The Laird Rams Join the CSN

[Generic Username]

To attempt to cut Grant's supplies off would require the Laird Rams to remain stationary in the Chesapeake. If they give up their freedom to move about, the Union Navy would be able to assemble all of its firepower to destroy them.

If Grant goes for it, yes. I'm reminded of the impact of Tirpitz on shutting down Allied convoys to Northern Russia during WWII in the sense the Rams would be a fleet in being deterring enemy action. In this case, making resupply too hazardous to attempt.

As to a major naval battle, I'd imagine Grant's Army would starve before then. It'd take at least several weeks to assemble such a task force and have it arrive. While that's happening, the weakening of the blockade will enable more blockade runners to get through.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Opening up Wilmington to me seems an obvious move, it's a major port close enough to the center of action to have a logistical impact while being a more contained engagement. Attacking into the Chesapeake which would probably require support from Lee to get a major port open given the Federal forts in the area. It also places the Laird Rams close enough to Virginia that they function as a fleet in being, which could have salutary effects on Northern decision making for the South. Grant going around the flanks of Lee as he did historically doesn't work unless his sea based supply lines are secure and here that might be too risky for the Lincoln admin since the Rams could sortie and threaten that. Grant getting down to the James just to do the ACW version of Yorktown would not be great in an election year, to say the least.

IF Grant does go for the Lynchburg Lunge as he initially considered, it's incredibly risky. Without Butler keeping Beauregard occupied in the Bermuda Hundred, the garrison of Richmond itself can keep the city secure while Lee could maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia between Grant and Washington. At that point the former either has to fight a decisive battle and hope he wins or the Army of the Potomac starves in the Virginian countryside. If he does attempt to go to Richmond, Beauregard could be the anvil while Lee is the hammer.

Given this, IMHO the only safe option is to attempt to do what Sherman did in Georgia which is steadily advance the railway lines behind the AotP as it advances into French. That's going to be time consuming, slow and incredibly costly as it requires Grant to attempt to force Lee back in a way he never really managed to do during 1864 historically. It also carries with the issue that Grant/Meade will steadily have to detach formations to guard this extended, vulnerable supply line and that means further they advance the weaker their main force becomes. Sherman resolved this with the March to the Sea after taking Atlanta but a flying column dependent on sea based supply at the end isn't really valid here, again, because of the Rams.

Good assessment, @Generic Username.

 

[rebelatsea]

Good assessment, @Generic Username.

That's a logical use of the turret ships, but I'm not sure they could get into Wilmington due to their draught.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Opening up Wilmington to me seems an obvious move, it's a major port close enough to the center of action to have a logistical impact while being a more contained engagement. Attacking into the Chesapeake which would probably require support from Lee to get a major port open given the Federal forts in the area. It also places the Laird Rams close enough to Virginia that they function as a fleet in being, which could have salutary effects on Northern decision making for the South. Grant going around the flanks of Lee as he did historically doesn't work unless his sea based supply lines are secure and here that might be too risky for the Lincoln admin since the Rams could sortie and threaten that. Grant getting down to the James just to do the ACW version of Yorktown would not be great in an election year, to say the least.

IF Grant does go for the Lynchburg Lunge as he initially considered, it's incredibly risky. Without Butler keeping Beauregard occupied in the Bermuda Hundred, the garrison of Richmond itself can keep the city secure while Lee could maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia between Grant and Washington. At that point the former either has to fight a decisive battle and hope he wins or the Army of the Potomac starves in the Virginian countryside. If he does attempt to go to Richmond, Beauregard could be the anvil while Lee is the hammer.

Given this, IMHO the only safe option is to attempt to do what Sherman did in Georgia which is steadily advance the railway lines behind the AotP as it advances into French. That's going to be time consuming, slow and incredibly costly as it requires Grant to attempt to force Lee back in a way he never really managed to do during 1864 historically. It also carries with the issue that Grant/Meade will steadily have to detach formations to guard this extended, vulnerable supply line and that means further they advance the weaker their main force becomes. Sherman resolved this with the March to the Sea after taking Atlanta but a flying column dependent on sea based supply at the end isn't really valid here, again, because of the Rams.

There is no evidence that supports the Laird rams being capable of operating along the U.S. East Coast.

It would be useful to note that the Laird rams drew 15'. The bar at the mouth of Cape Fear at high tide was 12', side channels 9'. None of the operations envisioned could have taken place.

Monitors drew (+/-) 10'.

The channel into Savannah was 12' to 14'.

In Charleston harbor Confederate gunships were confined to channels that resulted in them grounding & forced to surrender by Monitors that could maneuver in the shallow waters.

The Laird Rams were designed to operate in European waters not the treacherous Grave Yard of the Atlantic.

"Designated as "rams", they were designed for both strength and speed. Each had a length of 230 feet, a beam of 42 feet, and a fully loaded draught of 15 feet. The deck was designed to raise a mere 6 feet above the water line. The ship's outer surfaces were teak over iron, finished with armour plate to a depth of 5.5 inches."

When put into RN service the rams proved to have inferior sea going performance. As a result they were not deployed in the role envisioned by the designers.

Link

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

 

[Generic Username]

There is no evidence that supports the Laird rams being capable of operating along the U.S. East Coast.

It would be useful to note that the Laird rams drew 15'. The bar at the mouth of Cape Fear at high tide was 12', side channels 9'. None of the operations envisioned could have taken place.

Monitors drew (+/-) 10'.

The channel into Savannah was 12' to 14'.

In Charleston harbor Confederate gunships were confined to channels that resulted in them grounding & forced to surrender by Monitors that could maneuver in the shallow waters.

The Laird Rams were designed to operate in European waters not the treacherous Grave Yard of the Atlantic.

"Designated as "rams", they were designed for both strength and speed. Each had a length of 230 feet, a beam of 42 feet, and a fully loaded draught of 15 feet. The deck was designed to raise a mere 6 feet above the water line. The ship's outer surfaces were teak over iron, finished with armour plate to a depth of 5.5 inches."

When put into RN service the rams proved to have inferior sea going performance. As a result they were not deployed in the role envisioned by the designers.

Link

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

Given the Confederates still controlled Fort Fisher in early 1864, there would be no need for the Rams to go up the Cape Fear River. Instead they would be engaging the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron off the coast. Looking at the USN vessels that engaged off Fort Fisher in February of 1865, several had a draft equal or more demanding than the Rams:

USS Aries (15.7 ft)
USS Montgomery (15.6 ft)
USS R. R. Cuyler (17 ft)

 

[Rhea Cole]

Given the Confederates still controlled Fort Fisher in early 1864, there would be no need for the Rams to go up the Cape Fear River. Instead they would be engaging the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron off the coast. Looking at the USN vessels that engaged off Fort Fisher in February of 1865, several had a draft equal or more demanding than the Rams:

USS Aries (15.7 ft)
USS Montgomery (15.6 ft)
USS R. R. Cuyler (17 ft)

Indeed, you found a 3 deep water vessels

This link is to the entire Monitor force from the Civil War. Keep in mind that Monitors operated in flotillas. Had one of the Laird rams ( maximum speed 10 knots with a clean bottom ) encountered a flotilla of blockade Monitors it was incapable of out running them. As the RN discovered, the Lairds were very unhandy, which is to say very awkward to maneuver & rolled excessively in any kind of a sea.

As you will be able to see for yourself, no Confederate vessel no matter what the armament, prevailed against a flotilla of Monitors. This is not speculation, these are documented histories of the entire Monitor force.

The three vessels that you cite could hoist sails & walk away from the Lairds, especially in any kind of a sea state, r.e. RN. Hard to ram a vessel that can out maneuver & out run the attacker.

Link

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

 

[Generic Username]

Indeed, you found a 3 deep water vessels

This link is to the entire Monitor force from the Civil War. Keep in mind that Monitors operated in flotillas. Had one of the Laird rams ( maximum speed 10 knots with a clean bottom ) encountered a flotilla of blockade Monitors it was incapable of out running them. As the RN discovered, the Lairds were very unhandy, which is to say very awkward to maneuver & rolled excessively in any kind of a sea.

As you will be able to see for yourself, no Confederate vessel no matter what the armament, prevailed against a flotilla of Monitors. This is not speculation, these are documented histories of the entire Monitor force.

The three vessels that you cite could hoist sails & walk away from the Lairds, especially in any kind of a sea state, r.e. RN. Hard to ram a vessel that can out maneuver & out run the attacker.

Link

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

Leaving aside there were no Monitors off Wilmington in 1863-64, the maximum speed of a Passaic-class vessel is 7 knots and thus three knots slower than a Scorpion-class ironclad. As multiple Monitor crews learned during the war their vessels were also unsuited for open water engagements too. It was for this reason the USN was extremely hesitant to use them around Wilmington during the course of the conflict:

From Fort Caswell, the Union Navy would have better access points from which to launch an attack against Fort Fisher, and thus Wilmington. However, severe weather struck the coast of Cape Hatteras while the USS Monitor was en route. The ship, along with the possibility of a successful attack and hopes of capturing Lee's Lifeline, sank beneath the waves.

Wilmington was virtually ignored for the next two and a half years. The Union turned its focus to places such as Charleston, New Orleans, and Mobile. When the Confederate ports in coastal states like South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana began to fall, the blockade runners were forced to move their operations to Wilmington. And while the Union Navy concentrated its resources elsewhere, the blockading force outside of Wilmington was left weak at best. "The difficulty of maintaining an effective blockade at Wilmington, with none but slow steamers is evident"[v] wrote Rear Admiral Lee in January 1863. Lee would not learn that ships were being prepared to reinforce the Wilmington blockade until March of the same year. But even with the addition of more blockading vessels, the line was slow moving and spread out.

Given the realities of communication technology of the day, the Rams could show up and destroy the Blockading squadron (Which, again, does not have any Monitors) before a response of an entire flotilla of Monitors could be assembled. Even assembling said flotilla would work in favor of the Confederates, since it would leave other areas of the coast unguarded. Case in point, one reason for the delay on Farragut's attack on Mobile in 1864 was due to a lack of Monitors; he had none until shortly before the operation.

As to the sailing ships both USS Aries and USS R. R. Cuyler were indeed faster than the Rams at 12 and 14 knots respectively while USS Montgomery was much slower at 8 knots. Presuming they are willing to scatter at the approach of the CSS North Carolina and CSS Mississippi, most vessels probably could escape. That does, however, necessarily entail sacrificing their slower counterparts and handing the Confederacy the strategic and political victory of breaking the blockade by default.