The Laird Rams Join the CSN

[Generic Username]

To attempt to cut Grant's supplies off would require the Laird Rams to remain stationary in the Chesapeake. If they give up their freedom to move about, the Union Navy would be able to assemble all of its firepower to destroy them.

If Grant goes for it, yes. I'm reminded of the impact of Tirpitz on shutting down Allied convoys to Northern Russia during WWII in the sense the Rams would be a fleet in being deterring enemy action. In this case, making resupply too hazardous to attempt.

As to a major naval battle, I'd imagine Grant's Army would starve before then. It'd take at least several weeks to assemble such a task force and have it arrive. While that's happening, the weakening of the blockade will enable more blockade runners to get through.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Opening up Wilmington to me seems an obvious move, it's a major port close enough to the center of action to have a logistical impact while being a more contained engagement. Attacking into the Chesapeake which would probably require support from Lee to get a major port open given the Federal forts in the area. It also places the Laird Rams close enough to Virginia that they function as a fleet in being, which could have salutary effects on Northern decision making for the South. Grant going around the flanks of Lee as he did historically doesn't work unless his sea based supply lines are secure and here that might be too risky for the Lincoln admin since the Rams could sortie and threaten that. Grant getting down to the James just to do the ACW version of Yorktown would not be great in an election year, to say the least.

IF Grant does go for the Lynchburg Lunge as he initially considered, it's incredibly risky. Without Butler keeping Beauregard occupied in the Bermuda Hundred, the garrison of Richmond itself can keep the city secure while Lee could maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia between Grant and Washington. At that point the former either has to fight a decisive battle and hope he wins or the Army of the Potomac starves in the Virginian countryside. If he does attempt to go to Richmond, Beauregard could be the anvil while Lee is the hammer.

Given this, IMHO the only safe option is to attempt to do what Sherman did in Georgia which is steadily advance the railway lines behind the AotP as it advances into French. That's going to be time consuming, slow and incredibly costly as it requires Grant to attempt to force Lee back in a way he never really managed to do during 1864 historically. It also carries with the issue that Grant/Meade will steadily have to detach formations to guard this extended, vulnerable supply line and that means further they advance the weaker their main force becomes. Sherman resolved this with the March to the Sea after taking Atlanta but a flying column dependent on sea based supply at the end isn't really valid here, again, because of the Rams.

Good assessment, @Generic Username.

 

[rebelatsea]

Good assessment, @Generic Username.

That's a logical use of the turret ships, but I'm not sure they could get into Wilmington due to their draught.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Opening up Wilmington to me seems an obvious move, it's a major port close enough to the center of action to have a logistical impact while being a more contained engagement. Attacking into the Chesapeake which would probably require support from Lee to get a major port open given the Federal forts in the area. It also places the Laird Rams close enough to Virginia that they function as a fleet in being, which could have salutary effects on Northern decision making for the South. Grant going around the flanks of Lee as he did historically doesn't work unless his sea based supply lines are secure and here that might be too risky for the Lincoln admin since the Rams could sortie and threaten that. Grant getting down to the James just to do the ACW version of Yorktown would not be great in an election year, to say the least.

IF Grant does go for the Lynchburg Lunge as he initially considered, it's incredibly risky. Without Butler keeping Beauregard occupied in the Bermuda Hundred, the garrison of Richmond itself can keep the city secure while Lee could maneuver the Army of Northern Virginia between Grant and Washington. At that point the former either has to fight a decisive battle and hope he wins or the Army of the Potomac starves in the Virginian countryside. If he does attempt to go to Richmond, Beauregard could be the anvil while Lee is the hammer.

Given this, IMHO the only safe option is to attempt to do what Sherman did in Georgia which is steadily advance the railway lines behind the AotP as it advances into French. That's going to be time consuming, slow and incredibly costly as it requires Grant to attempt to force Lee back in a way he never really managed to do during 1864 historically. It also carries with the issue that Grant/Meade will steadily have to detach formations to guard this extended, vulnerable supply line and that means further they advance the weaker their main force becomes. Sherman resolved this with the March to the Sea after taking Atlanta but a flying column dependent on sea based supply at the end isn't really valid here, again, because of the Rams.

There is no evidence that supports the Laird rams being capable of operating along the U.S. East Coast.

It would be useful to note that the Laird rams drew 15'. The bar at the mouth of Cape Fear at high tide was 12', side channels 9'. None of the operations envisioned could have taken place.

Monitors drew (+/-) 10'.

The channel into Savannah was 12' to 14'.

In Charleston harbor Confederate gunships were confined to channels that resulted in them grounding & forced to surrender by Monitors that could maneuver in the shallow waters.

The Laird Rams were designed to operate in European waters not the treacherous Grave Yard of the Atlantic.

"Designated as "rams", they were designed for both strength and speed. Each had a length of 230 feet, a beam of 42 feet, and a fully loaded draught of 15 feet. The deck was designed to raise a mere 6 feet above the water line. The ship's outer surfaces were teak over iron, finished with armour plate to a depth of 5.5 inches."

When put into RN service the rams proved to have inferior sea going performance. As a result they were not deployed in the role envisioned by the designers.

Link

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

 

[Generic Username]

There is no evidence that supports the Laird rams being capable of operating along the U.S. East Coast.

It would be useful to note that the Laird rams drew 15'. The bar at the mouth of Cape Fear at high tide was 12', side channels 9'. None of the operations envisioned could have taken place.

Monitors drew (+/-) 10'.

The channel into Savannah was 12' to 14'.

In Charleston harbor Confederate gunships were confined to channels that resulted in them grounding & forced to surrender by Monitors that could maneuver in the shallow waters.

The Laird Rams were designed to operate in European waters not the treacherous Grave Yard of the Atlantic.

"Designated as "rams", they were designed for both strength and speed. Each had a length of 230 feet, a beam of 42 feet, and a fully loaded draught of 15 feet. The deck was designed to raise a mere 6 feet above the water line. The ship's outer surfaces were teak over iron, finished with armour plate to a depth of 5.5 inches."

When put into RN service the rams proved to have inferior sea going performance. As a result they were not deployed in the role envisioned by the designers.

Link

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

Given the Confederates still controlled Fort Fisher in early 1864, there would be no need for the Rams to go up the Cape Fear River. Instead they would be engaging the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron off the coast. Looking at the USN vessels that engaged off Fort Fisher in February of 1865, several had a draft equal or more demanding than the Rams:

USS Aries (15.7 ft)
USS Montgomery (15.6 ft)
USS R. R. Cuyler (17 ft)

 

[Rhea Cole]

Given the Confederates still controlled Fort Fisher in early 1864, there would be no need for the Rams to go up the Cape Fear River. Instead they would be engaging the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron off the coast. Looking at the USN vessels that engaged off Fort Fisher in February of 1865, several had a draft equal or more demanding than the Rams:

USS Aries (15.7 ft)
USS Montgomery (15.6 ft)
USS R. R. Cuyler (17 ft)

Indeed, you found a 3 deep water vessels

This link is to the entire Monitor force from the Civil War. Keep in mind that Monitors operated in flotillas. Had one of the Laird rams ( maximum speed 10 knots with a clean bottom ) encountered a flotilla of blockade Monitors it was incapable of out running them. As the RN discovered, the Lairds were very unhandy, which is to say very awkward to maneuver & rolled excessively in any kind of a sea.

As you will be able to see for yourself, no Confederate vessel no matter what the armament, prevailed against a flotilla of Monitors. This is not speculation, these are documented histories of the entire Monitor force.

The three vessels that you cite could hoist sails & walk away from the Lairds, especially in any kind of a sea state, r.e. RN. Hard to ram a vessel that can out maneuver & out run the attacker.

Link

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

 

[Generic Username]

Indeed, you found a 3 deep water vessels

This link is to the entire Monitor force from the Civil War. Keep in mind that Monitors operated in flotillas. Had one of the Laird rams ( maximum speed 10 knots with a clean bottom ) encountered a flotilla of blockade Monitors it was incapable of out running them. As the RN discovered, the Lairds were very unhandy, which is to say very awkward to maneuver & rolled excessively in any kind of a sea.

As you will be able to see for yourself, no Confederate vessel no matter what the armament, prevailed against a flotilla of Monitors. This is not speculation, these are documented histories of the entire Monitor force.

The three vessels that you cite could hoist sails & walk away from the Lairds, especially in any kind of a sea state, r.e. RN. Hard to ram a vessel that can out maneuver & out run the attacker.

Link

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

Leaving aside there were no Monitors off Wilmington in 1863-64, the maximum speed of a Passaic-class vessel is 7 knots and thus three knots slower than a Scorpion-class ironclad. As multiple Monitor crews learned during the war their vessels were also unsuited for open water engagements too. It was for this reason the USN was extremely hesitant to use them around Wilmington during the course of the conflict:

From Fort Caswell, the Union Navy would have better access points from which to launch an attack against Fort Fisher, and thus Wilmington. However, severe weather struck the coast of Cape Hatteras while the USS Monitor was en route. The ship, along with the possibility of a successful attack and hopes of capturing Lee's Lifeline, sank beneath the waves.

Wilmington was virtually ignored for the next two and a half years. The Union turned its focus to places such as Charleston, New Orleans, and Mobile. When the Confederate ports in coastal states like South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana began to fall, the blockade runners were forced to move their operations to Wilmington. And while the Union Navy concentrated its resources elsewhere, the blockading force outside of Wilmington was left weak at best. "The difficulty of maintaining an effective blockade at Wilmington, with none but slow steamers is evident"[v] wrote Rear Admiral Lee in January 1863. Lee would not learn that ships were being prepared to reinforce the Wilmington blockade until March of the same year. But even with the addition of more blockading vessels, the line was slow moving and spread out.

Given the realities of communication technology of the day, the Rams could show up and destroy the Blockading squadron (Which, again, does not have any Monitors) before a response of an entire flotilla of Monitors could be assembled. Even assembling said flotilla would work in favor of the Confederates, since it would leave other areas of the coast unguarded. Case in point, one reason for the delay on Farragut's attack on Mobile in 1864 was due to a lack of Monitors; he had none until shortly before the operation.

As to the sailing ships both USS Aries and USS R. R. Cuyler were indeed faster than the Rams at 12 and 14 knots respectively while USS Montgomery was much slower at 8 knots. Presuming they are willing to scatter at the approach of the CSS North Carolina and CSS Mississippi, most vessels probably could escape. That does, however, necessarily entail sacrificing their slower counterparts and handing the Confederacy the strategic and political victory of breaking the blockade by default.

 

[rebelatsea]

There is no evidence that supports the Laird rams being capable of operating along the U.S. East Coast.

It would be useful to note that the Laird rams drew 15'. The bar at the mouth of Cape Fear at high tide was 12', side channels 9'. None of the operations envisioned could have taken place.

Monitors drew (+/-) 10'.

The channel into Savannah was 12' to 14'.

In Charleston harbor Confederate gunships were confined to channels that resulted in them grounding & forced to surrender by Monitors that could maneuver in the shallow waters.

The Laird Rams were designed to operate in European waters not the treacherous Grave Yard of the Atlantic.

"Designated as "rams", they were designed for both strength and speed. Each had a length of 230 feet, a beam of 42 feet, and a fully loaded draught of 15 feet. The deck was designed to raise a mere 6 feet above the water line. The ship's outer surfaces were teak over iron, finished with armour plate to a depth of 5.5 inches."

When put into RN service the rams proved to have inferior sea going performance. As a result they were not deployed in the role envisioned by the designers.

Link

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

"British Battleships " by Dr Oscar Parks is the definitive source for these - and all other RN ironclads and battleships. THE R.U.S.I. could only find three mistakes.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Leaving aside there were no Monitors off Wilmington in 1863-64, the maximum speed of a Passaic-class vessel is 7 knots and thus three knots slower than a Scorpion-class ironclad. As multiple Monitor crews learned during the war their vessels were also unsuited for open water engagements too. It was for this reason the USN was extremely hesitant to use them around Wilmington during the course of the conflict:



Given the realities of communication technology of the day, the Rams could show up and destroy the Blockading squadron (Which, again, does not have any Monitors) before a response of an entire flotilla of Monitors could be assembled. Even assembling said flotilla would work in favor of the Confederates, since it would leave other areas of the coast unguarded. Case in point, one reason for the delay on Farragut's attack on Mobile in 1864 was due to a lack of Monitors; he had none until shortly before the operation.

As to the sailing ships both USS Aries and USS R. R. Cuyler were indeed faster than the Rams at 12 and 14 knots respectively while USS Montgomery was much slower at 8 knots. Presuming they are willing to scatter at the approach of the CSS North Carolina and CSS Mississippi, most vessels probably could escape. That does, however, necessarily entail sacrificing their slower counterparts and handing the Confederacy the strategic and political victory of breaking the blockade by default.

Have you read the RN's evaluation of the Laird rams? If so the notion that they could have lurked off shore & chased off the blockading squadrons would disappear.

This book is the one I would recommend because it comprehensively documents the Laird rams' RN career.

In essence, they were only what amounted to floating harbor defense batteries. This became they were useless in the open ocean.

That was because they had no keels.

• Length: 230 feet (extreme length approx. 231 feet)
• Beam (Width): 42 to 48 feet
• Draught (Depth): 14 to 15 feet loaded
• Ram Spur: Extended 7 feet forward from the bow
• Freeboard: Deck rose only 6 feet above the water line
• Armor Depth: 5.5 inches of iron plating over teak

My impression is that you are not a sailor. What the dimensions indicate is that underway outside of the calm waters of a harbor the deck was a 40 something foot long teter totter with first one end & then the other dunking into the ocean. Needless to say, it was all but impossible to stand on deck & effectively impossible to aim & fire the guns.

Note: I don't have to speculate on what that meant. With a fraction of the Laird's moment arm while sheeting home the jib of a tall ship the deck fell away from the mate & me.

Clinging to the sheet for dear life we floated above the deck & smacked into the pintail & ratlines. I ended up with polka dotted ribs from impact with the belaying pins.

LST 325 at the Cumberland River landing Nashville TN.

This is a keelless hull of (+/-) the same dimensions of the Laird rams. Except that the notorious roll that WWII LST crews endured was not with a freeboard less than the height of 325 painted on the bow.

LST 325 is a restored veteran of D Day. Her home port on the Cumberland River is Evanston, Indiana where she was constructed.

 

[Old Soldier]

Don't forget there were another two rams in France too, started in July 1863, some 3 months before the Laird Rams were impounded. They were built by L'Arman Frères with the approval of Napoleon III on the same Egyptian Navy scam, to a different design as an armored ram but also carried three guns: one 21 cm (8.3 in) and two 17 cm (6.7 in) pieces in armored casements and further on in construction than the Laird Rams. They were wooden hulled with armour added and rigged as brigs (2 masts). They never seem to get the same publicity as the British ones (something to prove?) Once the US ambassador got to know about them, they were told to be got rid of PDQ. They were sold to Denmark and Germany both at war with each other at the time.

Layout of the French Rams

By the time they were delivered the war was over. The German one was named SMS Prinz Adalbert. The ship was poorly built and as a result had a very limited service career. It was noted that the ram bow shipped a lot of water but was responsive to the rudder and had a very tight turning radius. She was heavily modified after her delivery to Prussia in early 1865, the French guns were replaced with Krupp guns of different calibers. A more modern and potent 21 cm RK L/19 gun of 20.95-centimeter (8.25 in) in the bow, two 17 cm RK L/25 of 17.26 cm (6.80 in) in the central battery. She briefly served with the fleet between 1866 and 1871 and was harbor guardship at Hamburg during the Franco Prussian War. After the war, it was discovered that the internal wood construction was badly rotted(!). She was laid up in October 1871, was stricken from the naval register in May 1878 and broken up for scrap that year.

The Danish vessel was re-named HDMS Stærkodder, and sailed by a Danish crew to Copenhagen in 1864. She was ejected on arrival and the Danish government refused to pay the price asked. She was sold on again, to the Confederate Navy. Some say it was returned and sold on by the French builders, but she actually remained in Denmark to be sold on to the Confederates by Denmark. She became CSS Stonewall, of course, but did not get across the Atlantic until the war was over and was basically abandoned in Havana, handed over to Cuba who turned her over to the USA.

SMS Prinz Adalbert (1864) – naval encyclopedia

naval-encyclopedia.com

Draft of 16 ft 3 in (4.96 m) forward, 16 ft 6 in (5.02 m) aft (after conversion).

CSS Stonewall/Kōtetsu/Azuma (1864) – naval encyclopedia

naval-encyclopedia.com

Draft of 14 ft 3 in (4.3 m) (also for SMS Prinz Adalbert, as received)

 

[Piedone]

This link is to the entire Monitor force from the Civil War. Keep in mind that Monitors operated in flotillas. Had one of the Laird rams ( maximum speed 10 knots with a clean bottom ) encountered a flotilla of blockade Monitors it was incapable of out running them. As the RN discovered, the Lairds were very unhandy, which is to say very awkward to maneuver & rolled excessively in any kind of a sea.

Please do not always move the goalposts as soon as someone is able to refute one of your points.
This is a bit of a pain - and a hindrance to deeper insights.

 

[Generic Username]

Have you read the RN's evaluation of the Laird rams? If so the notion that they could have lurked off shore & chased off the blockading squadrons would disappear.

View attachment 586313

This book is the one I would recommend because it comprehensively documents the Laird rams' RN career.

In essence, they were only what amounted to floating harbor defense batteries. This became they were useless in the open ocean.

That was because they had no keels.

• Length: 230 feet (extreme length approx. 231 feet)
• Beam (Width): 42 to 48 feet
• Draught (Depth): 14 to 15 feet loaded
• Ram Spur: Extended 7 feet forward from the bow
• Freeboard: Deck rose only 6 feet above the water line
• Armor Depth: 5.5 inches of iron plating over teak

My impression is that you are not a sailor. What the dimensions indicate is that underway outside of the calm waters of a harbor the deck was a 40 something foot long teter totter with first one end & then the other dunking into the ocean. Needless to say, it was all but impossible to stand on deck & effectively impossible to aim & fire the guns.

Note: I don't have to speculate on what that meant. With a fraction of the Laird's moment arm while sheeting home the jib of a tall ship the deck fell away from the mate & me.

Clinging to the sheet for dear life we floated above the deck & smacked into the pintail & ratlines. I ended up with polka dotted ribs from impact with the belaying pins.

View attachment 586314
LST 325 at the Cumberland River landing Nashville TN.

This is a keelless hull of (+/-) the same dimensions of the Laird rams. Except that the notorious roll that WWII LST crews endured was not with a freeboard less than the height of 325 painted on the bow.

LST 325 is a restored veteran of D Day. Her home port on the Cumberland River is Evanston, Indiana where she was constructed.

Leaving aside that presentation has holes in it as others have pointed out previously in this thread and I am aware historians have done the same, "floating harbor defense batteries" are perfectly suited for engagements in littoral waters by definition. The limitations of technology at the time meant the Union had to conduct a "close in" blockade by default and thus forcing them to grapple with the Laird Rams on terms favorable to said Rams. The alternative is a far out blockade which is much "leakier" and legally more questionable for the U.S. to enforce vis-a-vis the European powers.

However, I am indeed not a sailor and if you are-particularly with combat experience on a 19th Century Ironclad-I am open to hearing a counter argument here.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Leaving aside that presentation has holes in it as others have pointed out previously in this thread and I am aware historians have done the same, "floating harbor defense batteries" are perfectly suited for engagements in littoral waters by definition. The limitations of technology at the time meant the Union had to conduct a "close in" blockade by default and thus forcing them to grapple with the Laird Rams on terms favorable to said Rams. The alternative is a far out blockade which is much "leakier" and legally more questionable for the U.S. to enforce vis-a-vis the European powers.

However, I am indeed not a sailor and if you are-particularly with combat experience on a 19th Century Ironclad-I am open to hearing a counter argument here.

I defer to the Lords of the Admiralty that, unlike me, had read the reports of officers who attempted to sail the Lairds.

Perhaps nobody has pointed out to you that littoral waters are part of the ocean. Fortunately the Sea Lords were. That is why they deployed the Lairds as they did.

I have said all that intend to on this subject. No amount of verbiage is going to make the Lairds into effective warships.

I suggest that any future counter arguments be addressed to H.M.'s Sea Lords who could benefit from such observations.

 

[Generic Username]

I defer to the Lords of the Admiralty that, unlike me, had read the reports of officers who attempted to sail the Lairds.

Perhaps nobody has pointed out to you that littoral waters are part of the ocean. Fortunately the Sea Lords were. That is why they deployed the Lairds as they did.

I have said all that intend to on this subject. No amount of verbiage is going to make the Lairds into effective warships.

I suggest that any future counter arguments be addressed to H.M.'s Sea Lords who could benefit from such observations.

One wonders why the Lords of the Admiralty saw fit to sail said ships across not just the Atlantic but also the Indian and Pacific Oceans then? As to the difference between littoral waters and ocean combat, as the source you previously cited noted:

The mission for these two leviathans was to be simple yet daring. Operating as a pair with the support of smaller vessels, they were to sail up and down the Southern coastline using their almost impenetrable armour and heavy weapons to hold off attackers while they targeted individual ships with their massive rams. Quite literally, providing they did not stray into deep water, they were set to become the most powerful battle squadron as yet seen on any ocean. Understandably, Federal observers in Birkenhead became more than a little unsettled at the prospect.

 

[RodentRevolution]

One wonders why the Lords of the Admiralty saw fit to sail said ships across not just the Atlantic but also the Indian and Pacific Oceans then? As to the difference between littoral waters and ocean combat, as the source you previously cited noted:

"Just one week after the Battle of Gettysburg, US Ambassador Adams gave a thinly veiled warning that if the vessels were delivered to the Confederates, a state of war would exist between the USA and Britain."

While for the Laird Rams themselves an awful lot would have depended upon what the Confederates could have armed themselves, one wonders if they might have achieved far more had the USA been foolish enough to act upon Adams foolish rather than veiled threat.

Yes the Union was more powerful than it had been during the Trent Affair and far less immediately dependent upon the UK for gunpowder but starting a second war with a major power when France was just itching to get involved if it could do so without angering that major power seems perversely foolish when their armies and fleets were still entirely busy with the Confederacy.

Far better to face four ironclads which might have been awkward but was a force on a scale the US Navy could likely handle than court conflict with the first and second navies of the world and two European quality armies that already had bases in the New World.

 

[Old Soldier]

One wonders why the Lords of the Admiralty saw fit to sail said ships across not just the Atlantic but also the Indian and Pacific Oceans then? As to the difference between littoral waters and ocean combat, as the source you previously cited noted:

That is because they were heavily modified from the original designs. They were designed as coastal/esturine craft with small rudder and flat bottom. The modifications included extensions to the sides of the hull to increase their freeboard and thus their seaworth-ness as well as a 'flying bridge' . The illustrations below shows these extensions folded down

HMS Scorpion 1865
(Ignore the date at the top. The print was done from drawings on commissioning By this date they were schooner-rigged)

HMS Wivern 1865
Wivern also stepped tripod masts to do away with shrouds that would restrict gun arcs. The Scorpion was already rigged for sea trials when seized. The bark rig was changed to schooner rig in 1868.

They were poor sea-ships. Naval architect, Edward James Reed wrote:

"the turret-ship 'Wivern', belonging to the Royal Navy, has a low free-board (about 4 feet), and is very lightly armoured, while her armament is also very light. Yet on one occasion her behaviour at sea was so bad that she had to be brought head to wind in order to prevent her shipping large, and, of course, dangerous, quantities of water, the extreme angle of roll rising to 27 degrees each way."

So how did they make it all the way to those foreign ports? Very careful timing to avoid seasonal weather and routing as well as experienced skippers and crews.

Scorpion class Ironclad (1863) – naval encyclopedia

naval-encyclopedia.com

BTW - the British government purchased them to avoid them being sold on and reaching the CSN - unlike the French rams already mentioned. They were not commissioned until 1865. There was NO requirement for this type of vessel from the Admiralty.

 

[Generic Username]

That is because they were heavily modified from the original designs. They were designed as coastal/esturine craft with small rudder and flat bottom. The modifications included extensions to the sides of the hull to increase their freeboard and thus their seaworth-ness as well as a 'flying bridge' . The illustrations below shows these extensions folded down
View attachment 586394HMS Scorpion 1865
(Ignore the date at the top. The print was done from drawings on commissioning By this date they were schooner-rigged)

View attachment 586393HMS Wivern 1865
Wivern also stepped tripod masts to do away with shrouds that would restrict gun arcs. The Scorpion was already rigged for sea trials when seized. The bark rig was changed to schooner rig in 1868.

They were poor sea-ships. Naval architect, Edward James Reed wrote:

"the turret-ship 'Wivern', belonging to the Royal Navy, has a low free-board (about 4 feet), and is very lightly armoured, while her armament is also very light. Yet on one occasion her behaviour at sea was so bad that she had to be brought head to wind in order to prevent her shipping large, and, of course, dangerous, quantities of water, the extreme angle of roll rising to 27 degrees each way."

So how did they make it all the way to those foreign ports? Very careful timing to avoid seasonal weather and routing as well as experienced skippers and crews.

Scorpion class Ironclad (1863) – naval encyclopedia

naval-encyclopedia.com

BTW - the British government purchased them to avoid them being sold on and reaching the CSN - unlike the French rams already mentioned. They were not commissioned until 1865. There was NO requirement for this type of vessel from the Admiralty.

I agree there were poor sea going vessels, my point was that in terms of operating in the Littoral-which the Royal Navy had them do and which the Confederates planned-they were sufficient. The coastal zones were where the blockade functioned.

 

[Old Soldier]

I agree there were poor sea going vessels, my point was that in terms of operating in the Littoral-which the Royal Navy had them do and which the Confederates planned-they were sufficient. The coastal zones were where the blockade functioned.

And you would sail on one knowing that they were poor sea-ships and had difficulty manoevering?? How do you think they would do when surrounded by 6 USN monitors? One good hit on a turret and that turret is finished. You cannot win a sea war stuck in a river or estuary.

 

[Saphroneth]

And you would sail on one knowing that they were poor sea-ships and had difficulty manoevering?? How do you think they would do when surrounded by 6 USN monitors? One good hit on a turret and that turret is finished. You cannot win a sea war stuck in a river or estuary.

Would you sail on a USN monitor, knowing they were poor sea-ships and had difficulty manoeuvring? Indeed, I suspect that the Laird ram turrets would hold out better to their likely opponents than the alternative - plus being able to pick the range, so being surrounded would be very unlikely.

 

[Old Soldier]

Would you sail on a USN monitor, knowing they were poor sea-ships and had difficulty manoeuvring? Indeed, I suspect that the Laird ram turrets would hold out better to their likely opponents than the alternative - plus being able to pick the range, so being surrounded would be very unlikely.

No. I wouldn't. In any case, as others have said, you do not have to sink a ship to make it useless as a warship. What would happen in all the manoevering if they got grounded on a sandbank in coastal waters? Charts are not used in combat. What would happen if the opposition took out the rudder or screw? Or put one good dent on a turret low down and it is unable to turn? What would happen when they ran out of coal? A spar torpedo?

Picking the range? They had four guns probably with a slow rate of fire.