Gettysburg: the Ultimate "what if"...

[Rhea Cole]

I don't think anyone can accuse Lee of not continuing to push.

Absolutely, that is why he was able to humiliate McClellan, Hooker, Burnside et al.

 

[Rhea Cole]

All right, name the battle where Grant put in a heavy attack the day after heavy fighting.


Except that the situations are not remotely comparable. What killed Napoleon's army was (1) the massive casualties in the battles before reaching Moscow and (2) the massive casualties on the long retreat after Moscow.


"I must order a charge to save appearances".
Of course, history is equally full of generals who "kept on pushing" until their army disintegrated. Just one example: John Pope, August 1862.
Grant OTOH was more capable than that, and didn't push his armies to destruction - though he certainly attacked in occasions when attacking was not a good idea.

Analogy in the nature of, simile the same as. The example is an analogy.

 

[Saphroneth]

Analogy in the nature of, simile the same as. The example is an analogy.

But one could equally well say that the capture of Paris in 1871 and in 1940 was critical to the surrender of the French, and that in 1914-18 when Paris was not taken France did not surrender, therefore the capture of the capital was necessary.

An analogy has to be at least somewhat applicable, and the person making it has to be willing to defend the commonalities.

I was hoping that you'd have some sort of argument that would indicate that you felt that taking Washington was similar to taking Moscow (such as, for example, indicating how there were Federal plans for continuing the administration of the country from elsewhere in the event Washington was sufficiently threatened that abandoning it would be preferable) but instead you've just tried to explain the difference between an analogy and a simile.
You've also, incidentally, got the definition of a simile wrong. A simile is a figure of speech that compares two things directly through the use of words such as "like" and "as"; it does not mean that the two are the same. For the record, your original claim:

Like Napoleon in Moscow, Lee couldn't possibly stay in D.C., it would be a trap.

is a simile, because it uses the word "like" to invoke commonalities between the two situations. It may also be an analogy, but it is a simile.


As to the more general point. Washington D.C. is admittedly less important to the Union cause than Richmond to the Confederate, but it still has political and strategic value - and there is no reason to think that Confederate control of Washington would necessarily provoke a situation that could be considered a strategic dead-end followed by a retreat. On the contrary, control of Washington and the placement of an army therein would offer the prospect of cutting off the logistics of any overland-supplied operations south of the Potomac, while to cut off Washington from Confederate supply would mean either operating south of the Potomac and too far inland to be supplied by water (e.g. by taking Culpeper or Warrenton to cut the Orange and Alexandria) or operating directly against Richmond from the water while still defending the North from further actions by the Confederate army in Washington, or a risky operation in NE Virginia supplied from the sea while Washington was under Confederate control (to cut the O&A near Alexandria).

 

[Saphroneth]

Absolutely, that is why he was able to humiliate McClellan, Hooker, Burnside et al.

Pardon? Quite apart from how Lee and McClellan have roughly even laurels against one another (and how Lee rammed his army into McClellan's dug-in forces on several different occasions during the Seven Days and it only worked once)*, one cannot describe the defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg as "Lee was more willing to push and that is how he beat Burnside". On the contrary, Burnside's army took stunning casualties because it kept pushing past the point there was a reasonable expectation of victory, and Lee more or less just dug in his army and took the hits at a lopsided casualty ratio because it served his operational and strategic purposes.

If what matters is "continuing to push", irrespective of any other operational details or the tactical situation, then Lee should have won at Gettysburg (because he "kept pushing" to the point that every single one of his brigades had been sent in an attack at least once, unless I've miscounted). If "no matter how bad it is for you, it's worse for the enemy" is true, then Lee and Meade should both have thought the other side was worse off and one of them would be wrong.

The idea that "it's always worse for the enemy" is a rule which the simplest consideration should reveal cannot possibly be true in all circumstances, because a battle has two sides. The list of commanders who rolled the dice one too many times because they were sure their enemy was defeated is a long one and in fact includes Napoleon himself, while the more cautious and prudent Wellington never suffered from such overextension.


In fact, this speaks to a fundamental aspect of offensive warfare, which is the concept of the "culmination point" from Clausewitz - the point at which an offensive push has achieved the greatest success and after which the balance of events and trends now works against it. Commanders who rely on offensive action and who "push" often fall foul of the culmination point, and indeed the entirety of German operational warfare in World War two was focused on the idea that while expert operational things were one matter on the strategic level one should always keep pushing and keep hounding the enemy... and this completely failed. (cf. Citino).



The idea that Grant, or any other commander, could by "pushing" overcome Lee is based on the idea that Lee could be defeated thoroughly by means of a more aggressive course of action. A means for how this could be done has not been sufficiently demonstrated.
Conversely, however, the idea that Lee could overcome Meade with more luck - in winning a victory at Gettysburg, and potentially with less loss than the historical outcome - is more well founded, because Lee's second-day tactical scheme is fundamentally sound and because the loss ratio on days one and two favoured the Confederates.



* I think there's an argument to be made that Lee's operational moves could have got McClellan away from Richmond without a battle, but Lee committed to several. There's also an argument that McClellan's operational moves could have got Lee out of Maryland with only one battle - South Mountain - but McClellan committed to another.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Pardon? Quite apart from how Lee and McClellan have roughly even laurels against one another (and how Lee rammed his army into McClellan's dug-in forces on several different occasions during the Seven Days and it only worked once)*, one cannot describe the defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg as "Lee was more willing to push and that is how he beat Burnside". On the contrary, Burnside's army took stunning casualties because it kept pushing past the point there was a reasonable expectation of victory, and Lee more or less just dug in his army and took the hits at a lopsided casualty ratio because it served his operational and strategic purposes.

If what matters is "continuing to push", irrespective of any other operational details or the tactical situation, then Lee should have won at Gettysburg (because he "kept pushing" to the point that every single one of his brigades had been sent in an attack at least once, unless I've miscounted). If "no matter how bad it is for you, it's worse for the enemy" is true, then Lee and Meade should both have thought the other side was worse off and one of them would be wrong.

The idea that "it's always worse for the enemy" is a rule which the simplest consideration should reveal cannot possibly be true in all circumstances, because a battle has two sides. The list of commanders who rolled the dice one too many times because they were sure their enemy was defeated is a long one and in fact includes Napoleon himself, while the more cautious and prudent Wellington never suffered from such overextension.


In fact, this speaks to a fundamental aspect of offensive warfare, which is the concept of the "culmination point" from Clausewitz - the point at which an offensive push has achieved the greatest success and after which the balance of events and trends now works against it. Commanders who rely on offensive action and who "push" often fall foul of the culmination point, and indeed the entirety of German operational warfare in World War two was focused on the idea that while expert operational things were one matter on the strategic level one should always keep pushing and keep hounding the enemy... and this completely failed. (cf. Citino).



The idea that Grant, or any other commander, could by "pushing" overcome Lee is based on the idea that Lee could be defeated thoroughly by means of a more aggressive course of action. A means for how this could be done has not been sufficiently demonstrated.
Conversely, however, the idea that Lee could overcome Meade with more luck - in winning a victory at Gettysburg, and potentially with less loss than the historical outcome - is more well founded, because Lee's second-day tactical scheme is fundamentally sound and because the loss ratio on days one and two favoured the Confederates.



* I think there's an argument to be made that Lee's operational moves could have got McClellan away from Richmond without a battle, but Lee committed to several. There's also an argument that McClellan's operational moves could have got Lee out of Maryland with only one battle - South Mountain - but McClellan committed to another.

What McClellan & a whole host of other people did not understand was that Lee's army was the target, not Richmond. That was a strategic error that Grant did not make. Without Lee's army, Taking Richmond became a rescue mission. The USCT 25th Corps that took Richmond restored public order & put out fires that the retreating Confederate govt & freed criminals had set. I would have to lookit up, but I think that there were no casualties. Even a token siege of Richmond would have cost no telling how many lives.
I will set McCellan's often inexplicable lack of aggression aside. There is, however, an apples to apples comparison to be made. Chanslorsville & the Wilderness were fought over the same ground. Hooker was on the verge of passing beyond the thickets & into open ground when, by his own admission, he lost his nerve. Without that halt & retreat Jackson's flanking movement could not have happened. The original plan was to advance & make contact. Once engaged in the open country, Lee's options would have been few. Instead, Hooker conceded the initiative to Lee, always a bad mistake.
On the same ground, Grant faced a similar tactical situation. Lee's flank attack had some tactical success, but Grant knew that the thickets that allowed Lee to make the attack would equally prevent any exploitation. Grant kept the initiative. Lee had no choice but to follow. From that point on, it was just a matter of time.
Grant knew that Lee would be ordered to protect Richmond. That is what fixed Lee in place. Without Richmond, Lee could have headed for North Carolina or something of the sort. Lee said that when had maneuvered him into exposing Richmond & didn't take it, he knew that his army was the target. At that point, Lee knew that defeat was inevitable. It was just a matter of time. Lee was, of course, correct.

 

[Saphroneth]

What McClellan & a whole host of other people did not understand was that Lee's army was the target, not Richmond. That was a strategic error that Grant did not make. Without Lee's army, Taking Richmond became a rescue mission.

One might as well ask how Grant went after Lee's army during the Overland. As I've pointed out on multiple occasions on this thread, Grant's movements during the Overland do not make sense if he is targeting Lee's army.*

* except in so far as he might be moving against Richmond so as to provoke a response from Lee to make his army more vulnerable (and if that was the goal, then it failed, because the attrition rate got worse with every movement).

Lee's army and Richmond are bound at the hip: Richmond cannot survive without Lee's army, but Lee's army cannot survive in the form it took for most of the war without Richmond either. Any attempt to go after Lee's army has to do so with the understanding that Lee is often willing to refuse combat unless it serves his purposes; the most sure way to engage Lee's army is to threaten Richmond.

I've often wondered about that "the objective is the army" idea though; obviously crippling an enemy army is a good result, but taking a strategic objective is just as good which is why taking Atlanta and Corinth were considered victories.

I will set McCellan's often inexplicable lack of aggression aside. Not commotions Porter's Corps & his lack of initiative at Antetium speaks for itself. (Gotta do something will finish later)

At Antietam McClellan had a total of 39.5 brigades on the field at some point during the day, of which nine arrived during the course of the day. Of those, 30 were committed to some kind of significant attack and nine point five (eight of the brigades who arrived during the course of the day, Warren's tiny two-regiment brigade and one flank guard brigade) were not.
If this is a "lack of aggression" then Lee was not aggressive until Day Three at Gettysburg and Grant was literally never aggressive.

In fact McClellan was aggressive at Antietam, and Lee was aggressive at Gettysburg, and Grant was aggressive during the Overland - both tactically and operationally.

It's probably worth realizing that "Porter's Corps" actually consisted of one division on the field at the start (Sykes, 2.5 brigades, who was the entire centre of the Union position), one which arrived during the day (Morell, 3 brigades, two of which which were committed to the right wing but recalled when Burnside collapsed) and one which arrived the day after (Humphreys, made up entirely of exhausted new recruits). Since Sykes was certainly committed, functionally you're looking at between one and three brigades that were not actually engaged in combat - which is a division, not a corps.

 

[Rhea Cole]

One might as well ask how Grant went after Lee's army during the Overland. As I've pointed out on multiple occasions on this thread, Grant's movements during the Overland do not make sense if he is targeting Lee's army.*

* except in so far as he might be moving against Richmond so as to provoke a response from Lee to make his army more vulnerable (and if that was the goal, then it failed, because the attrition rate got worse with every movement).

Lee's army and Richmond are bound at the hip: Richmond cannot survive without Lee's army, but Lee's army cannot survive in the form it took for most of the war without Richmond either. Any attempt to go after Lee's army has to do so with the understanding that Lee is often willing to refuse combat unless it serves his purposes; the most sure way to engage Lee's army is to threaten Richmond.

I've often wondered about that "the objective is the army" idea though; obviously crippling an enemy army is a good result, but taking a strategic objective is just as good which is why taking Atlanta and Corinth were considered victories.



At Antietam McClellan had a total of 39.5 brigades on the field at some point during the day, of which nine arrived during the course of the day. Of those, 30 were committed to some kind of significant attack and nine point five (eight of the brigades who arrived during the course of the day, Warren's tiny two-regiment brigade and one flank guard brigade) were not.
If this is a "lack of aggression" then Lee was not aggressive until Day Three at Gettysburg and Grant was literally never aggressive.

In fact McClellan was aggressive at Antietam, and Lee was aggressive at Gettysburg, and Grant was aggressive during the Overland - both tactically and operationally.

It's probably worth realizing that "Porter's Corps" actually consisted of one division on the field at the start (Sykes, 2.5 brigades, who was the entire centre of the Union position), one which arrived during the day (Morell, 3 brigades, two of which which were committed to the right wing but recalled when Burnside collapsed) and one which arrived the day after (Humphreys, made up entirely of exhausted new recruits). Since Sykes was certainly committed, functionally you're looking at between one and three brigades that were not actually engaged in combat - which is a division, not a corps.

You & I have different definitions of the word aggressive. McClellan did not commit his reserves & sat in his tent & diddled until Lee was across the Potomac. That is not my definition of aggressive. My Wife's g-g-grandad was probably saved by McClelland's case of the slows, so I am content with how it came out. Grant finally caught him at Appomattox & fed him a welcome meal.

 

[Rhea Cole]

One might as well ask how Grant went after Lee's army during the Overland. As I've pointed out on multiple occasions on this thread, Grant's movements during the Overland do not make sense if he is targeting Lee's army.*

* except in so far as he might be moving against Richmond so as to provoke a response from Lee to make his army more vulnerable (and if that was the goal, then it failed, because the attrition rate got worse with every movement).

Lee's army and Richmond are bound at the hip: Richmond cannot survive without Lee's army, but Lee's army cannot survive in the form it took for most of the war without Richmond either. Any attempt to go after Lee's army has to do so with the understanding that Lee is often willing to refuse combat unless it serves his purposes; the most sure way to engage Lee's army is to threaten Richmond.

I've often wondered about that "the objective is the army" idea though; obviously crippling an enemy army is a good result, but taking a strategic objective is just as good which is why taking Atlanta and Corinth were considered victories.



At Antietam McClellan had a total of 39.5 brigades on the field at some point during the day, of which nine arrived during the course of the day. Of those, 30 were committed to some kind of significant attack and nine point five (eight of the brigades who arrived during the course of the day, Warren's tiny two-regiment brigade and one flank guard brigade) were not.
If this is a "lack of aggression" then Lee was not aggressive until Day Three at Gettysburg and Grant was literally never aggressive.

In fact McClellan was aggressive at Antietam, and Lee was aggressive at Gettysburg, and Grant was aggressive during the Overland - both tactically and operationally.

It's probably worth realizing that "Porter's Corps" actually consisted of one division on the field at the start (Sykes, 2.5 brigades, who was the entire centre of the Union position), one which arrived during the day (Morell, 3 brigades, two of which which were committed to the right wing but recalled when Burnside collapsed) and one which arrived the day after (Humphreys, made up entirely of exhausted new recruits). Since Sykes was certainly committed, functionally you're looking at between one and three brigades that were not actually engaged in combat - which is a division, not a corps.

You & I have different definitions of the word aggressive. McClellan did not commit his reserves & sat in his tent & diddled until Lee was across the Potomac. That is not my definition of aggressive. My Wife's g-g-grandad was probably saved by McClelland's case of the slows, so I am content with how it came out. Grant finally caught him at Appomattox & fed him a welcome meal.

Chattanooga & Atlanta were important because that is where Lee's food came from. The rail nodes of Chattanooga, Atlanta & Savannah were the choke points. Once Atlanta & the agricultural products were destroyed & Savannah neutralized, Sherman was free to move north & finish Lee off. That was what Grant sent him to do. With Lee fixed in place defending Richmond, Sherman was free to pursue his campaign without facing reinforcements from Lee's ar

 

[Saphroneth]

You & I have different definitions of the word aggressive.

Clearly. How many men do your attacks need to kill in one day before that day counts as aggressive?

McClellan did not commit his reserves & sat in his tent & diddled until Lee was across the Potomac. That is not my definition of aggressive.

McClellan's uncommitted reserves consisted of one brigade; everything else was on the firing line, sent to reinforce the firing line or (in most cases) shattered by a failed assault. McClellan launched the bloodiest day of combat in American history and yet you don't see that as aggressive; this is the mindset which lost John Pope his battle at Second Manassas, where any troops you have that haven't gone in on the attack proves you haven't attacked enough.

I mean, it's very in keeping with the general mindset of the 1860s public press, but one would hope that at a remove of a hundred and fifty years we could be more discerning.

Chattanooga & Atlanta were important because that is where Lee's food came from. The rail nodes of Chattanooga, Atlanta & Savannah were the choke points. Once Atlanta & the agricultural products were destroyed & Savannah neutralized, Sherman was free to move north & finish Lee off. That was what Grant sent him to do.

Okay, so capturing strategic locations can be important, and it's not always focusing on armies alone.

With Lee fixed in place defending Richmond, Sherman was free to pursue his campaign without facing reinforcements

And fixing Lee in Richmond is a worthwhile thing to do, because it allows attacks elsewhere to take place.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Clearly. How many men do your attacks need to kill in one day before that day counts as aggressive?


McClellan's uncommitted reserves consisted of one brigade; everything else was on the firing line, sent to reinforce the firing line or (in most cases) shattered by a failed assault. McClellan launched the bloodiest day of combat in American history and yet you don't see that as aggressive; this is the mindset which lost John Pope his battle at Second Manassas, where any troops you have that haven't gone in on the attack proves you haven't attacked enough.

I mean, it's very in keeping with the general mindset of the 1860s public press, but one would hope that at a remove of a hundred and fifty years we could be more discerning.


Okay, so capturing strategic locations can be important, and it's not always focusing on armies alone.


And fixing Lee in Richmond is a worthwhile thing to do, because it allows attacks elsewhere to take place.

I will give this one last try. Fixing Lee at Petersburg did not allow Sherman to destroy Atlanta, it was why he destroyed Atlanta. Lee's food supplies came from Georgia through Atlanta, Savannah & north to Virginia. The route through Chattanooga was way more efficient, but Grant had already secured that choke point. It was only when the original plan to transfer Sherman's army group by sea proved impractical that the decision was made to go overland. It was Sherman's imminent arrival & cutting off the last rail link that flushed Lee into the open. The reason Grant &'Sherman did what they did was logistics. After Lee was starved out, occupying Richmond or any other point was just a matter of moving troops around.

 

[Saphroneth]

I will give this one last try. Fixing Lee at Petersburg did not allow Sherman to destroy Atlanta, it was why he destroyed Atlanta. Lee's food supplies came from Georgia through Atlanta, Savannah & north to Virginia. The route through Chattanooga was way more efficient, but Grant had already secured that choke point. It was only when the original plan to transfer Sherman's army group by sea proved impractical that the decision was made to go overland. It was Sherman's imminent arrival & cutting off the last rail link that flushed Lee into the open. The reason Grant &'Sherman did what they did was logistics. After Lee was starved out, occupying Richmond or any other point was just a matter of moving troops around.

But your argument now is based fundamentally on positional warfare - that the capture of points in strategic lines of communications to cut rail links to the Richmond-Petersburg area was what got Lee out in the open.

This is at odds with the idea that what Meade should have done after Gettysburg was to go after Lee, because it means that to replicate Grant's success then Meade should have invaded Georgia (to cut the rail lines to Richmond) instead of closely following the Army of Northern Virginia... doesn't it?


I should also point out that these two are effectively contradictory:

With Lee fixed in place defending Richmond, Sherman was free to pursue his campaign without facing reinforcements from Lee's ar(my)

Fixing Lee at Petersburg did not allow Sherman to destroy Atlanta, it was why he destroyed Atlanta.

Unless what you meant in the first one was that the March to the Sea was the campaign Sherman was freed to pursue, in which case you assumed I meant a different one to the one you meant even though my point applies to whichever campaign you were thinking of in the first quote...

 

[Saphroneth]

Okay, so looking at the specifics of the operations after Gettysburg.

Historically what Meade did was to move his forces down to Frederick, and then west across South Mountain. This route is much longer than the route Lee took and so it's to Meade's credit that he got there before Lee was across the Potomac at all - the number I've seen is that it was twice as long of a route, and some corps covered about thirty miles in a single day which is outrageously far.

There are only really two alternative approaches.

The first is to move all the way south of the Potomac and then cut west to try and fight in the Shenandoah Valley, but the problem with this approach is simply that it entails giving Lee a free fun at Washington if he wants it (which is to say, it is counter to Meade's standing orders to protect Washington and Baltimore).
The second is to follow the same route as Lee, which is to say to go west and take the South Mountain passes in the north. This would be a gamble - if Meade went for it before the Gettysburg fighting was over then he's sending troops away from what looks to be the decisive battle and in which he historically committed all his reserves in the defence, while if he went for it afterwards he's trying to win a footrace with the Confederate army who get to start first and take the short route (and it means coming directly up behind the Confederate army who already did a lot of damage, and now they're defending).

Meade's movements after Gettysburg are an attempt to come around and cut Lee off from the Potomac, and despite prodigies of marching the enemy got a vote. It's the same reason why Grant's attempt to cut Lee off from Richmond didn't work out during the Overland.

 

[Rhea Cole]

But your argument now is based fundamentally on positional warfare - that the capture of points in strategic lines of communications to cut rail links to the Richmond-Petersburg area was what got Lee out in the open.

This is at odds with the idea that what Meade should have done after Gettysburg was to go after Lee, because it means that to replicate Grant's success then Meade should have invaded Georgia (to cut the rail lines to Richmond) instead of closely following the Army of Northern Virginia... doesn't it?


I should also point out that these two are effectively contradictory:




Unless what you meant in the first one was that the March to the Sea was the campaign Sherman was freed to pursue, in which case you assumed I meant a different one to the one you meant even though my point applies to whichever campaign you were thinking of in the first quote...

I surrender, you have completely lost me.

 

[Saphroneth]

I surrender, you have completely lost me.

Well, perhaps this would help re-focus things.

What operational moves do you think Meade should have made after Gettysburg, and can you give an example of as close an analogue as possible during the Overland campaign? (e.g. if you think that Meade should have attacked on July 4, the day after heavy fighting, cite an example of Grant launching an attack the day after heavy fighting; if you think that Meade should have followed Lee closely, cite an example of Grant following Lee closely.)

 

[CowCavalry]

The idea that "it's always worse for the enemy" is a rule which the simplest consideration should reveal cannot possibly be true in all circumstances, because a battle has two sides. The list of commanders who rolled the dice one too many times because they were sure their enemy was defeated is a long one and in fact includes Napoleon himself, while the more cautious and prudent Wellington never suffered from such overextension.

At some point during the battle of Waterloo, while the French were aggressively launching assault after assault, Wellington remarked of Napoleon something to the effect of " ****, turns out he is just a pounder after all"

 

[Saphroneth]

At some point during the battle of Waterloo, while the French were aggressively launching assault after assault, Wellington remarked of Napoleon something to the effect of " ****, turns out he is just a pounder after all"

I tend to the view that there are two Napoleons, not counting Napoleon II-IV inclusive. Napoleon is evolving his tactics until about 1807, and after that point he has the army he wants and can use more or less the same tactics at every battle.

His operations are another matter, but during the 1815 campaign he turns out to be rather - well, unsubtle, in that he doesn't even try to turn the British-Dutch-Hanoverian positions (though then again he seems to have been considering it in the event that Wellington dug field works).


The problem with the "hammer away" method is that if it doesn't work then you've probably left yourself open for a counterstroke - unless of course you've exhausted the enemy army as much as your own.

 

[steve59p]

There was a Napoleonic one grand battle & take the opponent's capital mindset amongst the Confederate high command. That might have worked in Austria. Taking Washington, with the resulting War of 1812 type destruction that would have been inevitable, would have inflamed, not dampened public opinion in the North. Even a small massacre or whatever it was at Fort Pillow spiked recruitment by over 100,000. Like Napoleon in Moscow, Lee couldn't possibly stay in D.C., it would be a trap. By that time of the war, Grant had figured out that the opponent's armed forces were the target, individual pieces of territory did not really matter. Anyways, it is all moot, Lee wisely fell back on his base. I agree with him, it was the thing to do.

Somewhat off the subject but if Lee had captured Washington [which seems highly unlikely] I can't see it being anything like as limited in destruction as when British forces occupied Washington in the 1812 conflict. The latter saw no fighting inside the 'city' itself and only limited destruction of government buildings in response to earlier US actions at York [now Toronto] and along the Niagra border. Any level of fighting inside the city itself would have caused considerably more damage by at least an order of magnitude. Even if there was no fighting outside the forts themselves I suspect the bitterness of the civil war is likely to mean at least a level of attacks on private property of leading supporters of the northern war effort.

 

[Saphroneth]

The latter saw no fighting inside the 'city' itself and only limited destruction of government buildings in response to earlier US actions at York [now Toronto] and along the Niagra border.

Be fair, though, there was also a tornado.

 

[steve59p]

Be fair, though, there was also a tornado.

Saphroneth

Sorry, don't know of any such occurrence at York, Niagra or Washington but could well be wrong?

Steve

 

[Rhea Cole]

Well, perhaps this would help re-focus things.

What operational moves do you think Meade should have made after Gettysburg, and can you give an example of as close an analogue as possible during the Overland campaign? (e.g. if you think that Meade should have attacked on July 4, the day after heavy fighting, cite an example of Grant launching an attack the day after heavy fighting; if you think that Meade should have followed Lee closely, cite an example of Grant following Lee closely.)

Grant didn't have to follow Lee because Lee was following him. I suspect the pursuit after the collapse of the Petersburg line qualifies as an example of Grant closely following Lee all the way toAppomattox.