Who Failed at Gettysburg

[HistorywithWaffles]

There's so many answers given when asked that question, who failed at Gettysburg. Since I have the ear of many Civil War buffs and historians, I want to see what you have to say. In your estimation who failed here at Gettysburg? What could've been done better? While you're at it go check out my video filled with Gettysburg stories.

 

[1SGDan]

Who Failed at Gettysburg

The obvious answer is the Confederates.

 

[rpkennedy]

My opinion on this is to quote Eric Wittenberg and J.D. Petruzzi and say that there was "plenty of blame to go around". There was no single failure that decided the battle and both sides committed errors during the battle. But the Yankees were able to overcome their errors while the Rebs were not.

Ryan

 

[wausaubob]

General Lee demonstrated to his own satisfaction, that given superb Summer weather, and the largest force he was ever going to have, and taking some very long gambles, the Confederacy could not win a decisive Napoleonic victory over the US army. The Confederacy was then left with the hope that the smaller belligerent was going to cause a level of casualties that caused the larger belligerent to quit. How would that work out, when the larger belligerent was gaining people through internal and international immigration, and gaining strategic territory every year?

 

[Cavalier]

My vote goes to Longstreet, Hill, and as much as I hate to say it, JEB Stuart.

John

 

[rvbgrif]

General Lee demonstrated to his own satisfaction, that given superb Summer weather, and the largest force he was ever going to have, and taking some very long gambles, the Confederacy could not win a decisive Napoleonic victory over the US army

Essentially yeah because the greatest strength the Confederacy had was that they were on the defensive. They could obstruct supply lines, raid, ambush, dig trenches, scout, maintain moral, choose battlefields, etc all better while they were in Virginia. Virginia is also blessed with very defendable terrain.

Lee was off his rocker when he decided to march into Pennsylvania and attack head on. Just throw away any strategic strength you have and go straight for the jugular.

 

[LCYingling3rd]

Fun discussion.

I think it is an important discussion to have on the anniversary every year no matter how subjective or futile it may seem. Our simple discussion reflects our thinking about and remembering all of those who were there. Even in disagreeing we are remembering and therefore honoring those that fought there.

That said, it is kind of a "broad strokes" question. Isn't it? "Who failed at Gettysburg?" Well, lots of folks depending on what you mean. There were certainly individual soldier failures. We will never know of all of them; being frightened and running, loading too many bullets and not firing, not taking cover, standing up to shoot, taking unnecessary chances. On and on we could think of individual failures.

But that isn't what you are getting at. Is it? There were also lots of tactical failures. Iverson was mentioned and Sickles of course. According to Trimble, Ewell "should have taken that hill..." And there were mistakes made that could be considered failures - like deciding to use a railroad cut for cover. What about not listening to Longstreet? Or Longstreet failing to make his flank march timely? Again, we can find lots of tactical level failures too. Can't we?

Then there is the strategic situation. Who failed there? Is this where it is obviously Lee? Hum? What if his strategy was to gain as much forage as possible for his army? I have heard it argued that Gettysburg was a Confederate success with the supply line defended and the fifty-two miles of trains making it safely back to Virginia. That is quite a stretch to me. Not only is it a stretch, but Lee also listed reasons for his campaign before it started, and foraging was only part of the reason.

Me, I am with those who believe Meade essentially did a better job commanding his army. Buford and Hancock did get the better ground. They not only had high ground, but they also had excellent interior lines. Meade could move troops and supplies far easier than Lee. I believe Meade's active participation in directing his troop positions and even assisting in feeding troops into battle influenced the outcome. I believe Meade essentially "out-generaled" Robert E Lee. I know... I know... ??? lol

This means I believe Lee failed to consider the importance of the ground. He failed to consider the problems of having such lengthy exterior lines. He failed to keep his emotion in check; or, at least, keep others from acting on their emotion and excitement that first day. He probably should have withdrawn and found better ground for his army. I think we can come up with lots of "failures" in Lee's strategy.

I have to remember one guided tour I had. We stood at the spot Lee and Longstreet stood Friday morning and discussed the July third charge. Looking across toward the "copse of trees" it looked perfectly flat to them, and to me. However, our guide had us drive over to near the Vermont Monument on Cemetery Ridge and there is actually a fairly steep ridge there. Lee and Longstreet failed to see a huge mass of troops behind that ridge and underestimated the number of troops at the center of the Union line.

This is a fascinating topic. I enjoy reading everyone's responses. My post is essentially to note that we can discuss this topic with lots of perspectives and opinions. I do believe we could probably agree that ultimately, strategically at least, Gettysburg was a Confederate failure. That many mistakes were made on the Confederate side and, as Lee himself is supposed to have said, "...it is all my fault...this is all my fault."

 

[JerryD]

My opinion on this is to quote Eric Wittenberg and J.D. Petruzzi and say that there was "plenty of blame to go around". There was no single failure that decided the battle and both sides committed errors during the battle. But the Yankees were able to overcome their errors while the Rebs were not.

Ryan

Just like there are "mistakes" on both sides in every battle. But we rarely talk about that. The only reason so much attention is given to Gettysburg is because Lee lost the battle and some people are obsessed with finding excuses for why its not his fault. Because as we all know, Lee was faultless!!

 

[damYankee]

Just like there are "mistakes" on both sides in every battle. But we rarely talk about that. The only reason so much attention is given to Gettysburg is because Lee lost the battle and some people are obsessed with finding excuses for why its not his fault. Because as we all know, Lee was faultless!!

Mistakes are inevitable in combat, at the end of the day it comes down to who can recover from them or exploit them that makes the difference, and more than likely it will be some unknown NCO who steps up to the plate and takes the lead under fire that has the greatest impact on the outcome.
The officers will get the credit or the discredit, they will be the footnote, they will get the statute,
For every Chamberlin, for every Stuart and for that matter for every Lee and Grant, it comes down to the NCOs who have direct control over troops engaged with the enemy at the point of contact that will make it or break it.
Nameless, faceless and lost to history, remembered by those they lead and few others.

 

[Cavalier]

Speaking only for myself of course, I'm probably as ardent a Lee a fan boy as you'll find however I certainly do not think he was faultless at Gettysburg, or any where else. I greatly admire the military talents of Napoleon and Frederick the Great too but I don't consider them faultless either.

I do however think several of Lee's immediate subordinates let him down at Gettysburg.

John

 

[damYankee]

Speaking only for myself of course, I'm probably as ardent a Lee a fan boy as you'll find however I certainly do not think he was faultless at Gettysburg, or any where else. I greatly admire the military talents of Napoleon and Frederick the Great too but I don't consider them faultless either.

I do however think several of Lee's immediate subordinates let him down at Gettysburg.

John

I would not disagree. I would add that the subordinates and for that matter Lee himself may have fallen victim to their own successes. The prevailing attitude among many of his troops was that they were simple unbeatable, or that they had the Yanks on the ropes.
One should never believe ones own press clippings, over confidence leads one to take more risks, Gettysburg is a perfect example.
But one must remember the outcome was not cut and dry, by every measure the margin of victory was slim, both sides suffered terrible losses, but the North stood fast, Lee withdrew.

 

[damYankee]

Following up to the previous posts regarding the elusive nature of defining what exactly is meant by failure, and considering it is literally July 1st, some thoughts on the opening day of the battle:

The accepted narrative of the Federal performance on the 1st day is that they succeeded in stopping the Confederates from obtaining the crucial high ground sound of town.

It involved considerable destruction of two corps which were out-flanked by Confederates coming down roads that approached from directions where they were known to be located, and the death of a corps commander and acting wing commander while he was doing the job of a regimental commander.

They failed to keep the crossroads in town or to prevent the separated Confederate forces from reuniting.

The position that was retained was good defensive ground, but the initiative passed entirely to the Confederates for the remainder of the battle because it proved to be poor ground to launch an offensive from. Although the names of the hills have become legendary, there really isn't any reason why they had to be held, the Pipe-Creek line that Meade initially wanted to hold would have served equally well, and perhaps better, as a defensive position.

There is no evidence that Meade intended to hold the high ground south of town, he said in his own words that he wanted to defeat the Confederate army in detail while it was widely scattered. Thus, Reynolds must have been acting with the goal of holding the crossroads. They not only failed to do that, but got destroyed in detail themselves. I think the performance of the high-command of the Union army on July 1st was a total failure that history has glossed over simply because they won the battle. It illustrates the difficulty in deciding such things, you benefit from hind-sight and whether or not something was a success or failure is entirely a matter of what perspective you view it in.

You failed to mention the Union was outnumbered greatly at first contact, two Confederate divisions to one division of Union unmounted cavalry, while Union elements arrived to reinforce the outnumbered Yanks the South had a significant advantage in men and artillery on July 1.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

There's so many answers given when asked that question, who failed at Gettysburg. Since I have the ear of many Civil War buffs and historians, I want to see what you have to say. In your estimation who failed here at Gettysburg? What could've been done better? While you're at it go check out my video filled with Gettysburg stories.

The chief of failure at Gettysburg was none other than the great Robert E. Lee.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I would not disagree. I would add that the subordinates and for that matter Lee himself may have fallen victim to their own successes. The prevailing attitude among many of his troops was that they were simple unbeatable, or that they had the Yanks on the ropes.
One should never believe ones own press clippings, over confidence leads one to take more risks, Gettysburg is a perfect example.
But one must remember the outcome was not cut and dry, by every measure the margin of victory was slim, both sides suffered terrible losses, but the North stood fast, Lee withdrew.

I like what you said about not believing one's own press clippings. That applied then as it has many times since then in college and professional sports.

 

[wausaubob]

Did General Lee fail? He lost the battle. The greater failure occurred in Richmond. People running the Confederacy refused to accept reality.

 

[damYankee]

What He Said;

 

[121st PA Vols]

Following up to the previous posts regarding the elusive nature of defining what exactly is meant by failure, and considering it is literally July 1st, some thoughts on the opening day of the battle:

The accepted narrative of the Federal performance on the 1st day is that they succeeded in stopping the Confederates from obtaining the crucial high ground sound of town.

It involved considerable destruction of two corps which were out-flanked by Confederates coming down roads that approached from directions where they were known to be located, and the death of a corps commander and acting wing commander while he was doing the job of a regimental commander.

They failed to keep the crossroads in town or to prevent the separated Confederate forces from reuniting.

The position that was retained was good defensive ground, but the initiative passed entirely to the Confederates for the remainder of the battle because it proved to be poor ground to launch an offensive from. Although the names of the hills have become legendary, there really isn't any reason why they had to be held, the Pipe-Creek line that Meade initially wanted to hold would have served equally well, and perhaps better, as a defensive position.

There is no evidence that Meade intended to hold the high ground south of town, he said in his own words that he wanted to defeat the Confederate army in detail while it was widely scattered. Thus, Reynolds must have been acting with the goal of holding the crossroads. They not only failed to do that, but got destroyed in detail themselves. I think the performance of the high-command of the Union army on July 1st was a total failure that history has glossed over simply because they won the battle. It illustrates the difficulty in deciding such things, you benefit from hind-sight and whether or not something was a success or failure is entirely a matter of what perspective you view it in.

rob63. I think you're being particularly harsh on the 1st and 11th corps commanders saying...."I think the performance of the high-command of the Union army on July 1st was a total failure that history has glossed over simply because they won the battle."

What were the failures? Here are a few thoughts:
* You're not considering both corps fought with new corps commanders who were elevated to that position on the field during battle. Of course that trickled down where it could have caused mass confusion but didn't.
* Howard's selection of Cemetery Hill and manning it was an entire division stands out as excellent performance of the high command. One of the key decisions of the battle.

I realize Kent Masterson Brown thought well of it but holding the 'cross roads' was not the highest priority.

 

[rob63]

You failed to mention the Union was outnumbered greatly at first contact, two Confederate divisions to one division of Union unmounted cavalry, while Union elements arrived to reinforce the outnumbered Yanks the South had a significant advantage in men and artillery on July 1.

I was answering the question that was asked, not attempting to explain the reasons why they failed, that is a different discussion.

 

[rob63]

rob63. I think you're being particularly harsh on the 1st and 11th corps commanders saying...."I think the performance of the high-command of the Union army on July 1st was a total failure that history has glossed over simply because they won the battle."

What were the failures? Here are a few thoughts:
* You're not considering both corps fought with new corps commanders who were elevated to that position on the field during battle. Of course that trickled down where it could have caused mass confusion but didn't.
* Howard's selection of Cemetery Hill and manning it was an entire division stands out as excellent performance of the high command. One of the key decisions of the battle.

I realize Kent Masterson Brown thought well of it but holding the 'cross roads' was not the highest priority.

I think I was pretty clear on what the failures were in my previous post, so I won't reiterate them, but I will expand on them.

I don't view pointing out that someone failed as being harsh at all, it is simply my view point. That the corps commanders were new to the job is totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not they failed. I can make a long list of reasons of why it was a difficult task under the circumstances. Command and control of a Civil War army was always a sketchy proposition, and intelligence rarely painted an accurate picture of anything. The wonder is not that generals failed, but that they ever succeeded. Nonetheless, the list of excuses doesn't change my answer to the question, failure is still failure.

I certainly agree that Howard did well to hold a division in reserve at Cemetery Hill and that was an excellent decision. Nonetheless, it doesn't change my opinion regarding what he did with the remainder of the corps.

I couldn't possibly care less what Kent Masterson Brown thinks of anything.

The importance they placed on holding the crossroads is certainly debatable, here is my reasoning:

Meade's goal, once taking command, was expressed by him to Halleck on June 29th:

The correspondence from Meade on July 1st indicates that Reynolds was ordered north towards Gettysburg for the purpose of forcing the Confederates to relinquish their hold on the Susquehanna, but clarifies that those orders were given prior to Meade knowing that the enemy was already retreating from Harrisburg.

Other correspondence makes it quite clear that Meade expected the Confederates to arrive at Gettysburg before Reynolds did, he knew that they were located both west and northeast of Gettysburg, and that it was his intention to fight at Pipe Creek, not Gettysburg. He was clearly willing to fight there, but only if circumstances dictated it.

Captain Weed reported to Meade that Reynolds sent the following message immediately after he met with Buford "the enemy are advancing in strong force, and I fear that they will get to the heights beyond town before I can. I will fight them inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets and hold them back as long as possible."

Keep in mind that when he sent this his army had not yet arrived on Seminary Ridge, so "the heights beyond town" that he is talking about is Oak Hill, not Cemetery Hill. Oak Hill is the hill beyond town that he would have seen while meeting with Buford on Seminary Ridge. Why is he willing to barricade the streets? I think the only logical answer is that he was trying to hold the crossroads. I would certainly agree that he saw the value of Cemetery Hill, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that he was trying to hold that hill. If so, why not barricade the hill instead of the streets? His death, of course, makes his goals at the time a matter of speculation and, obviously, seriously handicapped the entire command structure and their subsequent actions.

None of this means that I think Meade, Reynolds, Howard or any of the others were horrible generals. I think they did a splendid job under the circumstances. They were making decisions in real time, under intense pressure, and we have the benefit of hindsight. Nonetheless, I still view getting two corps destroyed because they were outflanked by superior numbers in a situation where it was already known that those superior numbers were present and that they had access to roads that out-flanked the position, and there were no orders to hold that position, is a pretty obvious failure that has been glossed over simply because they won the next two days. I make no claim that I could have done better, or that anybody should have been sacked as a result, or that anyone needs to have a low opinion of any of the generals involved. I simply see a series of decisions that led to a disaster, I consider that a failure. It happens.

 

[LCYingling3rd]

I think I was pretty clear on what the failures were in my previous post, so I won't reiterate them, but I will expand on them.

I don't view pointing out that someone failed as being harsh at all, it is simply my view point. That the corps commanders were new to the job is totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not they failed. I can make a long list of reasons of why it was a difficult task under the circumstances. Command and control of a Civil War army was always a sketchy proposition, and intelligence rarely painted an accurate picture of anything. The wonder is not that generals failed, but that they ever succeeded. Nonetheless, the list of excuses doesn't change my answer to the question, failure is still failure.

I certainly agree that Howard did well to hold a division in reserve at Cemetery Hill and that was an excellent decision. Nonetheless, it doesn't change my opinion regarding what he did with the remainder of the corps.

I couldn't possibly care less what Kent Masterson Brown thinks of anything.

The importance they placed on holding the crossroads is certainly debatable, here is my reasoning:

Meade's goal, once taking command, was expressed by him to Halleck on June 29th:

View attachment 554265

The correspondence from Meade on July 1st indicates that Reynolds was ordered north towards Gettysburg for the purpose of forcing the Confederates to relinquish their hold on the Susquehanna, but clarifies that those orders were given prior to Meade knowing that the enemy was already retreating from Harrisburg.

Other correspondence makes it quite clear that Meade expected the Confederates to arrive at Gettysburg before Reynolds did, he knew that they were located both west and northeast of Gettysburg, and that it was his intention to fight at Pipe Creek, not Gettysburg. He was clearly willing to fight there, but only if circumstances dictated it.
View attachment 554266
Captain Weed reported to Meade that Reynolds sent the following message immediately after he met with Buford "the enemy are advancing in strong force, and I fear that they will get to the heights beyond town before I can. I will fight them inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets and hold them back as long as possible."

Keep in mind that when he sent this his army had not yet arrived on Seminary Ridge, so "the heights beyond town" that he is talking about is Oak Hill, not Cemetery Hill. Oak Hill is the hill beyond town that he would have seen while meeting with Buford on Seminary Ridge. Why is he willing to barricade the streets? I think the only logical answer is that he was trying to hold the crossroads. I would certainly agree that he saw the value of Cemetery Hill, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that he was trying to hold that hill. If so, why not barricade the hill instead of the streets? His death, of course, makes his goals at the time a matter of speculation and, obviously, seriously handicapped the entire command structure and their subsequent actions.

None of this means that I think Meade, Reynolds, Howard or any of the others were horrible generals. I think they did a splendid job under the circumstances. They were making decisions in real time, under intense pressure, and we have the benefit of hindsight. Nonetheless, I still view getting two corps destroyed because they were outflanked by superior numbers in a situation where it was already known that those superior numbers were present and that they had access to roads that out-flanked the position, and there were no orders to hold that position, is a pretty obvious failure that has been glossed over simply because they won the next two days. I make no claim that I could have done better, or that anybody should have been sacked as a result, or that anyone needs to have a low opinion of any of the generals involved. I simply see a series of decisions that led to a disaster, I consider that a failure. It happens.

Interesting....

Awesome research defending your arguments. Thank you!

However, you essentially proved to me that the First and Eleventh Corps were victorious on July 1st and not a failure at all. Those two forces were routed and driven back through town - often in total disarray and confusion - and I always thought of July first as Confederate victory and a defeat for the Federals. Your research shows, on the other hand, how tenuous and extremely fluid the situation was and how, despite the awful casualties and supreme sacrifice, those two Corps, and Buford's troopers, were able to hold up the Confederate onslaught just enough to give the Federals their good position and the advantage for the rest of the battle! In my book, that is a victory.

I guess I kind of intuitively understood that July first was a federal victory of sorts by preserving the good ground. Yet, I always looked at the rout, the retreat through town in chaos and all the casualties, as a failure. Your excellent research though, shows me how improbable it was for any of the Union troops to hold the line long enough to attain that excellent ground. The two Corps engaged in forced marches right into battle and were almost immediately hit from the west, north and east and somehow held on long enough despite being nearly surrounded! Seeing the messages flying back and forth demonstrates how Meade really did not know exactly where the Confederate forces were and how he assumed the First and Eleventh would be so overwhelmed that they would have to fall back to his Pipe Creek line. They didn't. They held on long enough.

You do not mention it; however, my recollection is that the entire Twelfth Corps was only five miles away from the fighting on July 1st, resting on the Baltimore Pike most of the day. Isn't there evidence that general Howard sent messages to general Slocum to bring his Corps up in support of the First and Eleventh? One would think he could have even moved his force up, on his own, just to reinforce those fighting. I believe he heard about the fighting from civilians. That would make me send out staff officers to verify reports. I don't know, but that seems more of a failure to me than anything the commanders of the First and Eleventh Corps did. Slocum's argument seems to be that he was complying with the Pipe Creek Circular. That seems to be a pretty poor excuse to me. It is interesting to wonder how the Twelfth Corps presence in the fight on July 1st would have affected the outcome.

I had always looked only at the tactical circumstances of the first and eleventh Corps; however, your research has showed me how amazing their strategic victory really was!

Thanks!