Nathan Towne
2nd Lieutenant
- Joined
- Jan 14, 2023
@Lubliner
It isn't really an argument. I approach this subject, as I do all subjects, from the perspective of utilizing the historical record to enlighten and inform. There is just what is known and what isn't and what is to be made of it. There are no "sides" here. Lots of statements have been made which don't comport with the historical record and I have merely pointed that out.
Rosecrans had been at Iuka himself prior to the pulling out on September 12th. He moved back with Fuller's brigade of Stanley's Division on the basis of the September 11th orders to consolidate around Corinth. He had seen the area himself and had had a variety of there units at different times. Stanley's Division was there on the 12th. He left Murphy's brigade (Col. Robert Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin, provisionally commanding the brigade) to cover the stores as they were to be removed and brought back from Iuka. After Murphy pulled the brigade back and abandoned most of the stores, without being able to ascertain the size of the Confederate movement and was consequently arrested, Rosecrans ordered Joe Mower, of the 11th Missouri to push the brigade back towards Iuka and determine the Confederate strength and what they were doing, which they did. The brigade moved up near Iuka and Mower conducted reconnaissance with his old regiment and in doing so they were able to ascertain that the Army of the West was there in force, which was reported back. This was late on the 16th.
They knew the ground and Rosecrans formulated the plan which was ultimately adopted. He made it all very clear in his correspondence. At least some others may have understood this, as well. Here is Arthur Ducat, who was serving on Ord's staff at the time and would later join Rosecrans staff. This was sent many years later, in correspondence between he and Rosecrans in 1885, but it is nonetheless worth seeing, at least in that he claims to have understood this at the time, even serving on Ord's staff, for whatever it is worth (and I don't put too much stock into it). He wrote to Rosecrans:
"I was Senior officer to Gen. Ord,-a good, brave and competent soldier,- who was in command of Grant's principal column. I know of something of the internal workings of matters from Corinth down to Iuka, and the foolish halt at Burnsville, which was none of Ord's fault. Ord told me of Grant's proposition to send in the despatch to Price, informing him of the battle of Antietam and the defeat of the Confederate forces, asking for his surrender. Ord said, 'Ducat, what do you think of it?' I remarked, 'Why should Price surrender when he can run; and if this despatch goes in, he will get out if he can, because it gives him time. The thing to do is to attack him now.'"
-A.C. Ducat to Rosecrans, April 24, 1885.
We could walk through all of the correspondence, but it seems pretty unnecessary that way. It is voluminous and the contemporary correspondence repudiates the point being made as to the conception and formulation of the plan. We know that the conception and formulation of the plan recognized the prospect of the Army of the West pulling back to the east via Bear Creek. We just know that. It isn't something which can be in dispute that way based on the record. One can certainly argue against the plan, but they can't argue as to how it was conceived that way. I will post via snapshots again here below. Such was certainly relayed to Grant. See Post #45 in this thread.
Also, the other user noted previously that Price was at Iuka "looking for a fight" as a reason in which he would not have pulled back, but the whole object of the Confederate movement was to get at and harass the Army of the Mississippi, or elements of the Army, while isolated. Price had no intention of fighting the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi together alone (nor did the government want for him to do so) and he had been in extensive communication regarding this with both Van Dorn and the government. The government had ultimately ordered the consolidation and Van Dorn ordered Price to move via Rienzi to Pocahontas on September 16th in preparation for a move, optimally against Corinth. Those orders, per the accounts which we have, reached Price early on the 19th. Furthermore, even before Price received those orders there is evidence that he was considering pulling back out of Iuka in that the U.S. forces were consolidating and he had moved to Iuka in order to harass the Army of the Mississippi alone and out of a concern that the combined Federal forces could strike at him.
I will note that other things have been stated categorically as fact which are not know and/or in dispute, as well. For example, it has been stated that Grant altered the plan during the day on the 19th and informed Rosecrans to this effect, which we know Grant stated subsequently (and certainly may be true), but there is good evidence to indicate that if such was the case, that Rosecrans was not aware of it, for whatever reason. Rosecrans correspondence with his wife Annie implies that he may not have ever been aware of such an alteration of the plan at the time. In his words:
"The failure of proper cooperation unfortunately lost us the capture of Price and his entire army, which would have been inevitable had the attack from the west side been duly made. We accomplished our task, but the failure of the attack from the west to come up on time brought all the forces in our direction and prevented us from attaining the point we most desired on the evening of the 19th.
-W.S. Rosecrans to A.E. Rosecrans, September 24, 1862.
Rosecrans would later state that Grant's communications to him on the morning of the 19th were the last communications from him which he received that day. Is it possible that his memory failed him on that? Yes. However, as noted above, there is some contemporary evidence to the effect that he was not aware of this supposed change of plan. We then have unclear and somewhat conflicting testimony regarding both Lagow and Dickey that way.
It isn't really an argument. I approach this subject, as I do all subjects, from the perspective of utilizing the historical record to enlighten and inform. There is just what is known and what isn't and what is to be made of it. There are no "sides" here. Lots of statements have been made which don't comport with the historical record and I have merely pointed that out.
Rosecrans had been at Iuka himself prior to the pulling out on September 12th. He moved back with Fuller's brigade of Stanley's Division on the basis of the September 11th orders to consolidate around Corinth. He had seen the area himself and had had a variety of there units at different times. Stanley's Division was there on the 12th. He left Murphy's brigade (Col. Robert Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin, provisionally commanding the brigade) to cover the stores as they were to be removed and brought back from Iuka. After Murphy pulled the brigade back and abandoned most of the stores, without being able to ascertain the size of the Confederate movement and was consequently arrested, Rosecrans ordered Joe Mower, of the 11th Missouri to push the brigade back towards Iuka and determine the Confederate strength and what they were doing, which they did. The brigade moved up near Iuka and Mower conducted reconnaissance with his old regiment and in doing so they were able to ascertain that the Army of the West was there in force, which was reported back. This was late on the 16th.
They knew the ground and Rosecrans formulated the plan which was ultimately adopted. He made it all very clear in his correspondence. At least some others may have understood this, as well. Here is Arthur Ducat, who was serving on Ord's staff at the time and would later join Rosecrans staff. This was sent many years later, in correspondence between he and Rosecrans in 1885, but it is nonetheless worth seeing, at least in that he claims to have understood this at the time, even serving on Ord's staff, for whatever it is worth (and I don't put too much stock into it). He wrote to Rosecrans:
"I was Senior officer to Gen. Ord,-a good, brave and competent soldier,- who was in command of Grant's principal column. I know of something of the internal workings of matters from Corinth down to Iuka, and the foolish halt at Burnsville, which was none of Ord's fault. Ord told me of Grant's proposition to send in the despatch to Price, informing him of the battle of Antietam and the defeat of the Confederate forces, asking for his surrender. Ord said, 'Ducat, what do you think of it?' I remarked, 'Why should Price surrender when he can run; and if this despatch goes in, he will get out if he can, because it gives him time. The thing to do is to attack him now.'"
-A.C. Ducat to Rosecrans, April 24, 1885.
We could walk through all of the correspondence, but it seems pretty unnecessary that way. It is voluminous and the contemporary correspondence repudiates the point being made as to the conception and formulation of the plan. We know that the conception and formulation of the plan recognized the prospect of the Army of the West pulling back to the east via Bear Creek. We just know that. It isn't something which can be in dispute that way based on the record. One can certainly argue against the plan, but they can't argue as to how it was conceived that way. I will post via snapshots again here below. Such was certainly relayed to Grant. See Post #45 in this thread.
Also, the other user noted previously that Price was at Iuka "looking for a fight" as a reason in which he would not have pulled back, but the whole object of the Confederate movement was to get at and harass the Army of the Mississippi, or elements of the Army, while isolated. Price had no intention of fighting the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi together alone (nor did the government want for him to do so) and he had been in extensive communication regarding this with both Van Dorn and the government. The government had ultimately ordered the consolidation and Van Dorn ordered Price to move via Rienzi to Pocahontas on September 16th in preparation for a move, optimally against Corinth. Those orders, per the accounts which we have, reached Price early on the 19th. Furthermore, even before Price received those orders there is evidence that he was considering pulling back out of Iuka in that the U.S. forces were consolidating and he had moved to Iuka in order to harass the Army of the Mississippi alone and out of a concern that the combined Federal forces could strike at him.
I will note that other things have been stated categorically as fact which are not know and/or in dispute, as well. For example, it has been stated that Grant altered the plan during the day on the 19th and informed Rosecrans to this effect, which we know Grant stated subsequently (and certainly may be true), but there is good evidence to indicate that if such was the case, that Rosecrans was not aware of it, for whatever reason. Rosecrans correspondence with his wife Annie implies that he may not have ever been aware of such an alteration of the plan at the time. In his words:
"The failure of proper cooperation unfortunately lost us the capture of Price and his entire army, which would have been inevitable had the attack from the west side been duly made. We accomplished our task, but the failure of the attack from the west to come up on time brought all the forces in our direction and prevented us from attaining the point we most desired on the evening of the 19th.
-W.S. Rosecrans to A.E. Rosecrans, September 24, 1862.
Rosecrans would later state that Grant's communications to him on the morning of the 19th were the last communications from him which he received that day. Is it possible that his memory failed him on that? Yes. However, as noted above, there is some contemporary evidence to the effect that he was not aware of this supposed change of plan. We then have unclear and somewhat conflicting testimony regarding both Lagow and Dickey that way.
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