J. Johnston Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

[Henry Hunt]

Shift all discussion of Lee over here thank you:

Lee - Robert E. Lee as Grand Strategist | Famous People of the Late Unpleasantness

Robert E. Lee as Grand Strategist (Wikipedia) Spillover from my Joseph Johnston thread, where many of the posters have been debating the merits of Lee as a grand strategist. No one doubts Lee's tactical ability as demonstrated at 2nd Bull Run and Chancellorsville however how good of a grand...

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[MBuehner]

Did Johnston ably command the armies under his control? My opinion would be 'yes'. Was he implementing a strategy that would 'win' the war? It's fun to debate: but it is not a measure of how skillfully (or not) he executed his command of his armies.

I don't think you can separate the two. If Johnston decided to march his army to New Mexico and hold out there for the duration of the war, you could argue he commanded the action skillfully. But it certainly wouldn't have helped the confederacy win the war, which is the only real measure of generalship imo.

Of course you can break down a generals skillset- does he move his army well, does he keep it supplied, is he tactically gifted. But Hooker was all those things and failed miserably as an army commander. You could argue the same with Rosecrans. Necessarily a good general is more than the sum of his parts.

 

[leftyhunter]

I don't think you can separate the two. If Johnston decided to march his army to New Mexico and hold out there for the duration of the war, you could argue he commanded the action skillfully. But it certainly wouldn't have helped the confederacy win the war, which is the only real measure of generalship imo.

Of course you can break down a generals skillset- does he move his army well, does he keep it supplied, is he tactically gifted. But Hooker was all those things and failed miserably as an army commander. You could argue the same with Rosecrans. Necessarily a good general is more than the sum of his parts.

Not sure if Hooker and Rosecrans failed miserably at command. Yes the battle of Chancellorsville was lost but there were a lot of complex factors not the least of which was Hooker getting struck on the head and for some reason he wasn't relieved of command.
President Lincoln did trust Hooker to command a 20k relief force to Chattanooga and Hooker in Georgia did while outnumbered defeat a Confederate force in Georgia.
Yes Rosecrans was defeated at Chickumungua but Rosecrans along with General Curtis did defeat Confederate General Price in Missouri. General Rosecrans won arguably one of the most brilliant offensive actions in his Tullohmah Campaign.
Leftyhunter

 

[Dead Parrott]

I don't think you can separate the two. If Johnston decided to march his army to New Mexico and hold out there for the duration of the war, you could argue he commanded the action skillfully. But it certainly wouldn't have helped the confederacy win the war, which is the only real measure of generalship imo.

Of course you can break down a generals skillset- does he move his army well, does he keep it supplied, is he tactically gifted. But Hooker was all those things and failed miserably as an army commander. You could argue the same with Rosecrans. Necessarily a good general is more than the sum of his parts.

Thanks for the response. To a point I agree with you, in that it is possible can judge a military leader on a number of levels. I would also agree that for different campaigns, different strategies (irrespective of tactical and command competence) may be good or bad - as I feel Johnston's strategy against Sherman was better than others, and his strategy on the peninsula … not so much.

I'd part with you on judging his "Overrated\Underrated" based largely on his ability to conceive the 'one true solution' to winning the war (which NO confederate leader came up with). With hindsight (and with no winning results to prove it) we say it was the 'wrong' strategy now - we have that luxury. But most people who study the war would agree that the only way for the confederacy to 'win' involved one or more of 1.) foreign recognition 2.) the Union tiring of war, and/or 3.) the Border States joining the Confederacy ("I hope
god is on my side, but I must have Kentucky"). Perhaps across-the-board defensive counterpunching frustration campaigns might have made the Confederacy appear more resiliant and viable to northern Democrats and foreign powers. To use the AWI example (to which the Confederacy aspired), Washington didn't have to smash the british as much as 'keep an army in the field'. Perhaps that would have been enough as well. We don't know, even if we claim we do.

By the way, I'm not suggesting any one or the other of these ideas are 'the winning strategy' for the Confederacy. I'm merely pointing out that we don't know the winning strategy, or what would have worked - only what did not. I enjoy informed speculation (this is a great site for it!), but I won't hold someone accountable (or judge their 'rated-ness') based on an historically unprovable standard.

It's completely fair game for you to judge him on it - I just choose not to use that as a key criteria.

(Based on that same criteria, Lee would be 'Overrated' - and I tend to rate Lee rather highly!).

Good points. Thanks.

- K.

 

[John Fenton]

As to the question "what strategy would win the war for the Confederacy" … well, I respectfully submit that no general solved that one.

Agreed. I don't think there was one.

 

[John Fenton]

A blockade is a zero sum game either exports get through in sufficient quantities to support a viable economy or they don't. As long as the Union Navy got larger and the Union Army could seize deep water ports then the Confederacy can not wait for a war of attrition.

The blockade was a factor for any strategy. Yet the south withheld cotton in an embargo. Some cotton was still getting out through Mexico and the confederacy was getting credit/selling cotton still in place in the south. They did not have much longer to wait and would have been much stronger if they had not spent their military resources as if they could match northern production and imports.

 

[John Fenton]

Lee ultimately was forced to follow johnston's Strategy so how could it be wrong ? The trouble was he also kept trying to follow davis's Strategy and was thus trapped like pemberton.

 

[Belfoured]

This is an interesting point I don't know enough about it myself. However the other day was looking at reviews of Steven H. Newton's book Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond. One of the reviewers mentioned that Newton wrote how Johnston burned the supplies because he was order to do it not out of choice. I don't have the the book myself so can't look at the footnote. Anyone have this particular work?

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Modern War Studies): Newton, Steven H.: 9780700609215: Amazon.com: Books

Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Modern War Studies) [Newton, Steven H.] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Modern War Studies)

www.amazon.com

I have it. I'll try to check on that source tonight.

 

[Henry Hunt]

I have it. I'll try to check on that source tonight.

Thanks!

 

[Belfoured]

Thanks!

Well, unless I really missed something that's another Amazon review that makes you wonder which book the reviewer read. Newton deals with this at pp. 47-55. In the proverbial nutshell, this is what he says: Johnston actually thought that supplies were being overstocked and had tried without success to get Richmond to stop adding to the stockpile. When it came time to withdraw he told Richmond it would be "next to impossible" to salvage all of it - primarily massive amounts of meat/foodstuffs and significant heavy artillery. Multiple locations were involved. A big impediment was the poor railroad system in Virginia, exacerbated by the Government's failure to take control of it. There also was no feasible method for moving the heavy artillery. Newton provides good evidence that even with all of the hurdles, Johnston destroyed far less than the conventional wisdom holds and was able to move a good deal of the supply. I have no idea how the reviewer came up with his version.

 

[John Fenton]

in answering the question of whether Johnston was overrated or underrated it seems to me you have to ask "what was his strategy and how did his tactics achieve it or not ? "
his strategy was different than Davis or Lee and i believe that his tactics worked better to achieve his strategy than Lee's tactics did to achieve his strategy.
my thoughts.

 

[leftyhunter]

The blockade was a factor for any strategy. Yet the south withheld cotton in an embargo. Some cotton was still getting out through Mexico and the confederacy was getting credit/selling cotton still in place in the south. They did not have much longer to wait and would have been much stronger if they had not spent their military resources as if they could match northern production and imports.

There was a brief informal cotton embargo early in the ACW but overall the Confederacy tried to export has much cotton as possible.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Lee ultimately was forced to follow johnston's Strategy so how could it be wrong ? The trouble was he also kept trying to follow davis's Strategy and was thus trapped like pemberton.

Not sure I follow. By late summer of 1864 wasn't Lee's strategy just to entrench and pray for a miracle? Not that Lee had any choice in the matter.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

in answering the question of whether Johnston was overrated or underrated it seems to me you have to ask "what was his strategy and how did his tactics achieve it or not ? "
his strategy was different than Davis or Lee and i believe that his tactics worked better to achieve his strategy than Lee's tactics did to achieve his strategy.
my thoughts.

I have to go with Davis in the sense that surrendering territory is not a viable strategy.
Leftyhunter

 

[Dead Parrott]

Not sure I follow. By late summer of 1864 wasn't Lee's strategy just to entrench and pray for a miracle? Not that Lee had any choice in the matter.
Leftyhunter

Grant was exceptionally effective at not giving Lee any choice in the matter. Yet another way in which Grant is underrated.

 

[JKT]

Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

View attachment 319550
(Wikipedia)

Joseph E. Johnston, or as his critics call him 'Retreatin Joe", is one of the more controversial commanders of the war. He was thought of favorably by many contemporary figures such as Sherman, Grant and Longstreet. Grant thought his strategy of conserving Confederate resources was the correct one and Longstreet regarded him as a greater general than Lee. Today opinions seem to be turning firmly against Johnston, other Confederate commander such as Bragg and Hood are being rehabilitated to the determent of him.

Johnston's art of war was Fabian in nature. He would give ground to concentrate resources for a decisive attack such as he attempted at Fair Oaks and Bentonville. Johnston also favored fighting on the defensive as at 1st Manassas and Kennesaw Mountain. Less favorable he could be hesitant when decisive action was needed as at Vicksburg. Johnston's reaction to Lee's victory at Fredericksburg is one of the more revealing as to his style of generalship: "What luck some people have, nobody will ever come to attack me in such a place."[1]

What do you think of Johnston? Should he be viewed as one of the top Confederate commanders along with Lee, Jackson and Longstreet? Or was he rather worse and inferior to Bragg, Beauregard and Hood?


[1] Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 192.

I'll have a go at this. Johnston had the disadvantages of living in Lee's shadow & never being appreciated (or liked) by Davis. Great on defense, as Sherman would find out in north Georgia, and versatile being called to Mississippi prior to the Vicksburg breakout attempt. He also fought in every theatre. Being replaced by the "attack at all costs" Hood in the Atlanta campaign, as we know, was disastrous and not appreciated by the common soldier. There's no way I would drop him into Bragg's (Jeff Davis' "pet") bottom rung class. Longstreet, Grant & likely Sherman respected him; which says a lot.

 

[Irishtom29]

I'll have a go at this. Johnston had the disadvantages of living in Lee's shadow & never being appreciated (or liked) by Davis. Great on defense, as Sherman would find out in north Georgia...

I'd say capable on defense; had he been truly great he would've stopped Sherman, not merely delayed him.

 

[leftyhunter]

Grant was exceptionally effective at not giving Lee any choice in the matter. Yet another way in which Grant is underrated.

To be fair to Lee Grant had more men and better logistics.Of course that is not a criticism of Grant since it's not Grant's job to give an opponent a fair fight.
Not sure how Lee could of done better in the Overland Campaign based on Lee's limited manpower and logistical resources.
Ironically Grant wrote in the ORs a proposal to invade Virginia via the back door of New Berne, North Carolina. It was President Lincoln's idea to mount the Overland Campaign in order to keep the AoP in front of Washington DC.
I agree Grant was a good general.
Leftyhunter

 

[jackt62]

I'd say capable on defense; had he been truly great he would've stopped Sherman, not merely delayed him.

But the same can be said about Lee; he delayed Grant during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns, but was never able to stop him.

 

[leftyhunter]

I'd say capable on defense; had he been truly great he would've stopped Sherman, not merely delayed him.

Not sure Johnston could of stopped Sherman. I don't know Sherman's manpower superiority ratio but if it was over two to one that would make defending Georgia very difficult.
Leftyhunter