Blue water navy

[Piedone]

Could they hsve done it? Definite ... 'maybe'.

If I may contribute my 2 cents:

they had only a very short time span to do it:
IF they would have imported as many engines and as much machinery as they could (preferably ship engines and locomotives)
BEFORE the blockade got really effective - then there could have been quite some success.

But as soon as everything had to be unloaded eg. in Nassau from freight ships with a tonnage of 1700 or more
onto (quite expensive) blockade runners with a often much smaller tonnage of maybe 500 tons -
there was a relevant bottleneck.

And as soon as the blockading squadron tightened their grip on the shipping lanes and blockade runner losses rose
it would have been quite an effort to at least get some engines through….

 

[CSuniforms]

Atlantis, There is no need to discuss this topic. For good reason the commerce raiders were built in GB & manned with English crews.

The first link is to the NavSource Photo Archive "Old Navy Steam & Sail" index. It contains an alphabetical list of every commissioned vessel in both the USN & Confederate Navy. There are images & histories of each vessel. It is a fascinating source that is very easy to use. Frankly, just looking at the list of one navy vs the list of the other will speak volumes.

Link:

NavSource "Old Navy" Steam and Sail Index

The Monitors, there is no Confederate counterpart, are listed here.

Link:

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

The Confederacy had three blue water ports on the East Coast. There were no ship yards or trained craftsmen who could have built a blue water navy to confront the USN. The same was true of littoral or brown water vessels.

There was no supply of cordage in the Confederacy. In the 1860's sailing ships required miles of rope of varying dimension from twine to 8" hawsers. Sails were made of woven hemp fiber. The cultivation of hemp was laborious in the extreme. Then the hemp stems had to be processed & converted to finished products on rope walks.

The Blue Grass region of Kentucky, adjacent to the Ohio River was the source of hemp products. 40% of the state's agricultural exports were hemp products. The vast inventory of hemp fiber products went north on the RR & eastward on the Erie Canal to shipyards & chandlers in New England & onwards. A shortage of cordage hampered CSA shipping throughout the war. No rope, no sails , no caulking, no ships.

Because of an extraordinary deposit of copper in Michigan, there were almost no copper mills in the CSA. Only the serendipitous wreck of a ship supplied telegraph wire. Without copper to sheet wooden hulls, shipworm would make short work of any blue water vessel.


This American Battlefield Trust article begins with the massive build up initiated by the USN in the first months of the conflict. Not only were existing warships outfitted & numerous new vessels laid down hundreds of merchant vessels were acquired for conversion to blockading gunboats. The histories of these converted merchantmen are the Old Navy Steam & Sail index. In a phenomenally short period of time the active navy list increased exponentially. Anything like that was physically & financially impossible for the Confederacy. Read more here.

Link:

The Navies of the Civil War

A brief summary of naval history during the Civil War.

www.battlefields.org

The NavSource Index includes every USN commissioned ship from the Revolution to today. You can look up & wonder where an entire afternoon has gone to. RC

What I read is that the Confederacy wanted Iron clads to be built- the process was not managed correctly and a lack of Industrial capacity in making the plates was limited, the Carpenter crews and Machinists LIMITED- The South never had a chance.

 

[Rhea Cole]

What I read is that the Confederacy wanted Iron clads to be built- the process was not managed correctly and a lack of Industrial capacity in making the plates was limited, the Carpenter crews and Machinists LIMITED- The South never had a chance.

"The Confederacy" had no coherent program regarding constructing warships of any kind. Such a top down strategic policy & planning was bureaucratically impossible. 40 tin clad gunboats escorted the XVII Corps from Muscle Shoals to New Orleans in the buildup to the Mobile Bay operations.

In the vacuum deliberately created by the CSA Constitution, isolated hobbyhorses were cobbled together scattered across a continent. As a result, resources were frittered away or never allocated.

Compare the often farcical attempts to build a single fort on a raft ironclad with the flotilla of tinclads built in Ohio River yards. Flotillas of the humble but practical tin clads campaigned tirelessly throughout the Mississippi watershed.

In the littoral, there was nothing complicated about building & launching a Monitor. The crew was the size of a single watch on a screw-schooner-of-war. As a result, Monitor designs improved with experience.

Note: To examine the development of Monitors there is no better source than this. These ships destroyed the CSA fort on a raft designs at every encounter. See images & read more here.

Link

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

The apt simile is FedEx vs a child on a bike running a paper route. There are no "what ifs?" Because there was nothing to what if with.

 

[Piedone]

Note: To examine the development of Monitors there is no better source than this. These ships destroyed the CSA fort on a raft designs at every encounter. See images & read more here.

The only relevant difference between "a fort on a raft" (CSA) and "a cheese on a raft" (USA)
is the revolving turret of the latter (as on the "Monitor") .

The revolving turret did nothing to improve firepower or rate of fire - and was a somewhat cumbersome construction
(that needed teething for quite a while…).

But relevant was indeed that the Union could cast and rifle heavy and heavier ordinance without any problems -

whereas the Confederates were quite restricted -
they could (for quite a while) only rifle the guns they had (mostly 32-pounders) or
(with much effort) cast a few new ones over time.
Also their ammunition was of… well… let´s say moderate quality (see the thread @atlantis started about "Alabama vs. Kearsarge")

Nothing wrong with inclined armour ("fort on a raft") or
revolving turrets ("cheese on a raft") -
both were integrated on all more modern battleship.

 

[atlantis]

"The Confederacy" had no coherent program regarding constructing warships of any kind. Such a top down strategic policy & planning was bureaucratically impossible. 40 tin clad gunboats escorted the XVII Corps from Muscle Shoals to New Orleans in the buildup to the Mobile Bay operations.

In the vacuum deliberately created by the CSA Constitution, isolated hobbyhorses were cobbled together scattered across a continent. As a result, resources were frittered away or never allocated.

Compare the often farcical attempts to build a single fort on a raft ironclad with the flotilla of tinclads built in Ohio River yards. Flotillas of the humble but practical tin clads campaigned tirelessly throughout the Mississippi watershed.

In the littoral, there was nothing complicated about building & launching a Monitor. The crew was the size of a single watch on a screw-schooner-of-war. As a result, Monitor designs improved with experience.

Note: To examine the development of Monitors there is no better source than this. These ships destroyed the CSA fort on a raft designs at every encounter. See images & read more here.

Link

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

The apt simile is FedEx vs a child on a bike running a paper route. There are no "what ifs?" Because there was nothing to what if with.

Part of your comment I agree with but I disagree that the CS constitution was a problem as it is almost identical to the US consitution.
What is striking about the incoherence is that Mallory had served on the US naval affairs committee while a congressman and should have understood the need for a coherent program.

 

[atlantis]

The act of congress establishing the CS navy specified the force structure and strength, yet it was quickly discarded was this a hasty mistake as it did provide some coherent reference for a construction program and objective to work toward for. There was a survey done of resources shortly after establishment, so they had an understanding of what they needed to acquire.

 

[Piedone]

The act of congress establishing the CS navy specified the force structure and strength, yet it was quickly discarded was this a hasty mistake as it did provide some coherent reference for a construction program and objective to work toward for. There was a survey done of resources shortly after establishment, so they had an understanding of what they needed to acquire.

Could you please lead me to a source for that information?
The more I am participating in that thread the more curious I am becoming…

 

[Old Soldier]

The only relevant difference between "a fort on a raft" (CSA) and "a cheese on a raft" (USA)
is the revolving turret of the latter (as on the "Monitor") .

The revolving turret did nothing to improve firepower or rate of fire - and was a somewhat cumbersome construction
(that needed teething for quite a while…).

But relevant was indeed that the Union could cast and rifle heavy and heavier ordinance without any problems -

whereas the Confederates were quite restricted -
they could (for quite a while) only rifle the guns they had (mostly 32-pounders) or
(with much effort) cast a few new ones over time.
Also their ammunition was of… well… let´s say moderate quality (see the thread @atlantis started about "Alabama vs. Kearsarge")

Nothing wrong with inclined armour ("fort on a raft") or
revolving turrets ("cheese on a raft") -
both were integrated on all more modern battleship.

The 'Monitors' were a technological advance in all-metal, steam warships by Johan Ericsson. He had difficulty selling his idea to European Navies and turned his attention - and sales drive - to the USA. He was experienced in the design of steam haulage locos for railroads, but turned his attention to screw propulsion for ships. The USN had little time for his ideas in the 1850s
.
The rebuilding of Merrimack as an ironclad ram, prompted a USN search for an appropriate opponent. Ericsson's design was chosen, a unique design, based on Swedish lumber rafts, originally designed in 1854, but rejected by the USN!. It was mated with a revolving turret, which was designed by American inventor Theodore Timby. Why was it suddenly deemed necessary? The fear of The new Merrimack - CSS Virginia - steaming upriver to bombard Washington DC - or even New York City.

It was one of three - USS Monitor, USS Galena, and USS New Ironsides. The fact that Monitor had a guaranteed delivery date of 100 days was the main reason for the choice for the Battle at Hampton Roads as the other two were more traditional, conventional wooden-hulled ironclads and would take longer to build, Galena having an Ericsson 'vibrating lever' engine (also fitted to Monitor) and would also have to prove she could float, given the amount of steel armor fitted. New Ironsides was more like Gloire, the French ironclad.

USS Galena...(set for blockade)................................................................USS New Ironsides

The Monitor was really a dead-end design as it was not suitable for open sea actions - as were all early turret warships - due to the weight of turret and guns, making them top heavy. Monitor sank at sea while being towed to her new station, Beaufort NC in 1862. In contrast, the other two made good Blockade ships for bombarding Confederate harbors. Galena lasted until 1870 before being condemned while New Ironsides was destroyed by fire in Dec 1865

 

[Rhea Cole]

Part of your comment I agree with but I disagree that the CS constitution was a problem as it is almost identical to the US consitution.
What is striking about the incoherence is that Mallory had served on the US naval affairs committee while a congressman and should have understood the need for a cohere

Your comment does not represent the profound difference between a confederacy of sovereign states & a federation of sovereign states. In all candor, there is no point in replying to fantasizing about how the Confederate government should have operated with premises that have no basis in fact.

The profound disfunction inherent to the Confederate government is explained here.

Link:

Coming Apart From the Inside: How Internal Strife Brought Down the Confederacy

Politicians and generals on the Confederate side have long been lionized as noble warriors who heroically fought for an honorable cause that had little chance of succeeding. In reality, the Confederate leadership was rife with infighting.

historynet.com

In the future I will only respond to historically grounded discussions.

 

[DaveBrt]

If I may contribute my 2 cents:

they had only a very short time span to do it:
IF they would have imported as many engines and as much machinery as they could (preferably ship engines and locomotives)
BEFORE the blockade got really effective - then there could have been quite some success.

But as soon as everything had to be unloaded eg. in Nassau from freight ships with a tonnage of 1700 or more
onto (quite expensive) blockade runners with a often much smaller tonnage of maybe 500 tons -
there was a relevant bottleneck.

And as soon as the blockading squadron tightened their grip on the shipping lanes and blockade runner losses rose
it would have been quite an effort to at least get some engines through….

In the 1850's locomotives were shipped from the Northern factories on schooners, usually 2 to the ship. They were on the main deck, crosswise. If this was the method used for British shipments, then the stop in the islands would not have been a problem. The main problem was who would have to stand the loss if the locomotives were lost at sea or were captured?

 

[Rhea Cole]

In the 1850's locomotives were shipped from the Northern factories on schooners, usually 2 to the ship. They were on the main deck, crosswise. If this was the method used for British shipments, then the stop in the islands would not have been a problem. The main problem was who would have to stand the loss if the locomotives were lost at sea or were captured?

British motive equipment by the 1860' s was no longer powerful enough for U.S. mainline service. The terrain & the weight of the drags far exceeded English requirements.

Link:

THE RAILROAD SYSTEM.; English and American Railways Comparison of their Cost and Economy. (Published 1860)

www.nytimes.com

 

[Piedone]

In the 1850's locomotives were shipped from the Northern factories on schooners, usually 2 to the ship. They were on the main deck, crosswise. If this was the method used for British shipments, then the stop in the islands would not have been a problem.

Most impressive! Where on earth can someone find such special information?

. The main problem was who would have to stand the loss if the locomotives were lost at sea or were captured?

This suggests that @Rhea Cole might be on the right track - I learned from your website that southern railroad companies were mostly short on cash. They probably would have shrunk from taking such a risk.

So - theoretically - the confederate government should have stepped in and should have purchased locomotives from Europe as early as possible (even if they maybe weren't that much suited for southern railroads - besides of that: maybe continental models from Austria, Bavaria, France were better suited?).
They should have leased those locomotives out to the railroad companies or started something like the US Military Railroad with it.

But they would never have done it, right? Confederate railroads were staunchly private owned.
The government didn't want to infringe too much on private business interests (especially not in the early days of the war)?

And maybe even noone in the government wasted much thought on all of that?
For quite some time many Southerners followed wishful thinking and thought there would be no war.
And when war was inevitable R.E.Lee (for example) remarked with deep sorrow how very nonchalant southern preparations were.

I deem it is easily oberlooked how little time the Confederacy had.
After maybe two years in the war the federal blockade worked already - more or less efficient - and the stakes to get heavy machinery into the South got higher and higher…..

 

[DaveBrt]

Most impressive! Where on earth can someone find such special information?


This suggests that @Rhea Cole might be on the right track - I learned from your website that southern railroad companies were mostly short on cash. They probably would have shrunk from taking such a risk.

So - theoretically - the confederate government should have stepped in and should have purchased locomotives from Europe as early as possible (even if they maybe weren't that much suited for southern railroads - besides of that: maybe continental models from Austria, Bavaria, France were better suited?).
They should have leased those locomotives out to the railroad companies or started something like the US Military Railroad with it.

But they would never have done it, right? Confederate railroads were staunchly private owned.
The government didn't want to infringe too much on private business interests (especially not in the early days of the war)?

And maybe even noone in the government wasted much thought on all of that?
For quite some time many Southerners followed wishful thinking and thought there would be no war.
And when war was inevitable R.E.Lee (for example) remarked with deep sorrow how very nonchalant southern preparations were.

I deem it is easily oberlooked how little time the Confederacy had.
After maybe two years in the war the federal blockade worked already - more or less efficient - and the stakes to get heavy machinery into the South got higher and higher…..

Not only were the RRs privately owned (except the many roads that were partly state owned), the government was partly founded on the distaste of government helping, in any way, private internal improvements (roads, canals, harbor improvements, and RRs). Yes, they thought about it a lot, but still had to find a way to fund critical RR construction (Piedmont RR most prominently). To ask them to support RR companies before the war was just not going to happen (and what government are we talking about -- there really was not one, functioning, until the government got set up in Richmond).

 

[atlantis]

Could you please lead me to a source for that information?
The more I am participating in that thread the more curious I am becoming…

J Thomas Scharf a former officer in the CSN wrote the history of the confederate states navy, it has plenty of data you might find useful.
The report to the confederate congress in 1862 also lists various naval/industrial works established to meet the needs of the navy, everything from rope works to boiler works and so on.
Over 300 officers left the US navy to serve the confederacy the CS Navy secretary was the former chairman of the US senate naval affairs committee.
The US Navy in February of 1861 was small, that is when the provisional confederate congress created the CS navy and it was expedient to simply copy what they knew and go from there.
I am an amateur on here to learn from those more knowledgeable than me.

 

[atlantis]

Most impressive! Where on earth can someone find such special information?


This suggests that @Rhea Cole might be on the right track - I learned from your website that southern railroad companies were mostly short on cash. They probably would have shrunk from taking such a risk.

So - theoretically - the confederate government should have stepped in and should have purchased locomotives from Europe as early as possible (even if they maybe weren't that much suited for southern railroads - besides of that: maybe continental models from Austria, Bavaria, France were better suited?).
They should have leased those locomotives out to the railroad companies or started something like the US Military Railroad with it.

But they would never have done it, right? Confederate railroads were staunchly private owned.
The government didn't want to infringe too much on private business interests (especially not in the early days of the war)?

And maybe even noone in the government wasted much thought on all of that?
For quite some time many Southerners followed wishful thinking and thought there would be no war.
And when war was inevitable R.E.Lee (for example) remarked with deep sorrow how very nonchalant southern preparations were.

I deem it is easily oberlooked how little time the Confederacy had.
After maybe two years in the war the federal blockade worked already - more or less efficient - and the stakes to get heavy machinery into the South got higher and higher…..

The South had a river system that did not have the freezing problem the North had, geography, climate played a role in how each region developed.

 

[Piedone]

(and what government are we talking about -- there really was not one, functioning, until the government got set up in Richmond).

And even with the Richmond government it took some time
to let them perceive that they would have to infringe on the economy -
I mean they started the Nitre and Mining Bureau only in April 1863…
and in June 1864 the ANV was already pinned down in the trenches around Petersburg….

 

[Piedone]

J Thomas Scharf a former officer in the CSN wrote the history of the confederate states navy, it has plenty of data you might find useful.
The report to the confederate congress in 1862 also lists various naval/industrial works established to meet the needs of the navy, everything from rope works to boiler works and so on.
Over 300 officers left the US navy to serve the confederacy the CS Navy secretary was the former chairman of the US senate naval affairs committee.
The US Navy in February of 1861 was small, that is when the provisional confederate congress created the CS navy and it was expedient to simply copy what they knew and go from there.
I am an amateur on here to learn from those more knowledgeable than me.

That is interesting - thank you very much - I will try to hunt out a copy!

 

[atlantis]

Both North and South did impressive work in naval affairs in part because they came from the same naval background that had extensive service in oceanic operations pre-war.
Almost all of what the confederacy was able to create in terms of naval-industrial capacity was destroyed.

 

[atlantis]

And even with the Richmond government it took some time
to let them perceive that they would have to infringe on the economy -
I mean they started the Nitre and Mining Bureau only in April 1863…
and in June 1864 the ANV was already pinned down in the trenches around Petersburg….

On the other hand, the US did not start out 1776 ready to wage war against a Major Power. Independence movements usually don't wait until everything is in place.

 

[atlantis]

Not only were the RRs privately owned (except the many roads that were partly state owned), the government was partly founded on the distaste of government helping, in any way, private internal improvements (roads, canals, harbor improvements, and RRs). Yes, they thought about it a lot, but still had to find a way to fund critical RR construction (Piedmont RR most prominently). To ask them to support RR companies before the war was just not going to happen (and what government are we talking about -- there really was not one, functioning, until the government got set up in Richmond).

Where does the funding come from?