Grant Grant v Lee

[DanSBHawk]

As I recall, probably from Larry Daniel's book on Shiloh, it was Grant himself who when Nelson first arrived at Savannah (on the afternoon of the 5th?) told him he wouldn't be wanted until the 7th.

I've seen that too, and agree that Grant was a little too careless. But the notion that Buell was acting with urgency to get there is ridiculous in my opinion.

 

[Saphroneth]

I also asked this, "What evidence is there of Buell being the one most in a hurry to concentrate the armies?"

What I said was about "...the arrival of reinforcements almost despite Grant (as he'd been assuring Buell a couple of days prior he didn't need to hurry, and Buell did hurry)."

I believe it's the case (as you've just agreed) that Grant had been assuring Buell (or Nelson, at any rate, mea culpa if it's just Nelson he told, though it's still the samething on Grant's part) that he didn't need to hurry, and it's also the case that Buell did hurry in that he was moving at high speed (over 10 miles per day) once over the Duck.

We know that Buell was moving fast when he wasn't stopped by the Duck; how long do you think it should have taken him to bridge the Duck, starting from "no bridging material and no trained engineers" as seems to have been the case?

 

[DanSBHawk]

What I said was about "...the arrival of reinforcements almost despite Grant (as he'd been assuring Buell a couple of days prior he didn't need to hurry, and Buell did hurry)."

I believe it's the case (as you've just agreed) that Grant had been assuring Buell (or Nelson, at any rate, mea culpa if it's just Nelson he told, though it's still the samething on Grant's part) that he didn't need to hurry, and it's also the case that Buell did hurry in that he was moving at high speed (over 10 miles per day) once over the Duck.

We know that Buell was moving fast when he wasn't stopped by the Duck; how long do you think it should have taken him to bridge the Duck, starting from "no bridging material and no trained engineers" as seems to have been the case?

We don't know that the Duck was unfordable before the 29th. Buell was not with Nelson so I don't know how you can say that "Buell did hurry." And it was Nelson that asked to be allowed to ford the river. Buell didn't leave Columbia until the 3rd.

From the time that Buell received orders to "move rapidly" until his leading forces arrived at Shiloh, it was 20 days averaging 6.5 miles per day.

Buell had forces in Columbia for two and a half weeks before the first ones forded the river. How long does it take to build a bridge over the mighty Duck River?

 

[Saphroneth]

Buell had forces in Columbia for two and a half weeks before the first ones forded the river. How long does it take to build a bridge over the mighty Duck River?

Which forces did he have in Columbia for those two and a half weeks? I make it one cavalry regiment (Milliken's) for the first week at least, before McCook gets there; after McCook gets there


As for how long it takes to build a bridge over a two hundred yard river, starting with no pontoons and no trained engineers? It could be quite a while - the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg is only a hundred yards, for reference.

We don't know that the Duck was unfordable before the 29th. Buell was not with Nelson so I don't know how you can say that "Buell did hurry." Buell didn't leave Columbia until the 3rd.

(1) Nelson was specific that he got permission from Buell, and (2) the whole force is Buell's command, and the whole force moved rapidly. Buell sent troops ahead before departing, then rode to join his leading division - i.e. he rides ahead once everyone has departed.

From the time that Buell received orders to "move rapidly" until his leading forces arrived at Shiloh, it was 20 days averaging 6.5 miles per day.

...some of which is his force stopped behind a river which is taking several times as much water as it normally does...

Terrain obstacles still exist.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Which forces did he have in Columbia for those two and a half weeks? I make it one cavalry regiment (Milliken's) for the first week at least, before McCook gets there; after McCook gets there


As for how long it takes to build a bridge over a two hundred yard river, starting with no pontoons and no trained engineers? It could be quite a while - the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg is only a hundred yards, for reference.



(1) Nelson was specific that he got permission from Buell, and (2) the whole force is Buell's command, and the whole force moved rapidly. Buell sent troops ahead before departing, then rode to join his leading division - i.e. he rides ahead once everyone has departed.


...some of which is his force stopped behind a river which is taking several times as much water as it normally does...

Terrain obstacles still exist.

On March 10, Buell messaged Halleck that his "advance division" was at Columbia.

Read the correspondence section of OR vol 10. Halleck was practically begging Buell to send troops in the first half of March. Halleck was willing to send transports and take them down the river. Buell kept making stalling and making excuses, wanting to set up a meeting between himself and Halleck. Halleck complained to McClellan on March 10 about Buell's "hesitation" in reinforcing him.

If Buell had acted when Halleck asked him for reinforcements, that would have been around March 8th. Buell could have reinforced Grant weeks before he did, if he had taken Hallecks offer of river transports.

 

[DanSBHawk]

On Mar 10, Buell messaged Halleck that "I shall advance in a few days, as soon as our transportation is ready."

At the time he wrote that, his advance division was in Columbia. Yet it wasn't until nineteen days later that he advanced from Columbia.

 

[Saphroneth]

On March 10, Buell messaged Halleck that his "advance division" was at Columbia.

Yes, which is why I'm wondering what that means* and which division that was.

It wasn't McCook, because we know when he ordered McCook forward to Columbia (which was more than a week later)
It wasn't Nelson, because Ammen's account places Nelson's division as behind McCook.
It wasn't Wood, because we know the 57th Indiana left Nashville with the rest of that division in late March (not early March).
This leaves a number of choices. It could be Crittenden, though the 19th Ohio is listed here:
https://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/entry.php?rec=1266
as departing Nashville on the 18th.
It's a mystery to me. Any thoughts?



* I'm wondering if it's just a case of imprecise language, or whether the division in question wasn't one of the ones later formally constituted as such, or if I've missed one.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, which is why I'm wondering what that means* and which division that was.

It wasn't McCook, because we know when he ordered McCook forward to Columbia (which was more than a week later)
It wasn't Nelson, because Ammen's account places Nelson's division as behind McCook.
It wasn't Wood, because we know the 57th Indiana left Nashville with the rest of that division in late March (not early March).
This leaves a number of choices. It could be Crittenden, though the 19th Ohio is listed here:
https://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/entry.php?rec=1266
as departing Nashville on the 18th.
It's a mystery to me. Any thoughts?



* I'm wondering if it's just a case of imprecise language, or whether the division in question wasn't one of the ones later formally constituted as such, or if I've missed one.

I don't know, because it's not something that I consider interesting or significant. But it's clear to me that your earlier characterization of Grant brushing off reinforcements, while Buell hurried to the battlefield, is wrong.

Not only did Buell stall and get off to an extremely slow start to reinforce Grant, but Grant messaged at least twice indicating his anxiety about waiting for Buell to arrive.

As previously mentioned, Grant messaged Buell on the 19th that he was "feeling a little anxious to learn your whereabouts." And then on the 31st, Grant messaged McCook, "I have been looking for your column anxiously for several days."

So Grant may have been a little too nonchalant once Nelson arrived in the vicinity within supporting distance, but he was clearly anxious for Buell to show up.

 

[Saphroneth]

I don't know, because it's not something that I consider interesting or significant.

Well, it's worth looking at, because if it turns out that (for example):

1) Buell sent forward a division to try and seize the bridges but was unable to do so (and the division then had to withdraw as the rail line was not yet repaired far enough to supply)
or
2) Buell was referring to a cavalry regiment, which could sustain itself by forage much more easily than an infantry division

Then it affects the question of when he arrived at the Duck by more than a week.

So Grant may have been a little too nonchalant once Nelson arrived in the vicinity within supporting distance, but he was clearly anxious for Buell to show up.

One thing that interests me is that Ammen's account has Nelson tell him that they're not wanted at Savannah before the 7th - a view in keeping with Grant's expressed opinion when Nelson does arrive - back on the 31st March or 1st April or so. I suspect (but of course cannot show) that this may have been the result of being in contact with Grant and Grant expressing the same opinion then as he did later - otherwise either Nelson or Ammen is making things up.

 

[James N.]

Yes, which is why I'm wondering what that means* and which division that was.

It wasn't McCook, because we know when he ordered McCook forward to Columbia (which was more than a week later)
It wasn't Nelson, because Ammen's account places Nelson's division as behind McCook.
It wasn't Wood, because we know the 57th Indiana left Nashville with the rest of that division in late March (not early March).
This leaves a number of choices. It could be Crittenden, though the 19th Ohio is listed here:
https://www.ohiocivilwarcentral.com/entry.php?rec=1266
as departing Nashville on the 18th.
It's a mystery to me. Any thoughts?



* I'm wondering if it's just a case of imprecise language, or whether the division in question wasn't one of the ones later formally constituted as such, or if I've missed one.

The only other one I can recall is Ormsby Mitchel, but he went off on a totally different track altogether, towards Chattanooga.

 

[Saphroneth]

The only other one I can recall is Ormsby Mitchel, but he went off on a totally different track altogether, towards Chattanooga.

It's an interesting question. As noted I suspect my explanation (there was no division there continuously from the 10th to the 18th) is the right one, but it might take trawling regimental histories to be sure.

 

[Saphroneth]

It looks like it might be Thomas' division, but I have no positive proof of that - it's just that it's the only division I can find where I can't pretty much immediately tell it wasn't them.

That division (April 30 org) was:


- 1st (Thomas)
-- 1st Bde (Schoepf)
--- 12th KY, 17th OH, 31st OH, 38th OH
-- 2nd Bde (Fry)
--- 10th IN, 10th KY, 4th KY, 14th OH
-- 3rd Bde (McCook)
--- 2nd MN, 9th OH, 35th OH, 18th US


And their regimental narratives (on Wiki) are things like:

March to Louisville, Ky., thence moved to Nashville, Tenn., via Ohio and Cumberland Rivers February 10-March 2. March to Savannah, Tenn., March 20-April 8.

So March 2-20 is the question. It could be they were in Nashville, or they could have been Buell's lead division.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The importance of Shiloh in ref. to the OP, is that unlike many Union generals at the time, Grant learned from his mistakes and did not let the closeness to disaster temper his aggressiveness


P.S. on a side note, it took Lee only a single night to bridge the flooded Potomac , saving not only his army but taking all its POW s Wagons and artillery, losing only his rear guard.

 

[Saphroneth]

P.S. on a side note, it took Lee only a single night to bridge the flooded Potomac , saving not only his army but taking all its POW s Wagons and artillery, losing only his rear guard.

That's at Falling Waters? I make the timeline there:

July 6-7 - Stuart's cavalry reaches Falling Waters, where the pontoon bridge that was there previously had been destroyed by a cavalry raid
July 8 - the Confederate army arrives there
July 11 - Lee fortifies
July 13 - the river falls enough to allow troops to cross at Williamsport, and also there's a bridge built at Falling Waters by Confederate engineers which becomes available at this time

So there are at least three points to make here.

1) Lee didn't start crossing the river by ford (at Williamsport) until the river fell enough to do so.
2) Unless I am misunderstanding, we do not have confirmation that work on the bridge only began on July 13; if Lee began work as soon as his infantry arrived then it would have taken nearly a week.
3) Lee had engineers with him - at least a few - while Buell didn't.

None of these make the comparison useless, but they do mean it's not Lee just bridging a flooded river and crossing his whole force in a single night over one crossing.

 

[Saphroneth]

The importance of Shiloh in ref. to the OP, is that unlike many Union generals at the time, Grant learned from his mistakes and did not let the closeness to disaster temper his aggressiveness

I'm not so sure you can actually say that - Grant's next battle is the one where the column he's with doesn't do any of the fighting, while the column Rosecrans is with does all of it. That doesn't mean Grant's aggressiveness had suffered, necessarily, but it's not the much-less-ambiguous proof that a vigorous movement to bring the column he's with into the fighting would have been.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm not so sure you can actually say that - Grant's next battle is the one where the column he's with doesn't do any of the fighting, while the column Rosecrans is with does all of it. That doesn't mean Grant's aggressiveness had suffered, necessarily, but it's not the much-less-ambiguous proof that a vigorous movement to bring the column he's with into the fighting would have been.

Grant was in operational command at Iuka. The plan failed due to Rosecrans, and Grant tried to improvise. But Grant and Ord did not hear Rosecrans fighting.

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant was in operational command at Iuka. The plan failed due to Rosecrans, and Grant tried to improvise. But Grant and Ord did not hear Rosecrans fighting.

Which is why I say it doesn't mean Grant's aggressiveness had suffered; it's just also not a proof it hadn't.

 

[David Moore]

Which is why I say it doesn't mean Grant's aggressiveness had suffered; it's just also not a proof it hadn't.

Grant called off his part of the attack at Iuka while he waited for Price to surrender before the fighting even started. This is the opposite of being aggressive. Eyewitnesses did indeed hear the sounds of battle coming from Rosecrans'side of the army. I've been researching - sadly an unknown and even scorned concept to many posters on this site- Iuka for a number of years and have found more evidence of this that I hope to share soon. I've learned that no amount of evidence will ever change the opinions of certain Grant supporters probably because they've tied Grant to the anti lost cause cause.
ive been down this road many times; it leads nowhere. There are many on line fora where posts are expected to be supported with documentation and new research. This sadly isn't one of them although there are many good things here. To newcomers to this subject I'd caution you about those who post with little to no original documentation. You also have to decide what it is you want from historical research: a never ending search for "truth" or mere opinions to bolster one's current opinions and world views.

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant called off his part of the attack at Iuka while he waited for Price to surrender before the fighting even started. This is the opposite of being aggressive. Eyewitnesses did indeed hear the sounds of battle coming from Rosecrans'side of the army. I've been researching - sadly an unknown and even scorned concept to many posters on this site- Iuka for a number of years and have found more evidence of this that I hope to share soon. I've learned that no amount of evidence will ever change the opinions of certain Grant supporters probably because they've tied Grant to the anti lost cause cause.

I'd been wondering about the purported accoustic shadow at Iuka, as it seemed like quite a short distance (with no wind, and wind is necessary for an accoustic shadow) and they could definitely see smoke (which even if they didn't realize it was from a battle should indicate the Confederates burning their stores and preparing to evacuate, in which case an attack would be a good idea anyway just to try and pin them - notwithstanding how a wind would have helped disperse the smoke). I also know at least one field grade officer (a Major) said that Grant was drunk, and while that could just be supposition on his part he's high enough ranking he could conceivably have known.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'd been wondering about the purported accoustic shadow at Iuka, as it seemed like quite a short distance (with no wind, and wind is necessary for an accoustic shadow) and they could definitely see smoke (which even if they didn't realize it was from a battle should indicate the Confederates burning their stores and preparing to evacuate, in which case an attack would be a good idea anyway just to try and pin them - notwithstanding how a wind would have helped disperse the smoke). I also know at least one field grade officer (a Major) said that Grant was drunk, and while that could just be supposition on his part he's high enough ranking he could conceivably have known.

In order to disbelieve the acoustic shadow claim at Iuka, you'd have to believe that Grant and Ord knew there was a battle going on but did not want to engage. That would have been out of character for both men.

It's possible that some of Ord's forces heard something and some did not. Thousands of men do not stand on the same square foot of ground. But the men who really needed to hear the fighting, Grant and Ord, did not hear it.

And we would not even be talking about an acoustic shadow if Rosecrans had not bungled the original plan by failing to keep the timetable, and failing to cover both escape roads.

The "Grant was drunk" allegation was nonsense.