The Laird Rams Join the CSN

That could be right as RN gunners traditionally fired on the up roll in the days of sail with the primary intention of destroying motive power before boarding. However the advent of the heavy shell guns and the 68pdr high velocity shot guns changed that philosophy to one of physically destroying the enemy vessel.
I don't mean "firing on the up roll", I mean firing when the ship is at the appropriate angle - the ship rolls anyway and as I said continuous aim is decades away (it comes in about 1900). This is the way the men train and it's the way they can fight - note at Alexandria they start men running back and forth to give the ship a roll!
 
That could be right as RN gunners traditionally fired on the up roll in the days of sail with the primary intention of destroying motive power before boarding. However the advent of the heavy shell guns and the 68pdr high velocity shot guns changed that philosophy to one of physically destroying the enemy vessel.
The Laird turretships could never have been armed with Armstrong/Woolwich ordnance if they had got out, as this was strictly controlled by the British War Office, and only manufactured to order.

The two 8" Armstrong MLR taken at Ft Fisher remain a mystery which will never be solved as the foundry records were destroyed in the bombing of Newcastle by the Luftwaffe.

Ah. Everything I've read is that one of the reasons why the RN was so successful against a wide range of opponents in the age of sail was that it generally fired on the down-roll to hit the enemy hull and disable it. Most nations did as you said as sought to restrict enemy mobility although the US and IIRC the Dutch tended to do the same as the British in firing low into the hull.
 
Good catch, @steve59p , I should have noticed that - my understanding is indeed that the French tended to go for rigging and the Brits for the hull. Perhaps it was a misunderstanding of what I meant by firing on the roll of the ship that led to the confusion!
 
Good catch, @steve59p , I should have noticed that - my understanding is indeed that the French tended to go for rigging and the Brits for the hull. Perhaps it was a misunderstanding of what I meant by firing on the roll of the ship that led to the confusion!
"Fire on the up roll" and "As you bear" where standard gunnery instructions in the RN, the things is, certainly on the big ships, the lower gun decks could only ever fire into an opponents hull at the chosen battle ranges, while the upper deck guns smashed bulwarks and masts with everything on deck including officers and crew. The French, having learned not to let an RN ship board the hard way, made every effort to destroy the top hamper and keep the RN away.

You are quite right that the USN and most other continental navies went for the hulls and tried to keep their distance until the right moment. With the advent of the razee frigates and heavier 32pdrs, some RN Captains began to try the same tactics as well as directed broadsides.
 
I don't mean "firing on the up roll", I mean firing when the ship is at the appropriate angle - the ship rolls anyway and as I said continuous aim is decades away (it comes in about 1900). This is the way the men train and it's the way they can fight - note at Alexandria they start men running back and forth to give the ship a roll!
"continuous aim " had been tried on and off by individual Captains for decades, The first vessels equipped with rudimentary directors and gunports marked with angles and ranges were the British floating batteries, notably HMS Terror which had the system you will see in HMS Warrior at Portsmouth. On her it is manual but in subsequent vessels electrical controls were added to supplement voice pipes.
 
"continuous aim " had been tried on and off by individual Captains for decades, The first vessels equipped with rudimentary directors and gunports marked with angles and ranges were the British floating batteries, notably HMS Terror which had the system you will see in HMS Warrior at Portsmouth. On her it is manual but in subsequent vessels electrical controls were added to supplement voice pipes.
I beg leave to doubt that continuous aim (in the sense which I mean it, that of compensating for the roll of the ship so the weapon is aways at the correct elevation) could have been possible in the 1850s. You'd need an 1850s carriage to be able to elevate and depress by multiple degrees a second to compensate for the roll of the ship, and while that could be done in the late 1890s and 1900s with large-wheel elevating gear... like I say, I doubt it could be done half a century prior.
 
Sir, my uninformed thoughts...
...those two vessels had no more ability to change the course of the war than giving the Confederacy two Sherman tanks and no ability to reproduce, repair, supply same. By the way, where are they going to get a steady supply of coal? They might have done a lot of damage but they would have a short and VERY exciting life. The blockade comes down for awhile. This isn't going to be a 6 month free-for-all window. Couple of weeks maybe.
The Union sure did work hard to keep these ships out of Confederate hands...for them to be so (potentially) ineffective.
 
The Union sure did work hard to keep these ships out of Confederate hands...for them to be so (potentially) ineffective.
The idea that the Laird Rams were poor ships is very strange to me, yeah. These were quite advanced vessels; there's more than one possible ops plan that sees them causing the Union substantial damage. They don't have to be able to win the war by themselves for them to be a significant benefit to the Confederates - and in some cases they could do really serious damage to Union armies.
 
I beg leave to doubt that continuous aim (in the sense which I mean it, that of compensating for the roll of the ship so the weapon is aways at the correct elevation) could have been possible in the 1850s. You'd need an 1850s carriage to be able to elevate and depress by multiple degrees a second to compensate for the roll of the ship, and while that could be done in the late 1890s and 1900s with large-wheel elevating gear... like I say, I doubt it could be done half a century prior.
I see what you mean now, think we have been a tad at variance with each other.
 
I see what you mean now, think we have been a tad at variance with each other.
Yes, I expected there was some terminological confusion going on - that or 1850s carriages were vastly more advanced than I had been led to believe, which wouldn't be impossible but it would certainly be a revelation for me!
 
It is well-known to students of the ACW that a diplomatic crisis erupted in 1863 over the two ram warships under construction by Jonathan Laird in Liverpool. U.S. ambassador Charles Francis Adams was making veiled threats that war would develop if the ships were delivered to the Confederacy, and Confederate agent James Bulloch was trying to pull off a scheme to sneakily "transfer" the ships to Egypt and then to the Confederacy. As it was, it was a near-run thing.

Had the Laird Rams become the CSS Mississippi and North Carolina, what kind of damage could they have done to the blockade? Other than New Ironsides, what ships did the Union have that could stand up to them?

As others have noted, the pair showing up is enough to threaten any blockade force off a major port. More pertinent for the 1864 campaign season is their status of a fleet in being deterring Union amphibious operations like Butler at Bermuda Hundred, Mobile Bay and perhaps the Red River Campaign. Grant's entire concept of operations in the Overland Campaign required access to sea based supply and the Laird Rams can plausibly threaten that; he might be required to go for his "Lynchburg Lunge" stratagem which could hand the South a decisive victory on a platter so to speak.
 
Yes, I expected there was some terminological confusion going on - that or 1850s carriages were vastly more advanced than I had been led to believe, which wouldn't be impossible but it would certainly be a revelation for me!
Interestingly the CSN had iron gun carriages, initially built of railroad rail, before any European navy did. not that improved the physical characteristics of training an elevation, just made the carriages better. John Roy at New Orleans is credited with the first ones, as well as designing rotating mounts similar to a railroad turntable but for use on shipboard.
 
What I have been trying to find with no success is the plans for wooden versions of the Laird turretships that were drawn up and despatched to Canada, the intention being that armour and ordnance would be sent from Britain to equip them.
 
If, as stated earlier in this thread, it would have been difficult or impossible for these ships to actually enter a Southern port, how would they have repaired and resupplied themselves after a battle?
 
If, as stated earlier in this thread, it would have been difficult or impossible for these ships to actually enter a Southern port, how would they have repaired and resupplied themselves after a battle?
I think the idea that it would be difficult or impossible for them to enter a Southern port has been overstated. Since depth charts are mean low water and ships can be lightened by removing coal etc (and can basically resupply from coal lighters that follow them out) it would have to be the case that a depth chart showed that even at high tide the Rams would have be a foot or two aground, even on the deep water channel, for it to be unworkable.
 
Interestingly the CSN had iron gun carriages, initially built of railroad rail, before any European navy did. not that improved the physical characteristics of training an elevation, just made the carriages better. John Roy at New Orleans is credited with the first ones, as well as designing rotating mounts similar to a railroad turntable but for use on shipboard.
Truly interesting, @rebelatsea.
 
As others have noted, the pair showing up is enough to threaten any blockade force off a major port. More pertinent for the 1864 campaign season is their status of a fleet in being deterring Union amphibious operations like Butler at Bermuda Hundred, Mobile Bay and perhaps the Red River Campaign. Grant's entire concept of operations in the Overland Campaign required access to sea based supply and the Laird Rams can plausibly threaten that; he might be required to go for his "Lynchburg Lunge" stratagem which could hand the South a decisive victory on a platter so to speak.

Opening up Wilmington to me seems an obvious move, it's a major port close enough to the center of action to have a logistical impact while being a more contained engagement. Attacking into the Chesapeake which would probably require support from Lee to get a major port open given the Federal forts in the area. It also places the Laird Rams close enough to Virginia that they function as a fleet in being, which could have salutary effects on Northern decision making for the South. Grant going around the flanks of Lee as he did historically doesn't work unless his sea based supply lines are secure and here that might be too risky for the Lincoln admin since the Rams could sortie and threaten that. Grant getting down to the James just to do the ACW version of Yorktown would not be great in an election year, to say the least.

IF Grant does go for the Lynchburg Lunge as he initially considered, it's incredibly risky. Without Butler keeping Beauregard occupied in the Bermuda Hundred, the garrison of Richmond itself can keep the city secure while Lee could maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia between Grant and Washington. At that point the former either has to fight a decisive battle and hope he wins or the Army of the Potomac starves in the Virginian countryside. If he does attempt to go to Richmond, Beauregard could be the anvil while Lee is the hammer.

Given this, IMHO the only safe option is to attempt to do what Sherman did in Georgia which is steadily advance the railway lines behind the AotP as it advances into French. That's going to be time consuming, slow and incredibly costly as it requires Grant to attempt to force Lee back in a way he never really managed to do during 1864 historically. It also carries with the issue that Grant/Meade will steadily have to detach formations to guard this extended, vulnerable supply line and that means further they advance the weaker their main force becomes. Sherman resolved this with the March to the Sea after taking Atlanta but a flying column dependent on sea based supply at the end isn't really valid here, again, because of the Rams.
 
Grant getting down to the James just to do the ACW version of Yorktown would not be great in an election year, to say the least.

To attempt to cut Grant's supplies off would require the Laird Rams to remain stationary in the Chesapeake. If they give up their freedom to move about, the Union Navy would be able to assemble all of its firepower to destroy them.
 

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