Longstreet

[M E Wolf]

Page 237, expresses Colonel Marshall's opinions on Early.

 

[M E Wolf]

Page 238 does not give a specific time--just 'morning.'

 

[M E Wolf]

Page 239 has more details of the famed "Pickett's Charge."

Again, this is just from Colonel Marshall's papers on the matter of the Battle of Gettysburg. There was plenty of blame to go around however, hindsight is 20/20.

M. E. Wolf

 

[War Horse]

Points are how you interact with CivilWarTalk.com, posting and all. As a reward for participating you will also be promoted after a certain amount of posts. If folks "like" your posts, it usually adds to your reputation, in a good way.

M. E. Wolf
POSTED IN THE CAPACITY OF MODERATOR
Sept. 29, 2014 6:15 p.m.

Thank you

 

[thomas aagaard]

You first. You are picking and choosing. I guess you over looked the part where Wert says Longstreet should have been punished for his behavior. And there was a order for morning attack.

The quote is correct.
If you trust Wert then you have to accept that there was no such order...
If you keep insisting on such an order existing, then it is you who are picking and choosing the part of his book you like.

 

[War Horse]

Page 239 has more details of the famed "Pickett's Charge."

View attachment 48124

Again, this is just from Colonel Marshall's papers on the matter of the Battle of Gettysburg. There was plenty of blame to go around however, hindsight is 20/20.

M. E. Wolf

That is a very interesting read. Thank you very much.

 

[Vicksburger]

It comes from William Miller Owen and his reminiscences, In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery. The incident happened the evening of the Battle of Antietam, after the battle's conclusion.

http://books.google.com/books?id=Y8XtMvaGEZoC&pg=PA157&lpg=PA157&dq=Ah! Here is Longstreet; here's my old war-horse! Let us hear what he has to say&source=bl&ots=nFVIgvODJO&sig=PfMk-59wkFZCYXWhHbi5liZo-Lo&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Ho0pVI-7H4-byATj9ILQDg&ved=0CDAQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=Ah! Here is Longstreet; here's my old war-horse! Let us hear what he has to say&f=false

Thank you, Cash, I had never known exactly where it stemmed from, now I do.

 

[Rebforever]

Wert says Lee didn't order an attack until 11 o'clock AM. That's not an order for a morning attack.

That is not all Wert says. He states that Lee was looking for Longstreet and when he found him, he had done NOTHING to prepare for battleand that was at 11 am, in the morning.

 

[thomas aagaard]

You wrote:

The order was out for a morning attack

So you now admit that that statement was a "mistake"?


(yes, we can question why Longstreet didn't anticipate some sort of action that day, and have his corp ready for action at this time, but that was not what your wrote...)

 

[rpkennedy]

That is not all Wert says. He states that Lee was looking for Longstreet and when he found him, he had done NOTHING to prepare for battleand that was at 11 am, in the morning.

His lack of preparedness can be criticized. You asserted that there was a morning order, which is another matter entirely.

R

 

[War Horse]

That is not all Wert says. He states that Lee was looking for Longstreet and when he found him, he had done NOTHING to prepare for battleand that was at 11 am, in the morning.[/ he did do something. He found that the Union had doug in and reinforced their position which made the order of an early morning attack impractical. He met with Lee before dawn to discuss the situation. When he finally went in he went in hard. Never was his discretion challenged by Lee this is proven by Lee giving Longstreet the lead on the 3rd in which he on had two divisions engaged and A.P Hill had ( I believe eight). This does not sound like the actions of a General disappointed with the leadership skills of General Longstreet.

 

[cash]

That is not all Wert says. He states that Lee was looking for Longstreet and when he found him, he had done NOTHING to prepare for battleand that was at 11 am, in the morning.

He doesn't say Lee was looking for Longstreet. That's a fabrication on your part.

Lee rode to consult with Ewell at 9 o'clock. He returned at 11 o'clock. He didn't have to look for Longstreet because he knew exactly where he was. At 11 o'clock, Lee returned to Seminary Ridge. "Longstreet met with Lee and received orders to advance with the infantry divisions of McLaws and Hood and the corps artillery battalions. Longstreet requested a delay until Brigadier General Evander Law's brigade of Hood's division, known to be en route, arrived from New Guilford, where it had been stationed, and Lee acceded." [Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier, a Biography, p. 265]

And your claim that Longstreet did nothing to prepare for battle is wrong, too. Wert shows that Longstreet gave orders to Alexander to "assume command of the artillery on the field, to find a route by which to move the batteries into position that would not be detected by a Union signal station on Little Round Top, and then to bring up the cannon." [Ibid., p. 268]

Wert does say Longstreet didn't confer with McLaws or Hood about the attack, nor did he send anyone to update the reconnaissance information or to find a concealed route. As Wert says, ""He stayed at the observation post and waited for Lee's return." [Ibid.] Wert writes that "Lee apparently expected Longstreet to do something during his visit with Ewell, although what is unclear. In Longstreet's defense, Lee had not finalized the plans, and both men had accepted Johnston's report, believing that the route of march had been examined by the engineer officers." [Ibid.]

So once again, you're wrong.

 

[Rebforever]

Wert writes that "Lee apparently expected Longstreet to do something during his visit with Ewell, although what is unclear. In Longstreet's defense, Lee had not finalized the plans, and both men had accepted Johnston's report, believing that the route of march had been examined by the engineer officers." [Ibid.]

That is exactly what I posted, Cash. And you know it.

Post #108- That is not all Wert says. He states that Lee was looking for Longstreet and when he found him, he had done NOTHING to prepare for battleand that was at 11 am, in the morning.

 

[Rebforever]

On the night of July 2, Longstreet did not follow his usual custom of meeting Gen. Lee at his headquarters to discuss the day's battle, claiming that he was too fatigued to make the ride. Instead, he spent part of the night planning for a movement around Big Round Top that would allow him to attack the enemy's flank and rear. (Longstreet, despite his use of scouting parties, was apparently unaware that a considerable body of troops from the Union VI Corps was in position to block this move.) Shortly after issuing orders for the attack, around sunrise, Longstreet was joined at his headquarters by Lee, who was dismayed at this turn of events. The commanding general had intended for Longstreet to attack the Union left early in the morning in a manner similar to the attack of July 2, using Pickett's newly arrived division, in concert with a resumed attack by Ewell on Culp's Hill. What Lee found was that no one had ordered Pickett's division forward from its bivouac in the rear and that Longstreet had been planning an independent operation without consulting with him. Lee wrote with some restraint in his after-battle report that Longstreet's "dispositions were not completed as early as was expected."[49

Note #49 is Coddington.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Longstreet

 

[War Horse]

General Sickles thoughts on the matter.

In General Lee s official report not a word appears about any delay in Longstreet s movements on July 2, although, referring to the assault of July 3, General Lee says, " General Longstreet s dispositions were not completed as early as was expected." If General Lee did not hesitate to point out unlocked for delay on July 3, why was he silent about delay on July 2? His silence about delay on July 2 implies that there was none on July 2. Expresio unius exclusio alterius. General Lee says, in his report, referring to July 3,
" General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy s extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws."

 

[cash]

That is exactly what I posted, Cash. And you know it.

Post #108- That is not all Wert says. He states that Lee was looking for Longstreet and when he found him, he had done NOTHING to prepare for battleand that was at 11 am, in the morning.

Wrong as usual.

He doesn't state that Lee was looking for Longstreet and he doesn't state that Longstreet did nothing to prepare for the battle.

Lee knew where Longstreet was, at the observation post, and wasn't looking for him.

Telling Alexander to find an unobserved route and bring up his guns is preparing for the battle.

 

[cash]

Note #49 is Coddington.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Longstreet

You're confused again. Now you're confusing July 3 with July 2.

 

[War Horse]

Wrong as usual.

He doesn't state that Lee was looking for Longstreet and he doesn't state that Longstreet did nothing to prepare for the battle.

Lee knew where Longstreet was, at the observation post, and wasn't looking for him.

Telling Alexander to find an unobserved route and bring up his guns is preparing for the battle.

Exactly!

 

[JEB]

Early , Marshall and Pendleton all had an axe to grind . Their accounts on certin issues are questionable at best.

I don't believe Lee had come to any conclusions until Johnson came back .

Lee had given orders directly to McLaws . Longstreet gave orders to Alexander who was waiting on the infantry . Lee knew they were waiting on Law . Why was this Longstreet's fault ?

A telling General Lee quote comes from Cambell Brown . Lee's instructions to Ewell via Brown early in the morning of July 2nd stressed that General Ewell needed to make sure he could extricate his troops if neccessary because " I have not decided to fight here ".

 

[Rebforever]

Lee returned to Seminary Ridge approximately two hours later, about 11 o'clock. While he had been on the army's left, Longstreet had done virtually nothing to implement the movement, except to order Colonel E. Porter Alexander to find a concealed route to the right for the artillery. He neither conducted another reconnaissance, nor checked with Alexander to ascertain if he had located a route, nor conferred with McLaws and Hood. 'There was apparent apathy in his movements,' admitted Sorrel. 'They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield.'

Longstreet allowed his disagreement with Lee's plans to affect his generalship, and he deserves censure for this. While he may have opposed the idea of an offensive, he was still in a position of responsibility. What Lee expected of Longstreet during the two-hour interim is uncertain, but Lee expected something. Without specific orders, duty required that Longstreet attend to the preparations for a movement. On that morning, Longstreet was not the same general who had performed so capably on previous battlefields. His judgment about the offensive may have been correct, but he owed more to Lee than he gave.