J. Johnston Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

[Henry Hunt]

Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

(Wikipedia)

Joseph E. Johnston, or as his critics call him 'Retreatin Joe", is one of the more controversial commanders of the war. He was thought of favorably by many contemporary figures such as Sherman, Grant and Longstreet. Grant thought his strategy of conserving Confederate resources was the correct one and Longstreet regarded him as a greater general than Lee. Today opinions seem to be turning firmly against Johnston, other Confederate commander such as Bragg and Hood are being rehabilitated to the determent of him.

Johnston's art of war was Fabian in nature. He would give ground to concentrate resources for a decisive attack such as he attempted at Fair Oaks and Bentonville. Johnston also favored fighting on the defensive as at 1st Manassas and Kennesaw Mountain. Less favorable he could be hesitant when decisive action was needed as at Vicksburg. Johnston's reaction to Lee's victory at Fredericksburg is one of the more revealing as to his style of generalship: "What luck some people have, nobody will ever come to attack me in such a place."[1]

What do you think of Johnston? Should he be viewed as one of the top Confederate commanders along with Lee, Jackson and Longstreet? Or was he rather worse and inferior to Bragg, Beauregard and Hood?


[1] Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 192.

 

[alan polk]

This is a complex question on its face. Perhaps from a purely military aspect, Johnston's ideas and philosophies had great merit in isolation. We'll never know.

But here's the dealio, as they say: Johnston appeared unwilling to use his talents to implement, militarily, the political goals of the Davis Administration.

The situation at Vicksburg was the classic example. He thought Middle Tennesse was the more important of the two. Perhaps he was right. Maybe he had a better plan than Richmond. Again, we'll never know. But he was not a Czar, he was accountable to the President and the dictates of the administration. The Administration said Vicksburg and Port Hudson were important.

Instead of trying to meet the goals of the Administration, he subverted them. By subverting them, he got little done. If he could not implement his own ideas, he was not going to allow Davis to realize his. In the process, everything was lost. Nothing was realized to its fullest - his or Davis's - and in that context he was overrated.

 

[ErnieMac]

I'm not going to cast a vote because I don't see Johnston as being over or under rated, but think most CW historians have him slotted just right. IMO he was a capable strategist, but wasn't able to convince himself to act unless conditions were just right, something that rarely happens in war. In addition he allowed personal issues with the Confederate government to impact his job performance. Placing him below Lee, close to Beauregard, but above Bragg, Hood or Kirby Smith seems right to me.

 

[DaveBrt]

Johnston seems to have had some good plans, but his desire to conserve the South's limited manpower prevented him from taking effective action to protect the South's critical locations (Richmond and Atlanta). If you lose your critical locations in an effort to save manpower, you end up defeated, but with more men to surrender.

 

[Henry Hunt]

I'm not going to cast a vote because I don't see Johnston as being over or under rated, but think most CW historians have him slotted just right.

You bring up a good point, I edited the title to "Thoughts on Johnston" I think that will be a better fit.

 

[jackt62]

Interesting how the vote is split down the middle. For sure, Johnston seems to have a diminished historical reputation not least of because of his petty fights with Davis, favoring a policy of withdrawal, and waiting and hoping for the right opportunity to maneuver his opponents into an offensive position. Problem here is that his strategic leadership was not in sync with the Confederate administration (not that it always had a consistent strategy anyway). But none of the confederate leaders ever developed a winning strategy, so I don't think its fair to criticize Johnston for giving ground to conserve manpower. Hood's aggressive tactics after taking over from Johnston simply delayed an inevitable Union encirclement and capture of Atlanta, while bleeding the AOT dry. At least Johnston was a beloved commander who despite his failings, was called upon by Davis (albeit reluctantly) to take command of what remained of the AOT till the very end.

 

[ErnieMac]

Interesting how the vote is split down the middle. For sure, Johnston seems to have a diminished historical reputation not least of because of his petty fights with Davis, favoring a policy of withdrawal, and waiting and hoping for the right opportunity to maneuver his opponents into an offensive position. Problem here is that his strategic leadership was not in sync with the Confederate administration (not that it always had a consistent strategy anyway). But none of the confederate leaders ever developed a winning strategy, so I don't think its fair to criticize Johnston for giving ground to conserve manpower. Hood's aggressive tactics after taking over from Johnston simply delayed an inevitable Union encirclement and capture of Atlanta, while bleeding the AOT dry. At least Johnston was a beloved commander who despite his failings, was called upon by Davis (albeit reluctantly) to take command of what remained of the AOT till the very end.

I can't remember where, but I have read that Hood's aggressive tactics hastened the fall of Atlanta. Johnston's ability to keep his army intact caused Sherman to maintain a cautious approach and led to Sherman's positive assessment of Johnston after the war.

 

[Saint Jude]

Hood's aggressive tactics after taking over from Johnston simply delayed an inevitable Union encirclement and capture of Atlanta, while bleeding the AOT dry. At least Johnston was a beloved commander who despite his failings, was called upon by Davis (albeit reluctantly) to take command of what remained of the AOT till the very end.

It seems to me that Johnston was the one who was delaying the inevitable, while Hood was hastening it on. I can't help but wonder why Johnston agreed to take command again, which he must have known would be like trying to put the leaves back on the trees at that point. Strong sense of duty, I guess. Personally, I think he was a pretty good general.

 

[Carronade]

Johnston's strategy on the Peninsula seems to have worked. He bought time for the Confederates to assemble a force that could engage and defeat the principal army of the United States. What would one suggest as an alternative? Fighting a decisive battle at Yorktown or Williamsburg?

Similarly in the Atlanta campaign, he took advantage of the mountainous terrain to delay Sherman as long as he could, inflicting more losses than he suffered. Atlanta was also a rail hub; had there been Confederate reinforcements to be had, it was the place to collect them. When it came time to fight, Johnston's plan to concentrate 2/3 of his army against each half of Sherman's in turn was the best that could be developed. It might well have gone better under Johnston than Hood.

 

[Henry Hunt]

Johnston's strategy on the Peninsula seems to have worked. He bought time for the Confederates to assemble a force that could engage and defeat the principal army of the United States. What would one suggest as an alternative? Fighting a decisive battle at Yorktown or Williamsburg?

Similarly in the Atlanta campaign, he took advantage of the mountainous terrain to delay Sherman as long as he could, inflicting more losses than he suffered. Atlanta was also a rail hub; had there been Confederate reinforcements to be had, it was the place to collect them. When it came time to fight, Johnston's plan to concentrate 2/3 of his army against each half of Sherman's in turn was the best that could be developed. It might well have gone better under Johnston than Hood.

I agree fighting a decisive engagement at Yorktown would have given McClellan exactly what he wanted. McClellan would have loved it if Johnston filled up the fortress with as many soldiers as possible to be besieged and captured.

In regard to the Atlanta campaign, I am particularly impressed by Johnston's maneuvers in the lead up to Cassville. Sherman fell for Johnston's ruse pursuing with Hardee corps while leaving Schofield to face the bulk of Johnston's army alone. Had Butterfield not disrupted Hood's attack he may have struck a significant blow.

I can't remember where, but I have read that Hood's aggressive tactics hastened the fall of Atlanta. Johnston's ability to keep his army intact caused Sherman to maintain a cautious approach and led to Sherman's positive assessment of Johnston after the war.

Stephen Davis in his work on Atlanta takes the opposing view. He thinks that Johnston would have simply given up Atlanta if his initial attack at Peace Tree Creek failed citing his letter to Davis that mentioned leaving the city to militia. Davis thinks Hood held it longer by repeated attacks such as the near success on the Battle of July 22nd that killed McPherson.

 

[ErnieMac]

I agree fighting a decisive engagement at Yorktown would have given McClellan exactly what he wanted. McClellan would have loved it if Johnston filled up the fortress with as many soldiers as possible to be besieged and captured.

In regard to the Atlanta campaign, I am particularly impressed by Johnston's maneuvers in the lead up to Cassville. Sherman fell for Johnston's ruse pursuing with Hardee corps while leaving Schofield to face the bulk of Johnston's army alone. Had Butterfield not disrupted Hood's attack he may have struck a significant blow.



Stephen Davis in his work on Atlanta takes the opposing view. He thinks that Johnston would have simply given up Atlanta if his initial attack at Peace Tree Creek failed citing his letter to Davis that mentioned leaving the city to militia. Davis thinks Hood held it longer by repeated attacks such as the near success on the Battle of July 22nd that killed McPherson.

That's certainly not beyond the realm of possibility. I'll have to think on that.

 

[Florida Rebel]

Joe Johnston never wanted to attack and fight offensively. It always bothered me how he retreated almost to the gates of Richmond before the South was saved by his wounding and Lee taking over his command. Lee got the job done but sadly, lost a lot of men doing it but he saved the capital and gave the South hope. Back to Johnston, this much is true - his action in GA, in front of Sherman in '64, might have won the war and southern independence had Davis left him alone. But Davis let his hatred of Johnston interfere with good judgment. By playing "good defense," Johnston was frustrating Sherman to no end and killing a lot of Yankees too. Lee was killing even more of Grant's men that spring and summer. With all the Union boys coming home in coffins, the time for a new election up north and peace, maybe even independence, may have been on the horizon. But Davis threw that away because at that very important time, he failed to see what was happening. So to answer the question, was Johnston over-rated or under-rated? NEITHER.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Johnston's strategy on the Peninsula seems to have worked. He bought time for the Confederates to assemble a force that could engage and defeat the principal army of the United States. What would one suggest as an alternative? Fighting a decisive battle at Yorktown or Williamsburg?

Similarly in the Atlanta campaign, he took advantage of the mountainous terrain to delay Sherman as long as he could, inflicting more losses than he suffered. Atlanta was also a rail hub; had there been Confederate reinforcements to be had, it was the place to collect them. When it came time to fight, Johnston's plan to concentrate 2/3 of his army against each half of Sherman's in turn was the best that could be developed. It might well have gone better under Johnston than Hood.

His strategies worked right up to the final part .... the attack. The purpose of retreating was to draw the enemy further from his base while shortening his own, plus to gather forces and thenlaunch an attack that in theory would reverse the campaign and force the enemy to retreat back to,their starting point. In Johnston's case, every time he planned to make that attack something went terribly wrong and wrecked any chance of victory. Example #1: Seven Pines. Example #2, Cassville.

 

[Henry Hunt]

Something else that occurred to me, Johnston does not seem to have been afraid to get in the thick of the fighting. As we all know he was wounded at Fair Oaks and he was also standing next to Polk when he was killed. However if we are comparing him to Hood....

 

[John Fenton]

Johnston seems to have had some good plans, but his desire to conserve the South's limited manpower prevented him from taking effective action to protect the South's critical locations (Richmond and Atlanta). If you lose your critical locations in an effort to save manpower, you end up defeated, but with more men to surrender.

While we have been all over this subject let me say....
I think Johnston had the correct strategy . Once the fact of a protracted war was realized conservation was the name of the game. Johnston stopped McClellan's offensive at seven pines with about 4000 casulities. Lee had almost as many casulities in the seven days battle as he surrendered to grant. Lee lost Richmond. Hood lost Atlanta. Johnston's army was about the same size as lee's until after bentonville as it included all forces in the southeast besides his own army. Hood left Johnston with about 4500 men which Johnston increased to about 30,000.
Johnston had to fight the union, Davis, Bragg, hood, and others. Lee had Carte Blanche as far as it could be granted.
Johnston had flaws and is at least partly responsible for Vicksburg but pemberton carries the fullest blame.
The entire Georgia/Atlanta campaign was caused by letting grant out of Chattanooga. Bragg's fault.
Johnston was willing to give up territory that was inevitably going to be lost , to conserve manpower and effective
Maneuvering that would force the opponent to spend his resources.
I do not have any proof but believe Johnston hoped to stall for foreign recognition or northern fatigue with the war. Lee thought he could do the job on his own with his army.
These are my thoughts on Johnston, in a butternut shell.

 

[John Fenton]

PS. One argument against Johnston was that as the confederacy lost territory it lost recruiting in these areas. I maintain that these areas were pretty much picked clean already. Things like pemberton's surrender and lee's causalities cost much more.

 

[alan polk]

partly responsible for Vicksburg but pemberton carries the fullest blame

I would be interested in reading your further explanation of this.

 

[8thFlorida]

Thoughts on Joseph E. Johnston

View attachment 319550
(Wikipedia)

Joseph E. Johnston, or as his critics call him 'Retreatin Joe", is one of the more controversial commanders of the war. He was thought of favorably by many contemporary figures such as Sherman, Grant and Longstreet. Grant thought his strategy of conserving Confederate resources was the correct one and Longstreet regarded him as a greater general than Lee. Today opinions seem to be turning firmly against Johnston, other Confederate commander such as Bragg and Hood are being rehabilitated to the determent of him.

Johnston's art of war was Fabian in nature. He would give ground to concentrate resources for a decisive attack such as he attempted at Fair Oaks and Bentonville. Johnston also favored fighting on the defensive as at 1st Manassas and Kennesaw Mountain. Less favorable he could be hesitant when decisive action was needed as at Vicksburg. Johnston's reaction to Lee's victory at Fredericksburg is one of the more revealing as to his style of generalship: "What luck some people have, nobody will ever come to attack me in such a place."[1]

What do you think of Johnston? Should he be viewed as one of the top Confederate commanders along with Lee, Jackson and Longstreet? Or was he rather worse and inferior to Bragg, Beauregard and Hood?


[1] Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 192.

His wife was from Wilmington, DE. That is interesting to me.

 

[Henry Hunt]

His wife was from Wilmington, DE. That is interesting to me.

Very interesting, I wonder what she thought of him joining the Confederacy? As I recall Scott went to some effort to try and keep Johnston from leaving. Johnston fighting for the Union, a reverse of Pemberton who left because of his Virginia wife, is an interesting what if.

 

[8thFlorida]

Very good point. But Delaware was a border state and 2/3 of the state was pro confederacy. culturally Delaware is a Southern state. Even though it fought with the Union. I think she was likely a Southern sympathizer although I can't know for certain. In fact even after the war Senator Bayard from Delaware raged against the evil practices of Reconstruction which terrorized white civilians who had no association with the KKK. It's quite shocking if you read the history. And quite eye opening.