When was the war lost?

[damYankee]

I asked this question in another thread and thought it would be a good question for it's own OP.

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?

 

[G Low]

Less than half of Atlanta was destroyed.

@DanSBHawk , you are always looking at the bright side!! Would you believe that there has been a homeless problem in Atlanta since the Civil War?

 

[DanSBHawk]

@DanSBHawk , you are always looking at the bright side!! Would you believe that there has been a homeless problem in Atlanta since the Civil War?

I'm just trying to keep it based on reality, rather than exaggeration.

 

[G Low]

I'm just trying to keep it based on reality, rather than exaggeration.

I know and Sherman only burnt down half of South Carolina.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I know and Sherman only burnt down half of South Carolina.

That's very doubtful.

 

[leftyhunter]

And I am saying I am not sure that is right. The CSA could already buy all the arms they want. The Declaration of Neutrality only applied to prohibit British subjects from enlisting in either nation's forces, or in selling or equipping naval vessels. And even though the US was recognized, it also could not buy ships. The issue of docking ships was not really going to effect the outcome of the war as the CSA only had a couple seagoing vessels and for the most part they did not patrol the Atlantic. Recognition of the CSA was not going to dramatically change the course of the war without intervention, which is a completely different topic. And Great Britain never seriously considered intervening on behalf of the CSA, like the French did in the American Revolution.

Not being able to buy warships is a major disadvantage to the Confederacy. The Union actually could buy warships from France and bought a submersible vessel from France called the Aligator that sunk on its way to the US.
If a nation is recognized it doesn't automatically get arms sales privileges but its an important first step in doing so.
It was of vital importance for Confederate raiders to have docking privileges because necessary repairs at a dock cant alwzy be done within seventy two hours. Nations with blue water navies make great efforts to secure overseas parts for that purpose.
In order for intervention on behalf if the Confederacy its of critical importance to secure diplomatic recognition.
Leftyhunter

 

[benmax]

When did the situation facing the South come to that point when surrender and the salvage of as much of it's national treasure, private property and blood of it's youth outweighed any hopes of defeating the North?

Some things from my perspective.

1) Lee carried the hopes for the South. He performed some good work in the East with some good tactical victories which kept the Confederacy alive. The Confederates' hopes, dreams, confidence hinged on what he did and eyes were on him.

2) The Western Theatre was a disaster from the get-go for the Confederates. I believe that Lee in the East at least mitigated these setbacks in terms of emotional/physical loss therefore giving the Confederacy SOMETHING to cling to......if things were going on in the East, then all the losses the Confederacy sustained elsewhere would still be worth it.

3) If Lee could keep things going in the East, then every loss of treasure , youth and infrastructure would be worth it for independence.

4) When he tried to link up with Johnston after slipping out from Petersburg by heading West, there was still hope.

5) He just couldn't overcome the Union as he was moving West. Lee I believe at this point he saw what was happening and what was going to happen......it was THIS point where surrender became more important than defeating the North.

6) It doesn't really matter when historians think at what point it was or when other commanders in the war thought at what point it was. If Lee was still active in the field, directing the movements etc.....then that point would come later, regardless of what failures were happening elsewhere.

My response is very Lee-centric, I am aware of this. I believe that what he did and thought decided (in the minds of Confederates) what was worth it and what wasn't worth it.

So one could say that it took the whole war to get to the point where surrender became more important than defeating the North.

 

[atlantis]

President Davis laid out 3 requirements for the war effort-arm the army, feed the army, pay the army. It struggled to feed/pay the army from the start to finish.
We don't have a confederate version of the pentagon papers, but I would not be surprised if senior civilian and military leaders of the confederacy knew it was a lost cause by 1Jan 1862 certainly by 1Jan 1865.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Not being able to buy warships is a major disadvantage to the Confederacy. The Union actually could buy warships from France and bought a submersible vessel from France called the Aligator that sunk on its way to the US.
If a nation is recognized it doesn't automatically get arms sales privileges but its an important first step in doing so.
It was of vital importance for Confederate raiders to have docking privileges because necessary repairs at a dock cant alwzy be done within seventy two hours. Nations with blue water navies make great efforts to secure overseas parts for that purpose.
In order for intervention on behalf if the Confederacy its of critical importance to secure diplomatic recognition.
Leftyhunter

There is a whole other aspect to foreign recognition that is hardly recognized - it would have helped stabilize Confederate currency and made it much easier to obtain loans from European banks. The Rothschilds Bank or the Barings Bank are going to see a legitimate, recognized government as a much better bet for major loans than an unrecognized rebellion. This, in turn, would have reduced inflation within the Confederacy and allowed the Confederate government to pay its soldiers in something that had actual value. Inflation was one of the biggest factors in reducing Southern popular support for the war, and while there still would have been inflation, it likely would have been considerably less than it was historically.

If nothing else had changed, the American Revolution might have failed had it not been for loans from the French government and Dutch banks.

Fiscal matters are so often ignored in history, but as I always say, wars are won and lost on the floor of the bond market no less than they are won and lost on the battlefield

 

[atlantis]

Some things from my perspective.

1) Lee carried the hopes for the South. He performed some good work in the East with some good tactical victories which kept the Confederacy alive. The Confederates' hopes, dreams, confidence hinged on what he did and eyes were on him.

2) The Western Theatre was a disaster from the get-go for the Confederates. I believe that Lee in the East at least mitigated these setbacks in terms of emotional/physical loss therefore giving the Confederacy SOMETHING to cling to......if things were going on in the East, then all the losses the Confederacy sustained elsewhere would still be worth it.

3) If Lee could keep things going in the East, then every loss of treasure , youth and infrastructure would be worth it for independence.

4) When he tried to link up with Johnston after slipping out from Petersburg by heading West, there was still hope.

5) He just couldn't overcome the Union as he was moving West. Lee I believe at this point he saw what was happening and what was going to happen......it was THIS point where surrender became more important than defeating the North.

6) It doesn't really matter when historians think at what point it was or when other commanders in the war thought at what point it was. If Lee was still active in the field, directing the movements etc.....then that point would come later, regardless of what failures were happening elsewhere.

My response is very Lee-centric, I am aware of this. I believe that what he did and thought decided (in the minds of Confederates) what was worth it and what wasn't worth it.

So one could say that it took the whole war to get to the point where surrender became more important than defeating the North.

I wonder if Lee ever thought it was possible to win. He served in the Mexican war he knew the power of the US and its desire for empire.

 

[benmax]

I wonder if Lee ever thought it was possible to win. He served in the Mexican war he knew the power of the US and its desire for empire.

It really is quite bizarre. The whole thing is really. I just don't understand the mechanics of his thinking. Maybe there was a genuine belief he could win.

If ever there is a book called "The Psychology of Lee", I'd be reading that pretty quick.

 

[JeffBrooks]

I wonder if Lee ever thought it was possible to win. He served in the Mexican war he knew the power of the US and its desire for empire.

It really is quite bizarre. The whole thing is really. I just don't understand the mechanics of his thinking. Maybe there was a genuine belief he could win.

I think he had his doubts at the beginning, but once he made his choice to side with the South, he gave it his all.

One letter that's particularly telling is the one Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis on June 10, 1863, as the AoNV was moving north toward Pennsylvania. While pointing out the weakness of the South in manpower and material, Lee points to Northern war weariness as a potential opportunity for the South to exploit. Reading this, it seems clear to me that Lee believed the South had a chance to win the war if they could only persuade the Northern public that the price for winning the war was not worth paying.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Often political leaders succumb to to the pressures/influences of their voting populations (because votes translate to power), when deciding on the course of a war.

But if there was a general shift in entrenched Southern population attitudes towards the war perceived in late '64/early '65, then it's interesting to note the wide divergence that occurred in these views at this time with Davis (together with some of his military leaders like Early, Alexander and Hampton) who wanted to continue the conflict.

Seems by Apr. '65, Davis in particular, was as firm as he ever was in his belief that the war was not lost.

 

[leftyhunter]

There is a whole other aspect to foreign recognition that is hardly recognized - it would have helped stabilize Confederate currency and made it much easier to obtain loans from European banks. The Rothschilds Bank or the Barings Bank are going to see a legitimate, recognized government as a much better bet for major loans than an unrecognized rebellion. This, in turn, would have reduced inflation within the Confederacy and allowed the Confederate government to pay its soldiers in something that had actual value. Inflation was one of the biggest factors in reducing Southern popular support for the war, and while there still would have been inflation, it likely would have been considerably less than it was historically.

If nothing else had changed, the American Revolution might have failed had it not been for loans from the French government and Dutch banks.

Fiscal matters are so often ignored in history, but as I always say, wars are won and lost on the floor of the bond market no less than they are won and lost on the battlefield

Very good and underappreciated point!
Leftyhunter

 

[damYankee]

Some things from my perspective.

1) Lee carried the hopes for the South. He performed some good work in the East with some good tactical victories which kept the Confederacy alive. The Confederates' hopes, dreams, confidence hinged on what he did and eyes were on him.

2) The Western Theatre was a disaster from the get-go for the Confederates. I believe that Lee in the East at least mitigated these setbacks in terms of emotional/physical loss therefore giving the Confederacy SOMETHING to cling to......if things were going on in the East, then all the losses the Confederacy sustained elsewhere would still be worth it.

3) If Lee could keep things going in the East, then every loss of treasure , youth and infrastructure would be worth it for independence.

4) When he tried to link up with Johnston after slipping out from Petersburg by heading West, there was still hope.

5) He just couldn't overcome the Union as he was moving West. Lee I believe at this point he saw what was happening and what was going to happen......it was THIS point where surrender became more important than defeating the North.

6) It doesn't really matter when historians think at what point it was or when other commanders in the war thought at what point it was. If Lee was still active in the field, directing the movements etc.....then that point would come later, regardless of what failures were happening elsewhere.

My response is very Lee-centric, I am aware of this. I believe that what he did and thought decided (in the minds of Confederates) what was worth it and what wasn't worth it.

So one could say that it took the whole war to get to the point where surrender became more important than defeating the North.

To me Lee is a mystery wrapped up in mythology, and I don't mean that in a derogatory way.
That being said, in every war there comes a point when in retrospect, the outcome is obvious.
I understand it is nearly impossible to discuss this without going down the "Lee" rat hole, to be clear, Lee's army was still capable of putting up a fight right up to the surrender. Both armies were suffering casualties, but the South could no longer replace those casualties, even if Lee united his force with Johnston that unsurmountable problem would persist.

Johnston's situation as was no better than Lee's.
Who was going to feed the armies?
Who is going to supply the ammo?
Who is going to care for the wounded?
Will those losses bring forth a victory?
Pyrrhic victories serve no purpose.

 

[benmax]

I wonder if Lee ever thought it was possible to win.

You know........ I've been thinking today about this.

My conclusion?

I honestly believe that fighting for the Confederacy was more important to Lee than a plan for victory.

 

[Georgia Sixth]

Link:

Civil War Surprises: Santiago Vidaurri’s Tempting Offer - Emerging Civil War

In 1861 the Confederacy dispatched envoys, diplomats, and agents abroad in attempts to secure foreign recognition and international prestige. The most well-known of these became the Trent affair. A far more obscure effort was that of José Augustín Quintero, a Cuban-born Texas resident. Enlisting...

emergingcivilwar.com

Link:

The Confederate of the Sierra Madre

How the South came close to annexing northern Mexico.

archive.nytimes.com

Many thanks for the links. After reading, it's easy to understand why the Davis government didn't jump on this offer: (1) there was a high risk of being in the middle of the Mexican civil war and even worse (2) there was a risk of turning France into an enemy instead of a sympathetic power.

Side note, Vidaurri's scheme was more reckless gamble than sound strategy, a scheme to solidify power for the moment in order to grab more power down the road. This sort of action is repeated over again in Mexico's history and the current drug cartels can be viewed as the latest example. It also drives home the reality that the geography of Mexico does not lend itself to unity. There's no river connecting the bulk of the population. There are few harbors worthy the name. The only geographic feature running through the length of the nation is a steep, volcanically active mountain range. It does create the fertile Central Valley as a hub of sorts; this valley inherently has greater strength over the others and separates the states on the Gulf from the states on the Pacific. Those coastal states enjoy no natural features connecting them overland, so they repeatedly go through cycles of resistance, even outright rebellion, from the Central Valley, which is the only region that can hope to dominate the region as a whole. The map pretty much guarantees instability,

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I honestly believe that fighting for the Confederacy was more important to Lee than a plan for victory.

Interesting point.

On the micro level.

An implication for this view might be derived when Lee said to Longstreet at Fredericksburg (Dec. 13, '62), ...'It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it'...

Another possible hint in support of this might have occurred during the Battle of the Wilderness (May 6, '64). When Lee's blood was boiling, he had to be restrained by some soldiers from following Gregg's TX infantrymen in a ferocious attack on Federal infantry in the woods ahead.

 

[Rhea Cole]

You know........ I've been thinking today about this.

My conclusion?

I honestly believe that fighting for the Confederacy was more important to Lee than a plan for victory.

No need to speculate.

All you have to do to understand Lee's analysis of the strategic situation is read his letters to Davis before the Pennsylvania incursion.

Rightly, he understood that the only hope for independence was to destroy civilian morale. His plan, which Davis rejected, involved concentrating the idle forces in the Carolinas at Culpepper under Beauregard.

A two pronged incursion would have forced the Army of the Potomac to defend Washington. The combined forces would have overwhelmed the defenders & possiblely taken Washington.

A look at the map will show why Lee was leery of getting trapped in & around Washington.

The defeat would cause a collapse of Northern morale & Lincoln's defeat in the fall. The Democratic admiration would sue for peace.

Lee rightly stated that the fighting season of 1863 was a nexus. From that point Union forces would only get stronger & Confederate weaker. He was correct. 1863 was the last time there would be a sufficient force to inflict a defeat that would break Northern morale.

There were 26 Confederate army commands. Lee wasn't the only general that Davis paid attention to.

 

[Piedone]

I think this is approximately, when a majority of the avg. citizens of the Confederacy could see the writing on the wall, i.e., approx. mid July to Sept. 1864.

When looked back upon, after the events, the seemingly slow but inexorable advances of Grant and Sherman, acquired the appearance of inevitability to the ordinary citizens of the South who read the newspapers or letters of family members in the military.

After 3 yrs of agonizing war, its end would come with a rush, with Grant crossing the James besieging of Petersburg and the taking of Atlanta(and its burning).

I always thought just the same but then was puzzled to read quite optimistic letters of Southerners dating from as late as late1864.

Maybe it was decidedly harder then to get an overview over what was happening in a vast country as the South was. In addition: during the war the South continually experienced quite traumatic defeats and somehow always came back - and life conditions had become uncomfortable since 1863 - most were already used to.

Maybe there was that mixture of depressed lethargy, desperate hope and too less and mostly biased information that made a substantial number of people living just for the next day, always hoping to hear "Marse Robert" had pulled off the thing again and had delivered the Union another blow with another miraculous stunt.

The people cracking peanuts in the Confederate congess seemed strangely unaware of what was coming as late as 1865 (something one could also observe in the german and the austrian-hungarian parliaments as late as october 1918….)

 

[Old Soldier]

You know........ I've been thinking today about this.

My conclusion?

I honestly believe that fighting for the Confederacy was more important to Lee than a plan for victory.

Lees strategy appears to have been to threaten, or better still take, the Federal capital. A short-cut to victory, to demoralise the North. That is where most of the effort seems to have been aimed. After all, the Battle of Gettysburg - which stopped the plan dead - was 90 miles NORTH of Washington. Lee seems to have assumed (or was told) that the Army of the Potomac was ON the Potomac, South of Washington DC, so a sweep from the West around the Potomac and then down on Washington from the North (as well as an advance from the South?) would have entrapped the government in Washington allowing little chance of escape. Another one of the big upsets in this plan was the separation of his cavalry who continued the push North, but on the other side of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

Whether this would have stopped Grant in the West and Sherman's subsequent 'drive to the sea' is debatable, but Gettysburg prevented that outcome. In any case, if Lee had won at Gettysburg, would he have had enough men left to march on Washington?