Blue water navy

[Piedone]

So how do you break the blockade, how do you prevent more union landings.

From reading "Defending the Arterias of Rebellion" I got the impression that the Confederacy had a quite promising start around N.O. with Hollins - but then quite blundered it all.
I must admit I am not knowledgeable enough to do anything else but build castles in the air - but with such a interesting question I just cannot refrain from start building such a castle…..

1) I´d deem union landings and the usage of inland waterways for Union incursions to be not a too serious threat. For once the Confederacy could take advantage from the South´s underdeveloped infrastructure: A lot of effort would be necessary for the Union to develop such an incursion into something more substantial (Burnside´s North Carolina Expedition comes to one´s mind).

2) The Confederacy needn´t to be competitive on blue water - they could take advantage of the fact that a lot more ships are needed to continually keep a blockade up - than to punctually harass the blockading squadrons. Just a few seagoing vessels could suffice to take advantage of promising situations (maybe the federals bungled the change of shift of their blockading ships, maybe a federal ship ran aground or developed engine problems….). A few quick, successful attacks could made it necessary for the Union to invest much more ressources in upkeeping the blockade (hence prolonging the war, weakening operations on other fronts...).

3) To have those seagoing vessels, to keep them seaworthy and to repair eventual battle damage the Confederacy should - first of all things - have tried to defend their scarce shipbuilding capabilities in N.O. and Norfolk as long as possible.

4) And they should have done a much better job coordinating and organizing their shipbuilding: instead of scattering money and ressources all over the place they should have concentrated on a few promising projects. Why starting those monster ironclads in N.O. that ate up so much time, ressources and workforce - when a few well designed ironclads of much more moderate size would do the job far better? They would have been operable far earlier, they would have been much easier to maneuvre and to power - and given the then prevailing " Merrimac scare" would have stalled federal operations for quite some time.

5) The Confederates build quite some ironclads in the backwoods, using recycled insufficient power plants, unsuitable wood and unskilled workers - building them in Algiers or Norfolk should have gotten them much better vessels. Many of those "backwoods-ironclads" lost their battleworthiness because they couldn´t get proper maintenance - which would have been possible if they operated from N.O. or Norfolk.

My castle-in-the-air-question would be:

- given the Confederates held to Norfolk
- given they assembled there a fleet of let´s say four ironclads of moderate size (and some smaller vessels)
- given they chose a promising situation (when naval presence of the USN was reduced for some reason)
and steamed down to Wilmington to attack the blockading ships there….
- retreating to Wilmington if things went awry
- then waiting on another promising situation...
(Well, this should have produced quite some perturbance in the hen-house….)

How many ships, ressources and naval presence would it take the Union to guard against such expeditions?

 

[DaveBrt]

My castle-in-the-air-question would be:

- given the Confederates held to Norfolk
- given they assembled there a fleet of let´s say four ironclads of moderate size (and some smaller vessels)
- given they chose a promising situation (when naval presence of the USN was reduced for some reason)
and steamed down to Wilmington to attack the blockading ships there….
- retreating to Wilmington if things went awry
- then waiting on another promising situation...
(Well, this should have produced quite some perturbance in the hen-house….)

How many ships, ressources and naval presence would it take the Union to guard against such expeditions?

Two or three divisions of Union infantry should have prevented the ships from being built in Norfolk. The shipyard required railroad communication with Richmond for armor and almost everything else naval. RR communication with food sources was essential, too. The Confederacy would require a meaningful army for a year or so to defend the area from attack from any of several directions. I do not believe such an army could have been created and not been hijacked for other, emergency assignments.

 

[Piedone]

Two or three divisions of Union infantry should have prevented the ships from being built in Norfolk. The shipyard required railroad communication with Richmond for armor and almost everything else naval. RR communication with food sources was essential, too. The Confederacy would require a meaningful army for a year or so to defend the area from attack from any of several directions. I do not believe such an army could have been created and not been hijacked for other, emergency assignments.

Aw. Another balloon bursted….

 

[Rhea Cole]

Two or three divisions of Union infantry should have prevented the ships from being built in Norfolk. The shipyard required railroad communication with Richmond for armor and almost everything else naval. RR communication with food sources was essential, too. The Confederacy would require a meaningful army for a year or so to defend the area from attack from any of several directions. I do not believe such an army could have been created and not been hijacked for other, emergency assignments.

This map from the Library of Congress graphically illustrates DaveBrt's point. Inland is the Great Dismal Swamp. Norfolk dangles out into the ocean from a narrow neck of dry land. As was amply demonstrated during the early phase of the war, there simply was no way to hold Norfolk without command of the littoral. It was simplistic to secure from a threat on the landward side.

Anybody who wants to contest that needs to take a good hard look at the map first. Great Dismal Swamp is not an euphemism.

 

[Piedone]

View attachment 578829

This map from the Library of Congress graphically illustrates DaveBrt's point. Inland is the Great Dismal Swamp. Norfolk dangles out into the ocean from a narrow neck of dry land. As was amply demonstrated during the early phase of the war, there simply was no way to hold Norfolk without command of the littoral. It was simplistic to secure from a threat on the landward side.

Anybody who wants to contest that needs to take a good hard look at the map first. Great Dismal Swamp is not an euphemism.

Great map.

 

[Rhea Cole]

So how do you break the blockade, how do you prevent more union landings. The union forces coming in on the land border and the union landings on the coast created a 2-front war for the confederacy, a 2-front war for mid-size powers like the confederacy or later Germany is just too much to handle.
Every river flowing to the sea is an invasion route how do you stop that.
What is a credible alternate to a blue water navy.

My impression is that antantis is not familiar with the U.S. East Coast. In almost 3,000 miles there are only three blue water ports south of New York. Wilmington, Charleston & Savannah. Only Mobile & New Orleans are on the Gulf.

Cape Fear earned its monicker for good reason. Barrier Islands & massive sandbars move around at will. Islands appear & disappear after the winter storms. At low tide, in the channel between Dafuskey & Hilton Head Islands at the mouth of the Savannah River a person can wade across. Nobody was going to build blue water warships up a creek or river for that matter. Commercial traffic travels on the Intercostal Waterway behind the Barrier Islands. Some basic map study is in order.

F

 

[Rhea Cole]

So how do you break the blockade, how do you prevent more union landings. The union forces coming in on the land border and the union landings on the coast created a 2-front war for the confederacy, a 2-front war for mid-size powers like the confederacy or later Germany is just too much to handle.
Every river flowing to the sea is an invasion route how do you stop that.
What is a credible alternate to a blue water navy.

The was no means of challenging the U.S. Navy on brown water, littoral, or blue water. The South Carolina Hot Heads were so convinced of their position at the center of the universe that such trivial details were not worthy of their attention. God had created an entire race of color coded people whose only purpose was to serve them. Cotton was King & all were unworthy & must bow before them.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

View attachment 578677
This is a marine engine of 1865. Which parts do you suppose would be shipped as spares? The parts for this engine would not fit any another model, they wear specific to this engine. Assuming a blockade runner could be convinced to add cumbersome castings instead of high profit needles & pins, what engine do you suppose they would fit?

I am definitely not an expert on such engines, and neither am I an expert on blockade running.

Nonetheless, I am aware that the Confederates, under the guidance of General Josiah Gorgas (Supt. of Ordnance), imported some equipment and had plans to import more. Machinery was to be imported from England, agents there were to provide payment, and Col. James Henry Burton and Col. Richard M. Cuyler were to be the recipients.

Col. Cuyler was in charge of the Confederate Arsenal in Macon, GA, and Burton was commander of the Confederate Armory.

Col. James Henry Burton was formerly CHIEF ENGINEER of the "Royal Small Arms FACTORY" in ENFIELD, England (known as the Enfield Works), and he knew all machinery that was needed to manufacture firearms, as well as having the names and connections in England to provide to CSA agents.

A photo of the remains of the uncompleted Confederate Arsenal taken in 1865, just after the war ended, is shown. When completed (it was not completed), it would have been the largest manufacturing facility for firearms in the world. As the war ended, I believe, Gorgas and Burton were expecting a significant shipment of machinery from England - YES, by blockade running.

This photo was taken from "Civil War Macon" by Richard W. Iobst.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I am definitely not an expert on such engines, and neither am I an expert on blockade running.

Nonetheless, I am aware that the Confederates, under the guidance of General Josiah Gorgas (Supt. of Ordnance), imported some equipment and had plans to import more. Machinery was to be imported from England, agents there were to provide payment, and Col. James Henry Burton and Col. Richard M. Cuyler were to be the recipients.

Col. Cuyler was in charge of the Confederate Arsenal in Macon, GA, and Burton was commander of the Confederate Armory.

Col. James Henry Burton was formerly CHIEF ENGINEER of the "Royal Small Arms FACTORY" in ENFIELD, England (known as the Enfield Works), and he knew all machinery that was needed to manufacture firearms, as well as having the names and connections in England to provide to CSA agents.

A photo of the remains of the uncompleted Confederate Arsenal taken in 1865, just after the war ended, is shown. When completed (it was not completed), it would have been the largest manufacturing facility for firearms in the world. As the war ended, I believe, Gorgas and Burton were expecting a significant shipment of machinery from England - YES, by blockade running.
View attachment 578830
This photo was taken from "Civil War Macon" by Richard W. Iobst.

How many hundred of these engines were there, complete with spares & journeyman artificers qualified to maintain them? If you will take a gander at the NavSource Old Navy & Sail Index the histories of the vessels will have year long refits as a routine part of their service. Do some research to understand what it took to keep a brown water, littoral & blue water fleet in service.

Ships & steam engines are maintenance hogs. After a cruise the engines had to be torn down & the boilers refurbished. There were no roller bearings in those days. Bushings were made of wood & leather. Without constant maintenance, the engines
"slapped" as the the connecting rods banged loosely.

On the rail roads it became necessary for passengers to dismount, walk to the top of long grades as the engined laboriously drug one empty car at a time to the siding where the lash-up was reassembled.

For blockade runners, only one or two high speed runs could be made before a complete rebuild was necessary.

In the book Dreadnaught we have discussed earlier, the experience of the the British Mediterranean Fleet is illustrative. After the annual exercise that involved high speed runs individual battleships were laid up for weeks on end while major engine parts were replaced.

The information anyone needs to understand the limitations of steam power in the 1860's is easily referenced. That knowledge is of primary importance to understanding how & why the brown water, littoral & blue water naval war proceeded as it did.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

How many hundred of these engines were there, complete with spares & journeyman artificers qualified to maintain them? If you will take a gander at the NavSource Old Navy & Sail Index the histories of the vessels will have year long refits as a routine part of their service. Do some research to understand what it took to keep a brown water, littoral & blue water fleet in service.

Ships & steam engines are maintenance hogs. After a cruise the engines had to be torn down & the boilers refurbished. There were no roller bearings in those days. Bushings were made of wood & leather. Without constant maintenance, the engines
"slapped" as the the connecting rods banged loosely.

On the rail roads it became necessary for passengers to dismount, walk to the top of long grades as the engined laboriously drug one empty car at a time to the siding where the lash-up was reassembled.

For blockade runners, only one or two high speed runs could be made before a complete rebuild was necessary.

In the book Dreadnaught we have discussed earlier, the experience of the the British Mediterranean Fleet is illustrative. After the annual exercise that involved high speed runs individual battleships were laid up for weeks on end while major engine parts were replaced.

The information anyone needs to understand the limitations of steam power in the 1860's is easily referenced. That knowledge is of primary importance to understanding how & why the brown water, littoral & blue water naval war proceeded as it did.

Wait a minute.
I previously posted (Bold added): "The parts could have been purchased, but it was difficult to get them into the CSA because of the blockade. Blockade runners could only do so much."

Before that I posted in reply to Atlantis' post #25 that it would NOT be possible for the CSA to build a blue water navy.

Before that I posted on Wed. that "the concept of manufacturing for a blue water navy was IMPOSSIBLE."

I think that either you are arguing with the wrong guy, or that you must disagree with these points.

 

[Old Soldier]

He's having his say = no matter what!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Wait a minute.
I previously posted (Bold added): "The parts could have been purchased, but it was difficult to get them into the CSA because of the blockade. Blockade runners could only do so much."

Before that I posted in reply to Atlantis' post #25 that it would NOT be possible for the CSA to build a blue water navy.

Before that I posted on Wed. that "the concept of manufacturing for a blue water navy was IMPOSSIBLE."

I think that either you are arguing with the wrong guy, or that you must disagree with these points.

The repetitious counterfactual posts in this thread are confusing. I summed it up in the first sentence of the first response. Knowledgeable members have repeatedly made the point that this topic is moot. It is time to go onto something else.

 

[Library Lady]

How many hundred of these engines were there, complete with spares & journeyman artificers qualified to maintain them? If you will take a gander at the NavSource Old Navy & Sail Index the histories of the vessels will have year long refits as a routine part of their service. Do some research to understand what it took to keep a brown water, littoral & blue water fleet in service.

Ships & steam engines are maintenance hogs. After a cruise the engines had to be torn down & the boilers refurbished. There were no roller bearings in those days. Bushings were made of wood & leather. Without constant maintenance, the engines
"slapped" as the the connecting rods banged loosely.

On the rail roads it became necessary for passengers to dismount, walk to the top of long grades as the engined laboriously drug one empty car at a time to the siding where the lash-up was reassembled.

For blockade runners, only one or two high speed runs could be made before a complete rebuild was necessary.

In the book Dreadnaught we have discussed earlier, the experience of the the British Mediterranean Fleet is illustrative. After the annual exercise that involved high speed runs individual battleships were laid up for weeks on end while major engine parts were replaced.

The information anyone needs to understand the limitations of steam power in the 1860's is easily referenced. That knowledge is of primary importance to understanding how & why the brown water, littoral & blue water naval war proceeded as it did.

@13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf , are you talking about bringing over machinery to make Enfield rifles? If so, that would be like what the Confederates were able to move from the Harper's Ferry arsenal to, I believe, Richmond, yes? You aren't talking big marine engines here, are you?

 

[Piedone]

@13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf , are you talking about bringing over machinery to make Enfield rifles? If so, that would be like what the Confederates were able to move from the Harper's Ferry arsenal to, I believe, Richmond, yes? You aren't talking big marine engines here, are you?

As a thought experiment:
It would have been possible to ship also maritime engines - even if that freight was a lot more cumbersome.
The Confederates also wouldn't have needed hundreds of them.

But regarding the creation of a navy…well….there are a lot of "buts" here (as I learned now….)

 

[Piedone]

Yes they were pretty BIG and don't forget the BOILERS - up to SIX required and also the coal to fire them. Wood is useless for ships.

I am currently reading all of @atlantis threads (as we have obviously similar interests) - and did a bit of reading about the James River flotilla. Some of the vessels had their boilers produced at Richmond.

But probably those boilers took quite an effort to be produced and maybe couldn´t deliver enough steam to power oceangoing crafts.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

@13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf , are you talking about bringing over machinery to make Enfield rifles? If so, that would be like what the Confederates were able to move from the Harper's Ferry arsenal to, I believe, Richmond, yes? You aren't talking big marine engines here, are you?

Yes - the particular machinery in that part of the discussion was manufacturing machinery. My topical position is best described by excerpts from some of my earlier posts:
1. "Blockade runners could only do so much."

2. "In reply to Atlantis' post #25, "it would NOT be possible for the CSA to build a blue water navy.

3. Before that I posted on Wed. that "the concept of manufacturing for a blue water navy was IMPOSSIBLE."

 

[Rhea Cole]

Yes - the particular machinery in that part of the discussion was manufacturing machinery. My topical position is best described by excerpts from some of my earlier posts:
1. "Blockade runners could only do so much."

2. "In reply to Atlantis' post #25, "it would NOT be possible for the CSA to build a blue water navy.

3. Before that I posted on Wed. that "the concept of manufacturing for a blue water navy was IMPOSSIBLE."

The premise is flawed. The Civil War was not a blue water war. With the exception of a few encounters with raiders, the entire war was littoral & brown water. That was true of the entire age sail, of which the Civil War was the coda. For every round fired at a blockader at sea, ten thousand were fired at the land.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The premise is flawed. The Civil War was not a blue water war. With the exception of a few encounters with raiders, the entire war was littoral & brown water. That was true of the entire age sail, of which the Civil War was the coda. For every round fired at a blockader at sea, ten thousand were fired at the land.

Totally agree with you!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Totally agree with you!

Library of Congress

Just think about Farragut taking the Hartford all the way upriver to Vicksburg. Notice that the topgallants have been struck down.

On the tall ship HMS Rose we struck topgallants to pass under the Brooklyn Bridge & on the River Avon down stream of Bristol. Also in anticipation of foul weather. No need for a man-o-war's topgallants & royals on the Mississippi River.

 

[Piedone]

The premise is flawed. The Civil War was not a blue water war. With the exception of a few encounters with raiders, the entire war was littoral & brown water.

Maybe the premise of @atlantis is not flawed in general -

of course it would have been advantageous
if the CSA could have lifted the blockade - if even for at least certain time spans and if only in some places.

What do you all think:
Would a dedicated blue water fleet even have been necessary for such a task?
I could imagine more littoral ships could also have helped a lot - if they at times kept blockading squadrons farther off -
hence giving more maneuvering space to blockade runners improving their successes?

But agreedly this is nothing more but an academic question:

- as the South should have found it hard to muster even such a capable littoral force….
- I mean most confederate ironclads - even the the better ones of the James River squadron could do not much more than 5 or 6 knots
- and to achieve anything against the blockade they would have had to be quite a bit more mobile….