How would you rate Rosecrans?

[67th Tigers]

You should tell the rest of the world there's no such thing as the Seven Days Campaign. But nice distraction.

There is no such thing as the "Seven Days Campaign". The Seven Days was a tactical beat during the Peninsular Campaign, or the 1862 Richmond Campaign, whatever you want to call it.

The fact is that McClellan didn't do the attacking during the Seven Days--Lee did. Yet apparently to you McClellan wasn't "boldly doing nothing." However, when shown events when Grant was attacked, you comment that Grant was "boldly doing nothing." You have a double standard, and really, that's all we need to know right now.

Well, you do know the first day of the Seven Days Battles is a significant offensive by McClellan? Anyway, during the Seven Days Lee bring down Jackson and has brought up reinforcements from SC, NC and Ga and with superior numbers attacks McClellan's hanging right and drives it in, cutting off his supply base, and McClellan makes a flank march to the James similar to Grant's disengaging from Cold Harbor but with the added fun of Lee actually outnumbering McClellan instead of Grant outnumbering Lee about 2:1 at that point.

So there's a question - if you construct a counterfactual where you more than double Lee's force in 1864 is the result still the same?

Illustrating a double standard. His hero gets attacked in the Seven Days, yet there's no claim of "boldly doing nothing." Grant gets attacked and he's "boldly doing nothing."

Indeed, but to construct a claim of a double standard one needs to assiduously ignore certain inconvenient evidence.

And, as Horace Porter [the poster, not the historical figure] said, Rosey's defenders can't simply talk about Rosey. They have to denigrate Grant.

Indeed, because Grant supporters have an unrealistic view of Grant and always have an apoplexy when this is challenged. I think this goes back to the late KP Williams, who tried to construct an argument that war is entirely about the personalities of the commanding generals, and logistics, mobilisation, economic strength etc. are essentially unimportant. He then constructed an unrealistic hagiography of Grant (and Pope!) by attacking all other generals for even slight failings, but absolving Grant of all his sins. It has a certain religious feeling to it, hence Showalter's term "military calvinism", and the arguments have all the drama of such. Just try and suggest that Grant committed the same sin as one of the damned - like when he abandoned Sherman during the Holly Springs debacle, or briefly visited the front at Shiloh many hours into the battle (having been 15 miles away from his army on a boat) gave a few brief orders and then abandoned the fighting and hightailed it back to his boat where Buell found him......

 

[cash]

There is no such thing as the "Seven Days Campaign". The Seven Days was a tactical beat during the Peninsular Campaign, or the 1862 Richmond Campaign, whatever you want to call it.

Good luck with that. A campaign is a series of battles connected by a strategic purpose. Lee's strategic purpose in the Seven Days campaign was to eliminate the Army of the Potomac as a threat to the confederacy. The rest of the world recognizes it as a campaign, but I wish you luck in changing the minds of everyone else.

Well, you do know the first day of the Seven Days Battles is a significant offensive by McClellan?

Calling Oak Grove "significant" is only the latest hilarious claim we've had.

Anyway, during the Seven Days Lee bring down Jackson and has brought up reinforcements from SC, NC and Ga and with superior numbers attacks McClellan's hanging right and drives it in, cutting off his supply base, and McClellan makes a flank march to the James similar to Grant's disengaging from Cold Harbor but with the added fun of Lee actually outnumbering McClellan instead of Grant outnumbering Lee about 2:1 at that point.

Still nothing about McClellan "boldly doing nothing."

Indeed, but to construct a claim of a double standard one needs to assiduously ignore certain inconvenient evidence.

We have McClellan being attacked day after day, with Lee having the initiative, yet he's not "boldly doing nothing."
We have Grant holding the initiative and Lee attacking in order to try to gain the initiative but failing to do so each time, yet you claimed Grant was "boldly doing nothing."

That's a double standard.

Indeed, because Grant supporters have an unrealistic view of Grant and always have an apoplexy when this is challenged.

If you're going to criticize Grant, then be objective about it and do so fairly. But to try to raise your hero by denigrating Grant through double standards and cherrypicking says more about the person doing the criticizing than it says about Grant.

I think this goes back to the late KP Williams, who tried to construct an argument that war is entirely about the personalities of the commanding generals, and logistics, mobilisation, economic strength etc. are essentially unimportant. He then constructed an unrealistic hagiography of Grant (and Pope!) by attacking all other generals for even slight failings, but absolving Grant of all his sins. It has a certain religious feeling to it, hence Showalter's term "military calvinism", and the arguments have all the drama of such. Just try and suggest that Grant committed the same sin as one of the ****ed - like when he abandoned Sherman during the Holly Springs debacle, or briefly visited the front at Shiloh many hours into the battle (having been 15 miles away from his army on a boat) gave a few brief orders and then abandoned the fighting and hightailed it back to his boat where Buell found him......

Where was McClellan during the Seven Days?--Specifically, where was he during Malvern Hill?

 

[Sbc]

You only see in this Rosecrans asking that his rank predate Grant's. There are other requests as well. Why would Rosecrans ask that he outrank Grant? Perhaps his experiences serving under Grant and fighting two battles under him in Mississippi in 1862 had something to do with it. Who wants to fight under a commander who doesn't show up for the battles? Also note Rosecrans wants to replace an aide who went on a bender. That telegram was about more than antedating his commission.

David you have apparently forgotten my post in another thread wishing luck on the Rosecrans statue. I have no animus toward Rosecrans. Only blue general I dislike is Sheridan, only one I like is Thomas. Grant is of little interest to me. You have made a valiant effort to boost Rosecrans but as others have stated more eloquently your evidence is thin and selective. I am not a professional writer or historian so researching holds little interest to me, besides it will tell me Rosecrans left the field. We do not have anything further to discuss on Chickamauga since you hold outrageous opinions on the battle that do not fit the facts. Look forward to your work on Iuka.

 

[David Moore]

How does how we rate Rosecrans windup talking about lil.mac.

Conversations like research can go off on tangents that are related to each other.
McC and Rosecrans did have some things in common.

Boy, you sure know a lot about a letter you just claimed you knew nothing about.

Well thanks, but I think you are making a completely different point. My point concerned Rosecrans asking Lincoln to pull strings for him personally. I could have snipped that sentence about rank out of the letter but wanted to show it in context.

As far as the rest of the letter, I agree that Rosecrans asked Lincoln for intervention on worthwhile war-related issues. I think the bigger point though, is that Rosecrans was even writing to Lincoln directly. You've made the case that Washburne exerted political influence for the benefit of Grant. There was no person in DC with greater political influence than Lincoln, and Rosecrans corresponded with him many times in '63. Lincoln wrote back many times, and encouraged and placated and pledged support.

I don't believe that Grant jumped the chain of command and appealed to the president directly during this period of the war, on the scale that Rosecrans did. In fact, Lincoln made a crack about Grant not being much of a letter writer.

So Rosecrans had support from the political establishment and he actively solicited favors based on that support. For both personal gain and for military reasons.

Lincoln was commander in chief. Washburne was a Congressman with no executive power over the military.
Washburne was the man responsible for getting Grant made at Lt. General. With that unique rank conferred upon him
there would never again be an issue about someone outranking Grant. The story of how the Lt Gen bill made its way through congress, was agreed to by Lincoln and the rank conferred on Grant (which was not specified in the legislation as passed) is an interesting one. Lincoln historian wrote, "Before appointing Grant lieutenant general, he wanted assurance that the new rank would not be used as a springboard to the White House. Two close friends of Grant from Galena were interviewed and gave full assurance that Grant's interests were purely military. Only then did Lincoln proceed with the appointment." I have also said that for much of the relationship Grant's main object from his friendship with Washburne was survival. Washburne was the one with higher goals for Grant.

Rosecrans, rightly or wrongly, felt that he was underappreciated in Washington. He had been replaced in WV by a general with political connections and ambitions John C. Fremont. His experience in NE Mississippi serving under Grant ended badly. Recall Grant called Rosecrans back from the pursuit of Van Dorn after Corinth. Regardless of whether one thinks that was the right or wrong decision it is clear that Rosecrans thought it was the wrong one. He didn't want to serve under Grant any longer and asked to be transferred. Doesn't it make sense that he would not want to be in that situation again? If Rosecrans felt his ideas would be ignored by Halleck and Stanton why not appeal to their boss Lincoln? This would not be the last time he would write directly to Lincoln.

 

[David Moore]

David you have apparently forgotten my post in another thread wishing luck on the Rosecrans statue. I have no animus toward Rosecrans. Only blue general I dislike is Sheridan, only one I like is Thomas. Grant is of little interest to me. You have made a valiant effort to boost Rosecrans but as others have stated more eloquently your evidence is thin and selective. I am not a professional writer or historian so researching holds little interest to me, besides it will tell me Rosecrans left the field. We do not have anything further to discuss on Chickamauga since you hold outrageous opinions on the battle that do not fit the facts. Look forward to your work on Iuka.

Ok thanks. In closing this chapter I would say none of those critics has actually read my book.
I will let everyone on this site know when my Iuka work is done.
Btw I don't know if you are a native Georgian or a northern transplant but John B Gordon of Georgia had positive and interesting things to say about Rosecrans in his Reminiscences. I am not alone in my opinions about Rosecrans which is why I continue to hammer away.

 

[Sbc]

Ok thanks. In closing this chapter I would say none of of those critics has actually read my book.
I will let everyone on this site know when my Iuka work is done.
Btw I don't know if you are a native Georgian or a northern transplant but John B Gordon of Georgia had positive and interesting things to say about Rosecrans in his Reminiscences. I am not alone in my opinions about Rosecrans which is why I continue to hammer away.

Not a native but been in the South most of my life since 1975. Btw I will probably read your book along with the Rose book when it hits the local library.

 

[David Moore]

Not a native but been in the South most of my life since 1975. Btw I will probably read your book along with the Rose book when it hits the local library.

You might have to request your library to get the books. Thanks for your support for a statue.

 

[Horace Porter]

I didn't say that. That is but one letter, apparently the most important letter to some on this site, exchanged between Lincoln and Rosecrans.

So Mr Porter may I infer that I am in varying degrees incompetent, ignorant, dishonest and dishonorable?
Still no thoughts on the Palmer quote? Or the Meigs letter I posted? Or the Bowman letter about Grant I posted? Or thoughts on why the phrase "the political leaders were not unwilling to see evil befall him" is not cited very often? Did you think I did a good thing is citing both letters in their entirety exchanged between John R Young and Garfield? Do you applaud my efforts to go to libraries and discover primary source items related to Rosecrans?
I fear my (perceived) personal traits have disgusted you so much that you have forgotten (in relation to me) why we are all on this site which is to learn and exchange information and ideas (especially new ones) about the CW ?
Perhaps you should block me.

Another non-responsive response.

 

[Sbc]

You might have to request your library to get the books. Thanks for your support for a statue.

Well I'm not actually supporting a statue but not opposing it either.

 

[67th Tigers]

Good luck with that. A campaign is a series of battles connected by a strategic purpose. Lee's strategic purpose in the Seven Days campaign was to eliminate the Army of the Potomac as a threat to the confederacy. The rest of the world recognizes it as a campaign, but I wish you luck in changing the minds of everyone else.

Okay.. Is a campaign a series of battles? No it's an operation which can be defined by a series of battles, but often isn't. The entirity of McClellan's April-August '62 operations can be defined as a campaign, but not just a little bit of it.

Calling Oak Grove "significant" is only the latest hilarious claim we've had.

Okay. However let us recall a few days back when you proposed a distorted list of engagements in a vain attempt to show that Grant was active. How is Oak Grove, a significant engagement with a thousand casualties that resulted in the gain of (on the left) a mile of ground that placed the Federal entrenchments within artillery range of Richmond more significant than Poplar Spring Road September 15, 1864, Dr. Boisseau's House October 4, 1864, Second Squirrel Level Road October 8, 1864, Second Darbytown Road October 13, 1864? In fact Oak Grove produces greater results for the Union than Second Fair Oaks October 27-29, 1864 or First Hatcher's Run October 27-28, 1864.

However, if one is applying a double standard then this significant and successful operation that would have been praiseworthy had Grant undertook it is suddenly hilarious.

Still nothing about McClellan "boldly doing nothing."

We have McClellan being attacked day after day, with Lee having the initiative, yet he's not "boldly doing nothing."
We have Grant holding the initiative and Lee attacking in order to try to gain the initiative but failing to do so each time, yet you claimed Grant was "boldly doing nothing."

That's a double standard.

If you're going to criticize Grant, then be objective about it and do so fairly. But to try to raise your hero by denigrating Grant through double standards and cherrypicking says more about the person doing the criticizing than it says about Grant.

Ah, but note your timings. In this period Grant occasionally stirs from torpor to gain some ground. There is 5 weeks between Lee's counterstroke at 2nd Reams Station and Grant's response at Prebble's Farm, and another 4 weeks before repeating the initiative, and then a mere 23 weeks for another stab at it.

If this was anyone other than Grant this would be considered scandalous.

Where was McClellan during the Seven Days?--Specifically, where was he during Malvern Hill?

At what point? For whilst McClellan's movements during the Seven Days are actually well understood (although not as many would have it) you point to a minor mystery which now appears to be solved. McClellan's command post (CP) was at Malvern House during the fighting. He arrived there ca. 2 pm after inspecting the whole position for the second time in the day, and was there most of the day.

Averell reports:

"
During the battle of July 1 (Malvern Hill), my cavalry was
deployed as a close line of skirmishers with drawn sabres in rear
of our lines, with orders to permit no one to pass to the rear who
could not show blood. The line of battle was ready and reserves
of infantry and artillery in position some time before the enemy
came in force and developed his attack. There were some preliminary
bursts of artillery, but the great crash of all arms did
not begin before 6 p. m. It lasted about two hours. The commanding
general, with his mounted staff, was standing on the
plateau in front of the farmhouse at the rear verge of the hill [Malvern House],
a conspicuous group, when a round shot from the enemy struck
the ground a few yards directly in front of him and threw dirt and
gravel over the little group around him. General Porter, with
whom I was riding, had just started toward the front when he
turned and said to McClellan: "General, everything is all right here
and you are not needed; if you will look after our center and right
that would help us here more than you can by remaining." Then
we separated from them and rode toward our left, at Crew's
house."

Averell doesn't report McClellan left the CP, as he and Porter went over to the Crew House. Evidently he remained at Malvern House a while longer, as around this time he sent to the fleet from there: "Fire rapidly; this is the crisis of the day." and a surgeon (Everett) with the hospital at Malvern House watched the action through a glass near McClellan. He returned to GHQ at Haxall's (where Heintzelman apparently made his HQ as wing commander according to Sneden) after dark, and stayed only long enough to brief Keyes etc., and returned to that vicinity as Averell reports being called to an O-group in the evening at that location:

"
When the battle was over and the field had become quiet, the
cavalry bivouacked half a mile in rear of the line of battle. Men
and horses were too tired to do aught but sleep for hours. At
midnight I found myself in the saddle with a cup of hot coffee
held to my lips, a portion of its contents having scalded its way
down my throat. When awakened I was informed by the Due
de Chartres that General McClellan desired to see me. We found
him near by, in a little orchard by a camp fire, giving orders
rapidly to his generals and staff officers."

 

[David Moore]

Well I'm not actually supporting a statue but not opposing it either.

OK . Don't worry I'll never ask you for any money

 

[cash]

Okay.. Is a campaign a series of battles? No it's an operation which can be defined by a series of battles, but often isn't. The entirity of McClellan's April-August '62 operations can be defined as a campaign, but not just a little bit of it.

See page 33 here: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

"campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."

Major operations in the Civil War were the battles and the movement to the battles.

You flub in defining all of McClellan's operations as a campaign, since his objective in the Peninsula Campaign differed from his objective in the Seven Days Campaign. Lee's Seven Days Campaign had its own objective.

Okay. However let us recall a few days back when you proposed a distorted list of engagements in a vain attempt to show that Grant was active.

Dishonest. It was a correct list of engagements that proved Grant was indeed active. You were shown to be wrong and now you lack the intellectual integrity to admit it.

How is Oak Grove, a significant engagement with a thousand casualties

That's if you add all the KWM of both sides together.
http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va015.htm

that resulted in the gain of (on the left) a mile of ground that placed the Federal entrenchments within artillery range of Richmond

Overstate much? Yes, you do. "Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan's attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion."
http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va015.htm

more significant than Poplar Spring Road September 15, 1864, Dr. Boisseau's House October 4, 1864, Second Squirrel Level Road October 8, 1864, Second Darbytown Road October 13, 1864? In fact Oak Grove produces greater results for the Union than Second Fair Oaks October 27-29, 1864 or First Hatcher's Run October 27-28, 1864.

Only because the attacks were repulsed. For example: http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va080.htm
I didn't say those particular attacks were more or less significant than any other action. You're the one who claimed Oak Grove was "a significant offensive." To call that claim hyperbole is being charitable.

http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va080.htm
However, if one is applying a double standard then this significant and successful operation that would have been praiseworthy had Grant undertook it is suddenly hilarious.[/quote]

As usual, what you claim has no relation to fact.

Ah, but note your timings. In this period Grant occasionally stirs from torpor to gain some ground. There is 5 weeks between Lee's counterstroke at 2nd Reams Station and Grant's response at Prebble's Farm, and another 4 weeks before repeating the initiative, and then a mere 23 weeks for another stab at it.

Let's look again:

Second Deep Bottom August 14-19, 1864
Globe Tavern August 18-21, 1864
2-day gap
First Gravelly Run August 23, 1864
2-day gap
Second Reams' Station August 25, 1864
Fourth Bermuda Hundred August 25, 1864
16-day gap
Gregory's Chimneys September 10, 1864
5-day gap
Poplar Spring Road September 15, 1864
14-day gap
Chaffin's Bluff Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 1864
Poplar Spring Church Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 1864
3-day gap
Dr. Boisseau's House October 4, 1864
3-day gap
First Darbytown Road October 7, 1864
Second Squirrel Level Road October 8, 1864
5-day gap
Second Darbytown Road October 13, 1864
9-day gap
First Fort Brady October 22, 1864
5-day gap
Second Fair Oaks October 27-29, 1864
First Hatcher's Run October 27-28, 1864
Fourth Jerusalem Plank Road October 30, 1864
6-day gap
Forts Haskell and Morton November 5, 1864
26-day gap
First Stony Creek Depot December 1, 1864
6-day gap
Expedition to Hicksford and Bellefield December 7-12, 1864
Fourth New Market Heights December 10, 1864
44-day gap in winter
Second Fort Brady January 23-24, 1865
12-day gap in winter
Second Hatcher's Run February 5-7, 1865
46-day gap late winter/early spring
Fort Stedman March 25, 1865
Fourth Petersburg (Lewis' Farm, Third Boydton Plank Road, White Oak Road, Dinwiddie Court House, Five Forks, Third Jones' Farm, Sutherland's Station, Breakthrough, and Ninth Corps Attacks) March 28-April 2, 1865

And that doesn't get into deploying Sheridan to the Valley or the North Carolina foray.

As the list shows, you're simply not being truthful by trying to hide all the days the two armies were engaged.

If this was anyone other than Grant this would be considered scandalous.

If what you claimed had any truth, it would be scandalous. Since your claim has no validity, then we don't need to worry.

At what point? For whilst McClellan's movements during the Seven Days are actually well understood (although not as many would have it) you point to a minor mystery which now appears to be solved. McClellan's command post (CP) was at Malvern House during the fighting. He arrived there ca. 2 pm after inspecting the whole position for the second time in the day, and was there most of the day.

Averell reports:

"
During the battle of July 1 (Malvern Hill), my cavalry was
deployed as a close line of skirmishers with drawn sabres in rear
of our lines, with orders to permit no one to pass to the rear who
could not show blood. The line of battle was ready and reserves
of infantry and artillery in position some time before the enemy
came in force and developed his attack. There were some preliminary
bursts of artillery, but the great crash of all arms did
not begin before 6 p. m. It lasted about two hours. The commanding
general, with his mounted staff, was standing on the
plateau in front of the farmhouse at the rear verge of the hill [Malvern House],
a conspicuous group, when a round shot from the enemy struck
the ground a few yards directly in front of him and threw dirt and
gravel over the little group around him. General Porter, with
whom I was riding, had just started toward the front when he
turned and said to McClellan: "General, everything is all right here
and you are not needed; if you will look after our center and right
that would help us here more than you can by remaining." Then
we separated from them and rode toward our left, at Crew's
house."

Averell doesn't report McClellan left the CP, as he and Porter went over to the Crew House. Evidently he remained at Malvern House a while longer, as around this time he sent to the fleet from there: "Fire rapidly; this is the crisis of the day." and a surgeon (Everett) with the hospital at Malvern House watched the action through a glass near McClellan. He returned to GHQ at Haxall's (where Heintzelman apparently made his HQ as wing commander according to Sneden) after dark, and stayed only long enough to brief Keyes etc., and returned to that vicinity as Averell reports being called to an O-group in the evening at that location:

"
When the battle was over and the field had become quiet, the
cavalry bivouacked half a mile in rear of the line of battle. Men
and horses were too tired to do aught but sleep for hours. At
midnight I found myself in the saddle with a cup of hot coffee
held to my lips, a portion of its contents having scalded its way
down my throat. When awakened I was informed by the Due
de Chartres that General McClellan desired to see me. We found
him near by, in a little orchard by a camp fire, giving orders
rapidly to his generals and staff officers."

So McClellan wasn't at the front? Didn't he spend time on the USS Galena during the battle as well?

 

[NedBaldwin]

He asks that his commission be antedated to December 1861. He doesn't say why but based on Lincoln's reply
and Rosecrans' experience serving under Grant I think it is safe to assume that he didn't want to be in a situation where
he was under Grant.

Getting his commission back-dated that far wouldn't protect him from being in a situation where he was under Grant.

Lincoln could exercise his authority to appoint a general of later date to command over a general of earlier date -- Lincoln had done this in the summer of 1862 when he put Pope in command of the Army of Virginia, he would do it again in putting
Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac, Sherman over Thomas, Canby over Banks.

Lincoln could also promote Grant, as would be done in the summer of 1863 to MG USA and in earl 1864 to LtG USA, both of which would make him senior to Rosecrans.

 

[Jackson Hornets]

6.5/10

 

[David Moore]

Getting his commission back-dated that far wouldn't protect him from being in a situation where he was under Grant.

Lincoln could exercise his authority to appoint a general of later date to command over a general of earlier date -- Lincoln had done this in the summer of 1862 when he put Pope in command of the Army of Virginia, he would do it again in putting
Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac, Sherman over Thomas, Canby over Banks.

Lincoln could also promote Grant, as would be done in the summer of 1863 to MG USA and in earl 1864 to LtG USA, both of which would make him senior to Rosecrans.

I'm not sure what point you are making. Please be clear. I have no desire to get into a discussion about semantics. Why do you think Rosecrans wanted to have his commission date changed? Wasn't it so he would outrank other generals? Is that an unreasonable request? He was writing to the commander in chief not a politician.

 

[NedBaldwin]

I'm not sure what point you are making. Please be clear.

I think I was perfectly clear. The date didnt determine whether or not he might end up under Grant since Lincoln could assign one over the other, or vice vera, if he wanted. So I dont think it makes sense to guess that this was the reason.

Why do you think Rosecrans wanted to have his commission date changed?

A couple posts ago I gave the answer of "Ego; ambition."

Wasn't it so he would outrank other generals?

Yes. It irritated him that there were other generals who he looked down on that were senior to him. earlier I quoted from his letter to Halleck in September 1862. He had heard that he would be ordered to join to Army of the Ohio. He told Halleck that he deserved to be more senior and rattled of a list -- "Buell, Granger, Gilbert, Schenck, Lew. Wallace, Tom Crittenden, and Bully Nelson" -- of generals who would be ahead of him, presumably these were generals he considered "men who have not rendered a tithe of the services nor had a tithe of the success".

Is that an unreasonable request?

I find it unbecoming.

He was writing to the commander in chief not a politician.

The commander in chief was a politician.

 

[David Moore]

I think I was perfectly clear. The date didnt determine whether or not he might end up under Grant since Lincoln could assign one over the other, or vice vera, if he wanted. So I dont think it makes sense to guess that this was the reason.


A couple posts ago I gave the answer of "Ego; ambition."



Yes. It irritated him that there were other generals who he looked down on that were senior to him. earlier I quoted from his letter to Halleck in September 1862. He had heard that he would be ordered to join to Army of the Ohio. He told Halleck that he deserved to be more senior and rattled of a list -- "Buell, Granger, Gilbert, Schenck, Lew. Wallace, Tom Crittenden, and Bully Nelson" -- of generals who would be ahead of him, presumably these were generals he considered "men who have not rendered a tithe of the services nor had a tithe of the success".


I find it unbecoming.


The commander in chief was a politician.

Perhaps he should have gone through Chase?
I assume you approve of his trying to get his soldiers paid promptly.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Perhaps he should have gone through Chase?

It is odd to me that you accuse others of not being clear and whine about short replies but then you write things like this question. Why should he go through Chase?

assume you approve of his trying to get his soldiers paid promptly.

Yes, thus i havent made any point about it.

 

[67th Tigers]

Lincoln could also promote Grant, as would be done in the summer of 1863 to MG USA and in earl 1864 to LtG USA, both of which would make him senior to Rosecrans.

Are you suggesting regular rank was senior to volunteer rank? If so then this is wrong. Seniority in a rank is only about the order on the army register (i.e. date of Commission, and order if multiples on the same date), irrespective of whether the Commission is in the regular or volunteer force.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Are you suggesting regular rank was senior to volunteer rank? If so then this is wrong. Seniority in a rank is only about the order on the army register (i.e. date of Commission, and order if multiples on the same date), irrespective of whether the Commission is in the regular or volunteer force.

I am not wrong. On the register, regular generals were ordered first, volunteer after; by regulation that is how it worked -- regular army generals were senior to volunteer generals of the same grade, regardless of date.