Grant Grant v Lee

[DanSBHawk]

Ammen's account has:

March 20 - "bridge over Duck River at Columbia burned by the rebels; river high; no boats."
On the 27th, when Nelson discusses crossing with Ammen, Nelson says there are still no boats, but "that the river is falling, and **** you, get over".
On the 28th, Ammen observes forage wagons crossing the river (so there's an argument that it was fordable as early as the 28th, and possibly the 27th). The water is just up to the bed of the wagons.
On the 29th, when Ammen's brigade crosses, they do so with cavalry using their horses to break the current and the infantry holding their pantaloons etc. on bayonets over their heads.

I must recant the claim about the 29th, as it seems that the river was probably fordable a day or two before then. However, I don't think more than that can be said, because the force that crossed was a complete one (including trains and artillery) and if the water was just up to the bed of the wagons on the 28th then (since it was falling on the 27th) it would have been enough to swamp the wagons on the 25th and 26th.

So did anyone actually check the depth before the 28th or are you assuming the level was too high several days before?

 

[Saphroneth]

So did anyone actually check the depth before the 28th or are you assuming the level was too high several days before?

I'm rather assuming that if Ammen says the river is high on the 20th, and that when told on the 27th to cross on the 29th his first question is "is the bridge done" and his second is "are there boats", that the river was considered unfordable on account of the river being high.

The Duck is described as being a good defensive line in high water, though to be fordable at "many points" in "the dry season".

Buell's orders to McCook on March 18th were that he should ford any rivers which were fordable, and that he should move on the road to Savannah; thus, Buell had ordered McCook to move ahead (by fords if possible) to Savannah. He also told McCook that there were supplies waiting at Savannah.

On the 21st Buell mentions "constant heavy rains" which would serve to put the rivers into flood stage.

I would not necessarily expect someone to have explicitly noted down that the Duck river was unfordable in so many words, not when "river high" does just the same. Similarly, I'd not necessarily expect the Rebels to have burned the bridges if the river was fordable at any stage, and since it was clearly at a high stage (and indeed we would expect it to be at a high stage, given that the weather of Spring 1862 was unusually wet which contributed directly to the loss of Fort Henry) then the river being unfordable for all of those reasons makes more sense than the idea that the river was fordable but nobody actually checked.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm rather assuming that if Ammen says the river is high on the 20th, and that when told on the 27th to cross on the 29th his first question is "is the bridge done" and his second is "are there boats", that the river was considered unfordable on account of the river being high.

The Duck is described as being a good defensive line in high water, though to be fordable at "many points" in "the dry season".

Buell's orders to McCook on March 18th were that he should ford any rivers which were fordable, and that he should move on the road to Savannah; thus, Buell had ordered McCook to move ahead (by fords if possible) to Savannah. He also told McCook that there were supplies waiting at Savannah.

On the 21st Buell mentions "constant heavy rains" which would serve to put the rivers into flood stage.

I would not necessarily expect someone to have explicitly noted down that the Duck river was unfordable in so many words, not when "river high" does just the same. Similarly, I'd not necessarily expect the Rebels to have burned the bridges if the river was fordable at any stage, and since it was clearly at a high stage (and indeed we would expect it to be at a high stage, given that the weather of Spring 1862 was unusually wet which contributed directly to the loss of Fort Henry) then the river being unfordable for all of those reasons makes more sense than the idea that the river was fordable but nobody actually checked.

Or it could be that Buell didn't really try to find a ford, choosing to rebuild the bridge, because he was not in all that much of a hurry.

On the other hand, Nelson really wanted to move forward, and convinced Buell to let him.

Nothing about this movement supports that Buell was in a hurry.

 

[Saphroneth]

Or it could be that Buell didn't really try to find a ford, choosing to rebuild the bridge, because he was not in all that much of a hurry.

On the other hand, Nelson really wanted to move forward, and convinced Buell to let him.

Nothing about this movement supports that Buell was in a hurry.

Buell's orders to McCook were to move on to Savannah by fords if possible. If what happened after those orders were issued (on the 18th) was that McCook reached the Duck and started rebuilding the bridge then there are two options:

1) McCook did not obey orders to move on by fords if possible, despite Buell explicitly stating this.
2) The river was not fordable.

Meanwhile, Nelson's division (the 4th) reached the Duck around the 20th or 21st. Either Nelson wasn't with the division, or (despite really wanting to move forward) it took him a week or so to decide to go ahead.


There is ample evidence to the effect that the river was in a flood stage around the 20th and the subsequent days, and that (as noted, Nelson explicitly said) the river was falling around the period of the 26th-29th - which is the period when it was forded.


If the river was not fordable as of mid March, then everything everyone did and said hangs together; if the river was fordable but nobody bothered to find one, then we have problems with:

- McCook disobeying orders and not continuing on via fords.
- Ammen being under the impression the river was not fordable.
- The Confederates destroying bridges on a fordable river despite not needing to.
- The rain which took place in mid-March not resulting in the river becoming unfordable.
- Buell explicitly noting that many of the smaller streams were unfordable (but the Duck would have to be fordable despite smaller streams not being).
- Buell being willing to move at 10 miles per day or more when marching, yet "not being in a hurry", but when he did cross the Duck he then put in some of the fastest marching of the war with his rear divisions (which reached Savannah after a march of around 20-25 miles per day).

On top of all that, we have that Ammen saw the Duck "200 yards or more wide" after the river had fallen somewhat (it was 200 yards or more on the 28th, it had been said to be falling on the 27th). The modern Duck at Columbia is not more than about 70-80 yards.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Buell's orders to McCook were to move on to Savannah by fords if possible. If what happened after those orders were issued (on the 18th) was that McCook reached the Duck and started rebuilding the bridge then there are two options:

1) McCook did not obey orders to move on by fords if possible, despite Buell explicitly stating this.
2) The river was not fordable.

Meanwhile, Nelson's division (the 4th) reached the Duck around the 20th or 21st. Either Nelson wasn't with the division, or (despite really wanting to move forward) it took him a week or so to decide to go ahead.


There is ample evidence to the effect that the river was in a flood stage around the 20th and the subsequent days, and that (as noted, Nelson explicitly said) the river was falling around the period of the 26th-29th - which is the period when it was forded.


If the river was not fordable as of mid March, then everything everyone did and said hangs together; if the river was fordable but nobody bothered to find one, then we have problems with:

- McCook disobeying orders and not continuing on via fords.
- Ammen being under the impression the river was not fordable.
- The Confederates destroying bridges on a fordable river despite not needing to.
- The rain which took place in mid-March not resulting in the river becoming unfordable.
- Buell explicitly noting that many of the smaller streams were unfordable (but the Duck would have to be fordable despite smaller streams not being).
- Buell being willing to move at 10 miles per day or more when marching, yet "not being in a hurry", but when he did cross the Duck he then put in some of the fastest marching of the war with his rear divisions (which reached Savannah after a march of around 20-25 miles per day).

On top of all that, we have that Ammen saw the Duck "200 yards or more wide" after the river had fallen somewhat (it was 200 yards or more on the 28th, it had been said to be falling on the 27th). The modern Duck at Columbia is not more than about 70-80 yards.

This is all spin. Who at the time described this march as in a "hurry?" Was there any sense of urgency in Buells communications with Halleck? A primary source would be nice.

Your description of the speed of the rear divisions is based on what evidence? The last of Buells troops arrived too late to be part of the battle.

 

[Piedone]

The western theater was a good training ground for Grant and he did not have the burden of high expectations from superiors. War has a way of weeding out the incompetent.

While you are obviously right that Grant´s successes in the West extremely furthered his career - I must admit that I am more skeptical regarding your more general assertion.
War seems also to have a way to be a just perfect playground for all sorts of weirdos, egomaniacs, string-pullers and other strange people, sometimes elevating them to high positions and enabling them to accomplish the most absurd blunders...

 

[Saphroneth]

Your description of the speed of the rear divisions is based on what evidence? The last of Buells troops arrived too late to be part of the battle.

It's based on your giving their date of departure, and the fact that the rear division did take some wounded in the battle (four wounded, zero killed) which means they must have at least been there even if arriving too late to participate. To do that at all is impressive.

This is all spin. Who at the time described this march as in a "hurry?" Was there any sense of urgency in Buells communications with Halleck? A primary source would be nice.

Moving at over ten miles a day while actually mobile doesn't count as a hurry?

When Buell writes to Halleck on the 24th (at Nashville) he expects the bridge to be ready by the time he reaches Columbia, and it's not; the simplest explanation for the delay to me is just that people without training in bridge construction turn out to take longer at it than they'd anticipated at the time.

As for primary source, I've been using the ORs all the way through; what sort of thing are you looking for? Grant talking about the high stage of water in his own area of operations on March 19 and 20? Buell's March 18 to McCook where he tells him to ford any rivers that were fordable?
Halleck ordering Grant to "wait until you are properly fortified" over two weeks before Shiloh itself?

 

[DanSBHawk]

It's based on your giving their date of departure, and the fact that the rear division did take some wounded in the battle (four wounded, zero killed) which means they must have at least been there even if arriving too late to participate. To do that at all is impressive.


Moving at over ten miles a day while actually mobile doesn't count as a hurry?

When Buell writes to Halleck on the 24th (at Nashville) he expects the bridge to be ready by the time he reaches Columbia, and it's not; the simplest explanation for the delay to me is just that people without training in bridge construction turn out to take longer at it than they'd anticipated at the time.

As for primary source, I've been using the ORs all the way through; what sort of thing are you looking for? Grant talking about the high stage of water in his own area of operations on March 19 and 20? Buell's March 18 to McCook where he tells him to ford any rivers that were fordable?
Halleck ordering Grant to "wait until you are properly fortified" over two weeks before Shiloh itself?

Your partner, 67, once described Buell as an aggressive hothead. You're claiming that Buell was a fast-moving commander in a hurry to a fight.

If Buell actually fit those descriptions, he would have kept his command.

Buell's divisions were not all complete and present at the battle. So your assumptions on marching speed are based on nothing. Your earlier claim that the second day was fought by Buell's army and "elements" of Grant's army is backwards. The second day was fought by Grant's army and "elements" of Buell's army.

 

[Saphroneth]

Your partner, 67, once described Buell as an aggressive hothead. You're claiming that Buell was a fast-moving commander in a hurry to a fight.

If Buell actually fit those descriptions, he would have kept his command.

Buell's divisions were not all complete and present at the battle. So your assumptions on marching speed are based on nothing. Your earlier claim that the second day was fought by Buell's army and "elements" of Grant's army is backwards. The second day was fought by Grant's army and elements of Buell's army.

My assumptions on marching speed are based on your data on when Buell's divisions crossed the Duck (you said his last division crossed 3rd April) and that that last division suffered four wounded at Shiloh (on the 7th) which indicates that they had at least arrived on that day, if too late to participate (i.e. they spent the whole of the 7th on the move). If in fact the components of Buell's last division which was at Shiloh crossed on the 2nd April, for example, that would change things, but I'm using your numbers for the crossing date.

I'm saying that Buell arrived approximately one week later than we would expect had his march been on a good road uninterrupted by major obstructions (such as, say, a river that needed bridging) and he marched at the "standard" rule-of-thumb speed of 10 miles per day. Furthermore, the amount of time he spent not moving because of the Duck river blocking him was more than the one week he was "late" (compared to a good road march without a river needed etc.) so his marching speed while in motion was such that he made up time on the move; if Buell wasn't in some sense moving with urgency, we would expect his trailing divisions (i.e. the ones behind Nelson) to move at ca. 10 miles per day or less, and thus miss Shiloh entirely.


It's like how Jackson is considered to be a fast marcher because we count him when he was actually in motion (i.e. "646 miles in 48 days" in the Valley campaign) rather than including the period when he's static waiting for conditions to be right.

 

[DanSBHawk]

My assumptions on marching speed are based on your data on when Buell's divisions crossed the Duck (you said his last division crossed 3rd April) and that that last division suffered four wounded at Shiloh (on the 7th) which indicates that they had at least arrived on that day, if too late to participate (i.e. they spent the whole of the 7th on the move). If in fact the components of Buell's last division which was at Shiloh crossed on the 2nd April, for example, that would change things, but I'm using your numbers for the crossing date.

I'm saying that Buell arrived approximately one week later than we would expect had his march been on a good road uninterrupted by major obstructions (such as, say, a river that needed bridging) and he marched at the "standard" rule-of-thumb speed of 10 miles per day. Furthermore, the amount of time he spent not moving because of the Duck river blocking him was more than the one week he was "late" (compared to a good road march without a river needed etc.) so his marching speed while in motion was such that he made up time on the move; if Buell wasn't in some sense moving with urgency, we would expect his trailing divisions (i.e. the ones behind Nelson) to move at ca. 10 miles per day or less, and thus miss Shiloh entirely.


It's like how Jackson is considered to be a fast marcher because we count him when he was actually in motion (i.e. "646 miles in 48 days" in the Valley campaign) rather than including the period when he's static waiting for conditions to be right.

As I've repeatedly said, Buells divisions were not complete. Some brigades were not there. So you're making assumptions based on nothing that I said.

 

[Saphroneth]

As I've repeatedly said, Buells divisions were not complete. Some brigades were not there. So you're making assumptions based on nothing that I said.

Okay, so when you said that:

Buell spent 3 weeks delayed by the Duck. When he did start crossing, it took him 6 days to cross 3 divisions. That doesn't seem very hurried to me.

Did you in fact mean, or did you not, that when Buell started crossing the Duck it took him six days to cross three divisions? Which divisions did you mean?

When you subsequently said this:

Buell was in Columbia from March 10 until April 3. He moved his 4 divisions across the Duck from March 29 to April 3.

Did you in fact mean that the four divisions of Buell's army crossed the Duck from March 29 to April 3?

To put it another way - which units crossed the Duck on April 3?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Okay, so when you said that:



Did you in fact mean, or did you not, that when Buell started crossing the Duck it took him six days to cross three divisions? Which divisions did you mean?

When you subsequently said this:



Did you in fact mean that the four divisions of Buell's army crossed the Duck from March 29 to April 3?

To put it another way - which units crossed the Duck on April 3?

Off-hand, I don't know the specific units. Tim Smith, in his Shiloh book, writes that the first of Buells forces arrived in Columbia on March 10, and the last of them left Columbia crossing the Duck on April 3.

Smith's description of Buell's march does not support your claim of Buell being in a hurry.

 

[Saphroneth]

Off-hand, I don't know the specific units. Tim Smith, in his Shiloh book, writes that the first of Buells forces arrived in Columbia on March 10, and the last of them left Columbia crossing the Duck on April 3.

Smith's description of Buell's march does not support your claim of Buell being in a hurry.

Though the problem here is that we have primary source evidence to the effect that the first division over the river at Columbia was Nelson's division (head of column crossed on the 29th, per Ammen), and furthermore that nine distinct brigades of Buell's army were engaged at Shiloh at least to the extent of suffering casualties. This means that, from the 29th March to the 7th April inclusive (ten days) Buell got nine brigades from "on the north side of the Duck" to "at Shiloh", which is ca. 100 miles.

Any brigades which crossed on the 29th March would have moved at 10 miles per day to be "at Shiloh" on the end of the 7th; any brigades which crossed afterwards would have moved faster than that.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Though the problem here is that we have primary source evidence to the effect that the first division over the river at Columbia was Nelson's division (head of column crossed on the 29th, per Ammen), and furthermore that nine distinct brigades of Buell's army were engaged at Shiloh at least to the extent of suffering casualties. This means that, from the 29th March to the 7th April inclusive (ten days) Buell got nine brigades from "on the north side of the Duck" to "at Shiloh", which is ca. 100 miles.

Any brigades which crossed on the 29th March would have moved at 10 miles per day to be "at Shiloh" on the end of the 7th; any brigades which crossed afterwards would have moved faster than that.

As I said earlier, Nelson was definitely eager to get there. He was the one who pushed for fording the river, and the other units followed him. Once he was on the move, I would think the other units did not want to be left out of the fight.

And as I said earlier, the issue is not just from the 29th onward. It is from the 10th onward, or at least, the 16th onward.

I'm not aware of any historian claiming that Buell was in a hurry.

 

[Saphroneth]

Having a look, it seems Buell mentions his lead division being at Columbia on March 10, but I can't locate a report in the ORs from said head division.
When Buell orders McCook forward on the 18th he mentions it'll still be a few days until the rail line to Columbia is finished (and that it's not yet finished to Franklin), and while he says to send to General Smith to find out his situation this seems to refer to CF Smith (who was briefly in charge of the expedition up the Tennessee). I suspect what's going on is that Buell refers at a different point to a dash forwards (possibly by cavalry) to save the bridges, but that this failed. Buell also refers to Col. Milliken's regiment being there, which appears to be a cavalry regiment.


(The 1st LA cavalry has a report from Columbia on the 10th, so I would assume - but would not wish to assert - that they probably were the ones to burn the bridges.)

 

[Saphroneth]

As I said earlier, Nelson was definitely eager to get there. He was the one who pushed for fording the river, and the other units followed him. Once he was on the move, I would think the other units did not want to be left out of the fight.

And as I said earlier, the issue is not just from the 29th onward. It is from the 10th onward, or at least, the 16th onward.

I'm not aware of any historian claiming that Buell was in a hurry.

Buell is repeatedly expressing his annoyance (and apologies) in his correspondence at the slower than expected bridging of the Duck, so I don't think it's exactly outrageous to assert that that was the main cause of the delay and that the problem was a lack of engineers - especially as he doesn't seem to have had any. Engineering is a specialist job for a reason.


Having found the account of the 57th Indiana (which had four wounded at Shiloh and were in the last brigade to actually arrive there) I see that they crossed the pontoons at Duck river on the 1st April. This makes their march from the 2nd to the 7th a slightly more reasonable average of ca. 15 miles per day.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Buell is repeatedly expressing his annoyance (and apologies) in his correspondence at the slower than expected bridging of the Duck, so I don't think it's exactly outrageous to assert that that was the main cause of the delay and that the problem was a lack of engineers - especially as he doesn't seem to have had any. Engineering is a specialist job for a reason.


Having found the account of the 57th Indiana (which had four wounded at Shiloh and were in the last brigade to actually arrive there) I see that they crossed the pontoons at Duck river on the 1st April. This makes their march from the 2nd to the 7th a slightly more reasonable average of ca. 15 miles per day.

Is there any historian that agrees with your claim that Buell had more of a sense of urgency than Grant?

Halleck ordered Buell to "push forward your troops as rapidly as possible."

Grant wrote Buell on March 19th "feeling a little anxious to learn your whereabouts."

What evidence is there of Buell being the one most in a hurry to concentrate the armies?

 

[Saphroneth]

Is there any historian that agrees with your claim that Buell had more of a sense of urgency than Grant?

I'm sorry, I don't follow. You asked for primary sources earlier, and I replied that I'd been working only with primary sources; now we need a historian instead?

Halleck ordered Buell to "push forward your troops as rapidly as possible."

Grant wrote Buell on March 19th "feeling a little anxious to learn your whereabouts."

What evidence is there of Buell being the one most in a hurry to concentrate the armies?

Do you know why it was that Nelson told Ammen on the 31st to "conduct the march so as to reach Savannah, Tenn., Monday, April 7, as we are not wanted there before that time"? I can't seem to find the correspondence in either direction which would cause that, but if Nelson's come up with it himself it wouldn't exactly fit your description of him...

 

[James N.]

... Do you know why it was that Nelson told Ammen on the 31st to "conduct the march so as to reach Savannah, Tenn., Monday, April 7, as we are not wanted there before that time"? I can't seem to find the correspondence in either direction which would cause that, but if Nelson's come up with it himself it wouldn't exactly fit your description of him...

As I recall, probably from Larry Daniel's book on Shiloh, it was Grant himself who when Nelson first arrived at Savannah (on the afternoon of the 5th?) told him he wouldn't be wanted until the 7th.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm sorry, I don't follow. You asked for primary sources earlier, and I replied that I'd been working only with primary sources; now we need a historian instead?




Do you know why it was that Nelson told Ammen on the 31st to "conduct the march so as to reach Savannah, Tenn., Monday, April 7, as we are not wanted there before that time"? I can't seem to find the correspondence in either direction which would cause that, but if Nelson's come up with it himself it wouldn't exactly fit your description of him...

I also asked this, "What evidence is there of Buell being the one most in a hurry to concentrate the armies?"

So, what evidence supports this, and do any historians agree with your claim?