Was Grant insubordinate?

[DanSBHawk]

What an incredibly "interesting" map. Let me use the same logic for Yorktown:

View attachment 540518

In fact, Fort Donelson was certainly not an objective. It was merely a placed that had to be gone through to to get to the objective. You are committing a classical error of confusing an obstacle with an objective.

I don't know what you hope to gain. Your argument has been fully addressed and fully refuted. Now you want to discuss McClellan's failures in the east?

Feel free to start a new thread with your map, and make the claim that Lee surrendered at Appomattox because McClellan took Yorktown. See how that goes.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I don't know what you hope to gain. Your argument has been fully addressed and fully refuted. Now you want to discuss McClellan's failures in the east?

Feel free to start a new thread with your map, and make the claim that Lee surrendered at Appomattox because McClellan took Yorktown. See how that goes.

Hahahaha!

 

[67th Tigers]

I don't know what you hope to gain. Your argument has been fully addressed and fully refuted. Now you want to discuss McClellan's failures in the east?

Feel free to start a new thread with your map, and make the claim that Lee surrendered at Appomattox because McClellan took Yorktown. See how that goes.

Yes, "refuted."

The point is to point out the nonsense argument you are making by applying it to another circumstance - a circumstance you would never accept.

 

[Stryker65]

In fact, Fort Donelson was certainly not an objective. It was merely a placed that had to be gone through to to get to the objective. You are committing a classical error of confusing an obstacle with an objective.

How far does that go? You could say that Nashville was an obstacle to capturing the state of Tennessee, as it was a necessary staging point; that Chattanooga was an obstacle to getting a way into Georgia; that Vicksburg was an obstacle to getting the Mississippi; that Savannah was an obstacle to getting to the Atlantic...during the war everything was an objective, since everything was an obstacle for everything else.

Petersburg and Richmond were objectives only because Lee's army was there. Take away the army, and it's completely unnecessary. If there weren't Confederate troops in Donelson, it wouldn't be an objective. It was because of the 12,000 Confederate troops there that it was an objective. Same way that, if the Harpers Ferry garrison evacuated in 1862, Lee wouldn't have sent Jackson there. It became an objective because there were troops present.

The point is to point out the nonsense argument you are making by applying it to another circumstance - a circumstance you would never accept.

Why would he never accept it? That map is another example of what I've said above.

 

[TallTallMan]

How far does that go? You could say that Nashville was an obstacle to capturing the state of Tennessee, as it was a necessary staging point; that Chattanooga was an obstacle to getting a way into Georgia; that Vicksburg was an obstacle to getting the Mississippi; that Savannah was an obstacle to getting to the Atlantic...during the war everything was an objective, since everything was an obstacle for everything else.

Petersburg and Richmond were objectives only because Lee's army was there. Take away the army, and it's completely unnecessary. If there weren't Confederate troops in Donelson, it wouldn't be an objective. It was because of the 12,000 Confederate troops there that it was an objective. Same way that, if the Harpers Ferry garrison evacuated in 1862, Lee wouldn't have sent Jackson there. It became an objective because there were troops present.

Why would he never accept it? That map is another example of what I've said above.

You're talking to a brick wall at this point.

 

[67th Tigers]

How far does that go? You could say that Nashville was an obstacle to capturing the state of Tennessee, as it was a necessary staging point; that Chattanooga was an obstacle to getting a way into Georgia; that Vicksburg was an obstacle to getting the Mississippi; that Savannah was an obstacle to getting to the Atlantic...during the war everything was an objective, since everything was an obstacle for everything else.

Petersburg and Richmond were objectives only because Lee's army was there. Take away the army, and it's completely unnecessary. If there weren't Confederate troops in Donelson, it wouldn't be an objective. It was because of the 12,000 Confederate troops there that it was an objective. Same way that, if the Harpers Ferry garrison evacuated in 1862, Lee wouldn't have sent Jackson there. It became an objective because there were troops present.

Nashville, Chattanooga etc. were major rail junctions. If I may post the UMSA map on wikipedia:

McClellan's grand strategy was to break up the rebel communications. His ordered operation against Ft Henry was to allow the destruction of the bridge south of it, disconnecting Beauregard's Army Corps at Bowling Green and Polk's Army Corps at Columbus. The destruction of the bridge at Clarksville would then disconnect that entire section from the Confederacy.

The question that then vexed Halleck was where would Beauregard go? McClellan and Buell believed, correctly, that he would fall back on Nashville. Halleck believed, wrongly, that he would move to Clarksville and fall on Grant.

McClellan, for his part, is looking at grand strategy and is pushing for, as soon as the bridge at Clarksville is gone, an expedition down the Tennessee to Decateur. This would have isolated the two armies, and prevented Polk and Beauregard forming a junction.


In fact, on 3rd January 1862 McClellan ordered the expedition up the Cumberland for the specific purpose of breaking communications between Polk and Beauregard, although McClellan expected it to be Polk reinforcing Beauregard.

Donelson didn't have 12,000 troops until this campaign. The force at Dover/Donelson was about 2,000 men, mostly because this was a recruiting camp (3 regts in the process of being raised there, 49th, 50th and 53rd TN). The actual fort had a regiment (30th TN) and Forrest's cavalry regiment was also based there. However, the defenders of Henry (about 2,700 in 5-ish regts* and a bty) fell back on them.

Then, Pillow has a visit from the good idea fairy. He decides he wants to attack Grant and starts sending the force at Clarksville, and additional forces being sent there (because this is what AS Johnston considers the enemy objective to be) to Dover. Clark's brigade is first, although Clark disputes Pillows orders and resigns instead of following them. Buckner with two brigades and Floyd had been ordered to Clarksville to bolster the defences there, and Pillow sends them to Donelson instead. Taking command on the 9th, his orders show 5 regts (3 from Clark - 1st MS, 23rd MS and 7th TX, and 2 from Floyd - 51st VA and 56th VA) had been forwarded to Donelson. Six regts from Buckner (2nd KY, 3rd TN, 8nd TN 26th TN, 32nd TN and 26th MS) arrived the 9th-10th. Reaching Clarksville, Buckner puts a stop to this. Together with Floyd they stop the reinforcement of Donelson and instead start constructing a new position at Cumberland City.* On the 11th Buckner arrives at Dover to begin the removal of the reinforcements diverted by Pillow. Pillow objects and goes to see Floyd. Floyd agrees with Buckner and has been trying to get AS Johnston to approve not making a determined defence at Donelson. However, Pillow is angered by this, goes to see Floyd and basically browbeats him into putting everything into Donelson to attack Grant. They really don't start properly digging in until the 11th-12th.

Strength, 7th: ca. 5,000
Reinforcements arriving on the 8th: ca. 1,900 (hence the estimate of 7,000 late on the 8th)
Reinforcements arriving on the 9th and 10th: ca. 3,800 (about 10,700)
Reinforcements arriving on the 13th: ca. 3,000

My point being that when Grant was considering pursuing to Dover with just infantry and cavalry, there wasn't a huge force there.
As of 8th February, when Grant had already decided Donelson was too strong, there were only about 6-7,000 men there. However, Halleck was worried about the whole of the Bowling Green force striking Grant, who he now considered to be exposed, and so arranged to move on Clarksville via Dover. He wasn't really expecting Pillow to have diverted the Clarksville defenders to Dover.

Anyway, I started writing that weeks ago, and got hung up on when arty units was at Donelson which, as you can see, isn't resolved, but I'd best hit post being windows updates.

---

Richmond was a major objective because it provided a huge percentage of rebel war material. Ultimately it was abandoned because Sheridan's force managed to cut the last railroad. Harper's Ferry was always an objective because it controls communications.

It all comes down to logistics.

Why would he never accept it? That map is another example of what I've said above.

I was making a reductio ad absurdum.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Nashville, Chattanooga etc. were major rail junctions. If I may post the UMSA map on wikipedia:

View attachment 542074

McClellan's grand strategy was to break up the rebel communications. His ordered operation against Ft Henry was to allow the destruction of the bridge south of it, disconnecting Beauregard's Army Corps at Bowling Green and Polk's Army Corps at Columbus. The destruction of the bridge at Clarksville would then disconnect that entire section from the Confederacy.

The question that then vexed Halleck was where would Beauregard go? McClellan and Buell believed, correctly, that he would fall back on Nashville. Halleck believed, wrongly, that he would move to Clarksville and fall on Grant.

McClellan, for his part, is looking at grand strategy and is pushing for, as soon as the bridge at Clarksville is gone, an expedition down the Tennessee to Decateur. This would have isolated the two armies, and prevented Polk and Beauregard forming a junction.


In fact, on 3rd January 1862 McClellan ordered the expedition up the Cumberland for the specific purpose of breaking communications between Polk and Beauregard, although McClellan expected it to be Polk reinforcing Beauregard.

Donelson didn't have 12,000 troops until this campaign. The force at Dover/Donelson was about 2,000 men, mostly because this was a recruiting camp (3 regts in the process of being raised there, 49th, 50th and 53rd TN). The actual fort had a regiment (30th TN) and Forrest's cavalry regiment was also based there. However, the defenders of Henry (about 2,700 in 5-ish regts* and a bty) fell back on them.

Then, Pillow has a visit from the good idea fairy. He decides he wants to attack Grant and starts sending the force at Clarksville, and additional forces being sent there (because this is what AS Johnston considers the enemy objective to be) to Dover. Clark's brigade is first, although Clark disputes Pillows orders and resigns instead of following them. Buckner with two brigades and Floyd had been ordered to Clarksville to bolster the defences there, and Pillow sends them to Donelson instead. Taking command on the 9th, his orders show 5 regts (3 from Clark - 1st MS, 23rd MS and 7th TX, and 2 from Floyd - 51st VA and 56th VA) had been forwarded to Donelson. Six regts from Buckner (2nd KY, 3rd TN, 8nd TN 26th TN, 32nd TN and 26th MS) arrived the 9th-10th. Reaching Clarksville, Buckner puts a stop to this. Together with Floyd they stop the reinforcement of Donelson and instead start constructing a new position at Cumberland City.* On the 11th Buckner arrives at Dover to begin the removal of the reinforcements diverted by Pillow. Pillow objects and goes to see Floyd. Floyd agrees with Buckner and has been trying to get AS Johnston to approve not making a determined defence at Donelson. However, Pillow is angered by this, goes to see Floyd and basically browbeats him into putting everything into Donelson to attack Grant. They really don't start properly digging in until the 11th-12th.

Strength, 7th: ca. 5,000
Reinforcements arriving on the 8th: ca. 1,900 (hence the estimate of 7,000 late on the 8th)
Reinforcements arriving on the 9th and 10th: ca. 3,800 (about 10,700)
Reinforcements arriving on the 13th: ca. 3,000

My point being that when Grant was considering pursuing to Dover with just infantry and cavalry, there wasn't a huge force there.
As of 8th February, when Grant had already decided Donelson was too strong, there were only about 6-7,000 men there. However, Halleck was worried about the whole of the Bowling Green force striking Grant, who he now considered to be exposed, and so arranged to move on Clarksville via Dover. He wasn't really expecting Pillow to have diverted the Clarksville defenders to Dover.

Anyway, I started writing that weeks ago, and got hung up on when arty units was at Donelson which, as you can see, isn't resolved, but I'd best hit post being windows updates.

---

Richmond was a major objective because it provided a huge percentage of rebel war material. Ultimately it was abandoned because Sheridan's force managed to cut the last railroad. Harper's Ferry was always an objective because it controls communications.

It all comes down to logistics.



I was making a reductio ad absurdum.

All nonsense. Halleck ordered the Fort Henry expedition based on pressure from Grant and Foote, and also some false Beauregard intel sent from McClellan.

The earlier demonstrations in January were requested by Buell, and McClellan then requested Halleck's cooperation.

McClellan had no significant involvement in the Fort Henry and Donelson campaign.

 

[67th Tigers]

All nonsense. Halleck ordered the Fort Henry expedition based on pressure from Grant and Foote, and also some false Beauregard intel sent from McClellan.

The earlier demonstrations in January were requested by Buell, and McClellan then requested Halleck's cooperation.

McClellan had no significant involvement in the Fort Henry and Donelson campaign.

... except for ordering it as part of his grand strategy.

Grant was a subordinate, and did what Halleck told him and, via Halleck, McClellan.

 

[Stryker65]

... except for ordering it as part of his grand strategy.

Grant was a subordinate, and did what Halleck told him and, via Halleck, McClellan.

By that logic, well, Lincoln had supreme command, and therefore Lincoln is responsible for winning the entire war. McClellan, Grant, everyone else is useless, then, because everyone has to "follow orders," right? There could never be any deviations, right?

 

[DanSBHawk]

... except for ordering it as part of his grand strategy.

Grant was a subordinate, and did what Halleck told him and, via Halleck, McClellan.

You're simply trying to give McClellan credit for Grant's successes in the west. I think everyone understands that if McClellan had really been closely directing the war effort in the west, that it would have went badly. And Grant would not have even had the opportunity to succeed. McClellan certainly didn't want Grant leading campaigns.

Grant succeeded by pushing beyond what his superiors expected, and beyond what his superiors would have done had they been in his place.

 

[TallTallMan]

Nashville, Chattanooga etc. were major rail junctions. If I may post the UMSA map on wikipedia:

View attachment 542074

McClellan's grand strategy was to break up the rebel communications. His ordered operation against Ft Henry was to allow the destruction of the bridge south of it, disconnecting Beauregard's Army Corps at Bowling Green and Polk's Army Corps at Columbus. The destruction of the bridge at Clarksville would then disconnect that entire section from the Confederacy.

The question that then vexed Halleck was where would Beauregard go? McClellan and Buell believed, correctly, that he would fall back on Nashville. Halleck believed, wrongly, that he would move to Clarksville and fall on Grant.

McClellan, for his part, is looking at grand strategy and is pushing for, as soon as the bridge at Clarksville is gone, an expedition down the Tennessee to Decateur. This would have isolated the two armies, and prevented Polk and Beauregard forming a junction.


In fact, on 3rd January 1862 McClellan ordered the expedition up the Cumberland for the specific purpose of breaking communications between Polk and Beauregard, although McClellan expected it to be Polk reinforcing Beauregard.

Donelson didn't have 12,000 troops until this campaign. The force at Dover/Donelson was about 2,000 men, mostly because this was a recruiting camp (3 regts in the process of being raised there, 49th, 50th and 53rd TN). The actual fort had a regiment (30th TN) and Forrest's cavalry regiment was also based there. However, the defenders of Henry (about 2,700 in 5-ish regts* and a bty) fell back on them.

Then, Pillow has a visit from the good idea fairy. He decides he wants to attack Grant and starts sending the force at Clarksville, and additional forces being sent there (because this is what AS Johnston considers the enemy objective to be) to Dover. Clark's brigade is first, although Clark disputes Pillows orders and resigns instead of following them. Buckner with two brigades and Floyd had been ordered to Clarksville to bolster the defences there, and Pillow sends them to Donelson instead. Taking command on the 9th, his orders show 5 regts (3 from Clark - 1st MS, 23rd MS and 7th TX, and 2 from Floyd - 51st VA and 56th VA) had been forwarded to Donelson. Six regts from Buckner (2nd KY, 3rd TN, 8nd TN 26th TN, 32nd TN and 26th MS) arrived the 9th-10th. Reaching Clarksville, Buckner puts a stop to this. Together with Floyd they stop the reinforcement of Donelson and instead start constructing a new position at Cumberland City.* On the 11th Buckner arrives at Dover to begin the removal of the reinforcements diverted by Pillow. Pillow objects and goes to see Floyd. Floyd agrees with Buckner and has been trying to get AS Johnston to approve not making a determined defence at Donelson. However, Pillow is angered by this, goes to see Floyd and basically browbeats him into putting everything into Donelson to attack Grant. They really don't start properly digging in until the 11th-12th.

Strength, 7th: ca. 5,000
Reinforcements arriving on the 8th: ca. 1,900 (hence the estimate of 7,000 late on the 8th)
Reinforcements arriving on the 9th and 10th: ca. 3,800 (about 10,700)
Reinforcements arriving on the 13th: ca. 3,000

My point being that when Grant was considering pursuing to Dover with just infantry and cavalry, there wasn't a huge force there.
As of 8th February, when Grant had already decided Donelson was too strong, there were only about 6-7,000 men there. However, Halleck was worried about the whole of the Bowling Green force striking Grant, who he now considered to be exposed, and so arranged to move on Clarksville via Dover. He wasn't really expecting Pillow to have diverted the Clarksville defenders to Dover.

Anyway, I started writing that weeks ago, and got hung up on when arty units was at Donelson which, as you can see, isn't resolved, but I'd best hit post being windows updates.

---

Richmond was a major objective because it provided a huge percentage of rebel war material. Ultimately it was abandoned because Sheridan's force managed to cut the last railroad. Harper's Ferry was always an objective because it controls communications.

It all comes down to logistics.



I was making a reductio ad absurdum.

Good grief you're doing this on two seperate threads?

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Good grief you're doing ths on two seperate threads?

Is there anyone here who hasn't seen railroad maps?

 

[tony_gunter]

I've never heard that it was part of the Anaconda plan.

Opening the Mississippi River was part of the Anaconda Plan, the easiest way to open the Mississippi was through Fort Henry -> Corinth.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Opening the Mississippi River was part of the Anaconda Plan, the easiest way to open the Mississippi was through Fort Henry -> Corinth.

Yes it was.