Thoughts about General John Gibbon?

[7thWisconsin]

Custer was the man when it came to fighting Indians at that time; he literally wrote the book. At the Washita, after he´d charged through and destroyed the camp, the Cheyenne approached in a mounted line. Custer responded with a charge of cavalry and they withdrew. This led Custer to believe axiomatically that Indians would not stand against a determined mounted force of cavalry. His attack plan on the Little Bighorn demonstrate that tactical belief. I think this is why he chose to disregard his scouts intelligence about how large the Indian force had to be - he held the fatal notion that quality beats quantity every time. I also believe he was attempting to take the camp at both ends at the same time based on his understanding of Indian culture. He knew that the women, children and elders would move out of camp to high ground, to observe, pray and encourage from that vantage point. (Which they did - he was correct.) If he could move swiftly enough and get between them and the actively hostile force, he´s scored a major victory (a coup, if you will) in that he´s captured the vulnerable population of the Sioux people. It seems that the presence of high tech firearms has been overstated in the past, though. Ballistic evidence seems to suggest that maybe only 1-3% of the Indian force had repeating arms, and those were status guns in the hands of leaders. Misjudging the size of the enemy force, and how it would fight that day, though, are the 2 mistakes that doom the command. I´m sure Gibbon did feel badly about the Custer´s death. I don´t think they were friends, but it was a small army, they´d seen at lot of the same things together and certainly were respected collegues.

 

[PJO]

I thought it was like the XXV Corps. XXIII was with Schofield

Um.. Gibbon commanded the XXIV Corps, Godfrey Weitzel headed the XXV Corps...

 

[rbasin]

Um.. Gibbon commanded the XXIV Corps, Godfrey Weitzel headed the XXV Corps...

You're right. My bad.

 

[bayouace]

Did you know General Gibbon authored several books about his time in the CW and out West? Currently reading The 1876 Yellowstone Expedition which covers his movement to the LBH and finding what remained of the 7th Cav. I think I can say it is 99 cents on Amazon books.
Update: I really enjoyed reading this short book. Learned several new things about a column and their Crow scouts in the field on the Plains

 

[Belfoured]

They were the two leading experts on artillery in the pre war army. If the never met, they at least they relied on each other's studies. Mordecai was from No. Carolina and Gibbon grew up there. But Mordecai quit the army, and Gibbon stayed with the US.
Mordecai seems to have become more interested in pure math and teaching, which makes me think of trigonometry and calculus.
Gibbon is evidence that an artillery trained officer could command infantry, which suggests it is communication skills and the ability to handle men that mattered.
If the never spoke, the knew the same people and read the same literature.

Just to be clear, I'm not saying they never spoke and I am suggesting that Gibbon would have been well aware of Mordecai's Ordnance work and certainly of his views on the cannon obusier. I am, however, also saying that the facts you referred to are not evidence that the two were "close". I am unaware of any actual evidence that during the period that Mordecai was at Watervliet and before Gibbon left West Point they had any contact. It's certainly plausible but they were separated by 100 miles. It's not as though Mordecai was entrenched at the foundry operated by Parrott.

As for "leading experts in the pre-war Army", I wouldn't exclude Hunt and Barry. Both had long service in that branch (Barry was temporarily assigned under Poinsett to Ringgold's Company C of the 3rd US in 1838 when the major reforms for adopting mounted and horse artillery tactics were initiated). Both were considered expert enough to be given the assignment in 1856 (with French) of drafting the new official Instructions manual.

 

[Belfoured]

I need to add. When before the LBH had any native Americans stood and fought a whole regiment of the US army. They did at the Rosebud but no one, other than Crook and maybe Sheridan if Crook's messages had got that far knew that.

You can pick a number of wars/battles including the most recent in the Ukraine, where one side has been totally surprised that a supposedly inferior foe has got the best of an attacker.

Well, there were the Battle of the Wabash and the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Popular history tends to gloss over that period.

 

[wausaubob]

Just to be clear, I'm not saying they never spoke and I am suggesting that Gibbon would have been well aware of Mordecai's Ordnance work and certainly of his views on the cannon obusier. I am, however, also saying that the facts you referred to are not evidence that the two were "close". I am unaware of any actual evidence that during the period that Mordecai was at Watervliet and before Gibbon left West Point they had any contact. It's certainly plausible but they were separated by 100 miles. It's not as though Mordecai was entrenched at the foundry operated by Parrott.

As for "leading experts in the pre-war Army", I wouldn't exclude Hunt and Barry. Both had long service in that branch (Barry was temporarily assigned under Poinsett to Ringgold's Company C of the 3rd US in 1838 when the major reforms for adopting mounted and horse artillery tactics were initiated). Both were considered expert enough to be given the assignment in 1856 (with French) of drafting the new official Instructions manual.

Mordecai seems to have been right about the bronze Napoleons. It was easy to produce, as long as there was a copper source. I can see why he thought it would be a multi-purpose gun. It deformed, I think, rather than cracking. I think in a longer war the rifling may not have been stable. While we are on Gibbon, he seems to have played his cards right. He and Weitzel took corp commands under Butler, and Butler eventually got kicked out and replaced by Ord. Gibbon seems to have around for the end. Weitzel's corp seems to have been held back, after it was deliberately allowed to be the first US force entering Richmond. That must have been a sight.

 

[wausaubob]

Um.. Gibbon commanded the XXIV Corps, Godfrey Weitzel headed the XXV Corps...

I thought so, but I didn't want to correct the experts.

 

[breckod]

Gibbon got command of Twenty-Fourth Corps when he did in part because he was irritated at being passed over for Humphreys for temporary command of the Second Corps when Hancock took his leave of absence, and asked to be relieved. Gibbon wrote that he had no objection to a new permanent commander of the corps being assigned (and he thought very well of Humphreys), but until one was*, normally the senior division commander (Gibbon by this point) would take over for that interval, and Gibbon took it as a deliberate slight from Hancock. Grant smoothed it over, and about a month later, Gibbon got the Twenty-Fourth.

*That would ultimately be Humphreys of course, and by intent, since Meade had promised it to him, but was not officially the case yet

 

[Belfoured]

Mordecai seems to have been right about the bronze Napoleons. It was easy to produce, as long as there was a copper source. I can see why he thought it would be a multi-purpose gun. It deformed, I think, rather than cracking. I think in a longer war the rifling may not have been stable. While we are on Gibbon, he seems to have played his cards right. He and Weitzel took corp commands under Butler, and Butler eventually got kicked out and replaced by Ord. Gibbon seems to have around for the end. Weitzel's corp seems to have been held back, after it was deliberately allowed to be the first US force entering Richmond. That must have been a sight.

I agree. The issue with bronze was not "cracking" - bronze was less prone to that than cast iron because it's an alloy - copper and tin. The issue was other deformities from heavy use, including the development of a "burr" in the tube. This "wear" problem is a reason why bronze rifles were not good for long-term/heavy use. Iron, while more brittle than bronze, was also harder.

Gibbon did something a number of artillery officers did - he recognized the severely limited opportunities for high rank in the artillery branch and opted for an infantry command. Other examples are Griffin, Ricketts, and Upton.

 

[wausaubob]

I agree. The issue with bronze was not "cracking" - bronze was less prone to that than cast iron because it's an alloy - copper and tin. The issue was other deformities from heavy use, including the development of a "burr" in the tube. This "wear" problem is a reason why bronze rifles were not good for long-term/heavy use. Iron, while more brittle than bronze, was also harder.

Gibbon did something a number of artillery officers did - he recognized the severely limited opportunities for high rank in the artillery branch and opted for an infantry command. Other examples are Griffin, Ricketts, and Upton.

He was the right guy in the right place at the end. His people marched the heck out of the campaign. A scene in which multiple divisions of USCT confronted demoralized Confederate divisions never happened. That probably saved lives. However, one IX Corp division may have been USCT.

 

[wausaubob]

Custer was the man when it came to fighting Indians at that time; he literally wrote the book. At the Washita, after he´d charged through and destroyed the camp, the Cheyenne approached in a mounted line. Custer responded with a charge of cavalry and they withdrew. This led Custer to believe axiomatically that Indians would not stand against a determined mounted force of cavalry. His attack plan on the Little Bighorn demonstrate that tactical belief. I think this is why he chose to disregard his scouts intelligence about how large the Indian force had to be - he held the fatal notion that quality beats quantity every time. I also believe he was attempting to take the camp at both ends at the same time based on his understanding of Indian culture. He knew that the women, children and elders would move out of camp to high ground, to observe, pray and encourage from that vantage point. (Which they did - he was correct.) If he could move swiftly enough and get between them and the actively hostile force, he´s scored a major victory (a coup, if you will) in that he´s captured the vulnerable population of the Sioux people. It seems that the presence of high tech firearms has been overstated in the past, though. Ballistic evidence seems to suggest that maybe only 1-3% of the Indian force had repeating arms, and those were status guns in the hands of leaders. Misjudging the size of the enemy force, and how it would fight that day, though, are the 2 mistakes that doom the command. I´m sure Gibbon did feel badly about the Custer´s death. I don´t think they were friends, but it was a small army, they´d seen at lot of the same things together and certainly were respected collegues.

Someone on the Lakota side was a tactical genius that day. But Custer rolled the dice one time too many. I have to wonder if Gibbon had to have had the same thoughts as Grant. It was totally unnecessary because the Indian buffalo culture was going to collapse.

 

[Cavalier]

@wausaubob Wasn't the Army there in the first place because of Grant? By that I mean he was the Commander in Chief, no?

John

 

[Irishtom29]

I thought so, but I didn't want to correct the experts.

This would be less confusing if people used the proper names of the corps, the Twenty Fourth and the Twenty Fifth Corps (or the 24th and the 25th) rather than this inaccurate and anachronistic Roman numeral business.

 

[Irishtom29]

Well, there were the Battle of the Wabash and the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Popular history tends to gloss over that period.

Indeed. And Kekionga and Horseshoe Bend. The martial qualities of the Indians of the Old Northwest and Old Southwest are oft forgotten, as is the fact that when Indians of the Old Northwest went west the native western Indians soon learned to give them a wide berth.

 

[wausaubob]

@wausaubob Wasn't the Army there in the first place because of Grant? By that I mean he was the Commander in Chief, no?

John

Lets try to get back to John Gibbon.

 

[Rebforever]

Custer must have thought, there cannot be that many Indians in one encampment. It was practically impossible for such an alliance to form, and it didn't last for long. I wonder if ever looked for himself?

The Indian guides took him a ridge over and showed him the smoke coming out of the camp teepees and he ignored them.

 

[wausaubob]

The Indian guides took him a ridge over and showed him the smoke coming out of the camp teepees and he ignored them.ad

The Indian wars were starting to wind down. Custer wanted to do something great, and he wanted to do it before any of his superiors could take the credit from him. And in most situations, he probably would have been OK.

 

[rpkennedy]

This would be less confusing if people used the proper names of the corps, the Twenty Fourth and the Twenty Fifth Corps (or the 24th and the 25th) rather than this inaccurate and anachronistic Roman numeral business.

IIRC, it wasn't until WWI when the US military adopted the European style of using Roman numerals for Corps numbers. In the Civil War, the number of the corps was written out.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

IIRC, it wasn't until WWI when the US military adopted the European style of using Roman numerals for Corps numbers. In the Civil War, the number of the corps was written out.

Ryan

I believe you're correct. That said, it's a practice that some authors and publishers follow to distinguish Union and Confederate corps. I don't see it as all that big an issue either way. The Official Records and other documents use Roman numerals. Purely a matter of opinion.