I had already considered the slaves used in some of those positions. When an army outnumbers the opponent for example 110,000 to 68,000 it definitely carries superior strength.
By the way, those numbers are not the numbers for Chancellorsville - just an example to be typical of several instances in Grant's memoirs.
No doubt. But the point was, not as much as people would believe. The Lost Cause writers loved to present silly troop numbers to try to support their arguments about noble southern warriors fighting northern hordes. The reality is that the actual troop strengths were often much closer, and Grant was merely pointing out one way they were manipulated.
I'll accept that from you. Also, Grant, in his memoirs, was overall highly objective and factual in his approach. He tried to present what actually happened from his point of view (I intentionally nitpicked the few items that I thought he misrepresented.)
Force strength in the war was not close. Not always quite as extreme as some older texts implied, but it was not close. I have seen erroneous numerical claims go in every which direction though, so I wouldn't believe that false figures always went in that direction, by any means.
Well while in general I would agree but when the Confederacy did have the numbers like the Seven Days they tended to squander those numbers in favour of brute force , Another example would be Bragg at Chickamauga , I think the real difference between the North & South was in Logistics the North was better equipped better fed could transport supplies more efficiently via railroads and rivers therefore sustain their armies in the field more effectively not to mention the huge advantage of having a navy which is very often overlooked imho.
Consolidations always occur at the expense of other areas, my friend.
Force strength is not the only determinant for success. Strategic prerogatives and tactical opportunities dictate many military moves. What appears as an opportunity to the local commander may conflict with the overall strategic plan. Lee felt that the offensive course of action gave them the best chance of victory. Davis and others thought different and did not listen when Lee told them that the defense of Richmond was a war loser. without the losses accumulated by Lee's aggressiveness the defense may have worked, but military history tells us that the defense can only stall but not win.
I am going to disagree that there was much substantial disconnect on these issues between Lee and Davis.
Yes, but it's only part of the equation, and ignores al the advantages the CSA had, and to a large extent, squandered. To pretend that the war was solely about numbers of men is extremely simplistic. It's actually much more complicated than that.
Nathan Towne, you are absolutely correct. Someone is going to slam me for these numbers because you simply cannot get fully accurate totals, but here goes. The Union fielded about 2,128,948 men in the Civil War (not including Navy) (2,677,000 men IF you include re-enlistments). The Confederacy fielded about 750,000 to 880,000 men depending on the source (perhaps as many as 900,000 but not likely).
To be sure. The material and resource advantage was critical, as well and it is absolutely true that it ultimately meant nothing if the will to pursue the war to the end didn't exist. That just has to be there! A professional and detained officer corps and good enough decision making from the Administration and so on and so forth are all integral, as well.
Bringing the