The Laird Rams Join the CSN

[OldReliable1862]

It is well-known to students of the ACW that a diplomatic crisis erupted in 1863 over the two ram warships under construction by Jonathan Laird in Liverpool. U.S. ambassador Charles Francis Adams was making veiled threats that war would develop if the ships were delivered to the Confederacy, and Confederate agent James Bulloch was trying to pull off a scheme to sneakily "transfer" the ships to Egypt and then to the Confederacy. As it was, it was a near-run thing.

Had the Laird Rams become the CSS Mississippi and North Carolina, what kind of damage could they have done to the blockade? Other than New Ironsides, what ships did the Union have that could stand up to them?

 

[USS ALASKA]

Sir, my uninformed thoughts...

For them to do any damage, they have to either attack Union harbors - and do what? Send a landing party ashore?...or attack the Union fleet. They have to come to me. For once the USN doesn't have to hunt them down. And there isn't unlimited options for them to really cause war-changing damage so the Union can rally the masses at a few vital points. Once ID'd, the Hounds of Heck will descend. This will kinda be like the RN hunting the Bismarck. Once known to be out on the open ocean, all ops will cease until they are found and killed. I don't care about armor and guns. They are two ships. When rundown by 100 vessels, you're doomed. Rammed, burned, boarded, something bad is going to happen. I will take my loses - and like Jutland, the prisoners might attack their jailers but at the end of the day, the jailers will prevail. While potentially spectacular, those two vessels had no more ability to change the course of the war than giving the Confederacy two Sherman tanks and no ability to reproduce, repair, supply same. By the way, where are they going to get a steady supply of coal? They might have done a lot of damage but they would have a short and VERY exciting life. The blockade comes down for awhile. This isn't going to be a 6 month free-for-all window. Couple of weeks maybe. And while ports like Bermuda and the Bahamas have a backlog of supplies to run into Confederate ports, what ships are going to do it? The already available runners are going as fast as they can. And while no one will have to wait for moon phases and tides and nightfall and other runner concerns and the voyage total might be able to get bumped up some, the distances stay the same. And the wear and tear on ships built as disposable items will vastly increase. What other shipping is immediately available? The blockade would have been reestablished upon the completion of Operation Sink-Ex. And this will happen in the what - late 1863 time frame? How many ships does the USN have by then? And she can't leave a few on station to provide the semblance of manning the blockade at least as well as in April 1861? When the Brits and French agreed to abide to that paper tiger? The blockade would have been reestablished upon their demise.


"What the heck is that and how do we fight her?!?" You don't believe that the USN didn't start thinking about that soon after the Battle of Hampton Roads kerfuffle? That was a first-time, self-critiquing, learning exercise. Think less CSS Virginia and more CSS Tennessee II.

Other posters milage may, and has, varied.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Jantzen64]

Sir, my uninformed thoughts...

For them to do any damage, they have to either attack Union harbors - and do what? Send a landing party ashore?...or attack the Union fleet. They have to come to me. For once the USN doesn't have to hunt them down. And there isn't unlimited options for them to really cause war-changing damage so the Union can rally the masses at a few vital points. Once ID'd, the Hounds of Heck will descend. This will kinda be like the RN hunting the Bismarck. Once known to be out on the open ocean, all ops will cease until they are found and killed. I don't care about armor and guns. They are two ships. When rundown by 100 vessels, you're doomed. Rammed, burned, boarded, something bad is going to happen. I will take my loses - and like Jutland, the prisoners might attack their jailers but at the end of the day, the jailers will prevail. While potentially spectacular, those two vessels had no more ability to change the course of the war than giving the Confederacy two Sherman tanks and no ability to reproduce, repair, supply same. By the way, where are they going to get a steady supply of coal? They might have done a lot of damage but they would have a short and VERY exciting life. The blockade comes down for awhile. This isn't going to be a 6 month free-for-all window. Couple of weeks maybe. And while ports like Bermuda and the Bahamas have a backlog of supplies to run into Confederate ports, what ships are going to do it? The already available runners are going as fast as they can. And while no one will have to wait for moon phases and tides and nightfall and other runner concerns and the voyage total might be able to get bumped up some, the distances stay the same. And the wear and tear on ships built as disposable items will vastly increase. What other shipping is immediately available? The blockade would have been reestablished upon the completion of Operation Sink-Ex. And this will happen in the what - late 1863 time frame? How many ships does the USN have by then? And she can't leave a few on station to provide the semblance of manning the blockade at least as well as in April 1861? When the Brits and French agreed to abide to that paper tiger? The blockade would have been reestablished upon their demise.


"What the heck is that and how do we fight her?!?" You don't believe that the USN didn't start thinking about that soon after the Battle of Hampton Roads kerfuffle? That was a first-time, self-critiquing, learning exercise. Think less CSS Virginia and more CSS Tennessee II.

Other posters milage may, and has, varied.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

All very good points! I think another angle to consider is what might have happened had England not backed down to Adam's drawing the line in the sand and delivered the rams anyway. Would the US have been able to avoid a direct conflict with England or been forced to take action that would have drawn England into direct conflict or more active support (e.g., more ships like a squadron of Warriors, leveling the odds). I realize the OP is more directed to the capabilities of the rams themselves, but I've always been interested in the diplomatic battle that was waged at this critical juncture.

 

[JeffBrooks]

All very good points! I think another angle to consider is what might have happened had England not backed down to Adam's drawing the line in the sand and delivered the rams anyway. Would the US have been able to avoid a direct conflict with England or been forced to take action that would have drawn England into direct conflict or more active support (e.g., more ships like a squadron of Warriors, leveling the odds). I realize the OP is more directed to the capabilities of the rams themselves, but I've always been interested in the diplomatic battle that was waged at this critical juncture.

Lincoln would have done whatever was necessary to avoid war with Britain. His threats of war were a bit like the threat of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. He likely was bluffing, but the British couldn't be absolutely certain he was bluffing. And he would have held his cards as long as he could have.

 

[USS ALASKA]

I apologize to @OldReliable1862 for straying from his OP but the questions have been brought to the fore...

The Brits ganked the Laird Rams because of the amount of 'heck' the Union was raising. In the historical timeline, regardless of any level of recognition the Confederacy was granted, she wasn't getting those rams. Weighting the pros and cons, the United States was a much greater concern, (not deadly, not mortally, not life threatening...just a possible MAJOR pain in the posterior...), to the Brits than the gains that could be achieved by delivering the rams. What is best for Britain today? Had the Union not gone crazy and just didn't care, those ships would have sailed under the Confederate flag regardless of recognition issues.

Charles Francis Adams and the Laird Rams Crisis of 1863
David Martin Bryan

Ami's SOA - Civil War Diplomacy | Wartime Politics, & Debates

Diplomats at war: a critical analysis of American and Confederate diplomacy, 1861-1862. Collection: Master of Military Art and Science Theses Title: Diplomats at war: a critical analysis of American and Confederate diplomacy, 1861-1862. Author: Houston, John P...

civilwartalk.com

The Laird Rams: Warships in Transition 1862-1885
Andrew Ramsey English
University of Exeter

Civil War Naval Papers | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Journal Article "The Clangor of That Blacksmith's Fray": Technology, War, and Experience Aboard the USS Monitor David A. Mindell Technology and Culture Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 242-270 The Johns Hopkins University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/3106372 Full article at above link...

civilwartalk.com

"This Is War": The Construction of the Laird Rams
Hannah M. Christensen
Gettysburg College

Laird Rams-The threat of Lincoln to war with Great Britain | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Many threads have been written about the "Trent affair", but little is discussed about the "Laid Rams" built in Liverpool for the Confederate Navy. Lincoln was willing to go to war with Great Britain if they allowed delivery of those two ships to the South. Truly, the "Laird Rams" were the...

civilwartalk.com

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Jantzen64]

I apologize to @OldReliable1862 for straying from his OP but the questions have been brought to the fore...

The Brits ganked the Laird Rams because of the amount of 'heck' the Union was raising. In the historical timeline, regardless of any level of recognition the Confederacy was granted, she wasn't getting those rams. Weighting the pros and cons, the United States was a much greater concern, (not deadly, not mortally, not life threatening...just a possible MAJOR pain in the posterior...), to the Brits than the gains that could be achieved by delivering the rams. What is best for Britain today? Had the Union not gone crazy and just didn't care, those ships would have sailed under the Confederate flag regardless of recognition issues.

Charles Francis Adams and the Laird Rams Crisis of 1863
David Martin Bryan

Ami's SOA - Civil War Diplomacy | Wartime Politics, & Debates

Diplomats at war: a critical analysis of American and Confederate diplomacy, 1861-1862. Collection: Master of Military Art and Science Theses Title: Diplomats at war: a critical analysis of American and Confederate diplomacy, 1861-1862. Author: Houston, John P...

civilwartalk.com

The Laird Rams: Warships in Transition 1862-1885
Andrew Ramsey English
University of Exeter

Civil War Naval Papers | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Journal Article "The Clangor of That Blacksmith's Fray": Technology, War, and Experience Aboard the USS Monitor David A. Mindell Technology and Culture Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 242-270 The Johns Hopkins University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/3106372 Full article at above link...

civilwartalk.com

"This Is War": The Construction of the Laird Rams
Hannah M. Christensen
Gettysburg College

Laird Rams-The threat of Lincoln to war with Great Britain | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

Many threads have been written about the "Trent affair", but little is discussed about the "Laid Rams" built in Liverpool for the Confederate Navy. Lincoln was willing to go to war with Great Britain if they allowed delivery of those two ships to the South. Truly, the "Laird Rams" were the...

civilwartalk.com

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Thanks, @USS ALASKA . Is there any topic about the ACW that hasn't been discussed yet on this Board?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Here is the informative American Civil War Society of the United Kingdom's description of the Laird Ram timeline.

Link:

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

The Laird rams drew 15'.

A Chart of the entrance of Cape Fear River

Relief shown by hachures. Depths shown by soundings. Oriented with north toward the upper left. Includes "Tide Scale at Smithville." Available also through the Library of Congress Web site as a raster image. LC copy imperfect: Discoloration and staining on bottom of all sheets. Torn along edges...

www.loc.gov

This historic tide map of the mouth of the Cape Fear River is indicative of the challenges the Lairds would have faced " …cruising up & down …" the coast.

The bar at entrance of the Savannah River was 12'.

Charleston Harbor

The natural depth of the entrance to Charleston Harbor was 12' at high tide.

The channels were dredged to 17' before the war. Silting up during the war meant that the channels were shallower.

10'6" was the draft of a Monitor (+/-).

The waters the eastern seaboard off the Carolinas are known as the "graveyard of the Atlantic for good reason. Not only are there days long violent storms, the shoreline is constantly changing.

At high tide the channel between Dafuskie & Hilton Head Islands adjacent to the mouth of the Savannah River only leaves a narrow beach on both sides of the channel. At low tide, it looks like the ocean has all bit disappeared. It is possible to walk & wade across between the islands.

What, you may ask would a ram unable to enter a harbor except at spring tide, if that, get resupplied, refit & refurbished? As we know the CSS Virginia could not threaten Washington because of her 21' draft. The Lairds would have had similar problems. Where would the Lairds have gone during hurricane season… Havana?

Distance between cape Cod & Florida Keys (+/-) 1,500 miles. Combined radius of control Laird Rams (+/-) 4 miles.

Like all raiders, the Lairds would have been dependent on captured coal. Speed comes at a price, in this case tons of coal. City Class gunboats burnt a ton of coal/hour.

Metallurgy of the day meant that after cruising for several days or weeks, engine overhauls were mandatory. Where were the Laird's going to lay up for extended periods of time doing periodic maintenance?

Just what two vessels commanding (+/-) a four mile circle along 1,500 miles of coastline without a base could possibly accomplish escapes me. It would have taken every breath the crew took just to keep the Laird's seaworthy.

 

[USS ALASKA]

Thanks, @USS ALASKA . Is there any topic about the ACW that hasn't been discussed yet on this Board?

Nope - but there is always that weird one-off-question...especially from a noob like me...

If you have the legal right to say "Nope, we're sitting this one out.", why don't you have the legal right to say "Later - we're gone."?

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

I had never looked at it from that angle. I must say though that this is one of the best questions I have seen in a very long time! Just when I was thinking I had seen everything sliced, diced and argued by our members. Thanks!

For a noob. that was the highest form of acceptance from an old hand. In my 36 years under Uncle Sams shilling, most were spent as an instructor / evaluator. I was ALWAYS got posed with "Well what about...?" "Uh...uhm...not sure...let's look it up and we will both learn something." Any training session that I didn't learn something - was a failure. And not on the student, mine. I didn't push them hard enough...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[JeffBrooks]

One possible use of the Laird Rams would be to serve as a "fleet-in-being" in order to tie down Union naval resources that would otherwise be employed elsewhere. Let's say, for example, that the Laird Rams enter Confederate service and then sail into Charleston Harbor? Well, the Southern Atlantic Blockading Squadron is going to have to be heavily reinforced. Unfortunately, they can't just sail in under the guns of Fort Sumter, Fort Moultrie, and all the others to attack the rams, but they'll have to remain on their guard in case the two rams sail out to challenge the blockaders.

In other words, valuable ships that would otherwise be blockading Mobile, Wilmington, Galveston, and other spots, or perhaps ships that are hunting down Confederate commerce raiders, will have to be diverted to Charleston to bottle up the rams. This will reduce the effectiveness of the blockade in other places and serve to advance the overall Confederate war effort.

Think of the Tirpitz In Norway during WWII or the Königsberg in East Africa during WWI.

 

[Rhea Cole]

One possible use of the Laird Rams would be to serve as a "fleet-in-being" in order to tie down Union naval resources that would otherwise be employed elsewhere. Let's say, for example, that the Laird Rams enter Confederate service and then sail into Charleston Harbor? Well, the Southern Atlantic Blockading Squadron is going to have to be heavily reinforced. Unfortunately, they can't just sail in under the guns of Fort Sumter, Fort Moultrie, and all the others to attack the rams, but they'll have to remain on their guard in case the two rams sail out to challenge the blockaders.

In other words, valuable ships that would otherwise be blockading Mobile, Wilmington, Galveston, and other spots, or perhaps ships that are hunting down Confederate commerce raiders, will have to be diverted to Charleston to bottle up the rams. This will reduce the effectiveness of the blockade in other places and serve to advance the overall Confederate war effort.

Think of the Tirpitz In Norway during WWII or the Königsberg in East Africa during WWI.

You might want to check the depth of the channel leading into Charleston harbor. As is explained up thread, the Laird's drew 15'. The natural channel was 12'. It had been dredged to 17' prewar. However it silted up during the war.

The Laird's would have been aground somewhere in the channel or awaiting a spring tide to force their way into the harbor after removing their guns.

In order to leave, reducing their draft to (+/-) 10'6" like a Monitor would have been necessary. That would, of course, make the rams top heavy. They only had 6' of freeboard, so healing over would have been very precarious.

There were only three major ports on the CSA east coast. The Laird's dared not enter or approach any of them.

 

[JeffBrooks]

You might want to check the depth of the channel leading into Charleston harbor. As is explained up thread, the Laird's drew 15'. The natural channel was 12'. It had been dredged to 17' prewar. However it silted up during the war.

The Laird's would have been aground somewhere in the channel or awaiting a spring tide to force their way into the harbor after removing their guns.

In order to leave, reducing their draft to (+/-) 10'6" like a Monitor would have been necessary. That would, of course, make the rams top heavy. They only had 6' of freeboard, so healing over would have been very precarious.

There were only three major ports on the CSA east coast. The Laird's dared not enter or approach any of them.

I was not aware of that. Thanks for the clarification.

What about Mobile?

 

[Rhea Cole]

I was not aware of that. Thanks for the clarification.

What about Mobile?

Mobile was not a port for blue water ships because the entire Gulf Coast was too shallow. The coast wise traffic was carried in purpose built shallow draft schooners & light steamers. The trade was carried to landings up small rivers, not actual ports. Blockade runners captured in the Gulf originated in Havana & were mostly laden with salt.

The Mississippi River at New Orleans is over 100 feet deep. In the 1860's they still had to navigate the shifting banks of the delta. New Orleans was not really a blue water port like New York, for example. Purpose built schooners carrying New England ice & "extras" from Virginia, Maryland & Delaware plantations were a substantial part of cargo unloaded at the Port of New Orleans.

I have a book somewhere in my "piling system" that has every known blockade runner & their lading. It is an education in navigation, as well. They were sneaking in at night, so running aground was always a possibility.

 

[Saphroneth]

In order to leave, reducing their draft to (+/-) 10'6" like a Monitor would have been necessary. That would, of course, make the rams top heavy. They only had 6' of freeboard, so healing over would have been very precarious.

...er... the monitors had less than a third of that freeboard?

The Laird rams drew 15'.

A Chart of the entrance of Cape Fear River

Relief shown by hachures. Depths shown by soundings. Oriented with north toward the upper left. Includes "Tide Scale at Smithville." Available also through the Library of Congress Web site as a raster image. LC copy imperfect: Discoloration and staining on bottom of all sheets. Torn along edges...

www.loc.gov

This historic tide map of the mouth of the Cape Fear River is indicative of the challenges the Lairds would have faced " …cruising up & down …" the coast.

Looking at this (which is the chart you provided), I'm pretty sure I can see a path where the depth never goes below 10 as marked:

And the diagram explicitly states that the mean high tide is about six feet while the mean low tide is about one foot. You'd expect about an extra foot from spring tides on top of that.

I don't think you need to lighten very much to get through this in the configuration given by the charts. It might mean being careful around the shallowest points, sure, but it's doable if the ship's draft is 15 feet.


After all, the alternative is that the Confederates specifically ordered a ship that couldn't use any of their ports... but speaking of which...

The bar at entrance of the Savannah River was 12'.

Charleston Harbor

The natural depth of the entrance to Charleston Harbor was 12' at high tide.

Fortunately in 1864 there was a resurvey done of the Charleston Bar:

Resurvey of Charleston Bar

Scale 1:30,000. LC Civil War Maps (2nd ed.), 384 "No. 15" is in the upper left corner. Revised and redrawn edition of the preceding chart published in 1862. Description derived from published bibliography. Available also through the Library of Congress web site as raster image.

www.loc.gov

Detail:

The three surfaces are labelled, explicitly, as 6, 12 and 18 feet below mean low water, and there is indeed a path where the depth maxes out at 11 feet below mean low water - note, not high water, low water. The chart further states that the mean rise and fall of tide is 5 feet, or 6 in spring tides.

So no, the bar is not 12 feet at high water - it's 11 feet at low water, 16-17 in high.

 

[Saphroneth]

As for the military effectiveness of these ships, it would be substantial. Their armour scheme means that amidships they're potentially vulnerable to penetration by a 15" gun at very close range (since the scheme is pretty much the same as that of Warrior AIUI, which was marginal for penetration by a 15" gun with very heavy charges) and the ends would be more vulnerable, but the turrets are more strongly protected and wouldn't be vulnerable to either single penetration or spalling.

The 11" gun would have much greater trouble getting any sort of penetration.


Guns are more of a question mark. As completed they had 9" RMLs, though the Somerset Gun is an alternative possibility. Palliser Shell however was available by 1862 in experimental forms; if they actually did arrive with 9", 8" or 7" RMLs they'd probably be able to penetrate the turrets of most or all monitors.


The great benefit of these ships is that they can beat the "ships of force" of the Federal blockade, and indeed they can outspeed most all the monitors as well so they can bring them to battle. This means that the CSA can open the blockade of at least one port and keep it open, which if sustained for a sufficient period of time would be a major benefit to the CSA. (Effectively they would be able to import and export from that port on neutral vessels.)

 

[USS ALASKA]

One possible use of the Laird Rams would be to serve as a "fleet-in-being" in order to tie down Union naval resources that would otherwise be employed elsewhere. Let's say, for example, that the Laird Rams enter Confederate service and then sail into Charleston Harbor? Well, the Southern Atlantic Blockading Squadron is going to have to be heavily reinforced. Unfortunately, they can't just sail in under the guns of Fort Sumter, Fort Moultrie, and all the others to attack the rams, but they'll have to remain on their guard in case the two rams sail out to challenge the blockaders.

In other words, valuable ships that would otherwise be blockading Mobile, Wilmington, Galveston, and other spots, or perhaps ships that are hunting down Confederate commerce raiders, will have to be diverted to Charleston to bottle up the rams. This will reduce the effectiveness of the blockade in other places and serve to advance the overall Confederate war effort.

Think of the Tirpitz In Norway during WWII or the Königsberg in East Africa during WWI.

Sir, to look at the Tirpitz example, the distance from Scapa Flow to Tromso is 975 miles. No way to keep and support a standing force in close proximity so she was a major pain in the butt. Until the Brits put paid to her account, Arctic Convoys required in-close escort and distant support of CVs, BBs, and CAs, (sometimes including USN vessels).

IMVHO, the circumstances of SMS Königsberg might serve as a better example. Blockaded in the Rufiji Delta by the RN, she was battered by HMS Mersey and HMS Severn which were...wait for it...monitors!

Cool Naval-nerdo trivia bits...
1. Perhaps the first use of aerial spotting for naval gunfire.
2. The guns of SMS Königsberg were landed and converted into field artillery pieces and coastal guns. (some still exist to this day - please see https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=73&t=198646)
3. The men were organized as the Königsberg-Abteilung (Königsberg-Detachment) to serve as a land force and didn't surrender until 26 November 1917 - 15 days after the Armistice of 11 November 1918. Took a while for the word to get out.

"OK Alaska, what the for-heck does this have to do with the Laird Rams?!?'

Ignoring the political ramifications of their release, they get across the pond in reasonably good shape. Now they will have to fight their way into Charleston. Do they have local pilots onboard? Not going to run aground? How many CSN vessels ran aground in their own waters? To be a creditable threat of a fleet-in-being, you have to 'be' somewhere. Odds of them getting into port are 5 / 6, pick'em. Once they are safely along side, now the fun begins. Any damage and wear and tear absorbed during the crossing and fight-in has to be repaired. Does this port have the skills and supplies to do this? Liverpool to Charleston is 3923 miles straight line. Got the fuel for that for a non-stop voyage? Nope. So you have to get fuel somewhere and make it in - where you going to get fuel now? The South has coal but hard steam coal? There are Anthracite deposits within the South but these were not exploited until postbellum. These monsters are going to use a lot of fuel, further burdening the Confederate rail system as @DaveBrt can attest to. So now you get everything righted and wish to venture out to attack the USN fleet - and it will be a fleet. In RN service, they could make 10.5 knots. In clean hull, fully maintained, steam coal conditions. Going to have that operating from Charleston - lets knock off a knot or 2. Even if they can make 10.5 knots balls-out, you aren't going to be barreling out of the harbor at that speed. (For those of you reaching for the report button, 'balls-out' is a real term used to describe the centrifugal governor on a steam engine at full speed. NOT the weird golf thing. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centrifugal_governor). You are going to gingerly navigate your way out of the harbor and THEN build up speed. Meanwhile the Hounds of Heck are waiting to disable and immobilize you. They are going to have a short and VERY exciting operational life.

Just my thoughts,
USS ALASKA

 

[Saphroneth]

Liverpool to Charleston is 3923 miles straight line. Got the fuel for that for a non-stop voyage? Nope. So you have to get fuel somewhere and make it in - where you going to get fuel now?

Sorry, but at this point I have a problem... the Laird Rams have sails, you know.

So it rather comes across as throwing a lot of problems at the wall to see what sticks!

 

[Rhea Cole]

Sir, to look at the Tirpitz example, the distance from Scapa Flow to Tromso is 975 miles. No way to keep and support a standing force in close proximity so she was a major pain in the butt. Until the Brits put paid to her account, Arctic Convoys required in-close escort and distant support of CVs, BBs, and CAs, (sometimes including USN vessels).

IMVHO, the circumstances of SMS Königsberg might serve as a better example. Blockaded in the Rufiji Delta by the RN, she was battered by HMS Mersey and HMS Severn which were...wait for it...monitors!

Cool Naval-nerdo trivia bits...
1. Perhaps the first use of aerial spotting for naval gunfire.
2. The guns of SMS Königsberg were landed and converted into field artillery pieces and coastal guns. (some still exist to this day - please see https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=73&t=198646)
3. The men were organized as the Königsberg-Abteilung (Königsberg-Detachment) to serve as a land force and didn't surrender until 26 November 1917 - 15 days after the Armistice of 11 November 1918. Took a while for the word to get out.

"OK Alaska, what the for-heck does this have to do with the Laird Rams?!?'

Ignoring the political ramifications of their release, they get across the pond in reasonably good shape. Now they will have to fight their way into Charleston. Do they have local pilots onboard? Not going to run aground? How many CSN vessels ran aground in their own waters? To be a creditable threat of a fleet-in-being, you have to 'be' somewhere. Odds of them getting into port are 5 / 6, pick'em. Once they are safely along side, now the fun begins. Any damage and wear and tear absorbed during the crossing and fight-in has to be repaired. Does this port have the skills and supplies to do this? Liverpool to Charleston is 3923 miles straight line. Got the fuel for that for a non-stop voyage? Nope. So you have to get fuel somewhere and make it in - where you going to get fuel now? The South has coal but hard steam coal? There are Anthracite deposits within the South but these were not exploited until postbellum. These monsters are going to use a lot of fuel, further burdening the Confederate rail system as @DaveBrt can attest to. So now you get everything righted and wish to venture out to attack the USN fleet - and it will be a fleet. In RN service, they could make 10.5 knots. In clean hull, fully maintained, steam coal conditions. Going to have that operating from Charleston - lets knock off a knot or 2. Even if they can make 10.5 knots balls-out, you aren't going to be barreling out of the harbor at that speed. (For those of you reaching for the report button, 'balls-out' is a real term used to describe the centrifugal governor on a steam engine at full speed. NOT the weird golf thing. Please see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centrifugal_governor). You are going to gingerly navigate your way out of the harbor and THEN build up speed. Meanwhile the Hounds of Heck are waiting to disable and immobilize you. They are going to have a short and VERY exciting operational life.

Just my thoughts,
USS ALASKA

The logistical & maintenance points you make are spot on. Should one or more of the Lairds make it out, waiting for them would be a flotilla of fully worked up warships with veteran officers & crews of right manowarsmen.

With their 14 mile circles of observation, the Lairds would have steamed off into the treacherous waters of "Graveyard of the Atlantic." A week or so later when they needed coaling…

 

[Saphroneth]

With their 14 mile circles of observation, the Lairds would have steamed off into the treacherous waters of "Graveyard of the Atlantic." A week or so later when they needed coaling…

So... how exactly was this "graveyard of the Atlantic" blockaded? By definition that means ships staying offshore for long periods of time...

 

[rebelatsea]

It is well-known to students of the ACW that a diplomatic crisis erupted in 1863 over the two ram warships under construction by Jonathan Laird in Liverpool. U.S. ambassador Charles Francis Adams was making veiled threats that war would develop if the ships were delivered to the Confederacy, and Confederate agent James Bulloch was trying to pull off a scheme to sneakily "transfer" the ships to Egypt and then to the Confederacy. As it was, it was a near-run thing.

Had the Laird Rams become the CSS Mississippi and North Carolina, what kind of damage could they have done to the blockade? Other than New Ironsides, what ships did the Union have that could stand up to them?

If they had been adequately crewed and armed with 7"Brooke rifles, they could have been very effective, the USN did not have anything seagoing that could have stopped them . The second would not be too much of a problem, the first might have been problematic,

 

[rebelatsea]

As for the military effectiveness of these ships, it would be substantial. Their armour scheme means that amidships they're potentially vulnerable to penetration by a 15" gun at very close range (since the scheme is pretty much the same as that of Warrior AIUI, which was marginal for penetration by a 15" gun with very heavy charges) and the ends would be more vulnerable, but the turrets are more strongly protected and wouldn't be vulnerable to either single penetration or spalling.

The 11" gun would have much greater trouble getting any sort of penetration.


Guns are more of a question mark. As completed they had 9" RMLs, though the Somerset Gun is an alternative possibility. Palliser Shell however was available by 1862 in experimental forms; if they actually did arrive with 9", 8" or 7" RMLs they'd probably be able to penetrate the turrets of most or all monitors.


The great benefit of these ships is that they can beat the "ships of force" of the Federal blockade, and indeed they can outspeed most all the monitors as well so they can bring them to battle. This means that the CSA can open the blockade of at least one port and keep it open, which if sustained for a sufficient period of time would be a major benefit to the CSA. (Effectively they would be able to import and export from that port on neutral vessels.)

Unfortunately the first carriages for the 9" MLR on this pair were dreadful, it took an hour from full depression to full elevation in smooth water (Oscar Parkes - British Battleships) . I think the CSN would have had to get 7" Brooke MLR and carriages to them somehow.