Was Grant insubordinate?

[johncla]

One of the interesting stories about the Vicksburg campaign included in Grant's memoirs is how he decided at Grand Gulf to NOT send a corps south to join Banks at Port Hudson, rather - to rely on the long communications delay with his boss in DC to present him a fait accompli in late May. Grant would continue inland against Vicksburg and count on being too far along to undo his decision by the time Halleck caught up with him. And then there's the story of the Colonel from Banks' staff who caught up with him at the Battle of Big Black River Bridge with a written order to send troops to Banks, which Grant refused on the spot.

Insubordination? IANAL, and I have no military background, so I won't even offer an opinion. But it sure is an interesting story.

--Warren Grabau in '98 Days' doesn't mention the issue at all.

--Donald Miller in "Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy" describes Grant deciding to not send support to Banks as pivotal, but doesn't mention the bit about Grant hoping that Halleck didn't catch up with him until it was too late.

--Timothy Smith in 'The Inland Campaign for Vicksburg' wrote that "it was a classic example of asking for forgiveness rather than permission" and also wrote: "Some later said Grant disobeyed a direct order, which Halleck denied" going on to write that Halleck and his field commanders mutually understood that they had final say.

Hmm. Was Grant using poetic license when he wrote his memoirs? To an uninformed reader like me, as described by Grant in his memoir it smells like insubordination, especially when Banks' staff catches up with him with a written order in hand. Understand, it seems brilliant to me. I'm cheering for Grant!

 

[Stryker65]

Well, yes, in the sense that he didn't obey orders. But, IIRC, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were also against orders, so I could see how Grant would be thinking along those lines.

 

[wausaubob]

Except General Halleck never did anything like that on his own initiative. As President Lincoln later wrote in his letter to General Grant, it was Lincoln's idea to take Port Hudson first and then Vicksburg.
When Grant's army first crossed from the west bank to the east bank of the Mississippi River the risk to Grant was substantial. I think Grant and Sherman had to consider the worst case scenarios.
By the time the army of the Tennessee reached the Big Black River, the risk was minor. Conditions had completely changed.
The advantage of Banks' operation is that the Port Hudson siege could be supplied from New Orleans. Grant had to reconnect to the Yazoo River and build a siege road around Vicksburg. Once his force reached the Big Black, those additional steps were well within reach.

 

[RedRover]

Here's the definition of "insubordination."

So "disobedience" is given as...

A noticeable point is that these behaviors are relative to ones' superiors, like Halleck was to Grant in mid-1863 technically. General Halleck seemed satisfied that whatever Grant did or didn't do, he was neither insubordinate or disobedient to him.

By mid-July Grant was sending troops to reinforce other commands. He wanted to move his army against Mobile, but instead the Vicksburg army was broken up some to reinforce others.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Sending forces from Grant's army to Port Hudson, especially prior to fully investing Vicksburg, would have been a mistake and a wasteful use of the units involved.

 

[ErnieMac]

From what I have read Grant did not disobey orders. The following message (OR Series 1, Volume XXIV, Part 1, page 25) was sent by Halleck to Grant concerning operations at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. It is one of a number in which Halleck suggests desired operational objectives to Grant. In addition to Halleck's reluctance to issue orders at any time, it was not uncommon in that era to allow subordinates digression in operations in which the commander had no way make observations or direct operations himself. Halleck did just that (see highlighting below). No orders are given in this communication.

​

Washington, April 2, 1863.​

Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, before Vicksburg:​

​

General: Your dispatch of March 17 and also your telegrams of March 24 and 25 were received yesterday.​

​

While working upon the canal, the division of your forces into several eccentric operations may have been very proper for the purpose of reconnoitering the country; but it is very important that, when you strike any blow, you should have your troops sufficiently concentrated to make that blow effective. The division of your army into small expeditions destroys your strength, and, when in the presence of an enemy, is very dangerous.​

​

What is most desired, and your attention is again called to this object, is that your forces and those of General Banks should be brought into co-operation as early as possible. If he cannot get up to co-operate with you on Vicksburg, cannot you get troops down to help him on Port Hudson, or, at least, can you not destroy Grand Gulf before it becomes too strong I​

​

I know that you can judge of these matters there much better than I can here; but as the President, who seems to be rather impatient about matters on the Mississippi, has several times asked me these questions, I repeat them to you.​

​

As the season when we can do very little on the Lower Mississippi is rapidly advancing, I hope you will push matters with all possible dispatch.​

​

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,​

H. W. HALLECK,​

General-in- Chief.​

 

[jackt62]

I don't know whether some of Grant's actions were technically "insubordinate." But he was in the habit of using his authority as the on-site commander to sometimes take liberties with his orders. This first became apparent when Grant, acting without specific instructions from his superior Fremont, seized Paducah in Kentucky, and later on moved against Belmont. Grant took a less cautious approach than Halleck deemed proper over his troop staging at Pittsburg Landing, and of course declined to assist Banks at Port Hudson. Overall, Grant's free-wheeling command style proved successful, and likely contributed to the Lincoln administration's impulse to trust his judgement and promote him to higher command.

 

[wausaubob]

From what I have read Grant did not disobey orders. The following message (OR Series 1, Volume XXIV, Part 1, page 25) was sent by Halleck to Grant concerning operations at Vicksburg and Port Hudson. It is one of a number in which Halleck suggests desired operational objectives to Grant. In addition to Halleck's reluctance to issue orders at any time, it was not uncommon in that era to allow subordinates digression in operations in which the commander had no way make observations or direct operations himself. Halleck did just that (see highlighting below). No orders are given in this communication.

Washington, April 2, 1863.
Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, before Vicksburg:

General: Your dispatch of March 17 and also your telegrams of March 24 and 25 were received yesterday.

While working upon the canal, the division of your forces into several eccentric operations may have been very proper for the purpose of reconnoitering the country; but it is very important that, when you strike any blow, you should have your troops sufficiently concentrated to make that blow effective. The division of your army into small expeditions destroys your strength, and, when in the presence of an enemy, is very dangerous.

What is most desired, and your attention is again called to this object, is that your forces and those of General Banks should be brought into co-operation as early as possible. If he cannot get up to co-operate with you on Vicksburg, cannot you get troops down to help him on Port Hudson, or, at least, can you not destroy Grand Gulf before it becomes too strong I

I know that you can judge of these matters there much better than I can here; but as the President, who seems to be rather impatient about matters on the Mississippi, has several times asked me these questions, I repeat them to you.

As the season when we can do very little on the Lower Mississippi is rapidly advancing, I hope you will push matters with all possible dispatch.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,​

President Lincoln's ideas were based on the sluggish way the eastern US armies conducted the war. Grant had a plan based on movement which was a return to his Fort Donelson method. He was co-operating with Banks, but in a different way. Lincoln had forgotten the pressure the navy put on Porter to get downriver from Vicksburg. He may have been unaware the Farragut had gone back to New Orleans by a combination of overland and river routes. General Halleck is repeating Lincoln's concerns. But both Halleck and Grant knew plans had gone far beyond what Lincoln could comprehend.
Its hard to see how Halleck would want to divert forces from Grant to Banks. That would be like Grant abdicating command to McClerndan.

General-in- ChiefPresoide

 

[tony_gunter]

One of the interesting stories about the Vicksburg campaign included in Grant's memoirs is how he decided at Grand Gulf to NOT send a corps south to join Banks at Port Hudson, rather - to rely on the long communications delay with his boss in DC to present him a fait accompli in late May. Grant would continue inland against Vicksburg and count on being too far along to undo his decision by the time Halleck caught up with him. And then there's the story of the Colonel from Banks' staff who caught up with him at the Battle of Big Black River Bridge with a written order to send troops to Banks, which Grant refused on the spot.

Insubordination? IANAL, and I have no military background, so I won't even offer an opinion. But it sure is an interesting story.

--Warren Grabau in '98 Days' doesn't mention the issue at all.

--Donald Miller in "Grant's Campaign That Broke the Confederacy" describes Grant deciding to not send support to Banks as pivotal, but doesn't mention the bit about Grant hoping that Halleck didn't catch up with him until it was too late.

--Timothy Smith in 'The Inland Campaign for Vicksburg' wrote that "it was a classic example of asking for forgiveness rather than permission" and also wrote: "Some later said Grant disobeyed a direct order, which Halleck denied" going on to write that Halleck and his field commanders mutually understood that they had final say.

Hmm. Was Grant using poetic license when he wrote his memoirs? To an uninformed reader like me, as described by Grant in his memoir it smells like insubordination, especially when Banks' staff catches up with him with a written order in hand. Understand, it seems brilliant to me. I'm cheering for Grant!

Poetic license or just the distance of time, I can't remember how the message read that he received at Big Black River but it wasn't as Grant remembered in his memoirs.

Grant was under orders to cooperate with Banks and fully expected to comply after he took Grand Gulf by sending McClernand south. But Banks had decided to turn his attention in the opposite direction by moving up the Red River first and wasn't in a position to invest Port Hudson when Grand Gulf fell.

 

[wausaubob]

Poetic license or just the distance of time, I can't remember how the message read that he received at Big Black River but it wasn't as Grant remembered in his memoirs.

Grant was under orders to cooperate with Banks and fully expected to comply after he took Grand Gulf by sending McClernand south. But Banks had decided to turn his attention in the opposite direction by moving up the Red River first and wasn't in a position to invest Port Hudson when Grand Gulf fell.

So Grant wrote. But he may have been stretching it.

 

[tony_gunter]

So Grant wrote. But he may have been stretching it.

No, he was going to send McClernand to Banks, two birds one stone: comply with Halleck's order to cooperate and offload McClernand.

Three birds, actually, but Hamilton chose to resign rather than report for duty under McClernand.

That's probably why he had McClernand's corps in the lead crossing the river, they could rest / refit as he left them behind with orders to sail south.

 

[johncla]

The conclusion I draw from all of the above (thank you!) is that the consensus is -- 'yes maybe it was insubordination, but Grant did the right thing and Halleck never gave any sign that he was angry about it.' It also seems that Grant was using poetic license in his memoirs, and over-dramatized the incident a bit.

But then...I just received a gift copy of the 3 vol Edwin Bearss set on the Vicksburg campaign. I looked this up in volume 2. I see that when summarizing the importance of Champion Hill, Bears quoted a former CSA officer Lt Gen AG Paxton, who wrote that Grant "was under orders from General Halleck, his superior, to disengage at Vicksburg and move his forces at once to support Banks at Port Hudson".

Also, when describing the decision at Grand Gulf to not send a corps to support Banks, Bearss spent a paragraph explaining why it was the right decision. Summarizing, he wrote "To send a corps to Banks was to throw away what Grant had worked months to gain."

 

[tony_gunter]

You can't have it both ways. Either Grant was insubordinant or he took poetic license with how he remembered the order he received at Big Black River.

 

[Stryker65]

You can't have it both ways. Either Grant was insubordinant or he took poetic license with how he remembered the order he received at Big Black River.

I think you can...I would think that Grant just did the latter, and was perceived as insubordinate by others.

 

[tony_gunter]

I think you can...I would think that Grant just did the latter, and was perceived as insubordinate by others.

Falsely perceived?

How was it that Grant phrased it in his memoirs? Something like "I had a superstition for the chain of command."

 

[wausaubob]

Falsely perceived?

How was it that Grant phrased it in his memoirs? Something like "I had a superstition for the chain of command."

Success has many fathers.

 

[wausaubob]

Halleck and Grant both knew that President Lincoln was wrong. If Vicksburg fell first, the capture of Port Hudson was automatic. Lincoln admitted later that it was his idea to help Banks. If that would have happened Banks would have been a good candidate for VP.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Nelson sans arm & eye patch,

Sidebar: In references to Grant ignoring Halleck's meddling it is equated with Admiral Horatio Nelson's blind right eye.

At a critical moment in a battle Nelson claimed to not have seen a signal from a commander who had lost his nerve. Thus the expression, "To turn a blind eye." That is the stuff of heroes ¿no?

No, indeed… after loosing his right arm at the Battle of Santa Cruz, Nelson filed a claim for medical disability payment for both lost arm & blind eye. The claim for loss of limb was approved, that of blindness rejected.

That made Nelson's undoubted ignoring of the order doubly bold. No image of him wearing an eye patch appeared until long after his death.

Link:

Historian rips away Adm. Nelson’s eye patch

British naval hero Adm. Horatio Nelson did not wear a patch to hide his blind right eye, according to new evidence that blows out of the water a myth dating from the mid-19th century that was popularized by Hollywood.

www.nbcnews.com

At a lecture I attended two probable causes for Nelson's blindness were put forth. An impact could have detached the back of his eye causing partial blindness. I can personally attest to that as a result of a pre-seatbelt car accident.

From the 1400's onward navigators suffered debilitating eye damage due to staring at the sun while using sextant or earlier devices.

It was speculated that in those lusty days only visible scarring or traumatic amputation would have been rewarded with a pension.

 

[Stryker65]

At a critical moment in a battle Nelson claimed to not have seen a signal from a commander who had lost his nerve. Thus the expression, "To turn a blind eye." That is the stuff of heroes ¿no?

Wait, so that's where that saying came from?!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Wait, so that's where that saying came from?!

I was going to refer to it & decided to look it up just to establish the dates & facts. Obviously, I found something entirely unexpected.