Was Grant insubordinate?

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Yes, I'm aware of Halleck's Jan 30 orders, because I already posted them in full. They support my point: Halleck ordered Grant to take and hold Fort Henry. Period. Nothing about moving on to Donelson.

And I'm aware that after Grant took Fort Henry, Grant immediately messaged Halleck that he was going to continue on to Fort Donelson. He wasn't waiting for Halleck to order him to move on Fort Donelson. Grant announced to Halleck that he was moving on Fort Donelson.

Exactly as I stated in my original point. I supported my point with an excerpt from Tim Smith's book, and with the original sources. So I stand by my original point, and you can continue to flail around as much as you like. It shows you can't admit when you were wrong.

As they would say in the 1970's, "Right On!"

 

[67th Tigers]

Reading through Halleck's communications, I get the sense that he became extremely anxious after Grant announced that he was going to keep moving after taking Fort Henry. If Halleck had been on the scene, in command, he almost certainly would have strengthened Fort Henry and waited for a confederate counterattack, and then when he felt ready, conducted a slow safe movement against Fort Donelson. Much like the siege approach to Corinth.

Halleck was extremely concerned that Grant was moving too fast and the confederates were going to hit Grant while Buell was too far away to help. Below, Halleck talks about it being a "crisis" and "peril." He asks McClellan to direct Buell to Clarksville, and it's obvious by the way he brings it up that Halleck is concerned about Clarksville being the route that the confederates will "come down in a day" and "attack Grant in the rear."

View attachment 538497

How do you get that sense? Halleck was pushing Grant on to Clarksville etc., like he planned before sending Grant against Ft Henry and Ft Donelson.

I hate to say this, but on 17th February Ft Donelson had fallen, but Grant had not yet followed through and occupied Clarksville. Halleck was concerned that the Army of Central Kentucky (the force that had retreated from Bowling Green) was going to go to move to Clarksville and attack Grant. He wanted more reinforcements.

The remainder of Crittenden's division were already at Paducah, and Nelson's division was sent. On the 23rd, with Grant still being inert, Halleck sent Nelson's division to Clarksville, and ordered Grant to send CF Smith's division with him. This force, under Smith as senior general, occupied Clarksville. They then, under McClellan's orders, went to Nashville along with Crittenden's division to cooperate with Buell's 2 divisions advancing overland from Bowling Green.

Halleck then gave Grant a warning order for a movement against the bridges at Corinth etc., and Grant protested weakness. In fact, it's here that Grant almost gets relieved, as he is being inefficient and is preventing the rapid movements that McClellan is pushing Halleck for.

At this time, Polk's Corps (Army of Mississippi) is still at Columbus (although about to retreat), and Beauregard's Corps (the Army of Central Kentucky) had fallen back towards Chattanooga. The New Orleans garrison (Ruggles' division at Shiloh) is still in New Orleans, and Bragg's other forces are still at Mobile and Pensacola. The Tennessee river is completely open to Corinth, Florence and Decateur, and Grant's inefficency prevented this being exploited. Hence we end up with Shiloh and Corinth...

 

[DanSBHawk]

How do you get that sense? Halleck was pushing Grant on to Clarksville etc., like he planned before sending Grant against Ft Henry and Ft Donelson.

I hate to say this, but on 17th February Ft Donelson had fallen, but Grant had not yet followed through and occupied Clarksville. Halleck was concerned that the Army of Central Kentucky (the force that had retreated from Bowling Green) was going to go to move to Clarksville and attack Grant. He wanted more reinforcements.

The remainder of Crittenden's division were already at Paducah, and Nelson's division was sent. On the 23rd, with Grant still being inert, Halleck sent Nelson's division to Clarksville, and ordered Grant to send CF Smith's division with him. This force, under Smith as senior general, occupied Clarksville. They then, under McClellan's orders, went to Nashville along with Crittenden's division to cooperate with Buell's 2 divisions advancing overland from Bowling Green.

Halleck then gave Grant a warning order for a movement against the bridges at Corinth etc., and Grant protested weakness. In fact, it's here that Grant almost gets relieved, as he is being inefficient and is preventing the rapid movements that McClellan is pushing Halleck for.

View attachment 538696

At this time, Polk's Corps (Army of Mississippi) is still at Columbus (although about to retreat), and Beauregard's Corps (the Army of Central Kentucky) had fallen back towards Chattanooga. The New Orleans garrison (Ruggles' division at Shiloh) is still in New Orleans, and Bragg's other forces are still at Mobile and Pensacola. The Tennessee river is completely open to Corinth, Florence and Decateur, and Grant's inefficency prevented this being exploited. Hence we end up with Shiloh and Corinth...

I got the sense from actually reading Halleck's communications. Halleck thought Grant would stop at Fort Henry and strengthen it against confederate counterattack. Even McClellan was under the impression that Grant would stop at Fort Henry and await "further instructions" about "further movements."

The river forts, Henry and Donelson, were the primary strategic objectives of the campaign, not Clarksville. After Donelson fell, Clarksville was abandoned by the confederates. Grant casually informed Halleck on the 19th that Clarksville had been abandoned, and that he could occupy Clarksville on Friday and then take Nashville on Saturday.

During this period, Halleck was repeatedly asking Buell to handle Clarksville and Nashville.

The fact is that once the confederates were flanked out of Columbus and Bowling Green and Nashville, the railroads came under union control. This is why Halleck ordered Grant to make the railroad bridge across the Tennessee "impassible" but not to destroy it. Halleck knew that he would want to use that bridge once these operations were completed. Seizing the railroad bridges was nothing but temporary objectives in order to block confederate reinforcements. Grant's success in taking Henry and Donelson effectively put the railroad under union control.

I have no idea what you believe could have been "exploited" during this period that would have made Shiloh and Corinth unnecessary. But yes, I'm aware of the Halleck and McClellan back-biting of Grant during this period. I chalk it up to the fact that neither one of them had achieved the same success in battle that Grant had achieved, and that they were jealous. Also, they both knew that Grant had exceeded orders. He had moved quicker and more decisively than either one of them had expected, or would have done themselves in his place.

 

[67th Tigers]

You see, Nashville was the ultimate objective of this phase of the operation. Fts Henry and Donelson were simply obstacles. Grant was a bit of a slowcoach, but we can see some extenuating circumstances...

It's not all about Grant...

 

[DanSBHawk]

You see, Nashville was the ultimate objective of this phase of the operation. Fts Henry and Donelson were simply obstacles. Grant was a bit of a slowcoach, but we can see some extenuating circumstances...

It's not all about Grant...

"This phase?" Yes, after Grant had seized the forts on the Tennessee River and the Cumberland River, taking Nashville was an obvious next step.

Taking Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, had far greater strategic implications than simply being a step in the process of taking Nashville.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

"This phase?" Yes, after Grant had seized the forts on the Tennessee River and the Cumberland River, taking Nashville was an obvious next step.

Taking Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, had far greater strategic implications than simply being a step in the process of taking Nashville.

That's correct. That early in the war, the Union generals were not sure they could just go practically anywhere they wanted to go and do whatever they planned to do. Everything was in question, including the Union's ability to take Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, etc.

 

[67th Tigers]

"This phase?" Yes, after Grant had seized the forts on the Tennessee River and the Cumberland River, taking Nashville was an obvious next step.

Taking Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, had far greater strategic implications than simply being a step in the process of taking Nashville.

Yes. This phase. There is a general operational plan formulated by McClellan and implemented by Halleck and Buell. Grant is several levels down. He was tasked with operating initially against Clarksville and various railway bridges, for which Ft Henry/Donelson was an obstacle. They were not objectives in themselves.

The grand strategy ultimately came from Lincoln's concerns, and the main aim was to get Nashville and Knoxville. With Nashville a claim could be made that there was still a legitimate Unionist government in Tennessee. McClellan's primary military aims were Memphis, Corinth and Chatanooga. Possession of these compromised the rebel transport network and gave jumping off points for the three columns aimed down the Mississippi, Tennessee and towards Atlanta.

Forts Henry and Donelson were not important except that they blocked movements towards the real objectives. Ft Donelson only gains some import because the rebels randomly and unnecessarily surrender 11,000 men. You can't plan for enemy stupidity...

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Yes. This phase. There is a general operational plan formulated by McClellan and implemented by Halleck and Buell. Grant is several levels down. He was tasked with operating initially against Clarksville and various railway bridges, for which Ft Henry/Donelson was an obstacle. They were not objectives in themselves.

The grand strategy ultimately came from Lincoln's concerns, and the main aim was to get Nashville and Knoxville. With Nashville a claim could be made that there was still a legitimate Unionist government in Tennessee. McClellan's primary military aims were Memphis, Corinth and Chatanooga. Possession of these compromised the rebel transport network and gave jumping off points for the three columns aimed down the Mississippi, Tennessee and towards Atlanta.

Forts Henry and Donelson were not important except that they blocked movements towards the real objectives. Ft Donelson only gains some import because the rebels randomly and unnecessarily surrender 11,000 men. You can't plan for enemy stupidity...

That was indeed stupidity.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes. This phase. There is a general operational plan formulated by McClellan and implemented by Halleck and Buell. Grant is several levels down. He was tasked with operating initially against Clarksville and various railway bridges, for which Ft Henry/Donelson was an obstacle. They were not objectives in themselves.

The grand strategy ultimately came from Lincoln's concerns, and the main aim was to get Nashville and Knoxville. With Nashville a claim could be made that there was still a legitimate Unionist government in Tennessee. McClellan's primary military aims were Memphis, Corinth and Chatanooga. Possession of these compromised the rebel transport network and gave jumping off points for the three columns aimed down the Mississippi, Tennessee and towards Atlanta.

Forts Henry and Donelson were not important except that they blocked movements towards the real objectives. Ft Donelson only gains some import because the rebels randomly and unnecessarily surrender 11,000 men. You can't plan for enemy stupidity...

This is all laughably fake. Yes, McClellan had been pestering Buell about moving on East Tennessee - because Lincoln had been pestering McClellan - and Buell had been dragging his feet.

But to pretend that Forts Henry and Donelson were not major strategic objectives in themselves is just absurd. Confederate strongholds at Columbus and Bowling Green were abandoned because Grant took Henry and Donelson. It pushed A.S. Johnston all the way back to northern Mississippi. Controlling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers meant controlling actual invasion highways into the south.

Here is a map from Tim Smith's Grant Invades Tennessee which shows the strategic implications of capturing Forts Henry and Donelson. This is why they were primary strategic objectives in themselves.

Your continuing effort to give McClellan credit for any of this is noted, but is not taken seriously.

 

[Tom Hughes]

One of the interesting stories about the Vicksburg campaign included in Grant's memoirs is how he decided at Grand Gulf to NOT send a corps south to join Banks at Port Hudson, rather - to rely on the long communications delay with his boss in DC to present him a fait accompli in late May. Grant would continue inland against Vicksburg and count on being too far along to undo his decision by the time Halleck caught up with him. And then there's the story of the Colonel from Banks' staff who caught up with him at the Battle of Big Black River Bridge with a written order to send troops to Banks, which Grant refused on the spot.

Insubordination? IANAL, and I have no military background, so I won't even offer an opinion. But it sure is an interesting story.

--Warren Grabau in '98 Days' doesn't mention the issue at all.

--Donald Miller in "Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy" describes Grant deciding to not send support to Banks as pivotal, but doesn't mention the bit about Grant hoping that Halleck didn't catch up with him until it was too late.

--Timothy Smith in 'The Inland Campaign for Vicksburg' wrote that "it was a classic example of asking for forgiveness rather than permission" and also wrote: "Some later said Grant disobeyed a direct order, which Halleck denied" going on to write that Halleck and his field commanders mutually understood that they had final say.

Hmm. Was Grant using poetic license when he wrote his memoirs? To an uninformed reader like me, as described by Grant in his memoir it smells like insubordination, especially when Banks' staff catches up with him with a written order in hand. Understand, it seems brilliant to me. I'm cheering for Grant!

Grant was on his way to "catch the rabbit and dine in Vicksburg" and celebrate the July 4th with his victory. Nothing was going to stop him, let alone dividing his army by sending troops south. He took a big gamble and it paid off for him. Now, if he would've failed, it would be a different story altogether.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

This is all laughably fake. Yes, McClellan had been pestering Buell about moving on East Tennessee - because Lincoln had been pestering McClellan - and Buell had been dragging his feet.

But to pretend that Forts Henry and Donelson were not major strategic objectives in themselves is just absurd. Confederate strongholds at Columbus and Bowling Green were abandoned because Grant took Henry and Donelson. It pushed A.S. Johnston all the way back to northern Mississippi. Controlling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers meant controlling actual invasion highways into the south.

Here is a map from Tim Smith's Grant Invades Tennessee which shows the strategic implications of capturing Forts Henry and Donelson. This is why they were primary strategic objectives in themselves.

View attachment 538867

Your continuing effort to give McClellan credit for any of this is noted, but is not taken seriously.

I'll throw my hat in with @DanSBHawk on this.

 

[Stryker65]

This is all laughably fake. Yes, McClellan had been pestering Buell about moving on East Tennessee - because Lincoln had been pestering McClellan - and Buell had been dragging his feet.

But to pretend that Forts Henry and Donelson were not major strategic objectives in themselves is just absurd. Confederate strongholds at Columbus and Bowling Green were abandoned because Grant took Henry and Donelson. It pushed A.S. Johnston all the way back to northern Mississippi. Controlling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers meant controlling actual invasion highways into the south.

Here is a map from Tim Smith's Grant Invades Tennessee which shows the strategic implications of capturing Forts Henry and Donelson. This is why they were primary strategic objectives in themselves.

View attachment 538867

Your continuing effort to give McClellan credit for any of this is noted, but is not taken seriously.

I agree. Forts Henry and Donelson were important additionally in controlling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. While it can be said that the capture of the forts contributed to the army-based plan of capturing Nashville, the capture of the Rivers was part of the Anaconda Plan, which had been established long before any plan McClellan came up with.

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY , Washington, January 3, 1862. Major General H. W. HALLECK, Commanding Department of Missouri: GENERAL: It is of the greatest importance that the rebel troops in Western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the support of the force in front of General Buell. To accomplish this an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland River, to act in concert with General Buell's command, of sufficient strength to defeat any force that may be brought against it. The gunboats should be supported by at least one and perhaps two division of your best infantry, taken from Paducah and other points from which they can best be spared. At the same time such a demonstration should be made on Columbus as will prevent the removal of any troops from that place; and, if a sufficient number have already been withdrawn, the place should be taken. It may be well also to make a feint on the Tennessee River, with a command sufficient to prevent disaster under any circumstances. As our success in Kentucky depends in a great measure on our preventing re-enforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these expeditions. I desire they you give me at once your views in full as to the best method of accomplishing our object, at the same time stating the nature and strength of the force that you can use for the purpose and the time necessary to prepare. Very respectfully, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, Louisville, January 3, 1862. General H. W. HALLECK, U. S. A., Commanding Department of Missouri: . . . Considering the railroad facilities, which enable the enemy to concentrate in a few hours on any single point of this front, you will at once see the importance of a combined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of demonstrations which may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy the enemy on the whole front. It is probable that you may have given the subject, as far as Columbus and the center are concerned, more attention than I have. With reference to the former at least I can make no more than the general suggestion already expressed that it should be fully occupied. The attack upon the center should by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should say, 20,000 men on the two rivers. They should of course be organized with reference to the depth of water in the rivers, and whether they be of equal or unequal strength would depend on that and other considerations, and can hardly be determined until the moment of departure. The mode of attack must depend on the strength of the enemy at the several points and the features of the localities. It will be of the first importance to break the railroad communications, and, if possible, that should be done by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some 31 miles above the first principal battery that I know of, at Dover. The other is 18 miles above Fort Henry, the first I know of on the Tennessee. If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that re-enforcements from my columns or some other source would not reach them. By resisting they could establish themselves permanently under the protection of the gunboats. I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose any definite plan for your side. Whatever is done should done speedily, within a few days. The work will become more difficult every day. Please let me hear from your at once. Very truly, yours, D. C. BUELL, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The early January demonstration was requested by Buell. He was worried about confederate reinforcements coming from Columbus via the railroad. If either Buell or McClellan seriously believed that neutralizing an east-west railroad in northern Tennessee was strategically more important than what Grant accomplished with seizing both river forts then, well, that illustrates why neither Buell or McClellan lasted the entire war in command of anything.

Again, the Forts Henry and Donelson victory flanked the confederates out of Kentucky, caused Johnston to retreat to northern Mississippi, and opened up invasion highways into the south. It was far more consequential than just neutralizing an east-west railroad in northern Tennessee.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The early January demonstration was requested by Buell. He was worried about confederate reinforcements coming from Columbus via the railroad. If either Buell or McClellan seriously believed that neutralizing an east-west railroad in northern Tennessee was strategically more important than what Grant accomplished with seizing both river forts then, well, that illustrates why neither Buell or McClellan lasted the entire war in command of anything.

Again, the Forts Henry and Donelson victory flanked the confederates out of Kentucky, caused Johnston to retreat to northern Mississippi, and opened up invasion highways into the south. It was far more consequential than just neutralizing an east-west railroad in northern Tennessee.

You are right, @DanSBHawk. Forts Henry and Donelson were clearly more important to the Union cause than that railroad connection.

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

You are right, @DanSBHawk. Forts Henry and Donelson were clearly more important to the Union cause than that railroad connection.

The forts were important because they blocked access to the upper Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
Reaching the RR bridges meant that you've passed the forts and now have access to the upper Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
Although the stated goals were different, they both have the same outcome.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The forts were important because they blocked access to the upper Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
Reaching the RR bridges meant that you've passed the forts and now have access to the upper Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
Although the stated goals were different, they both have the same outcome.

Yes.

 

[Stryker65]

The forts were important because they blocked access to the upper Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
Reaching the RR bridges meant that you've passed the forts and now have access to the upper Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.
Although the stated goals were different, they both have the same outcome.

I agree. I always wondered this, but in your opinion would you say that gaining control of the aforementioned rivers was part of the Anaconda Plan or simply part of the invade-Tennessee-etc plan?

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

I agree. I always wondered this, but in your opinion would you say that gaining control of the aforementioned rivers was part of the Anaconda Plan or simply part of the invade-Tennessee-etc plan?

I've never heard that it was part of the Anaconda plan.

 

[67th Tigers]

This is all laughably fake. Yes, McClellan had been pestering Buell about moving on East Tennessee - because Lincoln had been pestering McClellan - and Buell had been dragging his feet.

But to pretend that Forts Henry and Donelson were not major strategic objectives in themselves is just absurd. Confederate strongholds at Columbus and Bowling Green were abandoned because Grant took Henry and Donelson. It pushed A.S. Johnston all the way back to northern Mississippi. Controlling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers meant controlling actual invasion highways into the south.

Here is a map from Tim Smith's Grant Invades Tennessee which shows the strategic implications of capturing Forts Henry and Donelson. This is why they were primary strategic objectives in themselves.

View attachment 538867

Your continuing effort to give McClellan credit for any of this is noted, but is not taken seriously.

What an incredibly "interesting" map. Let me use the same logic for Yorktown:

In fact, Fort Donelson was certainly not an objective. It was merely a placed that had to be gone through to to get to the objective. You are committing a classical error of confusing an obstacle with an objective.