Why General Hood

[Lost Cause]

As I understand it, he was taking medications at that time too. I am no historian, as I have mentioned before, but I am no medical expert either. Could these medications have caused problems?

In addition, could his infatuation with Sally Buchanan Preston have caused him to "take chances" on the battlefield as a way to impress her?

IMO, the medication argument is a mute point. Hood was at the wheel when the accident occurred. That is where I fault him for his lack of ownership for the losses. Grant and Lee accepted blame for their failed assaults at Cold Harbor and Gettysburg. Had Franklin and Nashville been successful for Hood, technically Franklin was because Schofield retreated, the AOT would have and did lose its most valuable resource, its fighting men. This lessens the impact of the campaign and Sherman's concern for the situation.

 

[Jamieva]

It's not a moot point

 

[Lost Cause]

It's not a moot point

Excuse my incorrect usage of moot. The use of medication can be taken as an excuse or the cause. Either way the damage was done. Since apparently it has been proven that he was not on medication only the damage is true.

 

[Jamieva]

It had been used in the past as the reason he did what he did. Now we know he didn't we can analyze what he did based on a clear mind. He was going to have to lose some men to have a successful campaign by driving Schofield and Thomas away from central TN

 

[peteanddelmar]

Sorry I can't help myself:

Johnston is McClellan in a gray uniform.

Yep, their men loved them both. And they were both really smart. And they both argued with their commander-in-chief. Both lied thru their teeth in their memoirs. And together they accomplished nothing.

And Hood was a spy on Johnston for Jeff Davis and sabotaged parts of battles leading up to Atlanta, by HIS inaction.
Generals are jealous and egotistical types.

 

[peteanddelmar]

That is your opinion. It wasn't so easy have that opinion in late 1864 as the commander of the only effective Confederate army which remained mobile.

Hood's personality caused his bad planning. "Too much lion not enough fox" - Robert E. Lee

 

[Elennsar]

As Trice and I once discussed, the weather in late Oct and thru mid Nov 1864 was not even close to the norm. That is normally among the driest times of the year in north Alabama and Middle Tennessee. The rains which came, day after day, created a situation which no one could have anticipated. Some rain is one thing. Rain for nearly THREE straight weeks is another.

So you claim Hood was ill-prepared. I take the position that some situations obliterate any and all appropriate preparations.

Frankly, the weather impacted not only the army's ability to cross the river, but more importantly delayed the transfer of adequate supplies.

I'm not doing this to claim Hood could have or should have anticipated the weather. I'm doing this to analyze what elements of that (the delay) came from forces beyond Hood's control, and what elements were because of Hood's decisions.

I disagree. No one disputes there were other troops "available" at Decatur and Murfreesboro. Available and being avilable for practical use are two entirely different things. Just because you have one player left on the bench doesn't mean you use him just because he is "available." Moreover, there was a virtual restriction, as noted in the OR. If there wasn't Thomas would have simply evacuated both Decatur and Murfreesboro.

This argument has never made sense to me. It's like saying that Meade had more troops "available" with which to oppose Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania because there were additional troops in Washington, DC.

French's division was used by Meade to oppose Lee's invasion. They were available (unlike how the forces in Washington were both in another department and specifically not going to be depleted still further) and they were involved in Meade's movements of the forces he controlled to counter Lee - they just weren't brought to Gettysburg specifically. Neither was Huey's brigade (prior to Gettysburg), it was "merely" used to guard Manchester.

And finally: Said virtual restriction meant Thomas asked for permission, got such permission, and used such permission to "use the troops as you will deem best" in Halleck's language.

Thomas "deemed best" using them for strengthening the defenses of Stevenson and Murefreesboro.

But if he so chose, he could have used them to strengthen Nashville's defenses. Saying that the only troops available do not include these men is defining "available" too narrowly.

 

[EricAJacobson]

And Hood was a spy on Johnston for Jeff Davis and sabotaged parts of battles leading up to Atlanta, by HIS inaction.
Generals are jealous and egotistical types.

Hood was a spy?? Please provide proof of that beyond the few letters he wrote, which Davis requested. Also, keep in mind that Hardee, Bragg, and A. P. Stewart wrote similar letters, so if you want to brand them all spies I'm good with that.

 

[EricAJacobson]

Hood's personality caused his bad planning. "Too much lion not enough fox" - Robert E. Lee

Lee never said, "Too much lion, not enough fox." It is a myth.

 

[Elennsar]

And given his official statements, a rather annoying one.

Lee took pains in presenting his opinion of Hood as ambivalent when asked for his opinion in regards to Hood commanding an army.

 

[EricAJacobson]

I'm not doing this to claim Hood could have or should have anticipated the weather. I'm doing this to analyze what elements of that (the delay) came from forces beyond Hood's control, and what elements were because of Hood's decisions.

Whether you have read my book or not, I think you are quite aware of the preparations that Hood did make. Other than shifting his supply base out of necessity, I think that Hood prepared for the campaign remarkably well. And he shifted his supply base because he needed to find a good place to cross the Tennessee. If you want to condemn him for moving as far as west as Florence/Tuscumbia, and dealing with the resulting delay which was driven by weather more than anything, then so be it.

 

[Allie]

Hood was a spy?? Please provide proof of that beyond the few letters he wrote, which Davis requested. Also, keep in mind that Hardee, Bragg, and A. P. Stewart wrote similar letters, so if you want to brand them all spies I'm good with that.

Really spies need to be on the other side. If someone discussing the activities of the General with the President counts as a spy, then something is fundamentally wrong.

 

[kepi]

Whether you have read my book or not, I think you are quite aware of the preparations that Hood did make. Other than shifting his supply base out of necessity, I think that Hood prepared for the campaign remarkably well. And he shifted his supply base because he needed to find a good place to cross the Tennessee. If you want to condemn him for moving as far as west as Florence/Tuscumbia, and dealing with the resulting delay which was driven by weather more than anything, then so be it.

Is your Book on Amazon?

 

[EricAJacobson]

And finally: Said virtual restriction meant Thomas asked for permission, got such permission, and used such permission to "use the troops as you will deem best" in Halleck's language.

Thomas "deemed best" using them for strengthening the defenses of Stevenson and Murefreesboro.

But if he so chose, he could have used them to strengthen Nashville's defenses. Saying that the only troops available do not include these men is defining "available" too narrowly.

I think this has simply devolved into the parsing of a single word without an end.

 

[EricAJacobson]

Really spies need to be on the other side. If someone discussing the activities of the General with the President counts as a spy, then something is fundamentally wrong.

Ha!!! I love this. I might use it in the future.

Hood being a "spy" is about as pervasive as Hood being on drugs.

 

[EricAJacobson]

Is your Book on Amazon?

Yes it is.

 

[kepi]

Yes it is.

FOUND IT!
It's now the next book on my list!
THANKS!

 

[EricAJacobson]

FOUND IT!
It's now the next book on my list!
THANKS!

You can also get it on Kindle if you are into that sort of thing!!

 

[Elennsar]

Whether you have read my book or not, I think you are quite aware of the preparations that Hood did make. Other than shifting his supply base out of necessity, I think that Hood prepared for the campaign remarkably well. And he shifted his supply base because he needed to find a good place to cross the Tennessee. If you want to condemn him for moving as far as west as Florence/Tuscumbia, and dealing with the resulting delay which was driven by weather more than anything, then so be it.

What I want is to know how- in Richard M. McMurry's wording - "Hood had forgotten to take up the pontoon bridge the Confederates had put across the Coosa River at Gadsden - a bridge that Hood planned to have with the army in case he met with defeat and had to recross the Tennessee at a point where it could not be forded." - indicates good preparations.

This looks more like "careless off (the battlefield)".

 

[peteanddelmar]

Hood was a spy?? Please provide proof of that beyond the few letters he wrote, which Davis requested. Also, keep in mind that Hardee, Bragg, and A. P. Stewart wrote similar letters, so if you want to brand them all spies I'm good with that.

He "kept sending confidential letters to Davis, the Secretary of War, and Bragg" according to Bruce Catton's "Never Call Retreat". Catton said these letters steadily undercut Johnston's own reports.

Use whatever word you want: spy, insubordinate backstabber, two-face, overly ambitious, spy....

Who say's my quote of Lee is a myth? You?