After Gettysburg

[Eric Wittenberg]

Those offensives were fairly limited in scope. They weren't the full-scale ones conducted in 1864. It's comparing two different things.

R

I have to disagree with you on part of this, Ryan. The advance that led to Second Rappahannock Station on November 7, 1863 was an advance by the entire Army of the Potomac, half at Kelly's Ford, and half at Rappahannock Station. The movement caught Lee by surprise, and the crossing at Kelly's Ford was largely uncontested. The movement forced Lee to abandon his chosen winter encampment in Culpeper County and forced his army back across the Rapidan River and into Orange County, a much less wealthy and worse location for the winter encampment. In fact, Lee's army faced great hardship there, in large part due to having to give up Culpeper County. In late January 1864, Lee issued this order:

General Orders, No. 7.

The commanding general considers it due to the army to state that the temporary reduction of rations has been caused by circumstances beyond the control of those charged with its support.

Its welfare and comfort are the objects of his constant and earnest solicitude, and no effort has been spared to provide for its wants. It is hoped that the exertions now being made will render the necessity but of short duration. But the history of the army has shown that the country can require no sacrifice too great for its patriotic devotion.

Soldiers, you tread with no unequal steps the road by which your fathers marched through, suffering privation and blood, to independence. Continue to emulate in the future as you have in the past their valor in arms, their patient endurance of hardships, their high resolve to be free, which no trial could shake, no bribe seduce, no danger appall, and be assured that the just God, who crowned their efforts with success, will in His own good time send down His blessings upon you.

R. E. Lee, General.

Second Rappahannock Station actually had great strategic significance that has long been misunderstood and under appreciated. Your statement demonstrates that.

 

[rpkennedy]

I have to disagree with you on part of this, Ryan. The advance that led to Second Rappahannock Station on November 7, 1863 was an advance by the entire Army of the Potomac, half at Kelly's Ford, and half at Rappahannock Station. The movement caught Lee by surprise, and the crossing at Kelly's Ford was largely uncontested. The movement forced Lee to abandon his chosen winter encampment in Culpeper County and forced his army back across the Radian River and into Orange County, a much less wealthy and worse location for the winter encampment. In fact, Lee's army faced great hardship there, in large part due to having to give up Culpeper County. In late January 1864, Lee issued this order:

General Orders, No. 7.

The commanding general considers it due to the army to state that the temporary reduction of rations has been caused by circumstances beyond the control of those charged with its support.

Its welfare and comfort are the objects of his constant and earnest solicitude, and no effort has been spared to provide for its wants. It is hoped that the exertions now being made will render the necessity but of short duration. But the history of the army has shown that the country can require no sacrifice too great for its patriotic devotion.

Soldiers, you tread with no unequal steps the road by which your fathers marched through, suffering privation and blood, to independence. Continue to emulate in the future as you have in the past their valor in arms, their patient endurance of hardships, their high resolve to be free, which no trial could shake, no bribe seduce, no danger appall, and be assured that the just God, who crowned their efforts with success, will in His own good time send down His blessings upon you.

R. E. Lee, General.

Second Rappahannock Station actually had great strategic significance that has long been misunderstood and under appreciated. Your statement demonstrates that.

I stand corrected then.

R

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

I stand corrected then.

R

This is why I'm finishing the research to do a book length study of Second Rappahannock Station, in the hope that it gets its due.

 

[rpkennedy]

This is why I'm finishing the research to do a book length study of Second Rappahannock Station, in the hope that it gets its due.

I'm looking forward to reading it in the future.

R

 

[TFSmith121]

The ultimate definition of an arm-chair quarterback with no concept of the reality of command, the terrain, or the position constructed by Lee's engineers. Those troops of Couch and Smith he mentions: more worthless than you-know-what's on a bull.

You might also include this in your "analysis":

After seeing how Meade was being savaged by the Monday morning quarterbacks, O. O. Howard, of all people, sent Lincoln this letter on July 18:

Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the battles [sic] of Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem calculated to convey a wrong impression to your mind, I wish to submit a few statements. The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operations of our present commanding General prior to the engagement and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before during the war been thrown in at just the right moment. . . . Moreover I have never seen a more hearty co-operation on the part of General officers as since General Meade took the command.

As to not attacking the enemy prior to leaving his stronghold beyond the Antietam it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not have been turned upon us; at any rate the Commanding General was in favor of an immediate attack but with the evident difficulties in our way the uncertainty of a success and the strong conviction of our best military minds against the risk, I must say, that I think the General acted wisely.

As to my request to make a reconnaissance on the morning of the 14th which the papers state was refused; the facts are, that the General had required me to reconnoitre the evening before and give my opinion as to the practicability of making a lodgement on the enemy's left, and his answer to my subsequent request was, that the movements he had already ordered would subserve the same purpose.

We have, if I may be allowed to say it, a Commanding General in whom all the officers, with whom I have come in contact, express complete confidence. I have said this much because of the censure and of the misrepresentations which have grown out of the escape of Lee's army.

Lincoln responded on July 21:

Executive Mansion,

Washington, 21st July, 1863.

My dear General Howard:

Your letter of the 18th is received. I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy—believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste. Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed—making my belief a hobby possibly—that the main rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done. General Meade has my confidence as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.

Yours very truly,

A. Lincoln.

So much for that.

An "armchair quarterback" who was the commander-in-chief, and who had the responsibility of demanding the most from his subordinates and the authority, as given by the citizenry, to do just that...

"Should" Meade have done more immediately after the battle? Of course.

"Could" Meade have done more with the Army as it was situated immediately after the battle, or - for that matter - after the previous two years plus of ultimately failed offensive operations, under McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker? That's a different question, and one that is worth considering.

Having said that, Lincoln - as CinC - had the right and the responsibility to demand Meade do more after Gettysburg than McClellan had after Antietam. It brings to mind Eisenhower and Patton in the Ardennes; if the enemy has overextended his resources in an offensive and been defeated, it is not the time to hold back...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

I missed the lincoln quote. My point is Meade will fight offense defense and win. It just wont be the bloodbath of Grant.

Grant's Overland offensive, bloodbath or no, does have one a significant difference from Meade's efforts after Gettysburg, however.

Best,

 

[Bee]

An "armchair quarterback" who was the commander-in-chief, and who had the responsibility of demanding the most from his subordinates and the authority, as given by the citizenry, to do just that...

I would suggest that the CiC forms his opinions based on those around him, unless he is on the battlefield, himself. His opinions of Mead were already being formed by an internal campaign against Mead. As soon as Sickles arrived in town to recouperate, he began his PR smear against Mead, beginning as early as July 5:

Historian Richard A. Sauers wrote: "While in the capital, Sickles told his version of the Battle of Gettysburg to everyone who would listen, President Lincoln included. During this recuperation period, Sickles may have begun his plan to have Meade removed from command, http://www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.org...rys-charlatans-general-dan-sickles-1819-1914/
​

The situation as it was, in Mead's words:

Letter from George Gordon Meade to Henry Wager Halleck, July 8, 1863


July 8, 1863, 2 P. M.

Gen'l Conch learns from scouts that the train is crossing at Williams port very slowly. So long as the river is unfordable the enemy cannot cross. My cavalry report that they had a fight near Funkstown, through which they drove the enemy to Hagerstown where a large infantry force was [...]. From all I can gather the enemy extends from Hagerstown to Williamsport [...] the march of their trains. Their cavalry and infantry pickets are advanced to the Hagerstown and Sharpsburg pike, on the general line of the Antietam. We hold Boonshoro, and our pickets, four miles in front, toward Hagerstown, are in contact with the enemy's pickets. My Army is assembling slowly; the rains of yesterday and last [...] have made all roads but pikes almost impassable. Artillery and wagons are stalled; it will take time to collect them together. A large portion of the men are barefooted. Shoes will arrive at Frederick today and will be issued as soon as possible. The spirit of the Army is high; the men are ready and willing to make any exertion to push forward. The very first moment I can get the different commands, the artillery and cavalry, properly supplied and in hand I will, move forward. Be assured I most earnestly desire to try the fortunes of war with the enemy on this side of the river, hoping, through Providence and the bravery of my men to setsle the question, but I should be wrong not to frankly tell you of the difficulties encountered. I expect to find the enemy in a strong position, well covered with artillery, and I do not desire to imitate his example at Gettysburg and assault a position when the chances are so greatly against success. I wish in advance to moderate the expectation of those who; in ignorance of the difficulties to be encountered, may expect too much. All that I can do under the circumstances, I pledge this Army to do https://www.gettysburg.edu/dotAsset/4a24eaf8-8a64-4d64-9f1e-12a6a2be2631.pdf​

 

[TFSmith121]

Bee -

Understood; but there's the issue that the weather would have had similar effects on Lee et al.

It is undeniable that Meade did well as an army commander against Lee, far better than any other US commander had done so far in the war; my point is that whether that was everything that could be expected, both from Meade as CG and the AoTP.

My own opinion is it was not.

Best,

 

[Bee]

In pursuit of replies to some of the more frequent posts about Mead and the Retreat of Lee's army, I found a couple of commentaries from a round table discussion on this very same topic. I am familiar with both Dave Powell and Jim Epperson from other discussions, readings, ariticles, blogs, so I have come to respect their opinions. I find their comments an asset to this discussion. I make no claims to being well read or studied on this topic of Mead and the retreat from Gettysburg, but it greatly interests me, nonetheless.

If Grant had been in charge the Army of Northern Virginia would have been annihilated in Pennsylvania

I'll certainly not dispute Grant's abilities or aggressiveness. However, Grant usually had time to get to know a command before taking on major responsibilities with it. Put him in Meade's shoes, and you still face Meade's problems - newness to command, distrust of some of your own staff, no time to establish clear working relationships with most of the other Corps commanders, etc. Even Grant's one experience that offers a clear parallel - Chattanooga - is not completely similar: Grant brought with him trusted troops and subordinates, and had a couple of weeks to understand the situation and get to know Thomas' army. Even then, the follow-up to Missionary Ridge wasn't exactly a grand pursuit. I think Grant would have attacked if he thought he could win - but I'm not sure he'd have reached that conclusion, especially with an army he distrusted.

Remember, Meade didn't even know the positions of the other Corps when he assumed command at 3:00 a.m. The burden was simply immense, and I don't think if fair to fault the man for the job he did given the weight of it. Plenty of the AOP's commanders would have _lost_ at Gettysburg, and then we'd be arguing about the speed of Lee's pursuit as the AOP retired to DC.

Dave Powell http://www.gdg.org/research/People/RELee/dtretrt.html​

We should consider the Sixth Corps, the largest corps in the Army of the Potomac was practically unengaged during the battle of Gettysburg and were therefore comparatively fresh.

Meade, operating on the edge of physical exhaustion and acutely aware of his own losses, started his cautious southward pursuit after noon on July 5, with the relatively intact VI Corps in the vanguard. Meade did not follow Lee directly but had the Army of the Potomac use three separate routes into Maryland. He then ordered his troops westward to Catoctin Mountain for a rendezvous at Middletown before sending them back across South Mountain to face Lee at Williamsport. http://www.civilwar.org/battlefield...ory-articles/battle-of-gettysburg-finale.html
​

One of the descriptions that I read about this particular part of VI Corps journey was that it was dark, rainy, and at times they were on all fours working their way up the mountain.

I also found it interesting that on the evening of July 4, Mead held a Council of War with the main questions of whether to stay in Gettysburg or pursue Lee: Those in favor of staying in Gettysburg — Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren. Those who wished to pursue - Newton, Pleasonton, and Slocum. Doubtful - Howard. It seemed that even Halleck had his reservations about when to engage: he postponed "general engagement" twice: on the night of the 8th (OR 27, 3:517) and again on the night of the 10th (OR 27, 1:89) giving the impression that Mead was stalling engagement unilaterally if the missives were not public at the time.

​

This commentary below does not necessarily address 6th corps as the sole means of pursuit, but it discusses another option of pursuit that I had not considered. I would be interested in others' opinions.

Cutting Lee off at the pass, so to speak, has merit, but I wonder if Meade and/or 6th Corps is the force to do that. Meade was starting from behind Lee, and in choosing a route to send some or all of his command around Lee, would have to first divine where Lee was headed, and then require that any flanking force march faster and farther than Lee's advance guard. That's a pretty tall order.

Also, in terms of devining intentions, Meade has already lost one cavalry division (Buford, with his best mounted commander) withdrawn for remounting. The state of his other cavalry become critical in this situation - especially since Stuart is no present, and any Union recon must penetrate the CSA screen.

However, focusing on Meade is too limiting, I think. The real opportunity may well reside with Halleck. Consider that Halleck had, at close hand, some 12000 infantry in the field, yet not fully under Meade's control. French had 5100 troops near Frederick, mostly the Harper's Ferry garrison that was withdrawn to avoid a repeat of the capture of that place. Another three brigades - 5700 troops - were brought north from VA and NC to bolster the defenses of DC. Finally, there was one Brigade of Pa Reserves - 1300 strong - retained in DC. Combined, this force would match the strength of Meade's stongest Corps, and still leave DC's basic garrison of heavy Arty regiments intact. These troops were also veterans, having fought with the AOP at various times, and were likely to give a solid account of themselves - it's not as if they were simply raw militia.

In fact, most of these 7 brigades did join Meade's army in the days after Gettysburg. French and his three brigades, for instance, were assimilated into 3rd Corps, where French took command.

But what if the force were assembled at Frederick - French's location during the battle? This location puts them within a day's march of virtually all of Lee's possible crossing sites, much faster than Lee could get there. Halleck, I think, bears a much greater responsibility for lack of vision and failure to stop Lee than Meade does.

Dave Powell http://www.gdg.org/research/People/RELee/dtretrt.html​

 

[Yankeedave]

Those offensives were fairly limited in scope. They weren't the full-scale ones conducted in 1864. It's comparing two different things.

R

Limited by results not intent. Eventually limited by weather.

 

[James_tiberous]

In pursuit of replies to some of the more frequent posts about Mead and the Retreat of Lee's army, I found a couple of commentaries from a round table discussion on this very same topic. I am familiar with both Dave Powell and Jim Epperson from other discussions, readings, ariticles, blogs, so I have come to respect their opinions. I find their comments an asset to this discussion. I make no claims to being well read or studied on this topic of Mead and the retreat from Gettysburg, but it greatly interests me, nonetheless.

I'll certainly not dispute Grant's abilities or aggressiveness. However, Grant usually had time to get to know a command before taking on major responsibilities with it. Put him in Meade's shoes, and you still face Meade's problems - newness to command, distrust of some of your own staff, no time to establish clear working relationships with most of the other Corps commanders, etc. Even Grant's one experience that offers a clear parallel - Chattanooga - is not completely similar: Grant brought with him trusted troops and subordinates, and had a couple of weeks to understand the situation and get to know Thomas' army. Even then, the follow-up to Missionary Ridge wasn't exactly a grand pursuit. I think Grant would have attacked if he thought he could win - but I'm not sure he'd have reached that conclusion, especially with an army he distrusted.

Remember, Meade didn't even know the positions of the other Corps when he assumed command at 3:00 a.m. The burden was simply immense, and I don't think if fair to fault the man for the job he did given the weight of it. Plenty of the AOP's commanders would have _lost_ at Gettysburg, and then we'd be arguing about the speed of Lee's pursuit as the AOP retired to DC.

Dave Powell http://www.gdg.org/research/People/RELee/dtretrt.html​

​

This commentary below does not necessarily address 6th corps as the

Cutting Lee off at the pass, so to speak, has merit, but I wonder if Meade and/or 6th Corps is the force to do that. Meade was starting from behind Lee, and in choosing a route to send some or all of his command around Lee, would have to first divine where Lee was headed, and then require that any flanking force march faster and farther than Lee's advance guard. That's a pretty tall order.

Also, in terms of devining intentions, Meade has already lost one cavalry division (Buford, with his best mounted commander) withdrawn for remounting. The state of his other cavalry become critical in this situation - especially since Stuart is no present, and any Union recon must penetrate the CSA screen.

However, focusing on Meade is too limiting, I think. The real opportunity may well reside with Halleck. Consider that Halleck had, at close hand, some 12000 infantry in the field, yet not fully under Meade's control. French had 5100 troops near Frederick, mostly the Harper's Ferry garrison that was withdrawn to avoid a repeat of the capture of that place. Another three brigades - 5700 troops - were brought north from VA and NC to bolster the defenses of DC. Finally, there was one Brigade of Pa Reserves - 1300 strong - retained in DC. Combined, this force would match the strength of Meade's stongest Corps, and still leave DC's basic garrison of heavy Arty regiments intact. These troops were also veterans, having fought with the AOP at various times, and were likely to give a solid account of themselves - it's not as if they were simply raw militia.

In fact, most of these 7 brigades did join Meade's army in the days after Gettysburg. French and his three brigades, for instance, were assimilated into 3rd Corps, where French took command.

But what if the force were assembled at Frederick - French's location during the battle? This location puts them within a day's march of virtually all of Lee's possible crossing sites, much faster than Lee could get there. Halleck, I think, bears a much greater responsibility for lack of vision and failure to stop Lee than Meade does.

Dave Powell http://www.gdg.org/research/People/RELee/dtretrt.html​

thanks, very interesting!

 

[Terence MacManus]

What if some sort of counter attack was attempted the late afternoon of July 3rd? IIRC Hancock wanted to regroup and attack immediately directly at the area where the retreating Confederates fled, and Lee's army was in disarray with the center non-existent. I don't know how possible it would have been to organize and counterattack that day, but the possibility and the possible results are intriguing.

In sum, though, the idea that Meade could have destroyed the ANV from the 4th to 14th seems to have been thoroughly and fully debunked (thanks in large measure to Mr Wittenberg)...that won't stop it from being repeated and accepted widely, however.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

What if some sort of counter attack was attempted the late afternoon of July 3rd? IIRC Hancock wanted to regroup and attack immediately directly at the area where the retreating Confederates fled, and Lee's army was in disarray with the center non-existent. I don't know how possible it would have been to organize and counterattack that day, but the possibility and the possible results are intriguing.

In sum, though, the idea that Meade could have destroyed the ANV from the 4th to 14th seems to have been thoroughly and fully debunked (thanks in large measure to Mr Wittenberg)...that won't stop it from being repeated and accepted widely, however.

Thank you for your kind words. My work with this issue is far from finished.

Regarding the counterattack, Meade himself addressed that question in his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Here is what he said about this issue:

"As soon as the assault was repulsed, I went immediately to the extreme left of my line, with the determination of advancing the left and making an assault upon the enemy's lines. So soon as I arrived at the left I gave the necessary orders for the pickets and skirmishers in front to be thrown forward to feel the enemy, and for all preparations to be made for the assault. The great length of the line, and the time required to carry these orders out to the front, and the movement subsequently made, before the report given to me of the condition of the forces in the front and left, caused it to be so late in the evening as to induce me to abandon the assault which I had contemplated."

Makes sense to me.

 

[jgoodguy]

I did a five part study of this question on my blog last year that has led to a 170,000 work book manuscript. This is not a simple question, nor is it one that can be addressed in a few pithy words of prolix prose here. If you're interested in my take on it, you can find it here: www.civilwarcavalry.com. The posts were from July 2015. I'm not about to repeat them here.

There are at least 2 books on this issue.


Retreat from Gettysburg
Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign Kent Masterson Brown

One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-1863
Jan 19, 2011 by Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi

However one argues it. A victory in hand at a low point in Union morale avoiding a potential defeat is a good thing. IMHO

 

[War Horse]

Bee -

Understood; but there's the issue that the weather would have had similar effects on Lee et al.

It is undeniable that Meade did well as an army commander against Lee, far better than any other US commander had done so far in the war; my point is that whether that was everything that could be expected, both from Meade as CG and the AoTP.

My own opinion is it was not.

Best,

The weather was atrocious. Lee's army had already retreated over the muddy mess of the few passes through the mountains. Meade in pursuit was forced to use these same routes after thousands of troops, horses and wagons had already basically destroyed them. I'd say that's a rather large disadvantage for the pursuing army to contend with.

 

[Yankeedave]

There is always the desire to follow up on the defeated, and then there is the reality. Jackson gets applauded for wanting to follow up at 1st Bull Run, but finds it isnt that easy see 2nd Bull Run...

 

[TFSmith121]

The weather was atrocious. Lee's army had already retreated over the muddy mess of the few passes through the mountains. Meade in pursuit was forced to use these same routes after thousands of troops, horses and wagons had already basically destroyed them. I'd say that's a rather large disadvantage for the pursuing army to contend with.

And that's fair - and yet... (source for the dates/times below is Tucker's High Tide at Gettysburg):

The rain began falling the night of July 3; Johnson began is withdrawal from Meade's right at 1:30 am July 4. Early and Rodes followed. At daybreak, it was unclear how far the ANV was withdrawing, and the rain stopped and started, but both Hancock and Pleasanton were urging an attack. Hill, Longstreet, and Ewell' corps moved out for good the night of July 4; Ewell's corps was not on the road until the morning of July 5, and Gordon's brigade, the last of the rear guard, didn't pull out until noon...

Lee reached the Potomac on July 7; Meade did not get to the same point in force until July 12. Lee's army was crossing the river July 13-14; Heth's division, the rear guard, was alone north of the river for much of July 14.

As Catton wrote, Meade was "one of the few men who could have lost the war ... and he had managed to avoid the mistakes that would have lost it. He would continue to avoid mistakes, even if he had to miss opportunity."

Meade did an excellent job of stopping Lee, grinding him up, and sending him home, sadder but wiser... but still: Gettysburg (and its aftermath) was, potentially, a battle where the war could have been won - but not, Faulkner notwithstanding, by the rebels: by the US.

To me, that's the great what if of the 1863 Pennsylvania Campaign. Not a rebel victory; but an total victory for the US.

Best,

 

[Bee]

Could, or perhaps should have Meade cut off and destroyed the Army of Northern Virginia?

To address where the lost opportunity for Mead was, it seems to point to the mountain passes, as this would have been the place to bottleneck Lee's army during a difficult retreat. It would suggest that caution on the part of Mead caused him to hesitate at a time most crucial in cancelling the original order to block the passes. This was further blundered by Kilpatrick failing to secure Monterey pass before departure :

Initially, Mead ordered French to return part of his command to Harpers Ferry, and to block the South Mountain passes with the rest of his troops. The order cancelled, thereby leaving the passes unguarded. (OR 27, 3:517-518)


The Federals had previously only made a half-hearted attempt to block the Confederate line of retreat on the afternoon of July 3. A single regiment of horsemen, the 6th US Cavalry, rode to Fairfield unsupported after a small column of wagons was reported to be in the area. The lone Yankee regiment blundered into Jones' brigade and, after a brief, but brutal fight, fled in wild route. The Army of the Potomac's big command had squandered a great opportunity. Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent, One Continuous Fight, 49-74.


On the night of July 4, Pleasonton sent Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick's Third Cavalry Division to go from Gettysburg to Emmitsburg, and then from Emmitsburg to seize the Monterey Pass through South Mountain. Instead of blocking the Pass, Kilpatrick then moved on, pursuing the wagon train into the valley below. Leaving the pass unblocked allowed Lee's army access to Williamsport. (Paraphrased) Ibid


​

 

[War Horse]

And that's fair - and yet... (source for the dates/times below is Tucker's High Tide at Gettysburg):

The rain began falling the night of July 3; Johnson began is withdrawal from Meade's right at 1:30 am July 4. Early and Rodes followed. At daybreak, it was unclear how far the ANV was withdrawing, and the rain stopped and started, but both Hancock and Pleasanton were urging an attack. Hill, Longstreet, and Ewell' corps moved out for good the night of July 4; Ewell's corps was not on the road until the morning of July 5, and Gordon's brigade, the last of the rear guard, didn't pull out until noon...

Lee reached the Potomac on July 7; Meade did not get to the same point in force until July 12. Lee's army was crossing the river July 13-14; Heth's division, the rear guard, was alone north of the river for much of July 14.

As Catton wrote, Meade was "one of the few men who could have lost the war ... and he had managed to avoid the mistakes that would have lost it. He would continue to avoid mistakes, even if he had to miss opportunity."

Meade did an excellent job of stopping Lee, grinding him up, and sending him home, sadder but wiser... but still: Gettysburg (and its aftermath) was, potentially, a battle where the war could have been won - but not, Faulkner notwithstanding, by the rebels: by the US.

To me, that's the great what if of the 1863 Pennsylvania Campaign. Not a rebel victory; but an total victory for the US.

Best,

I'm not really sure I completely understand what you are saying here. A chance for a complete Union victory, yes under ideal circumstances. That was not the case here. The loss of Reynolds and Hancock (two of Meades most trusted commanders) forced him to restructure his command. The AOP sufferered other losses in available horse fleash needed to make a vigorous pursuit. Not to mention Meade did not know what Lee's actual intentions were. Some felt he had retreated to South Mountain where he intended to make another stand. This lack of intelligence forced Meade to move cautiously inorder to assertain Lee's actual location and intentions. That why he divided the remaining AOP into three wings. Sedgwick (now Meades senior commander) commanding the left wing. Meade sent them out causiously to determine Lee's true location and intentions. Some people who were not present at the battle were not aware of the condition of Meades army Lincoln and even Meades friend and former Westpoint classmate Brig Gen Herman Haupt (who wasn't present for the battle) thought Meade was making a huge mistake by not imeadiately pursuing and destroying Lee's army. He simply did not have the information Meade had pertaining to the condition of his own army. Meade knew he had done considerable damage to Lee's army. He did not know the extent of that damage and he was not willing to simply take a gamble.

 

[TFSmith121]

I'm not really sure I completely understand what you are saying here. A chance for a complete Union victory, yes under ideal circumstances. That was not the case here. The loss of Reynolds and Hancock (two of Meades most trusted commanders) forced him to restructure his command. The AOP sufferered other losses in available horse fleash needed to make a vigorous pursuit. Not to mention Meade did not know what Lee's actual intentions were. Some felt he had retreated to South Mountain where he intended to make another stand. This lack of intelligence forced Meade to move cautiously inorder to assertain Lee's actual location and intentions. That why he divided the remaining AOP into three wings. Sedgwick (now Meades senior commander) commanding the left wing. Meade sent them out causiously to determine Lee's true location and intentions. Some people who were not present at the battle were not aware of the condition of Meades army Lincoln and even Meades friend and former Westpoint classmate Brig Gen Herman Haupt (who wasn't present for the battle) thought Meade was making a huge mistake by not imeadiately pursuing and destroying Lee's army. He simply did not have the information Meade had pertaining to the condition of his own army. Meade knew he had done considerable damage to Lee's army. He did not know the extent of that damage and he was not willing to simply take a gamble.

As I've said a couple of times, what Meade "should" have done as an army commander after a defensive victory against an enemy deep in friendly (US) territory and what he "could" have done with the Army of the Potomac as it was in July, 1863, may be two different things ... But we don't know they were, in fact, because Meade did not try.

He was, after all, five days behind Lee getting to the Potomac. However bad the weather was, that is not exactly evidence of a relentless pursuit. Could he have attacked Lee's rear guard, either at Gettysburg or on the Potomac? Yes.

Did he? No.

Meade wasn't Grant or Sheridan, obviously.

At the same time, thankfully, Meade wasn't McClellan.

So there's that.

Best,