How would you rate Rosecrans?

[Carronade]

This comment posted by nitrofd in the Chickamauga Union victory? thread (#129) is a good one:

"He looked worn and exhausted and was laboring under excitement, he heard my statement but in doing so showed the want of one requisite of a great commander, firmness and self reliance under adverse circumstances".he went on....."He was evidently crushed under the weight of the disaster."

I think Rosecrans was one of the better Union generals, and also a competent strategist and logistician, able to make sound plans and put them into effect; where he faltered was dealing with the unknowns and unexpected. This may also relate to the 'slows' a couple of people have mentioned; perhaps he sought through thorough preparation to minimize the chances of anything going wrong.

 

[leftyhunter]

Here is an assessment of Rosecrans made by the NY Times a few days after his removal from command of the AotC.
I think its importance isn't so much it's historical accuracy but the sense it gives of contemporary opinion about Rosecrans during the war. I have boldfaced a few sentences I think are of particular interest.
The Removal of Gen. Rosecrans.
Published: October 22, 186
As we are not of the number of those who think that the President ought to take the vote of the people and of the army before removing or appointing a General, we have no fault to find with the dismissal of Gen. ROSECRANS from his command in Tennessee. We are bound, at least in courtesy, to suppose that there are good reasons for a step in many respects so grave, and that in this, as in other things, the President has been guided, in the exercise of an undoubted prerogative, by a sense of duty, and by nothing else. What these reasons are it would be idle now to inquire. It would be just neither to Gen. ROSECRANS nor to the Government to discuss seriously the dozen rumors which are flying from lip to lip touching the General's alleged mistakes, or shortcomings, or misfortunes. We may be sure that we shall know in due time whatever he considers it necessary for the vindication of his own fame that we should know, and until that time comes we may well be spared the task of investigating the probability or improbability of every bit of camp gossip that is offered to us in explanation of one of the most untoward incidents of the war.

Whatever be the cause of it, however, and let it be ever so much called for by the exigencies of the actual crisis, there are few people who will learn of ROSECRANS' removal from the field of his last year's labors, without sincere and hearty regret. His being succeeded by such a man as GRANT, is, of course, an ample guarantee that the Republic will not suffer by the change, and that it indicates no lack of earnestness or zeal at headquarters. Nobody can be fitter to give the rebellion its deathblow in Georgia and South Carolina, than the man who wrested from it the valley of the Mississippi. But there are occasions when personal sympathy speaks still more loudly than public spirit, and when even one's interest in the fortunes of the nation, is momentarily obscured by our interest in the fortunes of those who have served it faithfully and well; and Gen. ROSECRANS' retirement is certainly one of these occasions. We feel confident that he will still bear a prominent part in finishing the work in which he has already borne so brilliant a share in beginning; but whether he does or not, no history of the rebellion will ever be written in which his name will not occupy a leading place. We care not whether it was he or MCCLELLAN who was entitled to the credit of those small successes in Western Virginia, in the Summer of 1861, by which so many people fondly hoped at that time "the back of the rebellion had been broken." It is enough for his fame, and enough for our respect and admiration, that he should have commanded at Iuka and Corinth; that, having taken a broken, dispirited and disorganized army out of the palsied hands of BUELL, he should in nine months have converted it into a machine of matchless efficiency and precision -- a host whose spirit and discipline has astonished the most exacting of military critics, and that in that same period he should have driven a victorious enemy out of so vast an area of Tennessee and Kentucky; and not only this, but have fixed a grasp of steel on the very position in the very heart of their territory, which the highest rebel authorities pronounced, two years ago, the key of the eastern States, and which they are at this hour concentrating all their resources to recover. There is many a military hero who considers his repose and laurels well won with half such achievements as these. There is but one military man living who has accomplished more, and that is GRANT.

And perhaps not the least of ROSECRANS' claims on our gratitude and esteem, is the heartiness of that enthusiasm for the cause which he has so well defended. The services we get from many of our trained officers are so strictly professional, that when an educated and successful soldier like ROSECRANS brings his faith with him into the field, and fights as his very highest duty, we must be hardly worth fighting for, if to be served in such fashion as this does not win from us something more than commonplace thanks. He has, there is no denying it, much of that sacred fire, which, if it had been more widely diffused, might, ere this, have produced more satisfactory results than those we witness to-day. We are, consequently, all grateful for the example of his zeal, his devotion and his integrity, and we think we may safely say that the misfortune which has momentarily dimmed the lustre of his fame, has not deprived him of one jot of the popular sympathy and esteem.

That is a very interesting editorial because the NY Times was at least during the CW a pro Republican paper and Rosecrans is a democrat.
Leftyhunter

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

This may also relate to the 'slows' a couple of people have mentioned; perhaps he sought through thorough preparation to minimize the chances of anything going wrong.

I remember hearing or reading something about this... "the slows" appeared to plague all Army of the Ohio/Cumberland commanders, but there was a crucial factor that Washington was likely not taking into account: supply and logistics. In the West along the Mississippi, the river itself was the major artery of supply; in the East, distances were much shorter and also supplies could go along the seaboard. In the "middle" Western theater (Kentucky-Tennessee et. al.) you had one river that could be used for some supplies (the Cumberland) as far as Nashville, but if you wanted to go south-southeast of Nashville, it was all about railroad and road supply. It was (for that matter, still is) more expensive (not only in cost, but in effort, efficiency, etc.) to transport bulk cargoes like supplies by land than by water, and correspondingly less efficient/more expensive to resupply once supplies have been expended. I know both Rosecrans and Thomas, and possibly Buell too, attempted to solve this problem by amassing substantial supply depots; this necessary massing of supplies without apparent action may have looked like "the slows" from a distance, but that's not really a fair judgment.

 

[leftyhunter]

I remember hearing or reading something about this... "the slows" appeared to plague all Army of the Ohio/Cumberland commanders, but there was a crucial factor that Washington was likely not taking into account: supply and logistics. In the West along the Mississippi, the river itself was the major artery of supply; in the East, distances were much shorter and also supplies could go along the seaboard. In the "middle" Western theater (Kentucky-Tennessee et. al.) you had one river that could be used for some supplies (the Cumberland) as far as Nashville, but if you wanted to go south-southeast of Nashville, it was all about railroad and road supply. It was (for that matter, still is) more expensive (not only in cost, but in effort, efficiency, etc.) to transport bulk cargoes like supplies by land than by water, and correspondingly less efficient/more expensive to resupply once supplies have been expended. I know both Rosecrans and Thomas, and possibly Buell too, attempted to solve this problem by amassing substantial supply depots; this necessary massing of supplies without apparent action may have looked like "the slows" from a distance, but that's not really a fair judgment.

Very good point plus their was a substantial amount of CSA guerrillas and freelance bandits behind Union lines plus you had Confederate raiders such as Forrest. That alone ties down quite a few troops to guard the supply lines.
Leftyhunter

 

[James N.]

One factor I'd never appreciated before until my recent visit there was the time and effort consumed between Stones River and Tullahoma spent in the construction of Fortress Rosecrans which effectively turned the entire Murfreesboro area into one gigantic earthen fort. Because of the constant threat of raids mentioned by leftyhunter Rosy felt he was forced to complete these works before moving forward.

 

[David Moore]

This comment posted by nitrofd in the Chickamauga Union victory? thread (#129) is a good one:

"He looked worn and exhausted and was laboring under excitement, he heard my statement but in doing so showed the want of one requisite of a great commander, firmness and self reliance under adverse circumstances".he went on....."He was evidently crushed under the weight of the disaster."

I think Rosecrans was one of the better Union generals, and also a competent strategist and logistician, able to make sound plans and put them into effect; where he faltered was dealing with the unknowns and unexpected. This may also relate to the 'slows' a couple of people have mentioned; perhaps he sought through thorough preparation to minimize the chances of anything going wrong.

That is a quote from Alfred Hough's Soldier in the West. I have posted about the problems with the quote on other threads on this site. Basically it was from an autobiography that was written from 1875 to 1890. The complication is that Hough wrote letters to his wife in 1863. In those letters he doesn't discuss Rosecrans' mental or physical condition. This is not to say that what he wrote in the quote above was incorrect but it is still not as trustworthy as something written shortly after the events. One can learn more about Hough and his papers -many of which were destroyed- via this link: http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015005159283;view=1up;seq=158
It is one of the surprisingly few negative assessments of Rosecrans after Chickamauga that I have come upon in my research.
There is the JD Cox retelling of what he says Garfield told him but that is secondhand and wasn't published until 1900.
There are Charles Dana's telegrams sent to Washington but his first few telegrams after Chickamauga were optimistic about Rosecrans and the future of the AotC. Dana later wrote Rosecrans that what he wrote in 1863 may have been misinformed and unfair.
There was an anonymous letter written by an officer of the AotC (possibly William Hazen) that was published in a number of newspapers.
Newspaperman Wm Shanks also wrote negatively about Rosecrans.
There were also newspaper opinion pieces that accused Rosecrans of opium eating among other thing.
That is what I have found. I would be interested in seeing other negative assessments made by people who were there and written relatively close in time to the events.

 

[David Moore]

That is a very interesting editorial because the NY Times was at least during the CW a pro Republican paper and Rosecrans is a democrat.
Leftyhunter

Exactly. I could quote - and do in my book- editorials ranging from total support to total disapproval depending on the paper's party stance. That the NY Times a Republican paper was so praising to Rosecrans makes their editorial interesting.

 

[johan_steele]

I would rate Old Rosie as a 6-7 behind men such as Logan, McPherson, Thomas, Sherman, Grant etc. but well ahead of Fremont, Pope, Hooker, Lil Mac etc. His Tullahoma Campaign was by far his best moment but it must be remembered that bit of brilliance was against Bragg...

 

[leftyhunter]

I would rate Old Rosie as a 6-7 behind men such as Logan, McPherson, Thomas, Sherman, Grant etc. but well ahead of Fremont, Pope, Hooker, Lil Mac etc. His Tullahoma Campaign was by far his best moment but it must be remembered that bit of brilliance was against Bragg...

True enough. War IMO is like street fighting you do the best you can vs the opponent that is front of you . In other words coming out on top is a combination of luck and skill and luck as we know (this being a family friendly forum) is a fickle lady indeed.
Leftyhunter

 

[JeffBrooks]

Well, it depends. What kind of scotch did he drink?

 

[ole]

Rosie was, in my scanty view, more than OK given his territory and his opposition.

What remains in most interested minds, was Chickamauga. That finished him. The "duck hit in the head" comment was his knell.

 

[Rebforever]

Now lets protect ducks from abuse!!
There would have been hell to pay if someone hit a duck in the head in this day and time!!

Outside the above, I think he still deserves a Statue in Washington, DC.!!

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Rosie was, in my scanty view, more than OK given his territory and his opposition.

What remains in most interested minds, was Chickamauga. That finished him. The "duck hit in the head" comment was his knell.

Yes. Fair or not, that comment signaled that Washington had given up on him.

 

[David Moore]

One factor I'd never appreciated before until my recent visit there was the time and effort consumed between Stones River and Tullahoma spent in the construction of Fortress Rosecrans which effectively turned the entire Murfreesboro area into one gigantic earthen fort. Because of the constant threat of raids mentioned by leftyhunter Rosy felt he was forced to complete these works before moving forward.

Without visiting the area between Murfreesboro and Chattanooga one can't have a real appreciation for the obstacles Rosecrans faced and what he accomplished.

 

[David Moore]

Yes. Fair or not, that comment signaled that Washington had given up on him.

Lincoln did write after Chickamauga that "I find it is scarcely less than indispensable for me to do something for Gen.
Rosecrans" and he did appoint him to command in Missouri. I think Lincoln had not lost faith in him but others in Washington for whatever reasons wanted Rosecrans out of any command.

 

[David Moore]

"5" - Slow mover.

Interesting discussion about Rosecrans as a mover by Edward Hagerman p 211f
https://books.google.com/books?id=hg7UfLDHBoIC&q=rosecrans#v=snippet&q=rosecrans&f=false

 

[sflickinger]

Thank you for this. I'll read it and then vote although I go into this read with a fairly favorable opinion on Rosecrans. I hope this educates me. My GG grandfather was in all those Rosecrans campaigns starting at Stones River. I've tried to read everything on the A of C I can find.

After reading the thesis I have mixed feelings about Rosecrans. I think at Stones River he showed bravery and innovation by sending the Pioneer Brigade into the line saving the battle. For his bravery riding to the front lines to see for himself what needed to be done he earns a 7. During Tullahoma he used the available intelligence brilliantly. That whole campaign was worth of at least an 8. As for the Chickamauga Campaign, I think his greatest failing, as stated in the thesis, he didn't use the intelligence he had gathered as well as he had during Tullahoma. I think he was exhausted and made questionable decisions that resulted in the defeat. Although, a case could be made that retreating to Chattanooga saved that vital hub, however, being subjected to a siege, wasn't his greatest moment. If he in fact, did lay the ground work for the "Cracker Line" he deserves credit, although I think most of the "spade work" and building that was so ably done by the Pioneers seems to have been done under Grant. That may be chalked up to timing. This campaign certainly lessened his reputation and is worthy of a 4. Overall, he was a very able, if flawed, commander, who does deserve a good amount of credit for what he accomplished.

 

[James N.]

... If he in fact, did lay the ground work for the "Cracker Line" he deserves credit, although I think most of the "spade work" and building that was so ably done by the Pioneers seems to have been done under Grant. That may be chalked up to timing. This campaign certainly lessened his reputation and is worthy of a 4. Overall, he was a very able, if flawed, commander, who does deserve a good amount of credit for what he accomplished.

Most of what you're calling "spade work" was begun under Rosecrans and continued to fruition under Grant - BUT the actual conception and completion of it seems to have been the inspiration of engineer William F. "Baldy" Smith. Grant only deserves credit for leaving the plan in place and Smith (who he knew previously from either West Point or Mexico - or both) alone to finish the job. Smith is another of those interesting and virtually unknown characters of the war: a failure or at least disappointment under McClellan he was shunted west to a lackluster job which he performed admirably. His reward from Grant was corps command, in which he again proved a disappointment and so he became largely "lost" to history.

 

[James N.]

That's a valid point. What frosted Stanton's shorts was that Rosecrans ran away vs Thomas was "the rock of Chickumagua. That's pretty much in a nutshell why Old Rosie lost his street cred so to speak.
Leftyhunter

This is begging for the introduction to this topic of the individual who I think is the real "villian" of the Rosecrans story: his two-faced chief-of-staff Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield. His relation to the topic has been discussed pretty fully in threads here before, but briefly he was the culprit who encouraged Rosecrans to return to Chattanooga and take charge of the fugitives while he (Garfield) sought out Thomas to inform him of the disaster. Before then, Rosecrans had decided to do that himself as commanding general and had actually already turned back when he met Garfield on the road. Things were all well and good until once back in Chattanooga the faithless Garfield then sent dispatches to Stanton and conspired with Stanton's agent to "smear" Rosecrans for "running away". Ever since finding this out I've always thought it was poetic justice that later as president Garfield got it in the back!

 

[sflickinger]

Most of what you're calling "spade work" was begun under Rosecrans and continued to fruition under Grant - BUT the actual conception and completion of it seems to have been the inspiration of engineer William F. "Baldy" Smith. Grant only deserves credit for leaving the plan in place and Smith (who he knew previously from either West Point or Mexico - or both) alone to finish the job. Smith is another of those interesting and virtually unknown characters of the war: a failure or at least disappointment under McClellan he was shunted west to a lackluster job which he performed admirably. His reward from Grant was corps command, in which he again proved a disappointment and so he became largely "lost" to history.

I meant no slight to Rosecrans, as I said, that may have been a function of timing. I agree that Smith served ably, but credit also goes to Col. George P. Buell who was in direct command of the pioneers and who became something of an expert in the use of pontoons. He also supervised the building of Fort Custer at Bighorn in 1877. It was one of those moments in war time that many performed their duties well and that contributed to a well-earned victory at Chattanooga/Missionary Ridge. Thanks for bringing in the memory of Gen. "Baldy" Smith. Interesting sidelight.