Was it worth it?

[The Ninth Ohio]

Why didn't McClellan win? The paid labor states had moved to the Republican Party and wanted the Republican program completed. The war was only one issue.
And what happened in the war?
Farragut closed Mobile Bay to blockade runners. The blockade fleet, in a few weeks, could re-align on Wilmington and Charleston.
Grant severed the direct railroad between Richmond and the rest of Confederacy.
General Lee never tried to help the Confederates in Georgia. General Lee had to attempt to retain the Shenandoah Valley. That effort mostly failed.
First Sherman entered one of the last towns in the Confederacy with a rolling mill and a machine shop. Then Sheridan defeated General Early's force in lopsided battle fought without prepared entrenchments. And then things got worse for the Confederates.

But Forrest raiding Sherman's supply lines would have counteracted all that and more. /s

 

[Pork Chop Phil]

There is an element of preference implicit in differing interpretations of the war's narrative.

I must confess that the depiction of the war as a progression of events that served to illustrate a sort of inevitability - and no doubt it's a legitimate way of seeing it - just doesn't appeal to me. It's much more interesting and inspiring to reflect on the stories of desperate and dramatic moments, of random acts of heroism and brilliance that defined outcomes.

Perhaps I just haven't grown up !

 

[wausaubob]

But Forrest raiding Sherman's supply lines would have counteracted all that and more. /s

A spy planted a bomb on the docks at City Point. His device caused a tremendous explosion. It made no difference in the siege of Petersburg.
In the McCallum plan, almost all the supplies were held in fortified city of Nashville and run forward as needed. The plan was there would be interruptions in service and they would be quicky remedied.

 

[atlantis]

I think we have to be careful not to conflate people not liking how confederate leadership was conducting the war effort with people not thinking it wasn't worth it. Morale, civilian and military didn't collapse until near the end which I suggest was in large part due to the decision to create confederate states colored units. This controversial decision thus provoked questioning of what were they fighting for.

 

[Hammons]

Yeah,I'm thinking about inviting Old Soldier out for a pint and some arm wrasslin.
Think we might fall out about a few things though.

I think all involved would lead to a lively night out.

 

[Hammons]

Hello Hammons

Opinions, arguments, perpetual refutations, amateurs? It almost sounds like a forum. Hard to to combine contradictions though, they're so, contradictory.

Not sure if this where that came from, but Heath Ledger, BEST Joker ever.


I like your style. Reminds me of... ME (Val Kilmer, Tombstone). Though I believe you've outdone me with this one (a 6-fer: argue, argue, arguing, agued, argument, and arguments, I bet you're good at skipping rocks).

To provide an unusually brief (especially for me) answer to your question, it was worth it for the Union and the slaves, not so much for the Confederates.

Someone got it!.. yes though the "thought process" is valid. I have only to comment on my own opinion in that most opinions are just opinions. Few reflect on their own opinions and deem it fact.

 

[Hammons]

Hello Hammons

Opinions, arguments, perpetual refutations, amateurs? It almost sounds like a forum. Hard to to combine contradictions though, they're so, contradictory.

Not sure if this where that came from, but Heath Ledger, BEST Joker ever.


I like your style. Reminds me of... ME (Val Kilmer, Tombstone). Though I believe you've outdone me with this one (a 6-fer: argue, argue, arguing, agued, argument, and arguments, I bet you're good at skipping rocks).

To provide an unusually brief (especially for me) answer to your question, it was worth it for the Union and the slaves, not so much for the Confederates.

It is an opinionated question for those wishing to express their opinion on what they have researched or come to understand of the question in question.

No more than a opinion on how to ripen a avacodo.

I understand the zeel and fortitude of each post. It is just individuals opining on a subject.

By all means share your thoughts. I was poking fun at our hobby.

 

[Hammons]

Hello Hammons

Opinions, arguments, perpetual refutations, amateurs? It almost sounds like a forum. Hard to to combine contradictions though, they're so, contradictory.

Not sure if this where that came from, but Heath Ledger, BEST Joker ever.


I like your style. Reminds me of... ME (Val Kilmer, Tombstone). Though I believe you've outdone me with this one (a 6-fer: argue, argue, arguing, agued, argument, and arguments, I bet you're good at skipping rocks).

To provide an unusually brief (especially for me) answer to your question, it was worth it for the Union and the slaves, not so much for the Confederates.

In short ...

 

[JerryD]

I think we have to be careful not to conflate people not liking how confederate leadership was conducting the war effort with people not thinking it wasn't worth it. Morale, civilian and military didn't collapse until near the end which I suggest was in large part due to the decision to create confederate states colored units. This controversial decision thus provoked questioning of what were they fighting for.

Interesting theory, but I dont think it holds up. That law was not passed until March 13, 1865, about three weeks prior to Lee's surrender. And we have lots of accounts of massive desertion from the ANV throughout the winter before this law was even considered. And that is not even taking into account the collapse of the CSA Army of the Tennessee at Nashville. I tend to think the collapse really accelerated during Sherman's March to the Sea when it became clear the CSA could not do anything to defend their heartland. And as he moved north the effect was magnified. Folks back home were left destitute and the soldiers in the ranks were hearing their tales of woe in letters sent to them in the trenches.

In fact, the CSA had to resort to a draft fairly early in the war (before the USA did) because after the initial enlistments during the first flush of war, recruiting dried up. The war was just not popular among the working classes in the south and there were large areas of the south that were primarily Unionist in sentiment.

 

[CW Buff]

If elected McClellan would not because president until March 4, 1865. By that time there would not have been much of a chance the Confedery could win the War. McClellan probably would not have surrendered in March of 1865. So are we talking about a political settlement in March or April of 1865 that equatedto a Confederatevictory? I am not sure at that time President Davis had a good enough hand to win by negotiating. However, if you believe the Confederates could win the War in March or April of 1865,I am willing to hear why.

At least this is not written in terms of absolutes. But no, we are not talking about a political settlement in March, were are talking of the potential absence Union headway as of November. Here's why.

First, the Confederacy did not have to win the war, per se, the Union did. The Confederacy just had to not lose it. NO ONE at the time was concerned that Lee was going to jump out of Richmond/Petersburg and deal Grant a defeat, or any equivalently implausible scenario at Atlanta. That's not the problem, the problem is the stalemate condition. Of course, the situation being what it was, the Confederacy being on the ropes, the Union could eventually endure and succeed. IF it was willing to persevere. Believe it or not, in mid to late 1864, people thought that was a big if.

"Lincoln expected George B. McClellan to be the next president. McClellan was the most popular Democrat and the most powerful symbol of opposition to Lincoln's war policies. . . . McClellan himself reportedly told a St. Louis businessman on August 24: 'If I am elected, I will recommend an immediate armistice and a call for a convention of all the states and insist upon exhausting all and every means to secure peace without further bloodshed.' " And regarding the Democratic platform peace plank drafted by Lincoln's old friend Vallandigham, "This crucial resolution made peace the first priority and Union a distant second." -- James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 771-72.

There's nothing here about McClellan immediately surrendering, nor did I say such. It's not a matter of Mac surrendering. It's not even a matter of what Mac would do on March 4. It's a matter of what he SAYS he will do on (or about) March 4. And what he says he'll do is seek an immediate armistice and call for a convention of states. Ask yourself 1) why, in August 1864, did Mac say what he said, 2) why did the Dem platform make peace rather than Union the main priority, and 3) why were Republicans concerned that Mac would win. It's because of the general mood of the people. The whole reason Mac and the Dems say what they say is, in a nutshell, to 'give the people what they want.' You have to put yourself in the anxiety and uncertainty of the time. As Thurlow Weed wrote to Seward on August 22, "The People are wild for Peace." Another VERY important point here is Mac's "without further bloodshed." And you also have to keep in mind the Union is seeking another significant installment of recruits/draftees at this time (it never rains but it pours).

Executive Mansion
Washington, Aug. 23, 1864.
This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union ***between the election and the inauguration***; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.
LINCOLN

The key concern here is not March 4, it's the lame duck period. If Grant or Sherman had not made any headway prior to the election, and if someone proposing what Mac is proposing wins the election, there's a very real chance the Union might have problems holding onto the soldiers it has, let alone raising more. How long would you remain in the lines, offering to shed your blood, and perhaps your life, just before the approaching armistice, as other men begin to desert? If 'as long as it takes,' I commend you, and to be sure some could be counted on to stand and deliver, but there is a very real concern here that the Union war effort could unravel in such a situation, and THAT is exactly what Lincoln is hoping to prevent, via a rather implausible, desperate plan. Unlike us, knowingly waiting for the fall of Atlanta just a couple weeks after Lincoln wrote his blind memorandum, or even understanding that if the Union would stick it out indefinitely it could certainly win (the "indefinitely" being the problem), they are sitting in a morass of uncertainty. As explained to the cabinet, soon after election day, Lincoln's plan here was to approach President Elect Mac and say "Now let us together, you with your influence and I with all the executive power of the Government, try to save the country. You raise as many troops as you possibly can for this final trial, and I will devote all of my energies to assisting and finishing the war." Lincoln had deftly undermined and defeated various threats from within the Republican party during this period of uncertainty, but his desperate plan reveals that all he could do about the Dems was pray for military progress while throwing one of the biggest Hail Mary's in history. Upon Lincoln's revelation, Seward derided the plan: "And the General would answer you 'Yes, Yes,' and the next day when you saw him again & pressed these views upon him he would say 'Yes—yes' & so on forever and have done nothing at all." To this Lincoln made clear he recognized the desperate, unlikely nature of the plan: "At least I should have done my duty and have stood clear before my own conscience." (cabinet discussions as per –– [John] Hay diary entry, November 11, 1864, in Burlingame and Ettlinger, eds., Inside Lincoln's White House, 247-48). ALL he could do was hope for the best, plan for the worst. The whole reason the blind memorandum was blind, and the cabinet would have no idea what they signed in August 1864 until either 1) the plan HAD to be executed, or 2) the plan was no longer needed, is because in the current climate, any hint of it might have the same result as, say, an election victory by a candidate promising an immediate armistice in March.

At any rate, where do fall on the question of outcome as of, say, the fall of Vicksburg? If you had been there, would you have felt sure of the outcome in the summer of 1864?

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

At least this is not written in terms of absolutes. But no, we are not talking about a political settlement in March, were are talking of the potential absence Union headway as of November. Here's why.

First, the Confederacy did not have to win the war, per se, the Union did. The Confederacy just had to not lose it. NO ONE at the time was concerned that Lee was going to jump out of Richmond/Petersburg and deal Grant a defeat, or any equivalently implausible scenario at Atlanta. That's not the problem, the problem is the stalemate condition. Of course, the situation being what it was, the Confederacy being on the ropes, the Union could eventually endure and succeed. IF it was willing to persevere. Believe it or not, in mid to late 1864, people thought that was a big if.

There's nothing here about McClellan immediately surrendering, nor did I say such. It's not a matter of Mac surrendering. It's not even a matter of what Mac would do on March 4. It's a matter of what he SAYS he will do on (or about) March 4. And what he says he'll do is seek an immediate armistice and call for a convention of states. Ask yourself 1) why, in August 1864, did Mac say what he said, 2) why did the Dem platform make peace rather than Union the main priority, and 3) why were Republicans concerned that Mac would win. It's because of the general mood of the people. The whole reason Mac and the Dems say what they say is, in a nutshell, to 'give the people what they want.' You have to put yourself in the anxiety and uncertainty of the time. As Thurlow Weed wrote to Seward on August 22, "The People are wild for Peace." Another VERY important point here is Mac's "without further bloodshed." And you also have to keep in mind the Union is seeking another significant installment of recruits/draftees at this time (it never rains but it pours).

The key concern here is not March 4, it's the lame duck period. If Grant or Sherman had not made any headway prior to the election, and if someone proposing what Mac is proposing wins the election, there's a very real chance the Union might have problems holding onto the soldiers it has, let alone raising more. How long would you remain in the lines, offering to shed your blood, and perhaps your life, just before the approaching armistice, as other men begin to desert? If 'as long as it takes,' I commend you, and to be sure some could be counted on to stand and deliver, but there is a very real concern here that the Union war effort could unravel in such a situation, and THAT is exactly what Lincoln is hoping to prevent, via a rather implausible, desperate plan. Unlike us, knowingly waiting for the fall of Atlanta just a couple weeks after Lincoln wrote his blind memorandum, or even understanding that if the Union would stick it out indefinitely it could certainly win (the "indefinitely" being the problem), they are sitting in a morass of uncertainty. As explained to the cabinet, soon after election day, Lincoln's plan here was to approach President Elect Mac and say "Now let us together, you with your influence and I with all the executive power of the Government, try to save the country. You raise as many troops as you possibly can for this final trial, and I will devote all of my energies to assisting and finishing the war." Lincoln had deftly undermined and defeated various threats from within the Republican party during this period of uncertainty, but his desperate plan reveals that all he could do about the Dems was pray for military progress while throwing one of the biggest Hail Mary's in history. Upon Lincoln's revelation, Seward derided the plan: "And the General would answer you 'Yes, Yes,' and the next day when you saw him again & pressed these views upon him he would say 'Yes—yes' & so on forever and have done nothing at all." To this Lincoln made clear he recognized the desperate, unlikely nature of the plan: "At least I should have done my duty and have stood clear before my own conscience." (cabinet discussions as per –– [John] Hay diary entry, November 11, 1864, in Burlingame and Ettlinger, eds., Inside Lincoln's White House, 247-48). ALL he could do was hope for the best, plan for the worst. The whole reason the blind memorandum was blind, and the cabinet would have no idea what they signed in August 1864 until either 1) the plan HAD to be executed, or 2) the plan was no longer needed, is because in the current climate, any hint of it might have the same result as, say, an election victory by a candidate promising an immediate armistice in March.

At any rate, where do fall on the question of outcome as of, say, the fall of Vicksburg? If you had been there, would you have felt sure of the outcome in the summer of 1864?

Again. The election wasn't close. You're acting as if McClellan was a hair's breadth from victory, when Grant and Sherman's success tipped the scales and snatched it from him.

So then what you are essentially saying is the CSA preventing those victories would have accounted for at least a ten point swing, which is…well, it's something. Next you will tell us Dukakis was just an ill-conceived tank ride away from beating HW Bush.

 

[atlantis]

Interesting theory, but I dont think it holds up. That law was not passed until March 13, 1865, about three weeks prior to Lee's surrender. And we have lots of accounts of massive desertion from the ANV throughout the winter before this law was even considered. And that is not even taking into account the collapse of the CSA Army of the Tennessee at Nashville. I tend to think the collapse really accelerated during Sherman's March to the Sea when it became clear the CSA could not do anything to defend their heartland. And as he moved north the effect was magnified. Folks back home were left destitute and the soldiers in the ranks were hearing their tales of woe in letters sent to them in the trenches.

In fact, the CSA had to resort to a draft fairly early in the war (before the USA did) because after the initial enlistments during the first flush of war, recruiting dried up. The war was just not popular among the working classes in the south and there were large areas of the south that were primarily Unionist in sentiment.

Agree the march of Sherman thru Georgia and the Carolinas not helpful, I think public debate on conscripting blacks began in November of 64. I'm of the view that the conscription acts reflected panic among the out of touch elite, that in fact enough men would have enlisted.

 

[BCS1973]

First, the Confederacy did not have to win the war, per se, the Union did. The Confederacy just had to not lose it. NO ONE at the time was concerned that Lee was going to jump out of Richmond/Petersburg and deal Grant a defeat, or any equivalently implausible scenario at Atlanta. That's not the problem, the problem is the stalemate condition. Of course, the situation being what it was, the Confederacy being on the ropes, the Union could eventually endure and succeed. IF it was willing to persevere. Believe it or not, in mid to late 1864, people thought that was a big if.

There's nothing here about McClellan immediately surrendering, nor did I say such. It's not a matter of Mac surrendering. It's not even a matter of what Mac would do on March 4. It's a matter of what he SAYS he will do on (or about) March 4.

The key concern here is not March 4, it's the lame duck period. If Grant or Sherman had not made any headway prior to the election, and if someone proposing what Mac is proposing wins the election, there's a very real chance the Union might have problems holding onto the soldiers it has, let alone raising more. .

So, I'm kind of in the same boat @major bill was referencing in that I have a hard time seeing much of a different outcome even if McClellan wins. By the time Lincoln would have written his words regarding losing the election, Grant had ANV pinned in Richmond for a couple months, and Sherman had AOT pinned to Atlanta. Not a lot had happened for about a month. Lincoln did have an objective, and I suspect that if he had a plan or two to achieve that goal, he probably had backup plans for each and likely a backup plan for each backup plan.

I'm assuming that any premise that doesn't re-elect Lincoln hinges on CSA not leaving Atlanta until November. That becomes a big what if in it's own right. My take on Lincoln's August 23 note is that he's laying groundwork for the worst case and laying proactive groundwork for the worst case scenario, i.e. he has to move a little faster than what actually happened.

 

[Hammons]

How could the answer be, Yes, all the bloodshed and money spent was worth the benefits that flowed from the surrender at Appomattox and reunification?
Frist the technical basis for transforming life in the US already existed before the Civil War. The telegraph system was rapidly consolidating before the Civil War and the railroad network in the northern states was boosted by the war. Very little that happened during the Civil War disturbed these two physical changes that created the continental nation.
The US grew before, during, and after the Civil War, based on voluntary immigration and foreign investment. Cotton production was an important factor. But separating the cotton revenue from the California Gold Rush, the railroad boom, and the sudden increase in immigration from Ireland and the German states seems to me to be impossible.
Did the Civil War increase immigration and foreign investment above the level that would have happened anyway? There's no way to tell. All that can be detected is that by 1863 immigration picked up. And from 1865 to 1874 it accelerated. Its difficult to imagine that level of immigration continuing if the US had been locked into an arms race with a nation maintaining slavery. The military expenses would have been a drag on the US and the Confederacy. One, or both nations would have needed to maintain conscription.
It seems improbable that foreign and domestic investment in infrastructure would have equaled the amount in real history if the US had agreed to a period or of separation. It would have taken many years for the railroad to climb the ridges in California and cross the empty regions of Wyoming and Utah. Peace made acceleration of that important communication link expeditious.
All that I can really detect is that when slavery was abolished Missouri benefitted from the population boom that swept over Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa and Missouri. Texas benefitted from the abolition of slavery at first. But in the 1870s explosive growth occurred in Texas, even before oil exploration began. After the Civil War, Texas demonstrated that cotton production did not require slavery. Instead railroads and a deep water port cut the cost of marketing cotton and made it competitive.
Different commentators will have different opinions. As always proceed carefully under the watchful eye of @bdtex and our other gracious moderators.

What is your base of acceptably blood shed vs outcome?

 

[Hammons]

Same question

 

[Hammons]

Look intonit deeper. Stop beinlpppp
Ppppp

 

[major bill]

Lincoln did have an objective, and I suspect that if he had a plan or two to achieve that goal, he probably had backup plans for each and likely a backup plan for each backup plan.

Let us say that Lincoln lost the election and believed McClellan soon after March 4, 1865 would fulfill the Democratic demand to end the War. McClellan contacts President Davis to ask for an end to the War. Davis play hard ball and demand the unconditional surrender of all Union armies. Davis refuses to negotiate on the point so McClean has little choice but agree. I am not sure how feasible this is, but let us say Lincoln believes this will occur. did Lincoln have had a real plan that could ended the War before March 4, 1865?

With the short time between November 1864 and March 1865 and the difficulties of winter campaigning, could Lincoln have pulled it off? I have serious doubts.

War winners decide on the peace terms. Davis has just won the War in March of 1865, why would Davis be generous to the defeated Union? McClellan must end the War, Davis is under no obligation to do so and can fight on to total victory. I am not so sure Southern fire eaters would have tolerated easy peace turns with the defeated Union. Why would they?

 

[BCS1973]

.... did Lincoln have had a real plan that could ended the War before March 4, 1865?

With the short time between November 1864 and March 1865 and the difficulties of winter campaigning, could Lincoln have pulled it off? I have serious doubts.

War winners decide on the peace terms. Davis has just won the War in March of 1865, why would Davis be generous to the defeated Union? McClellan must end the War, Davis is under no obligation to do so and can fight on to total victory. I am not so sure Southern fire eaters would have tolerated easy peace turns with the defeated Union. Why would they?

Did Lincoln have a plan that could go faster? I guess we never truly know since he got a reprieve. Regardless of what happens in the election, I suspect that Sherman is still on the move all winter. Even if he's 2 months behind schedule, he's entering South Carolina about the time McClellan is inaugurated. I suspect that Davis' ability to make serious demands by that time is severely hampered, even with a President that ran on peace. In that case, with Sherman on their doorstep, I wonder if even the Fire Eaters don't have second thoughts.

 

[JerryD]

What is your base of acceptably blood shed vs outcome?

Not to answer for wausaubob, as he is more than competent to express his thoughts himself, but at first blush it struck me he was expressing an opinion. Other people can have other opinions. What is acceptable to one may not be acceptable to another. So its not really a right or wrong answer, or subject to measurement.

That being said, I do think if you read this thread you will see that majority agree that the war was worth it, for all the stated reasons. If you want to see the reasons why people expressed the opinions they did, go back and read the thread.

 

[damYankee]

What difference does it make to what you believe now, verses what was believed during the period? It is called present ism. Founding cornerstone of Northern ism. "President was wrong"? Also heard it explained, he said something stupid. So, where our bias doesn't conform to our narrative, it is dismissed. North won so nothing else matters and is irrelevant.

Took Grant a year to conquer Vicksburg. Probably someone smarter could have done it sooner. After 1st Corinth a good example.

Guess the biggest sin of the Confederates. Didn't have the Internet.

The other side of the coin, Davis and Lee had a year to come up with a plan to stop Grant's campaign against Vicksburg.
Someone smarter would have figured out a plan to defeat Grant and save Vicksburg. Instead Davis and Lee decided to invade Pennsylvania and we know how that worked.
How many battles did Grant's army win during the Vicksburg Campaign?