Victories on the offensive when outnumbered

[Saruman]

The tactics and weaponry of the Civil War clearly favoured the defensive side. In general, victories on the offensive were more difficult to obtain. The most difficult victory of all to achieve was an offensive action while also being outnumbered. Scanning through all the major battles, I believe Robert E. Lee, Richard Taylor, and Nathan B. Forrest were the only Civil War generals to perform such a feat. Twice for Lee.

Second Manassas: Pope (62,000) defeated by Lee (48,500)
Chancellorsville: Hooker (133,900) defeated by Lee (60,900)
Sabine Crossroads: Banks (12,000) defeated by Taylor (9,000)
Brice's Crossroads: Sturgis (8,500) defeated by Forrest (3,200)

Should this define Lee, Taylor, and Forrest as the "greatest generals" of the war, or does the possible ineptitude of their opponents discount these rare achievements?

 

[Rebforever]

Uh oh!.........................

 

[NedBaldwin]

Sabine Crossroads: Banks (12,000) defeated by Taylor (9,000)

The numbers for this battle are problematic.

Numbers can be quite different depending on what is being measured. For example, is it:
(1) those in position at time of action,
(2) total who participated in battle (#1 + late arrivals), or
(3) overall forces in the area (#2 + those further down the road who didnt get to the battle).

[There is also the challenge of counting effectives vs present for duty vs total present.]

If one examines #1, Taylor was not outnumbered.
Even for #2 it depends on definitions and assumptions, but I dont think he was outnumbered.

Taylor's success was in the preparation, position and timing. He was definitely outnumbered in #3. But he found a spot and chose the time where he create a more favorable situation.

 

[brass napoleon]

The tactics and weaponry of the Civil War clearly favoured the defensive side. In general, victories on the offensive were more difficult to obtain. The most difficult victory of all to achieve was an offensive action while also being outnumbered. Scanning through all the major battles, I believe Robert E. Lee, Richard Taylor, and Nathan B. Forrest were the only Civil War generals to perform such a feat. Twice for Lee.

Second Manassas: Pope (62,000) defeated by Lee (48,500)
Chancellorsville: Hooker (133,900) defeated by Lee (60,900)

Regarding the Lee battles, I disagree that Lee was on the offensive at Chancellorsville. Hooker was the attacking party; Lee counterattacked, which was brilliant, but still not an offensive maneuver.

I do agree about Second Manassas though. That was a brilliant offensive campaign by Lee all the way around, and certainly qualifies him as one of the greatest generals of the war. But there are many other factors to take into consideration as well, including, as you noted, the ineptitude of the opponent, which at Second Manassas was significant.

 

[BillO]

Lee, Taylor and Forrest seems like a pretty good lineup to me.

 

[OpnCoronet]

As a general rule of the Military Art, superiority of numbers should not be regarded as any kind of guarantor of success. What is more important is superiority of numbers at a chosen point of the enemy forces.
What separates the good from the great generals is the ability to place inferior forces at a superior position through the use of maneuver, with superior numbers at a chosen point of contact with the enemy.

 

[Lt R. Blackwell 4th Texas]

The tactics and weaponry of the Civil War clearly favoured the defensive side. In general, victories on the offensive were more difficult to obtain. The most difficult victory of all to achieve was an offensive action while also being outnumbered. Scanning through all the major battles, I believe Robert E. Lee, Richard Taylor, and Nathan B. Forrest were the only Civil War generals to perform such a feat. Twice for Lee.

Second Manassas: Pope (62,000) defeated by Lee (48,500)
Chancellorsville: Hooker (133,900) defeated by Lee (60,900)
Sabine Crossroads: Banks (12,000) defeated by Taylor (9,000)
Brice's Crossroads: Sturgis (8,500) defeated by Forrest (3,200)

Should this define Lee, Taylor, and Forrest as the "greatest generals" of the war, or does the possible ineptitude of their opponents discount these rare achievements?

Possible additions:
Seven Days: Lee (90,000 plus) defeated McClellan (90,000-100,000)
Vicksburg: Opening stages: Grant (initially 17,000) defeated Pemberton et al (30,000 within a twenty mile radius)
Chickamauga: Bragg may have had a few thousand less than Rosecrans
Wilderness: Lee (60,000) marginally defeated Grant (120,000)

 

[PatW]

Remember at Second Manassas, Jackson's corps fought on the defensive with Pope's troops suffering heavy casualties in the offensive. It was rather late in the battle when Longstreet's corp launched its flank assault.

At Chancellorsville virtually every unit in Lee's army saw heavy fighting. Large portions of the Union army were uncommitted.

 

[James N.]

Possible additions:
Seven Days: Lee (90,000 plus) defeated McClellan (90,000-100,000)
Vicksburg: Opening stages: Grant (initially 17,000) defeated Pemberton et al (30,000 within a twenty mile radius)
Chickamauga: Bragg may have had a few thousand less than Rosecrans
Wilderness: Lee (60,000) marginally defeated Grant (120,000)

Likely true, considering the campaign as a whole, even if it contained individual disasters like Malvern Hill. Applying that rationale, however, would probably make the Wilderness a tactical semi-victory but definitely a strategic defeat, since Grant simply sidestepped to the next in the series of battles in the overall Overland Campaign.

 

[E_just_E]

The issue of looking at multiple available troops during a battle is that really what matters is the effective number of engaged troops that happened usually a brigade or two at a time from each side. Those battles were more like tag team fights instead of Battle Royales.

 

[BillO]

Likely true, considering the campaign as a whole, even if it contained individual disasters like Malvern Hill. Applying that rationale, however, would probably make the Wilderness a tactical semi-victory but definitely a strategic defeat, since Grant simply sidestepped to the next in the series of battles in the overall Overland Campaign.

The Wilderness battle could be considered a strategic defeat only if that had been Grants plan when he went into the wilderness. It would be a check and a counter move.

 

[Elennsar]

Since Grant's goal from the start was to defeat Lee and take Richmond, that Grant moved forward to continue the effort to do so means by definition the ANV failed to stop him from continuing the offense.

Thus, strategically, it (and its commander) failed in the Wilderness.

That doesn't take away anything from fighting well tactically, but it is not supposed to.

 

[BillO]

Since Grant's goal from the start was to defeat Lee and take Richmond, that Grant moved forward to continue the effort to do so means by definition the ANV failed to stop him from continuing the offense.

Thus, strategically, it (and its commander) failed in the Wilderness.

That doesn't take away anything from fighting well tactically, but it is not supposed to.

If, at the time of the Battle of Wilderness, Grants goal was to simply destroy the ANV then he failed as there was no need to move as the ANV was parked right in front of him. If his goal was to link up with Butler and take Richmond then he failed to get through the wildernesss in a timely fashion. This was his stated goal and there is simply no way to paint the Wilderness as anything but a large blunder on Grants part.

 

[Elennsar]

If, at the time of the Battle of Wilderness, Grants goal was to simply destroy the ANV then he failed as there was no need to move as the ANV was parked right in front of him. If his goal was to link up with Butler and take Richmond then he failed to get through the wildernesss in a timely fashion. This was his stated goal and there is simply no way to paint the Wilderness as anything but a large blunder on Grants part.

If Lee's strategic goal in the Wilderness was to force Grant back, he failed. If his strategic goal was to hold up Grant for a length of time long enough to make a difference to Richmond's security, he failed.

If Grant's goal was to destroy Lee's army and take Richmond, he was able to keep advancing - keep searching for ground to fight Lee on his terms, and keep Richmond's security in doubt regardless of what Butler did or didn't do.

 

[Rebforever]

If Lee's strategic goal in the Wilderness was to force Grant back, he failed. If his strategic goal was to hold up Grant for a length of time long enough to make a difference to Richmond's security, he failed.

If Grant's goal was to destroy Lee's army and take Richmond, he was able to keep advancing - keep searching for ground to fight Lee on his terms, and keep Richmond's security in doubt regardless of what Butler did or didn't do.

Which Grant failed to do.

 

[Elennsar]

Which Grant failed to do.

So some other general accepted Lee's surrender at Appomattox, and some other general commanded the forces that entered Richmond the week before?

This would explain a lot.

Or are you looking specifically at the Overland Campaign?

http://www.civilwar.org/hallowed-ground-magazine/spring-2014/the-overland-campaign.html

 

[Pat Answer]

Lee, Taylor, and Forrest certainly belong on the list of the greats. But I agree with NedBaldwin, OpnCoronet, and others here who point to "preparation, position and timing" being much more important factors than numbers or who happened to be doing the attacking at what moment. And I would say achieving a decisive victory at all over a similarly armed and organized opponent was the real trick in this war.

 

[Rebforever]

So some other general accepted Lee's surrender at Appomattox, and some other general commanded the forces that entered Richmond the week before?

This would explain a lot.

Or are you looking specifically at the Overland Campaign?

http://www.civilwar.org/hallowed-ground-magazine/spring-2014/the-overland-campaign.html

Were you talking about the Wilderness Battle? If you were then it would be the overland.

 

[BillO]

If Lee's strategic goal in the Wilderness was to force Grant back, he failed. If his strategic goal was to hold up Grant for a length of time long enough to make a difference to Richmond's security, he failed.

If Grant's goal was to destroy Lee's army and take Richmond, he was able to keep advancing - keep searching for ground to fight Lee on his terms, and keep Richmond's security in doubt regardless of what Butler did or didn't do.

Lee's goal was to postpone the war and look for openings to destroy a part of the AoP. Yes he failed as well. That's why it was a check but not a win for either. Lee didn't have enough force or control over his subordinates to force Grant back over the river and Grant had allowed himself to be caught stretched out and vulnerable. They both failed in their aims in the wilderness.

 

[Elennsar]

Lee's goal was to postpone the war and look for openings to destroy a part of the AoP. Yes he failed as well. That's why it was a check but not a win for either. Lee didn't have enough force or control over his subordinates to force Grant back over the river and Grant had allowed himself to be caught stretched out and vulnerable. They both failed in their aims in the wilderness.

Grant's position was more threatening after the battle than before it. This is not a strategic draw.