The Other Surprise At Shiloh

[hughes]

Was it possible for General Beauregard to have more accurate information concerning the arrival of Generao Beull's army before the resumption of the battle?
Where did he think General Beul was?
Why did he think that?
Was there accurate information ignored, disbelieved, or lost in the confusion?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I think the short answer is the Confederates simply thought they had more time before Buell arrived.

Accurate intelligence would have been complicated by the fact that Buell's army and the Confederate army were approaching Shiloh from opposite sides of a major river which was at flood stage. Confederate cavalry in the Western Theater was never particularly good for intelligence gathering and, at that stage of the war in those weather conditions, it was probably of particularly little use. Forrest would first gain attention for his rear guard action after Shiloh. Morgan only in charge of a regiment at the time, and new to that. Wheeler was at Shiloh, but commanding an infantry regiment. Van Dorn was still commanding an army in Arkansas.

The only way Beauregard would know would be spies.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Where did he think General Beul was?
Why did he think that?
Was there accurate information ignored, disbelieved, or lost in the confusion?

It appears controversial as to what exact information the Confederate army (and Beauregard, in particular) had on the whereabouts of Buell's army in the days immediately preceding the launch of Johnston's attack on Apr. 6.

Apparently on the night of Apr. 2/3, Beauregard received information from scouts' reports that Buell with thirty thousand men had finally left Columbia and was pushing south through the Duck River country en route to join Grant at Pittsburgh Landing. Upon receiving this information Beauregard and his chief of staff, Thomas Jordan, then serving as adjutant general for the army, urged Johnston to attack at once. It was this piece of singular information that probably convinced Johnston about the necessity for launching immediate action, before Buell and Grant could join forces. ('Shiloh - in Hell before Night' by James McDonough, @ p. 69; 'Army of the Heartland' by James Connelly, @ p. 152 & p. 172).

 

[hughes]

Thanks, Josh The Lighthouse Guy and Nathan Stuart. So, inadequate intelligence or misinterpretation of the intelligence did, then, create the belief that Monday would be a mopping up operation of Grant's, and only Grant's, force. That should be in the form of a question.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

So, inadequate intelligence or misinterpretation of the intelligence did, then, create the belief that Monday would be a mopping up operation of Grant's, and only Grant's, force. That should be in the form of a question.

Knowing how close Buell was or when to expect he would reach Shiloh was one thing.

Knowing Buell's army was arriving at Pittsburg Landing during the first day of fighting is another - one primarily relying on a different manner of intelligence gathering (prisoner interrogation). The Confederates probably didn't have an effective system in place and I doubt Beauregard was the type of general to believe the information.

Besides Buell, Beauregard also has essentially no way to know Grant has an entire unengaged division as well.

 

[dfostermem]

I'm sure long range intelligence was very poor at the time and I think short range intel was just starting to take shape. Beauregard authorized Henderson's Scouts just a few weeks before Shiloh on 9 March at Jackson TN. Henderson was able to get a few men (24) together and get to Corinth just a few days before the battle (23 March). With no experience or training they "winged" it and went on first scout on the 24th with 9 of his men. Their focus was on watching for any indication of troop movements. They spend night observing and then he reports back on the 25th. He took his time reporting to Bragg and he reported no movement. Bragg tells him he just received a report that a regiment of cavalry had been observed coming out. Henderson later figures out that he had been observed and they had come out after him. This would greatly influence their operations from then on. The lessons learned were: 1. Don't delay reporting; 2. Don't be observed; and 3. Keep a team in place maintaining continuous monitoring with reports made by sending a member of team. So Shiloh was a real learning curve for them.

To make matters worse, Henderson shoots himself in leg on 3 April and is out of action for six months. (The trigger got caught while going through brush while scouting). Little is known about what happened at Shiloh after that but his 2nd in command, LT Tully, was mentioned by Beauregard in his report.

By 1863 they become the long range intel unit by establishing posts along Memphis-Charleston RR that maintained observation and early warning of movement coming south from West TN. They also had scouts operating behind lines in West TN and did the same in MS around Vicksburg. In addition, they operated with units when they ventured into W TN.

To my knowledge they came up with their processes on their own. I haven't found any manuals or written documentation that would have been provided to them to tell them how to conduct intelligence work and I haven't found any evidence of any of them having any pre-war experience.