Gettysburg: the Ultimate "what if"...

[Saphroneth]

According to the Alliance to Preserve the Civil War Defenses of Washington:
"Union officials began to fortify the capital and its treasury against the feared invasion. By the end of the Civil War, the city was the most heavily fortified city in the world, bristling with 68 forts and artillery emplacements, more than 1,000 guns and mortars, and 20 miles of connecting roads, trench lines, and rifle pits.

This isn't necessarily correct, because of the problem of density. Essentially, when considering how strongly fortified a city is you need to consider the size of the defensive fort ring as a malus - the same number of guns and men on a wider radius means that the defences are weaker in any one place.

Washington's fort ring was very large, and this causes problems for the effectiveness one considers for the defences.
It was certainly heavily fortified, but one should compare it with cities like Sevastopol - which had a fortified perimeter that was much shorter and which had a very large number of guns.

Note the scale.

W.L.Clowes tabulated 208 guns in the Quarantine Fort, Fort Alexander and Fort Constantine at Sevastopol, while the Russian ships which were destroyed to avoid their surrender mounted about 2,200 guns between them (and those guns would have been able to reinforce the works if needed). Another source claims ~320 guns able to fire on attackers from the land during the assaults, and even assuming that these guns largely overlap with the guns of the Quarantine Fort and Fort Alexander that still leaves us Fort Constantine (to the north of the harbour and impossible to assail unless northern Sevastopol was actually captured, of a total of 94 guns) and the seawards guns of the other two forts (a total of 50) which means that Sevastopol probably had about 500 guns or more in her defence.


This means that with half as many guns as Washington and a fortified frontage of only about five miles (vice the ca. 37 miles the Washington defences were spread over, Sevastopol's defences were at least three times as dense in terms of average number of guns.

The second problem is that there's mostly no depth and little mutual support, except in the section on the southern shore of the Potomac. If you eliminate one of the forts then there's a gap large enough to fit a marching column through,



It's also worth considering the quality of the fortifications themselves. Early in the war (1862) a British engineer noted:


These works are not particularly well placed, nor is the design of much good. Many are too small to be of any real service, and although manned by some 80,000 men, I believe good troops would very shortly force them. The Confederates are not, however, good enough for this… several portions of their lines could be taken not only by good infantry, but by a sudden dash of well mounted cavalry. However, there is good excuse for this for a great portion of the works were hurriedly thrown up by civilians- I could not help pointing this out to the chief of the staff, and at last he acknowledged I was right especially after I had ridden one of his own cavalryman's horses (I think the worst saddle for any real riding) clear over the ditch, and parapet charged in amongst his men who were absolutely aghast at the idea of cavalry charging even the slightest obstacle.



While certainly many improvements took place between 1862 and 1865, how many forts were effectively rebuilt to eliminate this vulnerability? And how much had taken place by 1863, when the forts would actually be tested?



Of course, the source (Hewitt) notes that the Confederates are "not good enough for this", and this is probably true - certainly Lee had no siege train. But if we can postulate the collapse of the Army of the Potomac in the field, then it is actually possible for an attacking army to round the forts and march through the gap between Fort Lincoln and Fort Mahan (which are about two miles apart, and of the two only Fort Lincoln is an all-round fort; Fort Lincoln has 37 guns only and they have to be split between all four directions. Functionally by marching this route you're going to be taking the fire of two batteries in the flank of your column at a range of a mile.)

 

[Rhea Cole]

Lee's problem wasn't defenses, it was food & ammunition. He had enough wagons for his wounded, but none left for supplying his regiments. (Gen Imboden). There was no ammunition in the pipeline. It was not until Imboden, in command of the forty mile wagon train of wounded was actually crossing the Potomac that a small resupply of artillery ammunition crosses over & allows his artillery to help hold of interdicting Union cavalry. That was the one & only resupply Lee's army received north of the Potomac. Through out history, armies have arrived in front of fortresses & starved. In this case, Lee's army would have literally starved before it got there. Had Lee abandoned all his wounded, somehow received supplies from somewhere, he would have arrived outside Washington with little or no food, little to no ammunition. This is not some fanciful notion of mine, this is the cold hard reality of how many tons of forrage & rations his army consumed every day. The defenders of Washington would not have to defend the city. All they had to do was hold on until Union forces pinned them against the defenses & destroyed them. Lee was way, way, way too smart to do that.
As it was, he lost a significant part of his army army on the retreat. The wounded abandoned, wounded in the wagon train captured, & stragglers captured numbered about 20,000. Lee lost another 2,500 was it in Meade's attack across the Potomac. The leadership of the A.o.N.V. had been decimated. The Colonels, Majors & Captains that were the heart of the officer Corps were either dead, disabled or on their last legs.
An attack on Washington after Gettysburg, win or loose simply could not be done. It is a matter of simple math.

 

[John S. Carter]

If I were Lee, I would have listened to Longstreet. Push South, down towards Washington, swing behind Meades army. Choose your own ground to fight on, capture Washington even. If they would have done that, the war would have been won, don't you think?

There is another ONE .What if instead of a frontal attack on the third day ,Longstreet on the second day taken one division to Culb's Hill or to the Round Top ,Could he had then moved around the either of the flanks of Meade.There would be only one thing to consider is that FLAG communication could have halted this as it did when Reynolds saw the movement on the left flake and reinforced in time to halt the Confederate advance.The worse mistake that Lee blundered into was the distance in the separation of his force and apearly not maintaining communication with either commander.By the time he had established this ,the Union had Round Top and enforcing Culp's Hill,and Meade was able to bring up his entire Army which provided him with the reserve force that Lee did not have on that THIRD DAY,when the men had broke thought but as they turned and saw no support to maintain the opening.How long did it take Meade and his generals to close the gap and where did these come from?RESERVE DIVISIONS ?

 

[Rhea Cole]

There is another ONE .What if instead of a frontal attack on the third day ,Longstreet on the second day taken one division to Culb's Hill or to the Round Top ,Could he had then moved around the either of the flanks of Meade.There would be only one thing to consider is that FLAG communication could have halted this as it did when Reynolds saw the movement on the left flake and reinforced in time to halt the Confederate advance.The worse mistake that Lee blundered into was the distance in the separation of his force and apearly not maintaining communication with either commander.By the time he had established this ,the Union had Round Top and enforcing Culp's Hill,and Meade was able to bring up his entire Army which provided him with the reserve force that Lee did not have on that THIRD DAY,when the men had broke thought but as they turned and saw no support to maintain the opening.How long did it take Meade and his generals to close the gap and where did these come from?RESERVE DIVISIONS ?

Meade had the advantage that comes whenever a territory is invaded. His lines of communication were shorter than Lee's. Not only did he have reenactments coming, he had supplies, as well. A sixteen year old girl was the Military Telegraph operator who connected Meade with Washington. It is interesting to note that the Signal team that stalled Longstreet's advance was bluffing. They weren't sending signals, they were just letting the Confederates know they were watching. Imagine, Longstreet & the mighty A.o.V. Forced to countermarch by a tablecloth tied to a broom handle.

 

[Saphroneth]

Meade was able to bring up his entire Army which provided him with the reserve force that Lee did not have on that THIRD DAY,when the men had broke thought but as they turned and saw no support to maintain the opening.How long did it take Meade and his generals to close the gap and where did these come from?RESERVE DIVISIONS ?

As of the middle of the third day, Meade has committed all his reserves; at that point, surprisingly, Lee still has an unused reserve (it's Pickett's brigades).

 

[Rhea Cole]

As of the middle of the third day, Meade has committed all his reserves; at that point, surprisingly, Lee still has an unused reserve (it's Pickett's brigades).

That is true, but Meade had more on the road & available with time. Lee had everything he was going to have. Another issue for Lee was the attrition of his equines. Cavalry uses up horses the way infantry uses up shoes. Had he attempted any kind of extended campaign in Pennsylvania or attack on Washington, his loss in horse flesh would have been catastrophic. During the Tullahoma Campaign that started on June 23, Rosecrans ordered that rations & ammunition would be transported by wagon. The railroad carried fodder exclusively. Thousands of replacement mules & remounts were transported toward Chattanooga, as well. There was absolutely no way Lee could have mounted, let alone sustained such a logistical effort. As Gn Imboden pointed out, all of the army's wagons were in Pennsylvania.

 

[CowCavalry]

The ultimate what if, in my opinion, is what would have followed had Meade acted like Grant & hounded Lee back to the Potomac. General Imboden, in charge of the wagon train of wounded, reported that the first resupply of artillery ammunition came over the river as the wagon train of wounded crossed the Potomac. Imboden issued it out to artillery batteries devoid of ammunition & defended the river crossing. Lee's army was without the means to defend itself, it had no ammunition. As it was, Lee abandoned wounded & had stragglers captured totaling more than 10,000 men. A vigorous Western Army style follow up would have destroyed Lee's army north of the Potomac.

The wagon train of wounded, as reported by Gen Imboden was 40 miles long. Every wagon available to the army was used to evacuate the wounded. As Imboden remarked, had the pursuit struck the wagon train in force, it would have resulted in a loss the Confederacy had no means to recoup. The description of a inspector general who reported on Hood's army after it crossed the Tennessee in 1864 would also have described the A.o.N.V., "...nothing but a disarmed mob..."

On a purely personal note, had a Phillip Sheridan with Grant backing him up slammed into Lee's retreat, I might not be here to write this. Both my wife & I had relations who had survived the slaughter of Lee's attacks. They were somewheres amongst the weary sloggers headed for the Potomac. For my part, it all worked out exactly right. Any changes might have been disasterous. Personally, I think things turned out just right.

I think that the condition of Meade's forces after three days of battle are often discounted. The AOP was as exhausted and nearly as badly mauled after three days of battle as the ANV was. Meade himself as much as said this shortly after the battle IIRC.

 

[Saphroneth]

That is true, but Meade had more on the road & available with time.

Really? Who?
What Union troops were still marching to the battlefield in the middle of Day Three?

I think that the condition of Meade's forces after three days of battle are often discounted. The AOP was as exhausted and nearly as badly mauled after three days of battle as the ANV was. Meade himself as much as said this shortly after the battle IIRC.

This is the case, yes; the general view was that the losses the Army of the Potomac suffered inflicted permanent quality damage on it. It was never as good again.

The ultimate what if, in my opinion, is what would have followed had Meade acted like Grant & hounded Lee back to the Potomac.

Please give me an example of when Grant "hounded" Lee.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

Really? Who?
What Union troops were still marching to the battlefield in the middle of Day Three?


This is the case, yes; the general view was that the losses the Army of the Potomac suffered inflicted permanent quality damage on it. It was never as good again.



Please give me an example of when Grant "hounded" Lee.

The Overland Campaign.

 

[Saphroneth]

The Overland Campaign.

But Grant didn't "hound" Lee in the Overland campaign, at least not in operational terms.

Wilderness - Grant moved, Lee attacked him.
Spotsylvania - Grant and Lee raced for Spotsylvania, Lee won and entrenched, Grant attacked Lee but did not compel him to retreat.
North Anna - Grant moved first to get around Lee's flank, Lee countered and beat him to the North Anna position, Grant attacked Lee but did not compel him to retreat.
Cold Harbor - Grant moved first to get around Lee's flank, Lee countered and beat him to the Cold Harbor position, Grant attacked Lee but did not compel him to retreat.

At no point in the Overland does Lee pull back and Grant pursue. Indeed, at no point in the Overland does Grant commit to heavy fighting the day after heavy fighting!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Really? Who?
What Union troops were still marching to the battlefield in the middle of Day Three?


This is the case, yes; the general view was that the losses the Army of the Potomac suffered inflicted permanent quality damage on it. It was never as good again.



Please give me an example of when Grant "hounded" Lee.

In the 19th Century, 'to hound' meant to pursue something until you got your metaphorical teeth into it & did not let go. It is a simile for the behavior of a terrier catching rats. 'Grant hounded Lee's army from the Wilderness to Petersburg to Appomatox' is an example of that expression.

 

[Saphroneth]

In the 19th Century, 'to hound' meant to pursue something until you got your metaphorical teeth into it & did not let go. It is a simile for the behavior of a terrier catching rats. 'Grant hounded Lee's army from the Wilderness to Petersburg to Appomatox' is an example of that expression.

But Meade did follow Lee back to the Potomac - he just didn't attack Lee's entrenchments at Falling Waters. Meanwhile Grant broke contact with Lee on at least one occasion...

 

[Rhea Cole]

I think that the condition of Meade's forces after three days of battle are often discounted. The AOP was as exhausted and nearly as badly mauled after three days of battle as the ANV was. Meade himself as much as said this shortly after the battle IIRC.

Grant stated at the time that it was only the absence of maps that prevented him from finishing off the Army of Tennessee after Missionary Ridge. His stated view was that however bad off you were, they were in worse shape. Grant wanted nothing more than to completely eliminate his opponent. That is why he was dissatisfied with George Thomas when, to quote an inspector general, Hood's "milling mob of unarmed men" made it across the Tennessee after Nashville. His view was that if you let them go, you will have to fight them again later. It must have been a lesson he learned at Shiloh.

 

[Rhea Cole]

But Meade did follow Lee back to the Potomac - he just didn't attack Lee's entrenchments at Falling Waters. Meanwhile Grant broke contact with Lee on at least one occasion...

He followed, yes, which is exactly the point.

 

[Saphroneth]

He followed, yes, which is exactly the point.

I'm not sure I'm getting the point here. Meade follows Lee and that's not hounding him, while Grant moves away from Lee's army and that is hounding him?

Grant wanted nothing more than to completely eliminate his opponent.

The question however is whether this is actually practical to achieve. Nobody eliminated an enemy army in the field in the Civil War - bar none - though you could inflict casualties and disorganization.
In general the only time the elimination of an army is possible in 19th century warfare is when:

1) A fresh pursuit corps is available to follow up a broken enemy before they rally. This of course requires breaking the enemy in the first place.
2) The enemy can be trapped with no escape route.

 

[Rhea Cole]

There is another ONE .What if instead of a frontal attack on the third day ,Longstreet on the second day taken one division to Culb's Hill or to the Round Top ,Could he had then moved around the either of the flanks of Meade.There would be only one thing to consider is that FLAG communication could have halted this as it did when Reynolds saw the movement on the left flake and reinforced in time to halt the Confederate advance.The worse mistake that Lee blundered into was the distance in the separation of his force and apearly not maintaining communication with either commander.By the time he had established this ,the Union had Round Top and enforcing Culp's Hill,and Meade was able to bring up his entire Army which provided him with the reserve force that Lee did not have on that THIRD DAY,when the men had broke thought but as they turned and saw no support to maintain the opening.How long did it take Meade and his generals to close the gap and where did these come from?RESERVE DIVISIONS ?

What were all those men & horses going to eat? An army eats out all the forage in an area very quickly. Lee only had enough wagons to haul his wounded. (Gen Imboden) In order to make the kind of moves you are proposing, which would have win or loose involve a longer campaign in Pennsylvania, would you have Lee abandon his wound or use the wagons to support an advance? It really was an either or proposition. In his report about his command of the wagon train filled with wounded, Imboden emphatically makes this point. Imboden's greatest anxiety was that a force large enough to cut off the wagons would strike the route. In his educated opinion, there was absolutely no way that loss could ever have been made up.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I'm not sure I'm getting the point here. Meade follows Lee and that's not hounding him, while Grant moves away from Lee's army and that is hounding him?


ite
The question however is whether this is actually practical to achieve. Nobody eliminated an enemy army in the field in the Civil War - bar none - though you could inflict casualties and disorganization.
In general the only time the elimination of an army is possible in 19th century warfare is when:

1) A fresh pursuit corps is available to follow up a broken enemy before they rally. This of course requires breaking the enemy in the first place.
2) The enemy can be trapped with no escape route.

You are quite right, Civil War Armies were incapable of destroying one another in the open field. They simply couldn't move fast enough. As Grant so ably demonstrated, you had to back them into a corner where they could be surrounded in order to capture an entire army. That was, of course, exactly the fate that awaited Lee had Sherman arrived in Virginia in time.

 

[Saphroneth]

We know that Lee's army was able to in fact sustain itself for the length of the actual Gettysburg Campaign, so it's not as if Lee was immediately going to starve on July 5 if Gettysburg continued. Certainly his army can't remain concentrated indefinitely, but nor can Meade.

You are quite right, Civil War Armies were incapable of destroying one another in the open field. They simply couldn't move fast enough. As Grant so ably demonstrated, you had to back them into a corner where they could be surrounded in order to capture an entire army. That was, of course, exactly the fate that awaited Lee had Sherman arrived in Virginia in time.

Sherman? Are we still talking about the Gettysburg campaign?

My question about this has been - if Meade did "hound" Lee, what would it look like that was different to what actually happened? You've previously indicated that "following" Lee wouldn't count:

He followed, yes, which is exactly the point.

But it's not as if Meade is going to be able to back Lee into a corner where he can be surrounded, because there is nothing else to do the surrounding and Lee is a capable operational general who has the capability with his army to bridge the (upper) Potomac.

 

[CowCavalry]

What were all those men & horses going to eat? An army eats out all the forage in an area very quickly. Lee only had enough wagons to haul his wounded. (Gen Imboden) In order to make the kind of moves you are proposing, which would have win or loose involve a longer campaign in Pennsylvania, would you have Lee abandon his wound or use the wagons to support an advance. It really was an either or proposition. In his report about his command of the wagon train filled with wounded makes this point.

I think E.P. Alexander gave his assessment of what the ANV could do in PA so far from its base and living off forage etc. IIRC, he did not express much confidence in what could be accomplished. I however, do think that Lee's motives were justified; he knew the odds, knew he could not just wait and be ground down and realized a gamble had to be taken. He was well aware that things were not going well in the western theater. I think his thoughts on taking the battle to the enemy on his soil and getting it out of VA (Freemantle discussed how ravaged and denuded VA was on his way to Lee's army in PA) , winning a battle on that soil and influencing the peace party and the 1864 election were reasonable and sound.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

But Meade did follow Lee back to the Potomac - he just didn't attack Lee's entrenchments at Falling Waters. Meanwhile Grant broke contact with Lee on at least one occasion...

The army of the Potomac cavalry under George Custer attacked them at falling Waters.