Which Was the Most Effective C. S. A. Army Fighting Force?

[WJC]

Since we are discussing the most effective U. S. Army fighting force, maybe it would be interesting to look at the other side.
Which was the most effective and why?
Let's focus on the various armies and avoid a debate comparing commanders. We've done that elsewhere.
Use whatever criteria you want, but be ready to explain your criteria and selection.
Enjoy!

 

[contestedground]

None of the above. Black Confederates were the most effective fighting force. I hear they joined in great numbers, but damned few were killed, wounded, or captured.

 

[leftyhunter]

Since we are discussing the most effective U. S. Army fighting force, maybe it would be interesting to look at the other side.
Which was the most effective and why?
Let's focus on the various armies and avoid a debate comparing commanders. We've done that elsewhere.
Use whatever criteria you want, but be ready to explain your criteria and selection.
Enjoy!

It might take a while but over time the CEVs will help answer that question.
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

Given the very high CEVs achieved consistently by the Army of Northern Virginia - against just about every Union commander of the AotP - there are only three options.

Either just about every Union commander of the AotP was very poor compared to Lee, or the Army of Northern Virginia was much better man-for-man than the Army of the Potomac, or there was a commander skill gap combined with an army skill gap.

My suspicion is that the answer is a combination of the two. The nature of Lee as a commander and of the AoNV (i.e. there was a pool of men who rotated between the AoNV and the hospital system) meant that the skill level of the AoNV rose over time (due to higher morale and gained experience), while the continual influxes of new troops into the Army of the Potomac and the continual command shakeups (or heavy casualties in offensive battles) led to the AotP's skill level remaining comparatively low.

In effect, the Army of Northern Virginia was pretty much set up by the Seven Days, and most of the rest of the war's eastern battles were required to gradually grind it away. It says a lot that the CEV at Gettysburg looks more like the Confederates were the defenders, and that's with a major screwup in command-and-control resulting from incapacitated generals at the crucial point of the Second Day's echelon attack; it also says a lot that the echelon attack on the second day got that far, as the hardest part (Longstreet in the south attacking twice his own numbers, drawing in the reserves) went off without a hitch.

 

[Saphroneth]

None of the above. Black Confederates were the most effective fighting force. I hear they joined in great numbers, but ****ed few were killed, wounded, or captured.

Certainly true of the 1st Louisiana State Guard (CSA). Full of enthusiasm, oversubscribed, and not a man of them was a military casualty while with the regiment.

Granted, this is because they were disbanded (twice) without ever firing a shot in anger, but still...

 

[contestedground]

Certainly true of the 1st Louisiana State Guard (CSA). Full of enthusiasm, oversubscribed, and not a man of them was a military casualty while with the regiment.

Granted, this is because they were disbanded (twice) without ever firing a shot in anger, but still...

McClellan's kind of regiment.

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan's kind of regiment.

I'm not really sure what you mean by that. I could guess, but since some of the conclusions I come to are uncomplimentary I thought I'd instead ask you what you mean by it.

 

[jackt62]

No surprises here. The Army of Northern Virginia was hands down, the most effective CSA fighting force. I'm sure there are metrics to prove that statement given that the ANV managed to fight and win enough of its battles too hold off federal armies for many long years. If the confederacy could have prevailed in the war, it would have been because of the efforts of the ANV.

 

[Saphroneth]

No surprises here. The Army of Northern Virginia was hands down, the most effective CSA fighting force. I'm sure there are metrics to prove that statement given that the ANV managed to fight and win enough of its battles too hold off federal armies for many long years. If the confederacy could have prevailed in the war, it would have been because of the efforts of the ANV.

The total battle casualties taken by the AoNV during its time were on the order of 180,000 to 190,000; against most generals Lee inflicted more casualties than he took, an impressive feat for the smaller army (especially when in many cases Lee's army engaged full-bloodedly rather than fight in Fabian style). For example:

Pope (Northern Virginia campaign)
Lee inflicts about 16,800 casualties while taking about 9,200 - nearly a 2:1 exchange rate in favour of his army.
Burnside (Fredericksburg campaign)
This was mostly one battle, but it should be obvious. 12,650 casualties inflicted for 4,200 taken.
Hooker (Chancellorsville campaign)
17,300 casualties inflicted, 13,300 taken.
Meade (Gettysburg campaign)
32,000 inflicted for about 30,000 sustained.
Grant (Overland-Petersburg)
About 100,000 casualties inflicted for about 55,000 taken.

Given that in most cases military theory suggests the smaller army should take higher absolute casualties in battle (because, well, it's outnumbered), this is a good record indeed. Ignoring McClellan, Sheridan and the Appomattox surrender (the last being because it's not really "battlefield" as such), the AoNV took about 112,000 casualties to inflict about 180,000.



That being said, it's not the same as saying the AoNV was elite...

 

[Saphroneth]

There's one Confederate force which was markedly superior man-for-man to any other, and it's not a full army - instead it's whatever force Cleburne was currently in charge of, because the man gave proper rifle training to his formation. (Largely because he got hold of a copy of the then-current Hythe musketry manual and drilled his men in it.) The results were highly impressive, with a Cleburne force in one small engagement showing a Confederate CEV of 18 (!) due to their ability to deliver accurate, long-ranged rifle fire on their attackers.*


*They were outnumbered 3:1 but inflicted double the casualties they took. Expected inflicted casualties 3^2/1^2 in favour of the Union, so 9/1: actual casualties inflicted Union:Confederate 1:2. Ultimately the Confederates withdrew because they ran out of ammunition.

 

[contestedground]

I'm not really sure what you mean by that. I could guess, but since some of the conclusions I come to are uncomplimentary I thought I'd instead ask you what you mean by it.

You're free to let your imagination run wild. That shouldn't be hard.

 

[jackt62]

The total battle casualties taken by the AoNV during its time were on the order of 180,000 to 190,000; against most generals Lee inflicted more casualties than he took, an impressive feat for the smaller army (especially when in many cases Lee's army engaged full-bloodedly rather than fight in Fabian style). For example:

Pope (Northern Virginia campaign)
Lee inflicts about 16,800 casualties while taking about 9,200 - nearly a 2:1 exchange rate in favour of his army.
Burnside (Fredericksburg campaign)
This was mostly one battle, but it should be obvious. 12,650 casualties inflicted for 4,200 taken.
Hooker (Chancellorsville campaign)
17,300 casualties inflicted, 13,300 taken.
Meade (Gettysburg campaign)
32,000 inflicted for about 30,000 sustained.
Grant (Overland-Petersburg)
About 100,000 casualties inflicted for about 55,000 taken.

Given that in most cases military theory suggests the smaller army should take higher absolute casualties in battle (because, well, it's outnumbered), this is a good record indeed. Ignoring McClellan, Sheridan and the Appomattox surrender (the last being because it's not really "battlefield" as such), the AoNV took about 112,000 casualties to inflict about 180,000.

That being said, it's not the same as saying the AoNV was elite...

Thanks for making me aware of those statistics. All the more remarkable considering that the disparity in casualties that Lee's ANV inflicted was not just against one particular adversary, but almost all federal armies it went up against.

 

[Saphroneth]

You're free to let your imagination run wild. That shouldn't be hard.

Well, on the one hand you have a group of strongly pro-Confederate black Louisianans who volunteered for the Confederate army and were disbanded before firing a shot in anger.
On the other hand, you have a single white Union general who inflicted more casualties on Lee than anyone else besides Grant and is the only general to inflict more casualties to the Army of Northern Virginia than he took to achieve them. (To inflict his 55,000 battle casualties Grant took about 100,000; to inflict his ca. 46,000 casualties McClellan took about 36,000 to 40,000.)

I suppose the similarity might be that they got nixed for political reasons when they might have been useful, but apart from that I can't see anything much.

 

[AUG]

IIRC, the Army of the Mississippi was the army at Shiloh and Perryville, and the Army of Mississippi (aka Army of Vicksburg) was Pemberton's army in the Vicksburg Campaign. The Army of the Mississippi and Army of Tennessee were essentially the same army, just renamed.

Also, many of the those listed didn't last long (and some never saw action) before they were consolidated to form larger armies. For example, the Army of Louisiana, Army of Central Kentucky, Army of Pensacola, and Army of Mobile were all consolidated to form the Army of the Mississippi before Shiloh.

Anyway, I would say the ANV was the most effective, but that's largely due to the generalship as well as the Federal armies & commanders they faced. The troops of the AoT were just as good for the most part and fought well in most battles; the officer corps was the problem.

 

[Saphroneth]

Thanks for making me aware of those statistics. All the more remarkable considering that the disparity in casualties that Lee's ANV inflicted was not just against one particular adversary, but almost all federal armies it went up against.

Yes, one might be tempted to ascribe it all to troop quality (some fundamental flaw in the Army of the Potomac) except that the trend doesn't hold for McClellan, who was the first opponent in the sequence. This suggests that if there was a flaw in the AotP it either developed over time or could be overcome by McClellan.

In terms of operational art, meanwhile, the moves of the Army of Northern Virginia are generally very good - I've identified one out-and-out mistake (October 1862, which McClellan pounced on but got relieved before making it stick) and one "could do better here" (June 1863, a different marching order through Pennsylvania would have had all upside and no downside, with the main reason it wasn't taken being poor scouting) but generally speaking Lee's army was the one to pounce on enemy errors and his army was well enough articulated to make it work.

 

[jackt62]

Yes, one might be tempted to ascribe it all to troop quality (some fundamental flaw in the Army of the Potomac) except that the trend doesn't hold for McClellan, who was the first opponent in the sequence. This suggests that if there was a flaw in the AotP it either developed over time or could be overcome by McClellan.

In terms of operational art, meanwhile, the moves of the Army of Northern Virginia are generally very good - I've identified one out-and-out mistake (October 1862, which McClellan pounced on but got relieved before making it stick) and one "could do better here" (June 1863, a different marching order through Pennsylvania would have had all upside and no downside, with the main reason it wasn't taken being poor scouting) but generally speaking Lee's army was the one to pounce on enemy errors and his army was well enough articulated to make it work.

I'm assuming the operational mistake by the ANV in October 1862 is related to moves during McClellan's pursuit of that army to Virginia, but what is the actual error?

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm assuming the operational mistake by the ANV in October 1862 is related to moves during McClellan's pursuit of that army to Virginia, but what is the actual error?

The error is in dividing his army, basically, though there's a bit more nuance to it. McClellan had been static for long enough (largely due to supply deficiencies) that I think Lee had become complacent, and he left half his army (Jackson) in the Valley while moving the other half (Longstreet) south to Culpeper. The problem is that McClellan then thrust south through the Loudoun Valley and cut one half of Lee's army off from the other, and did it very thoroughly indeed - the Blue Ridge mountain gaps were stoppered so thoroughly that when Jackson did start moving it took him a full week to combine with Longstreet. Thus the smaller army is strategically divided and the larger army is concentrated against one half of it.

Spoiler: The force numers here are not Effectives, but they show the positions fairly well.

These do miss that Longstreet's wing was temporarily divided, but the gist is pretty clear.

The result of this was that McClellan's army (a much larger force than was on the field at Antietam, something like 80,000 effectives with more marching down from Washington) reached Warrenton while Longstreet's wing (30,000 effectives, of which about 6,000 were detached and elsewhere) was at Culpeper, and Jackson's wing (another 30,000 effectives) was a week away from being able to reinforce.
At that point (the point McClellan was fired) Lee hadn't even realized where McClellan was going, and was actually warning Jackson of possible danger.

At that point Lee has only bad options. If McClellan thrusts south at Culpeper (as he appeared to be planning to do, given his march orders at the time) then Longstreet can either retreat south (thus surrendering the line of the Rapidan without a fight) or retreat east (ditto but also letting McClellan get his main body between him and Jackson) or stand and fight (at worse than 3:1 odds and get smashed) or retreat west (allowing him to reconcentrate with Jackson eventually, but also opening the path to Richmond without opposition and with almost nobody in the defences).

Basically at that point the best case for Lee is that he wins the race to the Richmond fortifications with his whole army. The worst case is that McClellan smashes Longstreet aside and forces him back on Gordonsville, blocks the rail line from Gordonsville to Richmond, and marches his army down to take it before Longstreet and Jackson can get back.


So, Lee's mistake? He split his army across a major obstacle and got unlucky. It's much the same mistake McClellan made in June 1862, though McClellan at least can justify it on his orders.

 

[Jamieva]

Really? This is a debate?