch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.
Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, andI do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, andI am distressed immeasurably because of it.
I beg you will not consider this a prossecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

Abraham Lincoln

The ultimate definition of an arm-chair quarterback with no concept of the reality of command, the terrain, or the position constructed by Lee's engineers. Those troops of Couch and Smith he mentions: more worthless than you-know-what's on a bull.

You might also include this in your "analysis":

After seeing how Meade was being savaged by the Monday morning quarterbacks, O. O. Howard, of all people, sent Lincoln this letter on July 18:

Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the battles [sic] of Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem calculated to convey a wrong impression to your mind, I wish to submit a few statements. The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operations of our present commanding General prior to the engagement and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before during the war been thrown in at just the right moment. . . . Moreover I have never seen a more hearty co-operation on the part of General officers as since General Meade took the command.

As to not attacking the enemy prior to leaving his stronghold beyond the Antietam it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not have been turned upon us; at any rate the Commanding General was in favor of an immediate attack but with the evident difficulties in our way the uncertainty of a success and the strong conviction of our best military minds against the risk, I must say, that I think the General acted wisely.

As to my request to make a reconnaissance on the morning of the 14th which the papers state was refused; the facts are, that the General had required me to reconnoitre the evening before and give my opinion as to the practicability of making a lodgement on the enemy's left, and his answer to my subsequent request was, that the movements he had already ordered would subserve the same purpose.

We have, if I may be allowed to say it, a Commanding General in whom all the officers, with whom I have come in contact, express complete confidence. I have said this much because of the censure and of the misrepresentations which have grown out of the escape of Lee's army.

Lincoln responded on July 21:

Executive Mansion,

Washington, 21st July, 1863.

My dear General Howard:

Your letter of the 18th is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy—believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed—making my belief a hobby possibly—that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. General Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.

Yours very truly,

A. Lincoln.

So much for that.