Brass Napoleon Award Was Shiloh a Surprise?

[Andy Cardinal]

I am currently reading Timothy Smith's Shiloh: Conquer or Perish. I am really enjoying the book and find that I understand the battle far better now. I'm not sure whether that's because this book is so good (it is) or because it's the fourth book I've read about Shiloh and I'm finally starting to put it all together in my head.

I really had to stop and think when Smith discusses whether or not Shiloh was a military surprise, and I'm curious as to what others on this forum have to say about it. I apologize if this question has been discussed before & I know it also relates to the recent string about Peabody. I have quoted the excerpt from Smith's book -- I am reading the Kindle edition so sorry, I don't have page number. The excerpt is from chapter 5.

Shiloh is often called a military surprise; P. G. T Beauregard described the coup as "one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved," and historian Wiley Sword has termed the battle the "Pearl Harbor of the Civil War." The surprise at Shiloh is complicated, however, and in many ways was not a surprise at all—depending on the definition. There is also the thesis put forth by William J. Hardee and others that the Federals actually attacked the Confederate army. "At early dawn," Hardee wrote, "the enemy attacked the skirmishers in front of my line." Such an idea is not widespread and bears little on the question of surprise at Shiloh.

On the strategic (or operational) level, Shiloh was indeed a total surprise.... In dealing with this larger context, despite skirmishing in the days before April 6, the Federal commanders from Grant on down had no idea that the entire Confederate Army of the Mississippi was confronting them. They did not believe that they would be attacked in force and have to fight the biggest battle in American history to date. In that sense, Shiloh was indeed similar to Pearl Harbor. Despite Grant and Sherman taking the viewpoint to their graves that they were not surprised, the accepted fact is that the Confederates slipped up on the Federals and launched a massive attack that the Army of the Tennessee was not expecting....

On the tactical level, however, the Federals were not as surprised as later newspapers described. The press ran stories leading readers to believe that the Confederates had sneaked up on the Union soldiers, reached their camps, and suddenly bayoneted the soldiers as they slept. That would have been a remarkable surprise indeed, but it did not happen that way. In the largest sense, the Federals knew the enemy was in their front; skirmishing across the front line had been frequent in previous days. More significantly, Peabody's patrol uncovered the Confederate army a mile out from the camps, so Johnston had to start his attack a mile from the Union camps. It took precious hours for the green Confederates, tramping through unknown terrain and woods and hampered by Federals taking stands and delaying the advance all along the way, to reach those Federal camps they were supposed to assault at daylight. In those intervening hours, Federal commanders from Sherman and Prentiss on down realized that they were indeed under attack in force and that they had to defend their positions. Thus, the Federals had several minutes in some cases and hours in others to sound the long roll, form their lines, and take positions to defend their encampment....

As a result, when the slow and plodding Confederate advance began to approach the Union camps around 7:00 a.m., they did not find sleeping and surprised Federals who offered little resistance. Rather, they found regiment after regiment with artillery batteries in line, ready and waiting to meet them. In that sense, Shiloh was no surprise, except perhaps to the Confederates who expected no such reception.

 

[James N.]

I think that pretty well sums it up - Lower level unit commanders like Peabody knew something was up but their superiors remained blind to the threat. Sherman in particular should be criticized: Grant left him in charge in the actual campsite that became Shiloh Battlefield and he showed no interest or apprehension at all. Supposedly, one of his subordinate regimental colonels in his own division tried to warn him but was told, "Take your da mn regiment back to Ohio - there is no enemy nearer than Corinth!" Either Grant or Sherman went so far as to admit that they had made no attempt to secure the camps with fieldworks because "it will make the men think we fear the enemy"; of course, after Shiloh and a few other similar experiences, the throwing up of temporary fieldworks soon became routine whenever halting or going into camp.

 

[Perry Cuskey]

Tim Smith's book is excellent, and for my money that's probably as clear an explanation of the 'surprise' question as you're likely to get. It's not quite a straightforward yes or no issue, and Tim does a great job of pointing out how and why that's the case.

And as for why you're gaining a better understanding of the battle, I'd say both of your answers are probably right.

Perry

 

[chucksr]

Skirmishes are not battles, the Union army no doubt thought all they were facing was rebel reconnaissance forces out of Corinth, Grant was at Savannah waiting for Buell's troops before going on the offense and driving Johnston out of Corinth. Clearly, had Grant expected a full bore attack by the entire Confederate Army he would have been at Shiloh. What all this boils down to is how do you define "surprise".

 

[Albert Sailhorst]

It was definitely a surprise to the average Yankee Private at Shiloh.....

 

[wausaubob]

The particular attack launched by the Confederates was a surprise. But the general idea that the camps should be able to form the brigades and fight rapidly was taken into consideration.
General awareness of the need to fight and picking the terrain to channel the attack was part of the plan.
However, it was an intelligence failure.
If the Confederates could not track Buell's progress and estimate with 1 day of his arrival time as he eased his army's way though Tennessee, then they're not trying.
Grant on the other hand, had been on the shelf for a few weeks due to Halleck's manuevering, so his intelligence system was not up and running, a mistake he was not going to repeat.
But none of them had ever commanded a 40,000 man army, so they did not know how to manage its intelligence and how to maneuver such an army. Grant, Sherman, Prentiss, McClernand, McPherson, were all learning on the fly.
Grant also learned that it is mandatory that the cavalry know the roads available to each separate corps or division.
Overall, I think Halleck and Buell were going to let Grant "hold the bag" and Buell was going to get the credit while Halleck's attempt to take Island No. 10 was going to get him a promotion.
There is a book from the 1930's that covers this subject.
It is not acceptable to have a 40,000 man army in camp without constantly looking for the enemy in force. On the other hand, sitting waiting for Buell to show up just made a sitting target for A.S. Johnston.

 

[Albert Sailhorst]

The original plan for the Confederate attack was delayed by rain. I discount "If the Confederates could not track Buell's progress and estimate with 1 day of his arrival time as he eased his army's way though Tennessee, then they're not trying.".....Had the rains not come, Buell would have been too late, as the attack would have occurred before Buell moved in sufficient time....Because of the rains delaying the attack, Grant got lucky.....

 

[wausaubob]

The original plan for the Confederate attack was delayed by rain. I discount "If the Confederates could not track Buell's progress and estimate with 1 day of his arrival time as he eased his army's way though Tennessee, then they're not trying.".....Had the rains not come, Buell would have been too late, as the attack would have occurred before Buell moved in sufficient time....Because of the rains delaying the attack, Grant got lucky.....

The plan for the Confederates would have been just in time and Buell would have succeeded in eliminating Grant without being too obvious about it. But as Carl Von Clausewitz would advise, there is always that nasty element of friction.

 

[7th Mississippi Infantry]

I think that pretty well sums it up - Lower level unit commanders like Peabody knew something was up but their superiors remained blind to the threat. Sherman in particular should be criticized: Grant left him in charge in the actual campsite that became Shiloh Battlefield and he showed no interest or apprehension at all. Supposedly, one of his subordinate regimental colonels in his own division tried to warn him but was told, "Take your da mn regiment back to Ohio - there is no enemy nearer than Corinth!" Either Grant or Sherman went so far as to admit that they had made no attempt to secure the camps with fieldworks because "it will make the men think we fear the enemy"; of course, after Shiloh and a few other similar experiences, the throwing up of temporary fieldworks soon became routine whenever halting or going into camp.

I agree 100%.

It was definitely a surprise to the average Yankee Private at Shiloh....

That's an understatement.

 

[mofederal]

It was a shocking surprise for all of the young Union soldiers. Shiloh was a battle where green Union and Confederate soldiers learned to stand in the day of battle. They saw the elephant and unfortunately learned what it was really all about. It was a brutal lesson in the realities of their Civil War.

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

Never been able to piece Shiloh together, either so thanks very much for the posts and thread. Also terrible with maps and terrain so it's a further struggle.

Corporal Sam Huson, JPK's brother fell at Shiloh, 14th Illinois, why it's seemed important to know why newspaper clippings always describe his death as they do- a friend in his unit, fighting there, wrote my grgrgrgrandparents. Seems they were surprised- this is one article, can't find a longer one we have somewhere.

Malcolm Copeland, 14th Illinois, briefly describes part of that awful morning.

Off thread, sorry- his body somehow lost the identity Malcolm Copeland ensured he had- he's one of the unknown Illinois men now, buried there.

 

[James N.]

Never been able to piece Shiloh together, either so thanks very much for the posts and thread. Also terrible with maps and terrain so it's a further struggle...

Shiloh should not be very difficult to figure out in the most basic way (I'm not talking about the detailed maneuverings of individual units which CAN be confusing) since it's basically a head-on slugging match between two fairly evenly-matched forces (on the first and most critical day) in what - especially compared with something like Gettysburg, Vicksburg, or Chattanooga - is a really tiny space with little or no room for large-scale maneuvers. Since most of it is so densely wooded though, if you ever visit you need to try to keep what you're looking at in relation to the rest of the battlefield, and the park roads don't help since they follow the historic traces of the time.

 

[JohnW.]

To the Union rank and file....BIG SURPRISE....To the high command...me thinks not so much.

 

[JohnW.]

Speaking of Shiloh....you'll get a chuckle out of this. If I were a Confederate citizen at that time I would be partying like Charlie Sheen after reading this!!!

https://archive.org/stream/louisiananewspap00#page/n1/mode/2up

 

[Northern Light]

Shiloh is on my Civil War bucket list, and so I have been reading as much as I can find about (might get there next year!)
I have also been watching the youtube videos of the 150th commemoration, and they have been helpful, but sometimes contradictory, with one guide saying one thing and one saying another.
The latest thing I heard on one of these was that the men were expecting an inspection, so were all up and dressed and had their weapons at hand. Is this true?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

From what I can gather, that was true for some camps possibly but not all of them.

 

[Northern Light]

From what I can gather, that was true for some camps possibly but not all of them.

Thanks for your reply. I will have to go back to my books and see which ones were up and which camps still had their heads down.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

From Smith's book:

Stuart's brigade: "He thus formed his brigade, although some in the ranks thought they were still just turning out for inspection. They would soon learn different." (Kindle location 2778)

Veatch's brigade (Hurlbut's division): "The brigade moved in ten minutes, despite one Federal indicating that when the firing was first heard, some had their muskets apart for cleaning and inspection and "everyone for a moment seemed as if riveted to the spot where he happened to be standing." (Kindle location 3119)

 

[Northern Light]

From Smith's book:

Stuart's brigade: "He thus formed his brigade, although some in the ranks thought they were still just turning out for inspection. They would soon learn different." (Kindle location 2778)

Veatch's brigade (Hurlbut's division): "The brigade moved in ten minutes, despite one Federal indicating that when the firing was first heard, some had their muskets apart for cleaning and inspection and "everyone for a moment seemed as if riveted to the spot where he happened to be standing." (Kindle location 3119)

This must be where I heard this, as I have just recently watched NPS videos of both Veatch's and Stuart's brigades. One of the ones I watched was actually given by Tim Smith. thanks for you response.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Supposedly, one of his subordinate regimental colonels in his own division tried to warn him but was told, "Take your da mn regiment back to Ohio - there is no enemy nearer than Corinth!"

After looking into the issue, I have concluded that the quote is made up. The quote first appears decades later from a regimental remembrance but in correspondence (official and private) just prior to the battle, Sherman reported on enemy nearer than Corinth.