Southern Rail Difficulties

[dgfred]

Not really. If the Confederacy can't hold on to Virginia then it gives the Union to many advantage's such has more African American soldiers and easy access to invading North Carolina. President Davis needs to quickly know what the AnVs status is at all times not be in a communication glitch if the telegraph is not working.
Leftyhunter

I don't agree... but that is why we discuss.

1- Already had troops in NC
2- African Americans from VA would not be a major problem IMO
3- Don't understand your 'telegraph' point... and communication.
IMO the less Davis knew... the better off the Confederacy was.

A- A capitol much more defensible and safe
B- Much more easily supplied
C- More troops available for offensive moves... not tied to Richmond
D- You don't have to hold Petersburg either

E- Enjoy ruffling your feathers (just kidding) Haha

 

[leftyhunter]

I don't agree... but that is why we discuss.

1- Already had troops in NC
2- African Americans from VA would not be a major problem IMO
3- Don't understand your 'telegraph' point... and communication.
IMO the less Davis knew... the better off the Confederacy was.

A- A capitol much more defensible and safe
B- Much more easily supplied
C- More troops available for offensive moves... not tied to Richmond
D- You don't have to hold Petersburg either

E- Enjoy ruffling your feathers (just kidding) Haha

1.Yes the Confederacy had troops in NC but now the Union has siezed the key state of Virginia and it's Cavalry units are that much closer to raid and disrupt Confederate railroad lines.
2. The more territory siezed by the Union the more Unionist and African Americans it can and did recruit into the Union Army that's a big problem for the Confederacy.
3. Richmond is invaluable to the Confederacy has its the most important Industrial city in the Confederacy.
4. Davis is the Commander in Chief of the Confederacy and for better or worse he needs to know what is happening at all times. My point is the longer a telegraph line is the more vunereable said line is to Union cavalry raiders and or Unionist guerrillas.
5. Wars are won on the offense . At some point one side in a war has to stop giving up territory or it is no longer viable as a nation.
6. No problem ruffling my feathers. On the job I sometimes get called all sorts of names that I can't repeat here but it comes with the territory.
Leftyhunter

 

[DaveBrt]

The census of 1860 has a county by county breakdown of Southern agricultural production. Hog production reaches Carl Sagan Numbers in certain regions.

Once the war arrived in middle Tennessee, hogs became hard to come by. When you did get them, you had my old labor shortage again, and there was very little salt for the job.

 

[leftyhunter]

Once the war arrived in middle Tennessee, hogs became hard to come by. When you did get them, you had my old labor shortage again, and there was very little salt for the job.

Good point about salt production as especially in Florida the USN and the 2nd Florida Cavalry Union and one USCT Regiment that sometimes fought alongside them concentrated on attacking salt works.
Leftyhunter

 

[Rhea Cole]

Once the war arrived in middle Tennessee, hogs became hard to come by. When you did get them, you had my old labor shortage again, and there was very little salt for the job.

Diarist John Spence, a merchant who kept a wartime journal in Murfreesboro, has an interesting take on the availability of farm products. When things loosened up, a surprising volume of products would come to market. He was a grouch, so when he says something positive, it stands out.

During the winter of 1863, when the Army of Tennessee went into winter quarters after the Battle of Stones River. Bragg's quartermasters discovered that the commissary officers from the Atlanta Depot had scoured southern Middle Tennessee. They bought up everything they could find to supply the Army of Northern Virginia. There were even instances where they bought goods out from under the AoT. Bragg was ordered to subsist from Northern Alabama. He was forbidden an access to the Atlanta Depot which belonged to the AoNV. Connelly goes into great detail on this subject. The foot notes/sources are a treasure trove.

 

[DaveBrt]

Diarist John Spence, a merchant who kept a wartime journal in Murfreesboro, has an interesting take on the availability of farm products. When things loosened up, a surprising volume of products would come to market. He was a grouch, so when he says something positive, it stands out.

During the winter of 1863, when the Army of Tennessee went into winter quarters after the Battle of Stones River. Bragg's quartermasters discovered that the commissary officers from the Atlanta Depot had scoured southern Middle Tennessee. They bought up everything they could find to supply the Army of Northern Virginia. There were even instances where they bought goods out from under the AoT. Bragg was ordered to subsist from Northern Alabama. He was forbidden an access to the Atlanta Depot which belonged to the AoNV. Connelly goes into great detail on this subject. The foot notes/sources are a treasure trove.

Who is Connelly?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Who is Connelly?

Connelly wrote two of the seminal books on the Army ofTennessee, Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory. The books are exclusively from the Southern point of view. At a time when the only way to do research he had to travel all over the country, to access archives. He lived in Bershaba Springs on the edge of the Highland Plateau in the home of a Confederate General.

His books are still in print, University of Louisiana Press , if memory serves. As I noted above, his footnotes are a great guide to sources that can be accessed on the internet, these days.

Lost Causers really got their shorts in a twitch when Connolly's books were published. The documentation does not fit very nicely with the myth of Southern military genius that prevailed back then.

There is plenty of modern commentary & critiques but they are as though provoking as ever. You should have them on your bookshelf.

 

[leftyhunter]

Connelly wrote two of the seminal books on the Army ofTennessee, Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory. The books are exclusively from the Southern point of view. At a time when the only way to do research he had to travel all over the country, to access archives. He lived in Bershaba Springs on the edge of the Highland Plateau in the home of a Confederate General.

His books are still in print, University of Louisiana Press , if memory serves. As I noted above, his footnotes are a great guide to sources that can be accessed on the internet, these days.

Lost Causers really got their shorts in a twitch when Connolly's books were published. The documentation does not fit very nicely with the myth of Southern military genius that prevailed back then.

There is plenty of modern commentary & critiques but they are as though provoking as ever. You should have them on your bookshelf.

Your post reminds me of Leiutenant General Omar Bradley stated " Amateurs study strategy professionals study logistics". Even in the 21st Century well known modern militaries still don't always properly supply their troops even with water.
Leftyhunter .

 

[DaveBrt]

Connelly wrote two of the seminal books on the Army ofTennessee, Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory. The books are exclusively from the Southern point of view. At a time when the only way to do research he had to travel all over the country, to access archives. He lived in Bershaba Springs on the edge of the Highland Plateau in the home of a Confederate General.

His books are still in print, University of Louisiana Press , if memory serves. As I noted above, his footnotes are a great guide to sources that can be accessed on the internet, these days.

Lost Causers really got their shorts in a twitch when Connolly's books were published. The documentation does not fit very nicely with the myth of Southern military genius that prevailed back then.

There is plenty of modern commentary & critiques but they are as though provoking as ever. You should have them on your bookshelf.

I do have them, but did not recognize the name.

 

[steamman]

I would have picked Atlanta most likely... or Columbia, SC.

Politics picked Richmond. VA was a prize, industry, population and slaves. So throw a bone to make a deal. I'd picked Atlanta, but in 1861 how did it compare to Richmond.

 

[steamman]

The census of 1860 has a county by county breakdown of Southern agricultural production. Hog production reaches Carl Sagan Numbers in certain regions.

That is also what I thought. A lot of hog production was in Tennessee.

 

[Lubliner]

We had 46 posts since yesterday at 8:50 A. M. and a very lively conversation indeed. I have a few responses to share to keep this movement going forward. I will post the #number and highlight the name on my opinions for each response I make as a reference guide.

Post # 85 with @Rhea Cole. That is a marvelous record that was never destroyed. The point I wish to make about this slave labor was the impressment took place in October of 1862. Now, slaves were a huge problem for the confederacy as the Union slowly moved into each territory. On the east coast in North Carolina and Georgia, especially the State's Government was busy settling mandates for owners to relocate their slaves to other parts inland.

These slaves still had to be divided up enough to leave remnants behind to take in crops, but the majority were to be removed out of danger. The citizens along the coast submitted a few petitions for it to be done, worried as well about ease of escape. Also the problem existed with impressment with owners. Many began to refuse to hire out their labor force, claiming the need for their own purpose. They were also fearful of having their 'property' escape or be harmed by inexperienced management.

Essentially, the slaves had too much work shoved upon them, the owners had too much fear to let them go, and the opportunities to use them became slimmer each day the Union advanced.

The list you offered up is a rewarding sight on history. Thank you. It shows many owners with the age of 14 to about 47 with the labor force, as well as a physical composite for each slave. For each one of these men impressed into service, the owners required a sum of return in some form of payment. This to me expresses another problem with the system of economic management. Without proper exchange and inadequate returns the owners rebelled against the use.
Lubliner.

 

[Lubliner]

@wausaubob has made some excellent points about the deficiency and the inability of the confederate opportunities post #86.
@DaveBrt in post #89 responded with a very enlightening explanation to help define the situations as they existed.

Of course, @leftyhunter, your ability to put things into an overall view is always attracting attention and comment. With @steamman, @dgfred (post #94, welcome), joining in to the capital question and the pork import problems with all, my opinion is Raleigh as a move on Government, and Tredegar as the nix to any move whatsoever. Pork I never knew was to be imported. And the problems parried among us was a new thing to me. The exact reference given by @DaveBrt surprised me, to say the least (deferring all suck-up).

Lastly I wish to say that the slaves not only provided necessary work detail but always had dependable information, and a understandable motivation to work and interact with the Union, and an increasing desire to shirk from confederate impressment. I hope no redundancy in all this advancement has imposed no hindrance for us in moving forward. Thank you all for a super day!
Lubliner.

 

[Lubliner]

For the newcomers just hopping on I am posting a background thread for a comprehensive follow up here:
https://civilwartalk.com/threads/sh...n-their-railroads-if-so-where-and-how.173192/ begun by
@W. Caldwell-37thNC on May 26th.
Thank you.
Lubliner.

 

[steamman]

We had 46 posts since yesterday at 8:50 A. M. and a very lively conversation indeed. I have a few responses to share to keep this movement going forward. I will post the #number and highlight the name on my opinions for each response I make as a reference guide.

Post # 85 with @Rhea Cole. That is a marvelous record that was never destroyed. The point I wish to make about this slave labor was the impressment took place in October of 1862. Now, slaves were a huge problem for the confederacy as the Union slowly moved into each territory. On the east coast in North Carolina and Georgia, especially the State's Government was busy settling mandates for owners to relocate their slaves to other parts inland.

These slaves still had to be divided up enough to leave remnants behind to take in crops, but the majority were to be removed out of danger. The citizens along the coast submitted a few petitions for it to be done, worried as well about ease of escape. Also the problem existed with impressment with owners. Many began to refuse to hire out their labor force, claiming the need for their own purpose. They were also fearful of having their 'property' escape or be harmed by inexperienced management.

Essentially, the slaves had too much work shoved upon them, the owners had too much fear to let them go, and the opportunities to use them became slimmer each day the Union advanced.

The list you offered up is a rewarding sight on history. Thank you. It shows many owners with the age of 14 to about 47 with the labor force, as well as a physical composite for each slave. For each one of these men impressed into service, the owners required a sum of return in some form of payment. This to me expresses another problem with the system of economic management. Without proper exchange and inadequate returns the owners rebelled against the use.
Lubliner.

Slave owners put profit before patriotism.

One foundation principle for secession and war was that slave labor would allow The South to be competative with the North in manpower. The North simply could not mobilize to the same extent as the South in % term. That did not go as planned. Every slave that deserted to the North was a net of 2. -1 South, +1 North.

Then with all the ablebodied white men in the army, the was few to enforce slave discipline so slowdowns happened.

Not to mention, Confederate script lost value fast.

My forefathers were pretty smart, but they were not prophets that saw unpredictable events obvious in hindsight to Monday morning generals.

 

[Lubliner]

Slave owners put profit before patriotism.

One foundation principle for secession and war was that slave labor would allow The South to be competative with the North in manpower. The North simply could not mobilize to the same extent as the South in % term. That did not go as planned. Every slave that deserted to the North was a net of 2. -1 South, +1 North.

Then with all the ablebodied white men in the army, the was few to enforce slave discipline so slowdowns happened.

Not to mention, Confederate script lost value fast.

My forefathers were pretty smart, but they were not prophets that saw unpredictable events obvious in hindsight to Monday morning generals.

That is difficult to fully assess. The youth were family of slave holders, many of them, that went off to war and fought bravely. The owners too in some cases, but the ones that were exempt from a conscription were having all their necessities demanded from them, including the lives of family members. So I agree it could be confusing to the ones wanting to guard the home hearth and having a government come and carry away their own needs and leave them with a promise. That promise of liberty and freedom wasn't fulfilled, but to the slaves they were holding on to. I like that analogy you used of "Net of 2. -1 South, +1 North". Thank you.
Lubliner.

 

[wausaubob]

Because Atlanta Depot was exclusively dedicated to supply the Army of Northern Virginia, the rich bounty of North Georgia farms was denied to the Army of Tennessee. Bragg depended on supplies from Northern Alabama to supply's army. After the Battle of Stones River, his army was spread out over a 50 mile wide front McMinnville to Columbia TN so that he could feed his horses. Unfortunately, both Union & Confederate QM's (including those from the Atlanta Depot) had already scoured Middle Tennessee. According to inspector general reports, by the spring of 1863 the AoT's wagons & draft animals were effectively destroyed by the long hauls transporting fodder. This dire state of affairs was a direct result of the closing of his RR link. In June, 1863, the Army of Tennessee ran out of meat. None was available to be issued just as Rosecrans began his Tullahoma Campaign. The South's inability to maintain their RR's inflicted real harm on the AoT.

Right. When Farragut occupied the confluence of the Red River with the Mississippi, and the Confederates had to deal with Rosecrans movement in central Tennessee, their logistical ability in the west began to collapse. The consequences were felt at Chattanooga.. Wheeler's cavalry could not stay north of the Tennessee River. Longstreet's divisions could not be supplied far to the west of the railroad, and they had to be relocated.
The regiments aligned by the Confederates on Missionary Ridge were questionable. Some were improperly exchanged survivors of Vicksburg, and others were not being properly fed. And in his Memoirs Grant related stories casting doubt on the willingness of these Confederate westerners to die for a cause that was definitely lost in the west.
The Confederate outposts along the Tennessee River were very passive. The Confederates did not fight very long for their Orchard Knob position. The Confederate position on Lookout Mountain had no limbs and Hooker and his amalgamated divisions did the right thing and threatened to cut off the Confederates.
By about the 25th of November, the US troops had doubts about the Confederates in front of them. These doubts were only confirmed when the Confederates gave up the trenches in front of Missionary Ridge, and scurried up the ridge.
The railroads were only one of the Confederate problems. When the US restored full military use of the Mississippi, and the Confederates were expelled from Kentucky and Tennessee, even a better railroad system was not going to save them from their lack of the physical quantities necessary to sustain their military livestock.
And as @DaveBrt notes, even if the Confederates had the railroad equipment, the steady loss of territory, the weight of conscription and the leakage of the fittest and most able part of the formerly enslaved population to the US, was going to make maintenance of the Confederate railroads a difficult task.

 

[wausaubob]

Slave owners put profit before patriotism.

One foundation principle for secession and war was that slave labor would allow The South to be competative with the North in manpower. The North simply could not mobilize to the same extent as the South in % term. That did not go as planned. Every slave that deserted to the North was a net of 2. -1 South, +1 North.

Then with all the ablebodied white men in the army, the was few to enforce slave discipline so slowdowns happened.

Not to mention, Confederate script lost value fast.

My forefathers were pretty smart, but they were not prophets that saw unpredictable events obvious in hindsight to Monday morning generals.

The problem was that the US not only gained self liberated slaves, but it also had about 200,000 female workers in NE and the Mid-Atlantic states fully capable of keeping light manufacturing going without men. By 1863 immigration had returned to a more normal level of about 180,000 per year. Immigration was heavily weighted towards men between ages 15 and 30.
Its difficult to estimate how many families in the key population states of Virginia, No. Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, saw the conduct of Confederate troops, and the war, and made the logical decision to go some place that there was semblance of law and order.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Right. When Farragut occupied the confluence of the Red River with the Mississippi, and the Confederates had to deal with Rosecrans movement in central Tennessee, their logistical ability in the west began to collapse. The consequences were felt at Chattanooga.. Wheeler's cavalry could not stay north of the Tennessee River. Longstreet's divisions could not be supplied far to the west of the railroad, and they had to be relocated.
The regiments aligned by the Confederates on Missionary Ridge were questionable. Some were improperly exchanged survivors of Vicksburg, and others were not being properly fed. And in his Memoirs Grant related stories casting doubt on the willingness of these Confederate westerners to die for a cause that was definitely lost in the west.
The Confederate outposts along the Tennessee River were very passive. The Confederates did not fight very long for their Orchard Knob position. The Confederate position on Lookout Mountain had no limbs and Hooker and his amalgamated divisions did the right thing and threatened to cut off the Confederates.
By about the 25th of November, the US troops had doubts about the Confederates in front of them. These doubts were only confirmed when the Confederates gave up the trenches in front of Missionary Ridge, and scurried up the ridge.
The railroads were only one of the Confederate problems. When the US restored full military use of the Mississippi, and the Confederates were expelled from Kentucky and Tennessee, even a better railroad system was not going to save them from their lack of the physical quantities necessary to sustain their military livestock.
And as @DaveBrt notes, even if the Confederates had the railroad equipment, the steady loss of territory, the weight of conscription and the leakage of the fittest and most able part of the formerly enslaved population to the US, was going to make maintenance of the Confederate railroads a difficult task.

I have done a lecture on how to use letters & journals a sources. An inaccurate statement can also be remarkably accurate. The officers on Missionary Ridge during the eclipse of the moon stated that they gazed out on campfires of 80,000 men. They reported that 25 to 40,000 troops attacked them. The wildly inaccurate estimates open a window into the depressed & fatalistic mindset of the men on the ridge.

 

[wausaubob]

I have done a lecture on how to use letters & journals a sources. An inaccurate statement can also be remarkably accurate. The officers on Missionary Ridge during the eclipse of the moon stated that they gazed out on campfires of 80,000 men. They reported that 25 to 40,000 troops attacked them. The wildly inaccurate estimates open a window into the depressed & fatalistic mindset of the men on the ridge.

Putting the soldiers who had seen the US Army of the Tennessee in Mississippi among the Confederate brigades at Chattanooga, might not have been well considered.
The guys from Mississippi had been whipped multiple times and survived a 6 week siege. As Grant wrote, if the Confederacy had been a democracy, the people would have forced a peace agreement in December 1863.
It explains that Chattanooga was one place where Grant's guesses on enemy moral were based on the correct evidence.
It wasn't the railroads. It was the fact the Confederate leadership demanded that people keep fighting and dying when the Confederacy was reduced to the 5 Atlantic coast states, plus Alabama that made the railroads an issue.