Trench question

[atlantis]

Did either side make any effort to keep trench's dry. A wet trench can play heck with your feet and the effect on unit morale. Given that so many on both sides were treated as little more than cannon fodder I am curious if the engineers had pioneer details working to keep the trench bottom dry.

 

[DixieRifles]

Many of the trenches was built with 2 levels. This sketch of Confederate earthworks at Vicksburg in the Osprey booklet "American Civil War Fortifications (3)".
This design allowed the gunners to fire from behind a barrier, usually with a "head log". Then he could step back down to a lower level where he could safely reload.
I would think this design would help drain off the water but it could still be wet in the lower trench. Also the soil at Vicksburg may have made it easier to form proper drainage without any loss soil washing out causing a collapse.

 

[DixieRifles]

I thought the best resource to look for an answer would be found in Timothy Smith's books on Vicksburg: "The Union Assaults at Vicksburg" and "The Siege of Vicksburg", which is 715 pages thick. He includes a lot on the history of the building of the Confederate fortifications so I checked the contents to see if I could find anything that mentioned how they handled draining. I didn't find anything.
What I did find was the description of the flooding of the trenches caused by the torrential rains. They had heavy rains on May 23 and then 29th -30th and again on June 21st & 23rd. But on June 10-11, they were hit by a storm greater than they had seen before.
Here are some quotes.

"A hard rain suspending firing. Our pits a perfect mudhole---awful time! Looks like it would rain for a week."
One Confederate covered "12 feet of pits with wood covered with dirt. Have my bed inside of the ditch."
"The drainage in our ditches not being good, the ditch overflowed." -- Alabamian Elbert Willett.
"It is very muddy and disagreeable in the trenches."
"It rained so hard that many of the cooks' helpers had to swim. Blankets, knapsacks, clothing, and everything that was on the ground was floating."
One Texan wrote: "Many of the intrenchments caved in and others were full of water."
"A wetter, dirtier, muddier, lot of rebels were never seen but we kept our powder dry."
Indianan George Rogers stated: "It poured down in torrents reminding us of the days of Noah".
A Union artilleryman in Lauman's division described how the little creek at their camp in the ravine, dry most of the time, caused "a most unlooked for and sudden flood." The creek "overflowed its banks and covered the whole hollow.". The "3d Iowa boys were routed out first, some of them without their clothes."
One soldier reported water 2 feet deep in the camp of the 48th Indianan. Cave-ins also occurred in the Union camps, one in the 8th Illinois nearly covering three men. "One little Dutchman" brought a laugh when he commented dryly: "T' was a mity coot ting' that wan of 'em had 'is 'ed out so's he could holler."

The rain did not stop the construction. Charles Dana reported to Washington that "the siege works have been checked for 24 hours by violent storms, but were resumed yesterday. "

 

[tmorr]

Several months ago I was reading an archeology report on CS fortifications at Knoxville, specifically a four gun battery arrayed against Ft. Sanders, and it said they found evidence that the emplacements had drainage ditches run to the rear to allow for runoff. I'm sure this type of thing was done in siege and long term defensive construction wherever possible and it the commanders and engineers thought it prudent.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Anybody who has been involved with construction knows that soil is a term that covers a host of substances from wispy sand to near sold clay. The three miles of rifle pits (trenches) that run around a ridge at Triune TN are in remarkable condition. The huge earthworks in Fortress Rosecrans, Murfreesboro TN, have resisted the rigorous extremes of Middle Tennessee weather. The red clay layer under the top soil in Middle Tennessee is very dense.

On Kennesaw Mountain, in areas where visitors can't go, there are clearly visible tool marks on the hardpan clay. You can easily imagine the slave work gangs singing in rhythm as they dug. It had rained for days & was followed by a drought that fixed the red clay like cement.

The soil at Vicksburg was so light that a 12 pound cannon ball could penetrate a12 foot berm. An extra 24" had to be laboriously added.

The drainage engineered into the Works at Triune were a no brainer. From 15 miles away in Murfreesboro, the ridge dominates the horizon.

On flat boggy ground, there was no place for the water to go. In many cases, the army engineers who staked out the lines were not competent. An example of that is the existing line atop Shy's Hill in Nashville TN. It was staked out on the geographic summit, not the military summit. As a result, Union attackers advanced under cover until 15-30 yards of Shy's position. What was left of Bate's division was overrun & wiped out.

Standard military engineering principles were worked out during the Roman Empire. When Sébastien Le Prestre Vauban turned fortification into a science in the 1600's, drains, etc. were an integral element of his designs. Keeping the garrison heathy was as essential as the exact angle to deflect cannonballs. He is the reason we have to learn all those French names for the elements of fortifications.

It wasn't Vauban's fault that Confederate engineers chose underwater places like Fort Henry to build on. In the end, nature dictates. The ice storm that encased Hood & Thomas' works at Nashville in an inch of crystal clear ice defied all human intervention. The drains were in the manual…

 

[DixieRifles]

The soil at Vicksburg was so light that a 12 pound cannon ball could penetrate a12 foot berm. An extra 24" had to be laboriously added.

The soil that formed the bluffs was loess. It looks like clay.
I recall driving along I-20 where it cut thru some hills. You could see graffiti carved in the clay walls which had been there for years.

 

[JackADriscoll]

They didn't master it in passchendaele either

 

[CavRTO]

They didn't master it in passchendaele either

WWII, Korea, or Viet Nam and certainly not in the Ukraine. Has been and always will be the combatant's devil .

 

[atlantis]

It is certainly an age-old problem.

 

[121st PA Vols]

I thought the best resource to look for an answer would be found in Timothy Smith's books on Vicksburg: "The Union Assaults at Vicksburg" and "The Siege of Vicksburg", which is 715 pages thick. He includes a lot on the history of the building of the Confederate fortifications so I checked the contents to see if I could find anything that mentioned how they handled draining. I didn't find anything.
What I did find was the description of the flooding of the trenches caused by the torrential rains. They had heavy rains on May 23 and then 29th -30th and again on June 21st & 23rd. But on June 10-11, they were hit by a storm greater than they had seen before.
Here are some quotes.

"A hard rain suspending firing. Our pits a perfect mudhole---awful time! Looks like it would rain for a week."
One Confederate covered "12 feet of pits with wood covered with dirt. Have my bed inside of the ditch."
"The drainage in our ditches not being good, the ditch overflowed." -- Alabamian Elbert Willett.
"It is very muddy and disagreeable in the trenches."
"It rained so hard that many of the cooks' helpers had to swim. Blankets, knapsacks, clothing, and everything that was on the ground was floating."
One Texan wrote: "Many of the intrenchments caved in and others were full of water."
"A wetter, dirtier, muddier, lot of rebels were never seen but we kept our powder dry."
Indianan George Rogers stated: "It poured down in torrents reminding us of the days of Noah".
A Union artilleryman in Lauman's division described how the little creek at their camp in the ravine, dry most of the time, caused "a most unlooked for and sudden flood." The creek "overflowed its banks and covered the whole hollow.". The "3d Iowa boys were routed out first, some of them without their clothes."
One soldier reported water 2 feet deep in the camp of the 48th Indianan. Cave-ins also occurred in the Union camps, one in the 8th Illinois nearly covering three men. "One little Dutchman" brought a laugh when he commented dryly: "T' was a mity coot ting' that wan of 'em had 'is 'ed out so's he could holler."

The rain did not stop the construction. Charles Dana reported to Washington that "the siege works have been checked for 24 hours by violent storms, but were resumed yesterday. "

Timothy Smith's works are outstanding. I like that he, #1, destroys the misconception of 'trench/siege warfare' being static as many if not most believe. Also, #2, that he reminds of another falsehood that Petersburg....a year later....was in fact not the first instance of this, tho many believed as much.
Thanks DixieRifles for reminding me of Tim's great efforts. Time for yet another re-read!

 

[121st PA Vols]

Timothy Smith's works are outstanding. I like that he, #1, destroys the misconception of 'trench/siege warfare' being static as many if not most believe. Also, #2, that he reminds of another falsehood that Petersburg....a year later....was in fact not the first instance of this, tho many believed as much.
Thanks DixieRifles for reminding me of Tim's great efforts. Time for yet another re-read!

Edited/added to say I have a real bad habit of reading too quickly first time around and wonder if others do as well. It's too big a topic for a fast read and I'm trying to expand from my 'Gettysburg centric ways'!

 

[DixieRifles]

Thanks DixieRifles for reminding me of Tim's great efforts.

Last night I wanted to find out more about the 19th Louisiana Regiment. I first pulled out Smith's book on Vicksburg and it reminded me that they were part of General J. E. Johnston's "relief" army. So nothing really in those two volumes. So I pulled out his "Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg" which covers Grant's entire campaign from crossing the Mississippi River to Black Black River bridge. But Johnston still was not involved in any of this action.
Where was General Johnston during March - May 1863??
I have a brief history that says the 19th Louisiana Regt was in the Tullahoma campaign and finally arrived in Jackson in May.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Last night I wanted to find out more about the 19th Louisiana Regiment. I first pulled out Smith's book on Vicksburg and it reminded me that they were part of General J. E. Johnston's "relief" army. So nothing really in those two volumes. So I pulled out his "Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg" which covers Grant's entire campaign from crossing the Mississippi River to Black Black River bridge. But Johnston still was not involved in any of this action.
Where was General Johnston during March - May 1863??
I have a brief history that says the 19th Louisiana Regt was in the Tullahoma campaign and finally arrived in Jackson in May.

DixieRifles, I believe that is a core question of the 'campaign' and what historians are still asking. Where was Johnston? Grant was certainly concerned about him (as an understatement) sending almost half his army 'rearwards' fretting about Johnston slipping through the avenue like ground between the Black and Yazoo Rivers to get at his rear.

 

[Rhea Cole]

In his three volume History of the Vicksburg Campaign Ed Bearss covers Johnston's movements & dilemmas. There is no mystery about what Johnston was up to. It is all thoroughly documented.

When Grant crossed the Mississippi River, he was greatly outnumbered by CSA forces in Mississippi. Bearss goes into great detail documenting the masterful way Grant used cavalry & the threat of landings from the river to keep CSA commanders completely wrong footed. Constant feints toward the vital rail road kept Pemberton's cavalry chasing ghosts. Not only did Grant's cavalry campaign keep their much larger opponents off balance, it kept them both occupied & unable to make mischief.

Johnston suffered from the same problem as all Grant's other opponents did. He had no idea what Grant was going to do next. Even Sherman stated explicitly that he had no confidence that the unsupported move against Vicksburg would work until it did. Grant's operations were classic examples of the OODA Circle. By the time Johnston & Pemberton realized what Grant was up to, he was already several moves into his next phase.

Both Johnston & Grant understood that it was Pemberton's Army, not Vicksburg that was the key to victory. With Pemberton's Army intact, Johnston had options; Vicksburg could have been retaken. As events unfolded, Johnston ordering Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg was the correct decision. Pemberton chose, instead, to follow Davis' meddling order to hold at all costs.

Once Pemberton ordered his army to man the Vicksburg defense & Grant reached the Mississippi upriver, it was only a matter of time. With Grant's riverine supply line absolutely secure & nowhere for Johnston to draw a relieving force from, his options were extremely limited.

On July 4th, not only was Vicksburg secured, but the Tullahoma Campaign had swept the Army of Tennessee clear out of the state & Lee permanently lost the all important initiative in VA. By late fall, Bragg would be in North Georgia & Grant's line would run from New Orleans to Cumberland Gap. Johnston's Army of relief seems a mere trifle compared to that, ¿no?

Note: in his letter to Davis laying out his plan for the Pennsylvania incursion, Lee asked Davis to concentrate 100,000 idle troops from the Carolinas under Beauregard at Culpepper VA.

While Lee's Carolina 100,000 twiddled their thumbs amongst the palmettos, by July 4th Lee, Bragg & Pemberton had been soundly defeated. The initiative in VA & strategically vital Vicksburg & Middle Tennessee were irretrievably lost. The responsibility for that colossal defeat does not lie with Johnston.

 

[atlantis]

In his three volume History of the Vicksburg Campaign Ed Bearss covers Johnston's movements & dilemmas. There is no mystery about what Johnston was up to. It is all thoroughly documented.

When Grant crossed the Mississippi River, he was greatly outnumbered by CSA forces in Mississippi. Bearss goes into great detail documenting the masterful way Grant used cavalry & the threat of landings from the river to keep CSA commanders completely wrong footed. Constant feints toward the vital rail road kept Pemberton's cavalry chasing ghosts. Not only did Grant's cavalry campaign keep their much larger opponents off balance, it kept them both occupied & unable to make mischief.

Johnston suffered from the same problem as all Grant's other opponents did. He had no idea what Grant was going to do next. Even Sherman stated explicitly that he had no confidence that the unsupported move against Vicksburg would work until it did. Grant's operations were classic examples of the OODA Circle. By the time Johnston & Pemberton realized what Grant was up to, he was already several moves into his next phase.

Both Johnston & Grant understood that it was Pemberton's Army, not Vicksburg that was the key to victory. With Pemberton's Army intact, Johnston had options; Vicksburg could have been retaken. As events unfolded, Johnston ordering Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg was the correct decision. Pemberton chose, instead, to follow Davis' meddling order to hold at all costs.

Once Pemberton ordered his army to man the Vicksburg defense & Grant reached the Mississippi upriver, it was only a matter of time. With Grant's riverine supply line absolutely secure & nowhere for him to draw a relieving force from, Johnston's options were extremely limited.

On July 4th, not only was Vicksburg secured, but the Tullahoma Campaign had swept the Army of Tennessee clear out of the state & permanently lost the all important initiative in VA. By late fall, Bragg would be in North Georgia & Grant's line would run from New Orleans to Cumberland Gap. Johnston's Army of relief seems a mere trifle compared to that, ¿no?

Note: in his letter to Davis laying out his plan for the Pennsylvania incursion, Lee asked Davis to concentrate 100,000 idle troops from the Carolinas under Beauregard at Culpepper VA.

While Lee's Carolina 100,000 twiddled their thumbs amongst the palmettos, by July 4th Lee, Bragg & Pemberton had been soundly defeated. The initiative in VA & strategically vital Vicksburg & Middle Tennessee were irretrievably lost. The responsibility for that colossal defeat does not lie with Johnston.

Pemberton was duty bound to carry out the orders of the commander in Chief. If Davis and Johnston had not stuck their noses in Pemberton would have defeated Grant as he had with previous efforts made against his department.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Pemberton was duty bound to carry out the orders of the commander in Chief. If Davis and Johnston had not stuck their noses in Pemberton would have defeated Grant as he had with previous efforts made against his department.

Pemberton had, as I have pointed out to children many times, a gray blob between his ears. Doing something stupid just because somebody told them to is no excuse for abject failure. Nelson famously put his telescope to his blind eye to ignore orders. That is what real leaders do.

While Pemberton was conveniently locking his army up in Vicksburg to starve, Grant was creatively avoiding Halleck's orders to send reinforcements to Fort Hudson. We know how that worked out.

 

[Drumfish420]

While Lee's Carolina 100,000 twiddled their thumbs amongst the palmettos, by July 4th Lee, Bragg & Pemberton had been soundly defeated. The initiative in VA & strategically vital Vicksburg & Middle Tennessee were irretrievably lost. The responsibility for that colossal defeat does not lie with Johnston.

Thanks for this, I was not aware there were that many troops in the Carolina's that were not actively doing anything. This is incredible and could have made all the difference in any of those theaters.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Thanks for this, I was not aware there were that many troops in the Carolina's that were not actively doing anything. This is incredible and could have made all the difference in any of those theaters.

One of Davis first a presidential conundrums was the necessity to both keep the servile population under control & man an army. The notorious 20 slave rule is an example of that anxiety. That was the reason that the rigid departmental system came into being.

In the letter to Lee that was captured in PA, Davis told Lee that he hadn't even read his concentration of forces letter… so don't feel bad, President Davis hadn't heard about the 100,000 in the Carolinas either.

 

[Drumfish420]

I think there were just too many "Personalities" in the Confederate armies and government. Imagine if the egos had been dropped and they had all gotten along ...

 

[Old Soldier]

I suspect that, at that time, defense fortifications were built on raised ground, as castles and forts always had been. They controlled the ground around them and looked down on the opposition, therefore, drainage would not be such a problem, The trenches in front of the firing line were there to obstruct the opposition and flooding was, again, not a priority for the defenders to worry about. The besieging fortifications would be on the lower ground and may have had problems with drainage but, as they found out in WW1, it depends a lot on the ground in which you dig them.