Gettysburg: the Ultimate "what if"...

[Saphroneth]

The army of the Potomac cavalry under George Custer attacked them at falling Waters.

Fair point.

I think E.P. Alexander gave his assessment of what the ANV could do in PA so far from its base and living off forage etc.

It's actually interesting to consider what the Army of Northern Virginia could have done if it had driven Meade from the field. It probably could have kept foraging new areas for another few weeks before returning south of the Potomac without running any serious risk of running out of food entirely - in the 18th century armies could keep going for quite a while on enemy territory and indeed it was one of the main ways of sustaining an army.

Meanwhile the political damage done to Lincoln at that point would be pretty serious.


The golden prize is probably managing to make the Second Day attack wholly successful and gain control of one of the two remaining roads, because at that point there's too much Army of the Potomac to retreat down one road overnight and so the fresh Confederates arriving on day three can do some good pursuit work.

 

[jackt62]

Washington's fort ring was very large, and this causes problems for the effectiveness one considers for the defences.
It was certainly heavily fortified, but one should compare it with cities like Sevastopol - which had a fortified perimeter that was much shorter and which had a very large number of guns.

I get that the Washington defenses lacked density as you point out when compared to the fortifications at Sevastopol. But would the Washington defense nevertheless have been sufficient to deter or thwart a push by Lee and the ANV, who if successful in breaching those defenses, would still have been left vulnerable to being cut off from their communications and liable to become themselves surrounded by reinforcements brought up by the AOTP? Or alternatively, would it be likely that Lee would have either the means, methods, and time to besiege Washington and its defenses.

 

[Saphroneth]

I get that the Washington defenses lacked density as you point out when compared to the fortifications at Sevastopol. But would the Washington defense nevertheless have been sufficient to deter or thwart a push by Lee and the ANV

Yes. Lee had no siege train and Washington had enough men in it to garrison the forts; there are some weak points but Lee would probably have needed a detailed position map to identify the ones he could risk assaulting.

The point I wanted to make is that the quality of the Washington forts are good enough to serve, but they're not the strongest in the world at this time.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The army of the Potomac cavalry under George Custer attacked them at falling Waters.

Gn Imboden's report, which includes the encounter with Lee that Shaara wrote as with Longstreet, he details the attacks on the wagon train of wounded. He also deals the organized attack by civilians wielding axes that disabled many wagons. Lee had assigned Imboden's cavalry to the wagon train because it was not well organized. Many men begged to be left at the roadside to die in peace because of the agony of the unpadded wagon beds. I reread Imboden to refresh my memory before posting on this thread.

 

[Rhea Cole]

We know that Lee's army was able to in fact sustain itself for the length of the actual Gettysburg Campaign, so it's not as if Lee was immediately going to starve on July 5 if Gettysburg continued. Certainly his army can't remain concentrated indefinitely, but nor can Meade.



Sherman? Are we still talking about the Gettysburg campaign?

My question about this has been - if Meade did "hound" Lee, what would it look like that was different to what actually happened? You've previously indicated that "following" Lee wouldn't count:




But it's not as if Meade is going to be able to back Lee into a corner where he can be surrounded, because there is nothing else to do the surrounding and Lee is a capable operational general who has the capability with his army to bridge the (upper) Potomac.

I would suggest a bit of map study. You might want to figure the West Virginia troops that were nearby & on the southern side of the river. They were not truly combat ready, but if called upon could have held the southern end of any alternative crossing point. There weren't that many places ti cross. Lee made it plain to Imboden, when he gave him his orders, that the crossing was a now or never thing. I expect Lee knew what he was talking about. You can google Imboden's report.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I think E.P. Alexander gave his assessment of what the ANV could do in PA so far from its base and living off forage etc. IIRC, he did not express much confidence in what could be accomplished. I however, do think that Lee's motives were justified; he knew the odds, knew he could not just wait and be ground down and realized a gamble had to be taken. He was well aware that things were not going well in the western theater. I think his thoughts on taking the battle to the enemy on his soil and getting it out of VA (Freemantle discussed how ravaged and denuded VA was on his way to Lee's army in PA) , winning a battle on that soil and influencing the peace party and the 1864 election were reasonable and sound.

There was a Napoleonic one grand battle & take the opponent's capital mindset amongst the Confederate high command. That might have worked in Austria. Taking Washington, with the resulting War of 1812 type destruction that would have been inevitable, would have inflamed, not dampened public opinion in the North. Even a small massacre or whatever it was at Fort Pillow spiked recruitment by over 100,000. Like Napoleon in Moscow, Lee couldn't possibly stay in D.C., it would be a trap. By that time of the war, Grant had figured out that the opponent's armed forces were the target, individual pieces of territory did not really matter. Anyways, it is all moot, Lee wisely fell back on his base. I agree with him, it was the thing to do.

 

[Saphroneth]

I would suggest a bit of map study. You might want to figure the West Virginia troops that were nearby & on the southern side of the river. They were not truly combat ready, but if called upon could have held the southern end of any alternative crossing point.

Presumably this is French's division, where he gathered up all the parts of the (administrative) 8th Corps which could be sent into the field? That was about 7,000 men and 12 guns, and he had to send a brigade of 2,500 of them to Washington after that report, so functionally this is 4,500 men and 12 guns.
This cannot block the Army of Northern Virginia. Indeed French tried but found his force totally insufficient to the task.

 

[Saphroneth]

Like Napoleon in Moscow, Lee couldn't possibly stay in D.C., it would be a trap.

The analogy doesn't work. Moscow was hundreds of miles from territory friendly to the Emperor, while the distance between Washington DC and Virginia is "a single bridge".

 

[Rhea Cole]

We know that Lee's army was able to in fact sustain itself for the length of the actual Gettysburg Campaign, so it's not as if Lee was immediately going to starve on July 5 if Gettysburg continued. Certainly his army can't remain concentrated indefinitely, but nor can Meade.



Sherman? Are we still talking about the Gettysburg campaign?

My question about this has been - if Meade did "hound" Lee, what would it look like that was different to what actually happened? You've previously indicated that "following" Lee wouldn't count:




But it's not as if Meade is going to be able to back Lee into a corner where he can be surrounded, because there is nothing else to do the surrounding and Lee is a capable operational general who has the capability with his army to bridge the (upper) Potomac.

In answer to the question about how Grant would have hounded Lee after Pickett's defeat, there is some evidence. Meade had already moved a sizable force around Lee's right. Stuart had been soundly defeated on Meade's right. As the sun was setting, Grant could have put Sheridan or Black Jack Logan in command of the left hook. A general assault all along the line in the morning coupled with Sheridan"s smash form the right would have put Lee's depleted & ammunitioinless men into an impossible tactical position. Thank goodness Meade's chronic A.o.P. case of the slows was in effect, so he didn't do it. My wife's g-g-grandfather's regiment had suffered 50% casualties & my cousins' regiment 82% already. One more hard fight & they would not have made it home. Then where would I be?

 

[Rhea Cole]

The analogy doesn't work. Moscow was hundreds of miles from territory friendly to the Emperor, while the distance between Washington DC and Virginia is "a single bridge".

It is an analogy, not at simile, precisely the point.

 

[CowCavalry]

There was a Napoleonic one grand battle & take the opponent's capital mindset amongst the Confederate high command. That might have worked in Austria. Taking Washington, with the resulting War of 1812 type destruction that would have been inevitable, would have inflamed, not dampened public opinion in the North. Even a small massacre or whatever it was at Fort Pillow spiked recruitment by over 100,000. Like Napoleon in Moscow, Lee couldn't possibly stay in D.C., it would be a trap. By that time of the war, Grant had figured out that the opponent's armed forces were the target, individual pieces of territory did not really matter. Anyways, it is all moot, Lee wisely fell back on his base. I agree with him, it was the thing to do.

I don't think Lee ever seriously considered DC as his main objective. Nor do I believe Lee would have allowed the destruction you reference, had it been his objective and provided he could have successfully occupied the enemy capitol, reference Gn order #72 issued as the ANV entered PA.

Apparently, the Union High command entertained the same "game of thrones", hence all the attempts to take Richmond.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I don't think Lee ever seriously considered DC as his main objective. Nor do I believe Lee would have allowed the destruction you reference, had it been his objective and provided he could have successfully occupied the enemy capitol, reference Gn order #72 issued as the ANV entered PA.

Apparently, the Union High command entertained the same "game of thrones", hence all the attempts to take Richmond.

You are absolutely correct, remember the on to Richmond! days of McClellan's days in command. After all, everybody was in pre-school at that time. Lincoln, Grant et al absorbed the lessons & evolved as time went on. Jefferson Davis' had a remarkably rigid mind, on the other hand. The Confederacy suffered accordingly.

 

[CowCavalry]

In answer to the question about how Grant would have hounded Lee after Pickett's defeat, there is some evidence. Meade had already moved a sizable force around Lee's right. Stuart had been soundly defeated on Meade's right. As the sun was setting, Grant could have put Sheridan or Black Jack Logan in command of the left hook. A general assault all along the line in the morning coupled with Sheridan"s smash form the right would have put Lee's depleted & ammunitioinless men into an impossible tactical position. Thank goodness Meade's chronic A.o.P. case of the slows was in effect, so he didn't do it. My wife's g-g-grandfather's regiment had suffered 50% casualties & my cousins' regiment 82% already. One more hard fight & they would not have made it home. Then where would I be?

I would again reference the AOP's condition; badly mauled, exhausted after three days of continuous combat, the first two of which were touch and go for the AOP, as the main reason Meade was unable to take the initiative and attack. As you know, Lee expected a counter attack after the repulse on the third day and helped to rally his troops, but this would have required the AOP taking the initiative, something they really hadn't done in the first three days of battle and apparently Meade did not think his army was capable of by the the third day.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I would again reference the AOP's condition; badly mauled, exhausted after three days of continuous combat, the first two of which were touch and go for the AOP, as the main reason Meade was unable to take the initiative and attack. As you know, Lee expected a counter attack after the repulse on the third day and helped to rally his troops, but this would have required the AOP taking the initiative, something they really hadn't done in the first three days of battle and apparently Meade did not think his army was capable of by the the third day.

As Grant learned at Belmont, the other guy is always just as beat up & scared as you are. He applied that lesson after the attempted breakout at Donelson. When his commanders pleaded the exhausted condition of their men, he told them to kick *** & get moving. We all know how that worked out. You are exactly right, Meade didn't think his army was able to move. Grant's boot would have dispelled that illusion. (Apparently the animal the Ten Commandments tells us not to covet is banned. Who knew?)

 

[thomas aagaard]

I would again reference the AOP's condition; badly mauled, exhausted after three days of continuous combat, the first two of which went badly for them, as the main reason Meade was unable to take the initiative and attack. As you know, Lee expected a counter attack after the repulse on the third day and helped to rally his troops, but this would have required the AOP taking the initiative, something they really hadn't done in the first three days of battle and apparently Meade did not think his army was capable of by the the third day.

I unfortunately don't have a source for this, but I remember reading somewhere that after the fighting died down on the 3rd, Meade's staff tried to get a roll call for all regiments in the army.
When they got the numbers later in the evening it showed that they had something like 40% of the men, they had before the battle started.

Obviously the army did not suffer 60% casualties. But with men who have gotten lost, Helping wounded to the rear and similar the effective strength loss of the army was massive.

Also officer looses had been heavy. 3 corp commanders was down. A number of division commanders the same and the list of brigade commanders wounded or kills was similar rather long. All of it made any sort of attack a lot harder to pull of.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I unfortunately don't have a source for this, but I remember reading somewhere that after the fighting died down on the 3rd, Meade's staff tried to get a roll call for all regiments in the army.
When they got the numbers later in the evening it showed that they had something like 40% of the men, they had before the battle started.

Obviously the army did not suffer 60% casualties. But with men who have gotten lost, Helping wounded to the rear and similar the effective strength loss of the army was massive.

Also officer looses had been heavy. 3 corp commanders was down. A number of division commanders the same and the list of brigade commanders wounded or kills was similar rather long. All of it made any sort of attack a lot harder to pull of.

As Bragg learned on the second day at Stones River, nobody ever won a battle sitting in their tent counting casualties. The lesson that Grant learned that the other guy is in the same condition. It is the one who keeps on pushing that wins. RE, his response to the attempted breakout at Donelson.

 

[Carronade]

There was a Napoleonic one grand battle & take the opponent's capital mindset amongst the Confederate high command. That might have worked in Austria.

If I may be permitted a slight digression, on the two occasions when Napoleon captured Vienna, 1805 and 1809, the greatest and decisive battles of the campaign came after he held the enemy capital: Austerlitz, Aspern-Essling (defeat), and Wagram. There is indeed more to winning a war than just "On to fill in the blank!".

 

[thomas aagaard]

As Bragg learned on the second day at Stones River, nobody ever won a battle sitting in their tent counting casualties. The lesson that Grant learned that the other guy is in the same condition. It is the one who keeps on pushing that wins. RE, his response to the attempted breakout at Donelson.

You simply can't compare Grans situation at Donelson with Gettysburg.
Two very very different sizes of armies. And different qualities and different opponents.

To make an attack that would have been a real threat to Lee on the 4th, would require organisation at a level that simply didn't exist.

The only option I can see that might have worked, would have ordered all units from the 6th corp to gather in one place and do an attack. They had not seen that much combat and it was the largest corp. But it was spread all over the battlefield by the 3rd. So they would have needed to spend the night/early morning to gather.

 

[Saphroneth]

In answer to the question about how Grant would have hounded Lee after Pickett's defeat, there is some evidence. Meade had already moved a sizable force around Lee's right. Stuart had been soundly defeated on Meade's right. As the sun was setting, Grant could have put Sheridan or Black Jack Logan in command of the left hook. A general assault all along the line in the morning coupled with Sheridan"s smash form the right would have put Lee's depleted & ammunitioinless men into an impossible tactical position.

All right, name the battle where Grant put in a heavy attack the day after heavy fighting.

It is an analogy, not at simile, precisely the point.

Except that the situations are not remotely comparable. What killed Napoleon's army was (1) the massive casualties in the battles before reaching Moscow and (2) the massive casualties on the long retreat after Moscow.

As Bragg learned on the second day at Stones River, nobody ever won a battle sitting in their tent counting casualties. The lesson that Grant learned that the other guy is in the same condition. It is the one who keeps on pushing that wins. RE, his response to the attempted breakout at Donelson.

"I must order a charge to save appearances".
Of course, history is equally full of generals who "kept on pushing" until their army disintegrated. Just one example: John Pope, August 1862.
Grant OTOH was more capable than that, and didn't push his armies to destruction - though he certainly attacked in occasions when attacking was not a good idea.

 

[CowCavalry]

As Bragg learned on the second day at Stones River, nobody ever won a battle sitting in their tent counting casualties. The lesson that Grant learned that the other guy is in the same condition. It is the one who keeps on pushing that wins. RE, his response to the attempted breakout at Donelson.

I don't think anyone can accuse Lee of not continuing to push.