Thoughts on Chancellorsville

[Elliot]

The more I think about it, the more I feel Chancellorsville was a long-term disaster for the Confederate side even as it is often referred to as Lee's greatest victory (though I myself consider Fredericksburg to be Lee's greatest victory). Of course there's Jackson's death. But beyond that:

Assuming that Lee's army would've remained intact and in good order had Jackson's end-around not been executed (which I do assume), what then? Certainly Hooker would've remained in charge for longer than he had. Meade is, in my view, a bit underrated, and he was willing to rely on competent generals. Hooker, not so much. It's pretty likely that Lee would've moved north, and he would've faced less formidable generalship once there. It's easy to imagine that result being more of a success for the Confederates, at minimum.

There was also the model of Chancellorsville, which became Plan A for other Confederate generals but could not be executed to great effect to my awareness. Hood, most notably, attempted "another Chancellorsville" at least at Cassville and Atlanta. I am not enough of a tactician to suggest viable alternatives for taking the offensive while undermanned, as was expected and required of him (I think more like a counter-attacker), and I know the Federals caught a few breaks along the way, but there are so many variables that have to work out just so for a massive surprise flank attack to work....

In the end, I'm suggesting that beyond the battle itself, Chancellorsville coup had long-term negative consequences for the Confederates even beyond losing Jackson.

 

[dlofting]

Each battle in the east had long term consequences for the Confederacy because they lost men and officers they couldn't replace as easily as the Union could.

I'm not sure what they could have done differently, from a strategic perspective. A tactical blocking strategy almost cost them Richmond in 1862 and finally did in 1864/65. Could the Confederacy continue without Richmond and most of Virginia? I can't say for sure but probably not, for any length of time.

Lee's aggression was costly but it may have been the best way of trying to convince the North to give up the war. I'm sure we could debate this until the proverbial cows come home.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The more I think about it, the more I feel Chancellorsville was a long-term disaster for the Confederate side even as it is often referred to as Lee's greatest victory (though I myself consider Fredericksburg to be Lee's greatest victory). Of course there's Jackson's death. But beyond that:

Assuming that Lee's army would've remained intact and in good order had Jackson's end-around not been executed (which I do assume), what then? Certainly Hooker would've remained in charge for longer than he had. Meade is, in my view, a bit underrated, and he was willing to rely on competent generals. Hooker, not so much. It's pretty likely that Lee would've moved north, and he would've faced less formidable generalship once there. It's easy to imagine that result being more of a success for the Confederates, at minimum.

There was also the model of Chancellorsville, which became Plan A for other Confederate generals but could not be executed to great effect to my awareness. Hood, most notably, attempted "another Chancellorsville" at least at Cassville and Atlanta. I am not enough of a tactician to suggest viable alternatives for taking the offensive while undermanned, as was expected and required of him (I think more like a counter-attacker), and I know the Federals caught a few breaks along the way, but there are so many variables that have to work out just so for a massive surprise flank attack to work....

In the end, I'm suggesting that beyond the battle itself, Chancellorsville coup had long-term negative consequences for the Confederates even beyond losing Jackson.

Well, one thing that supports you is that despite the Union suffering heavier casualties, Lee's army could NOT afford the more than 13,000 casualties that it suffered.

 

[1SGDan]

I feel Chancellorsville was a long-term disaster for the Confederate side

Certainly the losses that occurred there were more recoverable by the union side. Jackson's death probably tilts the scales in favor of your proposition.

 

[Marco 1975]

The more I think about it, the more I feel Chancellorsville was a long-term disaster for the Confederate side even as it is often referred to as Lee's greatest victory (though I myself consider Fredericksburg to be Lee's greatest victory). Of course there's Jackson's death. But beyond that:

Assuming that Lee's army would've remained intact and in good order had Jackson's end-around not been executed (which I do assume), what then? Certainly Hooker would've remained in charge for longer than he had. Meade is, in my view, a bit underrated, and he was willing to rely on competent generals. Hooker, not so much. It's pretty likely that Lee would've moved north, and he would've faced less formidable generalship once there. It's easy to imagine that result being more of a success for the Confederates, at minimum.

There was also the model of Chancellorsville, which became Plan A for other Confederate generals but could not be executed to great effect to my awareness. Hood, most notably, attempted "another Chancellorsville" at least at Cassville and Atlanta. I am not enough of a tactician to suggest viable alternatives for taking the offensive while undermanned, as was expected and required of him (I think more like a counter-attacker), and I know the Federals caught a few breaks along the way, but there are so many variables that have to work out just so for a massive surprise flank attack to work....

In the end, I'm suggesting that beyond the battle itself, Chancellorsville coup had long-term negative consequences for the Confederates even beyond losing Jackson.

I think that Lee's or the confederate victories were steps on the way to defeat. They had so many losses, not just theire great leaders like Jackson and Stuart. There were many Colonels, Majors and also the Company-leaders who lead the confederate army to victory but been killed or woundet, so Lee had to reorganice his army after every campaign. And don't forget the men, the common soldiers, the best were dying soon often. That brings the result that every victory bleeds Lee's army out, to the point when there were no more reinforcements.
And as great the victories had been, he didn't destroyed the union armies, he " destroyed " some of the commanders of the union army

 

[52ndFandS]

From a modern perspective I'd say yes. Only that ot brought on Pickett's Charge in July and then Grant.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

From a modern perspective I'd say yes. Only that ot brought on Pickett's Charge in July and then Grant.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Yep. Grant, the bulldog, who latched onto Lee's army with his teeth and would not let go!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Each battle in the east had long term consequences for the Confederacy because they lost men and officers they couldn't replace as easily as the Union could.

I'm not sure what they could have done differently, from a strategic perspective. A tactical blocking strategy almost cost them Richmond in 1862 and finally did in 1864/65. Could the Confederacy continue without Richmond and most of Virginia? I can't say for sure but probably not, for any length of time.

Lee's aggression was costly but it may have been the best way of trying to convince the North to give up the war. I'm sure we could debate this until the proverbial cows come home.

Just for perspective, on an 8 1/2" X 11" map of the Western Theater the entire Army of the Potomac/ Army of Northern Virginia operations are the size of a postage stamp. The remnant of Virginia still under CSA control in 1864 is the size of a Chili bean.

The rest of the CSA got along just fine without any support from Virginia. It was Lee's army that was a strategic drain on Western resources.

Taking Donelson / Vicksburg & breaking the Chattanooga investment cost Grant's forces fewer men than Lee lost at Gettysburg.

Under Lee the A of N VA suffered (+/-) 240,000 casualties. RE: American Battlefield Trust.

The chili bean contributed little or nothing to the rest of the page… unless you consider demands for more men & supplies a contribution.

Loosing Virginia would have been a boost to the Western Theater.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Chancellorsville frustrated Lee the same way Fredericksburg did: sure, we've beaten the Yankees but they could just fall back across the river to safety. He had to maneuver the AOTP into a position from which they could not safely retreat, and he thought he could find such a battlefield in Pennsylvania.

Without Chancellorsville as another perceived lost opportunity Lee is not as driven to chase that elusive decisive victory.

 

[Rhea Cole]

As Joshim has stated, Lee was explicit in his evaluation of the options available to his army after Chancelorsville. On May 30 Lee wrote to President Davis;

"I fear the time has passed when I could have taken offensive with advantage…There may be nothing left for me to do but fall back"

Robert E. Lee & Clifford Downey, The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee, page 496

This is a professional military evaluation of Lee's orders during the Chancelorsville / Gettysburg Campaign.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA603264.pdf

 

[52ndFandS]

Yep. Grant, the bulldog, who latched onto Lee's army with his teeth and would not let go!

True. I'm not a great proponent of Grant.

 

[SWS]

Even had Hood won a second Chancellorsville at Bald Hill, the Chattahoochee, as a moat, would have served Sherman just as well as the Rappahannock had served Burnside and Hooker in the aftermath of their own blunders.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

True. I'm not a great proponent of Grant.

I read Grant's Memoirs not too long ago. Grant implied that in several major battles in which his army outnumbered Lee's (badly) the numbers were actually about equal because, he said, the cooks, teamsters, medical people, and forces needed to protect his Union wagon trains were counted. Does he think that Lee's army did not also have those types of requirements, or did he just want to make his own performance look better? I don't even have to wonder.

 

[dlofting]

I read Grant's Memoirs not too long ago. Grant implied that in several major battles in which his army outnumbered Lee's (badly) the numbers were actually about equal because, he said, the cooks, teamsters, medical people, and forces needed to protect his Union wagon trains were counted. Does he think that Lee's army did not also have those types of requirements, or did he just want to make his own performance look better? I don't even have to wonder.

I don't think Grant is saying that the ANV didn't have those requirements just that the two armies counted heads differently. One counted everyone present and the other only those who carried a weapon. I'm not saying this is necessarily true, just that it was the basis of Grant's assertion.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Chancellorsville frustrated Lee the same way Fredericksburg did: sure, we've beaten the Yankees but they could just fall back across the river to safety. He had to maneuver the AOTP into a position from which they could not safely retreat, and he thought he could find such a battlefield in Pennsylvania.

Without Chancellorsville as another perceived lost opportunity Lee is not as driven to chase that elusive decisive victory.

I am curious, have you read what Lee had myself wrote Davis about this?

 

[52ndFandS]

I read Grant's Memoirs not too long ago. Grant implied that in several major battles in which his army outnumbered Lee's (badly) the numbers were actually about equal because, he said, the cooks, teamsters, medical people, and forces needed to protect his Union wagon trains were counted. Does he think that Lee's army did not also have those types of requirements, or did he just want to make his own performance look better? I don't even have to wonder.

Excellent point. And yes, it's a matter of performance. While a sucess, tenacious, stubborn, I just don't admire the guy as some do. That's not to say other's opinions are wrong. That'd be fling a bit too far.

 

[LematLemat]

Each battle in the east had long term consequences for the Confederacy because they lost men and officers they couldn't replace as easily as the Union could.

I'm not sure what they could have done differently, from a strategic perspective. A tactical blocking strategy almost cost them Richmond in 1862 and finally did in 1864/65. Could the Confederacy continue without Richmond and most of Virginia? I can't say for sure but probably not, for any length of time.

Lee's aggression was costly but it may have been the best way of trying to convince the North to give up the war. I'm sure we could debate this until the proverbial cows come home.

I fully agree with this: While battles such as Chancellorsville were certainly costly in manpower, they're pretty much the only proven way of not losing.

Most of the time, Confederate situations in which they were on the tactical defense proved anticlimactic. Engagements like Fredericksburg or Chickasaw Bayou are remembered as these lopsided defensive victories but such successes were the exception and not the norm. Many defensive battles were outright defeats (such as Prairie Grove and Missionary Ridge) or never had operational success (such as Johnston's Peninsular and Atlanta battles).

Lee's aggression (both tactically and strategically), for all of its losses, brought the most consistent results. The Seven Days and the campaign against Pope drove the federals away from Richmond and out of Central Virginia respectively. Chancellorsville maintained the the defensive line of the Rapidan-Rappahannock and by extension, the defense of Central Virginia and Richmond.

While usually not talked about in the casualty counting, it's important to recognize the expiring two-year and nine-month enlistments which Hooker had to deal with after Chancellorsville.
On top of his 17,000 battlefield casualties, Hooker's army lost 35,000 men to expiring enlistments in April, May, and June. The Army of the Potomac lost 52,000 men when counting these expired enlistments, bringing it's strength down from more than 133,000 before Chancellorsville (its peak strength during the war) to below 82,000 in the month and change afterwards.

 

[JerryD]

I read Grant's Memoirs not too long ago. Grant implied that in several major battles in which his army outnumbered Lee's (badly) the numbers were actually about equal because, he said, the cooks, teamsters, medical people, and forces needed to protect his Union wagon trains were counted. Does he think that Lee's army did not also have those types of requirements, or did he just want to make his own performance look better? I don't even have to wonder.

Grant's point is that the CSA did not count those persons as troops. The CSA basically counted rifles, whereas the USA counted payroll. Besides, many of those positions in the CSA were handled by slaves.

 

[JerryD]

As Joshim has stated, Lee was explicit in his evaluation of the options available to his army after Chancelorsville. On May 30 Lee wrote to President Davis;

"I fear the time has passed when I could have taken offensive with advantage…There may be nothing left for me to do but fall back"

Robert E. Lee & Clifford Downey, The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee, page 496

This is a professional military evaluation of Lee's orders during the Chancelorsville / Gettysburg Campaign.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA603264.pdf

Interesting paper. I do agree that defeating northern will was the key to winning independence. One thing the author did not mention, which I have always asserted, was that winning a victory on northern soil would more likely drive the US to greater efforts and more determination, rather than lesser. That has always been the history of our country. When the going gets tough, the tough get going.

The way to exhaust northern will was not to jam it down northern throats, but to make the war so costly and dragged out that they conclude that the war was not winnable. This required a dramatically different approach to what Lee pursued. Lee wished to conquer a peace, and I agree with the author of the article that such a course was beyond the capability of the CSA. But a protracted defensive effort, with little to no progress towards ultimate victory, could have unseated Lincoln in the election of 64 and put a peace party in place. This is basically what Washington accomplished during the Revolution (with help from the French, granted). Washington did not conquer a peace so much as he wore out the British desire to keep the war going).

As the author noted, Lee's tactics were costly in terms of blood. If he fought smaller engagements, and did not rely so much aggressive tactics (not abandon them, but use them more judiciously; with Lee attacks were his go to move), he would have had more resources to successfully fight such a war. Was it risky? Yes. War always is. Was is assured of success? Not at all. The CSA was fighting long odds. But I tend to think it was a possible winning strategy if fought skillfully.