Grant Grant v Lee

[DanSBHawk]

William Stewart of the 11th Missouri wrote to his parents that he'd heard Grant was drunk and believed it. He also wrote a report that cited "hellish whiskey" as a factor in Grant's non participation in the battle that was printed in the Cincinnati Commercial.

William Stewart was nowhere near Grant for any part of the operation. Apparently hearsay and rumors are now considered to be reliable sources.

 

[Saphroneth]

"People."

If those "people" aren't named Grant or Ord, than it's irrelevant.

In the scenario where Grant and Ord had actually screwed up at Iuka, then it would be the case that they would attempt to disguise that fact, and we could not necessarily expect them to be truthful about the matter; if there was an accoustic shadow, for example, then by the very nature of such a phenomenon it would prevent the whole of Ord's column from hearing, not merely Ord himself (as the wind carries the sound high into the air and makes it "miss" the area, thus a shadow).

Now, this would be associated with the possibility of Ord failing far more than Grant failing, because Ord was closer and (absent a shadow) would be more likely to hear the firing.
ED: OTOH it could be argued that Grant should have been closer to the front.

 

[DanSBHawk]

In the scenario where Grant and Ord had actually screwed up at Iuka, then it would be the case that they would attempt to disguise that fact, and we could not necessarily expect them to be truthful about the matter; if there was an accoustic shadow, for example, then by the very nature of such a phenomenon it would prevent the whole of Ord's column from hearing, not merely Ord himself (as the wind carries the sound high into the air and makes it "miss" the area, thus a shadow).

Now, this would be associated with the possibility of Ord failing far more than Grant failing, because Ord was closer and (absent a shadow) would be more likely to hear the firing.
ED: OTOH it could be argued that Grant should have been closer to the front.

In my opinion, Grant's biggest screwup at Iuka was agreeing to Rosecrans' plan.

There's no reason to believe that either Ord or Grant would've wanted to avoid engaging. So there's no reason to believe they heard the battle and did nothing. Grant was where he was so that messengers from Rosecrans could reach him. As already stated, Grant was in operational command of the entire force, not just of Ords column.

 

[Saphroneth]

There's no reason to believe that either Ord or Grant would've wanted to avoid engaging.

Why is there no reason to believe it? We have a report by someone who said he told Ord about seeing smoke, and if there's that and accounts of people hearing the gunfire then why should we believe that Ord's lack of interest in engaging is so out of character that we should dismiss all of that information?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Why is there no reason to believe it? We have a report by someone who said he told Ord about seeing smoke, and if there's that and accounts of people hearing the gunfire then why should we believe that Ord's lack of interest in engaging is so out of character that we should dismiss all of that information?

Did either of them ever demonstrate a tendency to avoid engaging? Why are you so inclined to disbelieve them?

 

[Saphroneth]

Did either of them ever demonstrate a tendency to avoid engaging? Why are you so inclined to disbelieve them?

Well, there's that incident where Ord pretended to be ill rather than obey McDowell's orders...



Cozzens on the subject:

Cozzens offers an explanation for the lack of sound, but doesn't exactly exonerate Grant. He also says of Rosecrans' decision not to block both roads:

 

[DanSBHawk]

Well, there's that incident where Ord pretended to be ill rather than obey McDowell's orders...



Cozzens on the subject:

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Cozzens offers an explanation for the lack of sound, but doesn't exactly exonerate Grant. He also says of Rosecrans' decision not to block both roads:


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Cozzen's has always had a bit of an anti-Grant bias. Bottom line: the plan fell apart due to Rosecrans. Efforts to improvise failed. There's no reason to believe that Grant and Ord wanted to avoid battle.

 

[Saphroneth]

Cozzen's has always had a bit of an anti-Grant bias. Bottom line: the plan fell apart due to Rosecrans. Efforts to improvise failed. There's no reason to believe that Grant and Ord wanted to avoid battle.

Would you agree or dispute, then, that Ord should have moved to within four miles of Iuka?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Would you agree or dispute, then, that Ord should have moved to within four miles of Iuka?

I agree that the plan was in disarray by then, and communications between the two columns was extremely difficult.

Why not look at the actions of all these commanders involved, during the same time period and in the same area. A couple weeks later, a reverse Iuka happens. Rosecrans has orders from Grant to follow the retreating confederates from Corinth. Ord and Hurlbut have orders from Grant to confront the retreating confederates from the other direction. Again, Grant is in operational command. Ord plunges into combat at Hatchie bridge, and is injured. Rosecrans is nowhere to be found.

Why did Rosecrans fail to follow and engage the confederates at Hatchie bridge? Was it that he was avoiding combat?

It seems to me that you and Moore want to focus on spinning Iuka without looking at the bigger picture.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Well, there's that incident where Ord pretended to be ill rather than obey McDowell's orders...



Cozzens on the subject:

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Cozzens offers an explanation for the lack of sound, but doesn't exactly exonerate Grant. He also says of Rosecrans' decision not to block both roads:


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One thing that Cozzen's completely misses above is the concern for Corinth while these forces are going after Price in Iuka. Grant's biggest concern was that Van Dorn and Price will join forces and threaten Corinth.

The force left in Corinth was small. The reconnaissance that Cozzens scoffs at above was due to the concern that Van Dorn could possible attack Corinth while Grant's forces were at Iuka.

 

[Saphroneth]

One thing that Cozzen's completely misses above is the concern for Corinth while these forces are going after Price in Iuka. Grant's biggest concern was that Van Dorn and Price will join forces and threaten Corinth.

The force left in Corinth was small. The reconnaissance that Cozzens scoffs at above was due to the concern that Van Dorn could possible attack Corinth while Grant's forces were at Iuka.

Which is a valid concern, but wouldn't necessarily require Ord to be doing it (which is Cozzens' actual argument). Davies himself would have sufficed.

 

[Saphroneth]

I agree that the plan was in disarray by then, and communications between the two columns was extremely difficult.

That's not what I asked, though. Grant told Ord to move up to within four miles of Iuka, and Ord's report says that after this order was given (which was given between 4PM and 6PM - he arrived at Grant's HQ around 4PM) he got a dispatch from Ross to the effect that smoke had been rising from Iuka since 3:40 PM; Ord doesn't move up until the night.

Why not look at the actions of all these commanders involved, during the same time period and in the same area. A couple weeks later, a reverse Iuka happens. Rosecrans has orders from Grant to follow the retreating confederates from Corinth. Ord and Hurlbut have orders from Grant to confront the retreating confederates from the other direction. Again, Grant is in operational command. Ord plunges into combat at Hatchie bridge, and is injured. Rosecrans is nowhere to be found.

Why did Rosecrans fail to follow and engage the confederates at Hatchie bridge? Was it that he was avoiding combat?

Do we actually have that order? We know that Rosecrans followed up the next morning, which given when Van Dorn began to actually retreat (around 4PM - around the same time McPherson arrived - is my understanding) would mean a delay of between one to two hours' daylight.
Admittedly Rosecrans doesn't make it easier given he replies to multiple dispatches with the equivalent of "notification read".

 

[DanSBHawk]

That's not what I asked, though. Grant told Ord to move up to within four miles of Iuka, and Ord's report says that after this order was given (which was given between 4PM and 6PM - he arrived at Grant's HQ around 4PM) he got a dispatch from Ross to the effect that smoke had been rising from Iuka since 3:40 PM; Ord doesn't move up until the night.



Do we actually have that order? We know that Rosecrans followed up the next morning, which given when Van Dorn began to actually retreat (around 4PM - around the same time McPherson arrived - is my understanding) would mean a delay of between one to two hours' daylight.
Admittedly Rosecrans doesn't make it easier given he replies to multiple dispatches with the equivalent of "notification read".

Yes we have the message sent to Rosecrans ordering him to immediately follow the confederate retreat, so as not to leave Hurlbut and Ord to face the confederate force alone.

The battle was over by noon, the confederates retreating.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Do we actually have that order? We know that Rosecrans followed up the next morning, which given when Van Dorn began to actually retreat (around 4PM - around the same time McPherson arrived - is my understanding) would mean a delay of between one to two hours' daylight.
Admittedly Rosecrans doesn't make it easier given he replies to multiple dispatches with the equivalent of "notification read".

Here's the order to Rosecrans on Oct 4th, 1862:

To Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans​

Headquarters Dept. of West Tenn. Jackson Tenn. Oct. 4th 1862​

​

Maj Genl. Rosecrans​

If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth and Bolivar forces must act in concert.​

Hurlbut is not strong enough alone to handle the rebels without very good luck. Don't neglect this warning. I can reinforce no more from this on — hence you will see the vital importance of yours and Hurlbut's forces acting in conjunction and send forces messag in.​

​

U. S. Grant. Maj. Genl.​

There's nothing unclear about this order, and it clearly indicates urgency. Rosecrans left Hurlbut and Ord hanging out to dry at Hatchie bridge.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That's not what I asked, though. Grant told Ord to move up to within four miles of Iuka, and Ord's report says that after this order was given (which was given between 4PM and 6PM - he arrived at Grant's HQ around 4PM) he got a dispatch from Ross to the effect that smoke had been rising from Iuka since 3:40 PM; Ord doesn't move up until the night.

I read Ord's report and don't understand your point. Sometime after 4 pm, Grant tells Ord that Rosecrans is too far from being in position for Ord to initiate the battle. Grant then tells Ord to move up within 4 miles of Iuka. Ords troops have been 6 1/2 to 7 miles out and skirmishing with the confederates. Ord issues orders to move up within 4 miles. He receives Ross' message about 6:00, who says the confederates are evacuating and burning stores. Ords troops finish moving up at some point after this.

Ord writes that during this time he did not hear the battle and that was what prevented him from cooperating with Rosecrans.

You say that Ord didn't move up until the night, but Ord doesn't give an exact time for when his troops began moving and when they finished. He just says the "That night, in accordance with your orders, my whole force was moved up..." So he could be talking about a timespan of 6:00 to 8:00 pm or something similar. So I don't see how you can claim there was a significant delay.

 

[Saphroneth]

I read Ord's report and don't understand your point. Sometime after 4 pm, Grant tells Ord that Rosecrans is too far from being in position for Ord to initiate the battle. Grant then tells Ord to move up within 4 miles of Iuka. Ords troops have been 6 1/2 to 7 miles out and skirmishing with the confederates. Ord issues orders to move up within 4 miles. He receives Ross' message about 6:00, who says the confederates are evacuating and burning stores. Ords troops finish moving up at some point after this.

It's basically that Ord stuck to the letter of his orders to not attack until he heard the sound of gunfire, even though he'd had evidence that something was going on before 4PM and his orders to advance were given to him around 4:30 PM (per Cozzens at least). What Ord could have done, for example, is:


1) To follow up by launching a recce supported by artillery fire at sunrise on the next day, because:

- If the smoke column was Rosecrans, then Rosecrans is close enough that this would indicate he could resume engagement.
- If the smoke column was burning stores, but Rosecrans is close enough to attack that morning (which should have been obvious from the dispatch by Rosecrans about having been in a fight the previous evening, or could have been inferred from Rosecrans predicting his arrival at 1PM to 2PM on the 18th) then it would bring on an engagement from both directions as the plan outlined.
- If the smoke column was burning stores and Rosecrans was too distant to get involved that morning, then the plan is in the process of failing as the Confederates are abandoning Iuka. In that case an attack on their rearguard might be preferable to letting them get away unfought.


2) To follow Grant's orders to attack early on the 19th.
Simple enough.

3) To have Ross ready to move promptly when ordered, and to send those orders shortly after Grant told him to move up, thus getting Ross moved up much earlier than actually happened.

Grant's HQ was at Burnsville, and Burnsville is 8.2 road miles from Iuka. With Ross 7 road miles from Iuka this means that Ross was barely any distance away at all; it's actually kind of astonishing that the dispatch from Ross is supposed to have taken two hours to reach Ord.

Given how fast Rosecrans moved that day (it looks like ~18 miles in 10 hours), Ord's movements come across as slow by comparison even given his start time.


This doesn't mean Ord acted wrongly on the 18th, necessarily, it means Ord didn't showcase any particular aggression, or rather that we cannot use this incident to argue that Ord showed a willingness to act aggressively.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It's basically that Ord stuck to the letter of his orders to not attack until he heard the sound of gunfire, even though he'd had evidence that something was going on before 4PM and his orders to advance were given to him around 4:30 PM (per Cozzens at least). What Ord could have done, for example, is:


1) To follow up by launching a recce supported by artillery fire at sunrise on the next day, because:

- If the smoke column was Rosecrans, then Rosecrans is close enough that this would indicate he could resume engagement.
- If the smoke column was burning stores, but Rosecrans is close enough to attack that morning (which should have been obvious from the dispatch by Rosecrans about having been in a fight the previous evening, or could have been inferred from Rosecrans predicting his arrival at 1PM to 2PM on the 18th) then it would bring on an engagement from both directions as the plan outlined.
- If the smoke column was burning stores and Rosecrans was too distant to get involved that morning, then the plan is in the process of failing as the Confederates are abandoning Iuka. In that case an attack on their rearguard might be preferable to letting them get away unfought.


2) To follow Grant's orders to attack early on the 19th.
Simple enough.

3) To have Ross ready to move promptly when ordered, and to send those orders shortly after Grant told him to move up, thus getting Ross moved up much earlier than actually happened.

Grant's HQ was at Burnsville, and Burnsville is 8.2 road miles from Iuka. With Ross 7 road miles from Iuka this means that Ross was barely any distance away at all; it's actually kind of astonishing that the dispatch from Ross is supposed to have taken two hours to reach Ord.

Given how fast Rosecrans moved that day (it looks like ~18 miles in 10 hours), Ord's movements come across as slow by comparison even given his start time.


This doesn't mean Ord acted wrongly on the 18th, necessarily, it means Ord didn't showcase any particular aggression, or rather that we cannot use this incident to argue that Ord showed a willingness to act aggressively.

It was Ross who said he felt certain they were burning stores. He didn't say they were evacuating immediately.

The speed of Rosecrans versus Ord is irrelevant. They were supposed to be coordinated by a timetable which fell apart. Then they were to be coordinated by the sound of battle, and one commander didn't hear the other fighting so that fell apart.

I don't see that there is any lesson here as far as aggression. It's a matter of two columns having no clue as to what the other is doing.

 

[Saphroneth]

Here's the order to Rosecrans on Oct 4th, 1862:

To Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans​

Headquarters Dept. of West Tenn. Jackson Tenn. Oct. 4th 1862​

​

Maj Genl. Rosecrans​

If the enemy fall back push them with all force possible and save Hurlbut who is now on the way to your relief. The Corinth and Bolivar forces must act in concert.​

Hurlbut is not strong enough alone to handle the rebels without very good luck. Don't neglect this warning. I can reinforce no more from this on — hence you will see the vital importance of yours and Hurlbut's forces acting in conjunction and send forces messag in.​

​

U. S. Grant. Maj. Genl.​

There's nothing unclear about this order, and it clearly indicates urgency. Rosecrans left Hurlbut and Ord hanging out to dry at Hatchie bridge.

Okay, good, so we have the order - push the enemy if they fall back. Checking The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant I can't find any indication of when in the day the telegram was sent or recieved, except that we know it was recieved by the time Rosecrans sent back the reply.

That reply includes a summary of the action and also mentions that McPherson had arrived by then, and says that the Confederates were "in full retreat" (both McPherson's arrival and the Confederates retreating being something that happened at or after 4PM) and saying that there were Confederate casualties stretching back five miles from the fighting area itself to their hospital (which indicates that the Confederates had retreated some distance by that time, as obviously to know that fact Rosecrans has to be able to reach the hospital in the first place - something that's rendered a bit difficult if the enemy is still on the field itself).

While it is (I freely confess) not certain, this seems to me to be at least circumstantial evidence that Rosecrans did not get the dispatch in question until some time after 4PM; certainly he didn't reply until (well) after that time.

 

[Saphroneth]

It was Ross who said he felt certain they were burning stores. He didn't say they were evacuating immediately.

The speed of Rosecrans versus Ord is irrelevant. They were supposed to be coordinated by a timetable which fell apart. Then they were to be coordinated by the sound of battle, and one commander didn't hear the other fighting so that fell apart.

I don't see that there is any lesson here as far as aggression. It's a matter of two columns having no clue as to what the other is doing.

What about option 2, then? Grant's orders were to "engage the enemy as early as possible", and Ord didn't; by itself that sort of damages the idea that he was acting aggressively and that to not be aggressive is out of character for him.

 

[DanSBHawk]

What about option 2, then? Grant's orders were to "engage the enemy as early as possible", and Ord didn't; by itself that sort of damages the idea that he was acting aggressively and that to not be aggressive is out of character for him.

When it comes to other generals, you have endless excuses why they could not act more aggressively.

Yet here, with a plan between two columns completely falling apart, with lousy communication between the two columns,... you think one commander should have charged ahead blindly?

Aggressiveness is one thing. Blindly charging forward without a clue is another. The latter got Rosecrans in trouble at Chickamauga.