Was Burnside really surprised by Hills appearance

[Scott1967]

Did McClellan know in advance that Hill was about to attack Burnsides flank and did he warn Burnside before Burnside committed his division's up the hill?.

Did Red Hill play a part in this and did McClellan have any cavalry on the left flank or was Burnside taken completely by surprise?.

All the evidence I can uncover suggest that Hill's attack was a complete surprise and that the Union Divisions marching up the hill to Sharpsburg were clueless to the impending flank attack but how can this be so when the Red Hill signal station had a clear view of the battlefield and allegedly McClellan had posted Vedettes near the Harpers Ferry gap can we uncover this mystery or is it common knowledge already?.

 

[jepridgen]

I'd be interested to see if any signal station observations occurred. In every book I've read or map I've studied, I've never seen any evidence of a cavalry force or even a thin line of videttes on that flank along the Harper's Ferry Road. Remember, the federal cavalry at this point in the AotP was dispersed all over, and I'm not even sure they were operating at a brigade level consistently while McClellan was in charge. I don't think they were.

The majority of his cavalry was massed in the center for a Napoleonic type exploitation assault whenever the ANV broke. There isn't a whole lot of mention on what any other mounted elements were doing. Wouldn't the terrain have shielded Hill's movement to a certain extent as well? Obviously there was dust, but I'd be interested to see if anyone has any insight on terrain effects in relation to signal stations.

 

[Scott1967]

I'd be interested to see if any signal station observations occurred. In every book I've read or map I've studied, I've never seen any evidence of a cavalry force or even a thin line of videttes on that flank along the Harper's Ferry Road. Remember, the federal cavalry at this point in the AotP was dispersed all over, and I'm not even sure they were operating at a brigade level consistently while McClellan was in charge. I don't think they were.

The majority of his cavalry was massed in the center for a Napoleonic type exploitation assault whenever the ANV broke. There isn't a whole lot of mention on what any other mounted elements were doing. Wouldn't the terrain have shielded Hill's movement to a certain extent as well? Obviously there was dust, but I'd be interested to see if anyone has any insight on terrain effects in relation to signal stations.

Yes that is what i have found as well Pleasonton was in the centre at middle bridge with the vast majority of the cavalry escorting the artillery I cant find anything to suggest that any other Union cavalry were anywhere else.

 

[jepridgen]

Yes that is what i have found as well Pleasonton was in the centre at middle bridge with the vast majority of the cavalry escorting the artillery I cant find anything to suggest that any other Union cavalry were anywhere else.

Yeah, it seems crazy because the HF Road comes from the south right into the left rear of the AotP once they crossed the Antietam. There were undoubtedly also roads from the HF Road that branched off into the actual Federal rear. I assume Burnside had some of his forces that were positioned south along the creek covering his rear. It just looks like he totally ignored the possibility of anyone coming up from HF.

 

[Scott1967]

Yeah, it seems crazy because the HF Road comes from the south right into the left rear of the AotP once they crossed the Antietam. There were undoubtedly also roads from the HF Road that branched off into the actual Federal rear. I assume Burnside had some of his forces that were positioned south along the creek covering his rear. It just looks like he totally ignored the possibility of anyone coming up from HF.

What I find strange is after Burnside crossed the bridge and resupplied his divisions which took a couple of hours he then ordered the advance up the hill in battle formation if he had some knowledge of Hills division surely orders would have been given to meet the threat we know Rodman was on the left but was totally unaware of Hill the 16th Connecticut being a totally green regiment on the far left actually thought Hills troops union reinforcements presumably because they had looted Union clothing from HF.

 

[jepridgen]

What I find strange is after Burnside crossed the bridge and resupplied his divisions which took a couple of hours he then ordered the advance up the hill in battle formation if he had some knowledge of Hills division surely orders would have been given to meet the threat we know Rodman was on the left but was totally unaware of Hill the 16th Connecticut being a totally green regiment on the far left actually thought Hills troops union reinforcements presumably because they had looted Union clothing from HF.

I can't remember anywhere that I've read that he had any clue trouble was headed his way. I haven't read every book on the battle and campaign, but I've read quite a few. There's just no indication that an intelligence report of Hill approaching that I can remember. The cavalry definitely didn't provide a reconnaissance force that far south, and Burnside just as surely didn't have anything covering that route. If theres anyone out there who has seen evidence of a report with army HQ, they'll be on this forum most likely.

I'm not all that shocked the Burnside stopped for two hours or so to resupply. That was a very McClellan/AotP thing to do in 1862.

 

[Brian Downey]

Yes, the Confederates coming up from Harpers Ferry were noticed from Red Hill/Elk Ridge. General Burnside was in communication with that station, vis:

September 17 we received from General Burnside this:

Can you see any movements of the enemy on the road or elsewhere?
General BURNSIDE.

To General B.:
Yes; they are moving now a strong force of infantry from Shepherdstown into the woods west of Sharpsburg and northerly to our right.

Can you see any movement of the enemy, particularly in rear of the corn-field in front of us?
General BURNSIDE.

I can see no movement, particularly in rear of that corn-field.

This last message, although insignificant now, was very important then, as it gave assurances that there was no immediate danger to be apprehended from that particular place. At 3 p. m. same day we sent:

To General Burnside:
Look out well on your left; the enemy are moving a strong force in that direction.

This warning was in time, and it was noticed by General Burnside, as at that hour, I think, General A. P. Hill arrived with his forces from Harper's Ferry to re-enforce the enemy.

[from Acting Signal Officer Gloskoski's after-action report]

 

[Scott1967]

Yes, the Confederates coming up from Harpers Ferry were noticed from Red Hill/Elk Ridge. General Burnside was in communication with that station, vis:

September 17 we received from General Burnside this:

Can you see any movements of the enemy on the road or elsewhere?
General BURNSIDE.

To General B.:
Yes; they are moving now a strong force of infantry from Shepherdstown into the woods west of Sharpsburg and northerly to our right.

Can you see any movement of the enemy, particularly in rear of the corn-field in front of us?
General BURNSIDE.

I can see no movement, particularly in rear of that corn-field.

This last message, although insignificant now, was very important then, as it gave assurances that there was no immediate danger to be apprehended from that particular place. At 3 p. m. same day we sent:

To General Burnside:
Look out well on your left; the enemy are moving a strong force in that direction.

This warning was in time, and it was noticed by General Burnside, as at that hour, I think, General A. P. Hill arrived with his forces from Harper's Ferry to re-enforce the enemy.

[from Acting Signal Officer Gloskoski's after-action report]

Thankyou Brian , I'm vexed as to why Burnside didn't react if he had a hour to react did he just ignore the signal station?.

 

[jepridgen]

Mmmh, this has gotten my interest up. It's been a minute since I read one of my books on the battle. Since the timeline for Hill's attack is roughly 30 minutes after the signal officer reported it per his AAR, I'm wondering if Burnside's HQ had time to process the message, get it to him for action, and get word to his division commanders. It definitely looks like the signal station didn't identify trouble until very late, and there were definitely no eyes on the HF Road.