The Laird Rams Join the CSN

[Saphroneth]

Unfortunately the first carriages for the 9" MLR on this pair were dreadful, it took an hour from full depression to full elevation in smooth water (Oscar Parkes - British Battleships) . I think the CSN would have had to get 7" Brooke MLR and carriages to them somehow.

To my understanding that's not something you'd ever actually have to do often. The difference from full depression to full elevation is -5 degrees to +13.5 degrees - which is a lot, so it's about three minutes per degree - and Monitors, when they actually had to change elevation, took the same sort of time to elevate or depress by a degree. It's not abnormal so much as focused on.

That understanding might be incorrect, but as I say, that's what my understanding is.

 

[Old Soldier]

The Laird Rams became the Scorpion class ironclads of the Royal Navy - HMS Scorpion and Wivern after being bought by the Admiralty in 1863. (more later*) They did not carry their designed armament (deliberately) as, like all the other Confederate ships, they would have left British waters unarmed and been 'upgraded' probably in the Canary Islands. That would have been in the Winter of 1863/4 - a time of high wind and waves.

They were not ideal ocean craft, like most turretships of this period, in fact pretty poor in anything but good weather with a strong tendency to roll. They may have made to the Canaries, but, fully armed and loaded and low in the water, may not have survived the crossing. They would have needed a harbor to upload and operate out of too and there were few that could take them. I doubt if they could anchor offshore and approach for sneak raids. They would also need the latest charts of harbours and any attacks would have to be made at night due to vulnerability to shore batteries. New York Harbor would be a good target, never mind Charleston. Unfortunately, their inshore routing would be limited. A good frigate would run rings around them - even if they could not be sunk. Sails - they were on the ship to improve manoeverability, supplement the engines and allow coal conservation in good sailing weather.

*The real history - HMS Scorpion and Wivern were assigned to the Channel Fleet on commissioning in 1865. They were modified in 1868 with a 'flying bridge' and a walkway over the turrets from fo'c'sle to poop. Scorpion became guardship for Bermuda Harbor in 1869 and Wivern went to Hull (Kingston-upon Hull) as guardship. This suggests they were not good sea-ships but other factors were also involved. HMS Captain - the RN's British designed and built turret-ship - lasted less than a year, sunk at sea in 1870, rolling over in a storm in the Channel mainly due to the sails - which were barely set - only 18 of her 490 crew surviving. A Court-Martial investigated and decided it was the end of low freeboard turret ships in the Royal Navy.

The two Scorpion class lasted a bit longer as harbor support ships. Scorpion was harbor guardship in Bermuda until 1901 when she was sunk as a target. She was raised in 1902 and sold for scrap in February 1903. She sank while under tow to Boston, Massachusetts. Wivern was placed in reserve from 1870 until 1880, when she was sent to Hong Kong as the harbour defence ship. She became a distilling ship in 1898 and was sold in May 1922 for scrap.

 

[Saphroneth]

Unfortunately, their inshore routing would be limited. A good frigate would run rings around them - even if they could not be sunk.

Sorry, I'm slightly confused about this. Are you talking in terms of draft or in terms of speed? Frigates tended to be deeper than the Scorpion and Wivern, the Merrimacks were 23 feet and Niagara was deeper. (Which sort of by itself points to how the depth of the Scorpion and Wivern is clearly not outside the bounds of possibility for a warship...)

 

[Rhea Cole]

If they had been adequately crewed and armed with 7"Brooke rifles, they could have been very effective, the USN did not have anything seagoing that could have stopped them . The second would not be too much of a problem, the first might have been problematic,

My question is, "… very effective… " at what? With their 15 foot draft, where along the coast were they going to impose their 4 mile diameter fire & to what end? Burning (+/-) a ton of coal / hour how many days at sea could they coal?

For example, the City Class gunboat butnt a ton an hour steaming against the (+/-) 3 knot Mississippi current. Two coal barges were lashed onto each side. Virtually the entire crew was employed to shift the coal. How long could the Lairds maintain full speed? How long was the overhaul period after doing so?

Under the " ideal conditions " the references always cite, Brooke rate of fire was 1 to 2 shots / mile minute. (They were shot out at (+/-) 200 firings.)

At Charleston the defenders fired 2,300 times. That included Brookes. Seven USN Monitors of various designs were disabled. With at as our yardstick, a Laird vs a flotilla of monitors would, on a flat sea, would require (+/-) 1,150 minutes & 10 battle changes to defeat seven Monitors.

The point here is that a Bismarck, Yamato, etc. had to be an element of a strategy to be effective. A single vessel, no matter how powerful, can only garner a lot of headlines all by itself.

 

[Saphroneth]

At Charleston the defenders fired 2,300 times. That included Brookes. Seven USN Monitors of various designs were disabled. With at as our yardstick, a Laird vs a flotilla of monitors would, on a flat sea, would require (+/-) 1,150 minutes & 10 battle changes to defeat seven Monitors.

That's a nonsense approach - the defenders fired a lot of shots at long range because the firing was at long range, and not all of the defending fire was from high velocity rifles firing bolts. At closer ranges then the fire becomes both more accurate and more effective, because the velocity of the projectile is higher and because of the fundamental way that accuracy works.

After all, you're basically arguing here that it would take more than two hundred shots for a Laird to disable a Monitor. And yet at short range (600 yards or less) bolts from a Brooke can certainly do at least some significant damage and get a fairly high hit rate - while a Monitor cannot avoid engagement with a Laird by running away, it can only avoid engagement by going into shallower water.

Which is to say... avoiding the deep water channel.

The point here is that a Bismarck, Yamato, etc. had to be an element of a strategy to be effective. A single vessel, no matter how powerful, can only garner a lot of headlines all by itself.

There are a few possible strategic uses to put them to, like driving off the blockade of a given Southern port, but you seem to basically be arguing that these ships wouldn't be any use because they're each just a single ship - but the Confederates could hardly buy an entire Great Power navy off the shelf in a single batch. They are spending money to buy ships and those ships expand their total capabilities, and one of the things that the Lairds can do is to defeat the blockade of any given Southern port - something which greatly improves the ability of the CSA to import and export goods vital to their economy and war effort.

 

[Old Soldier]

Sorry, I'm slightly confused about this. Are you talking in terms of draft or in terms of speed? Frigates tended to be deeper than the Scorpion and Wivern, the Merrimacks were 23 feet and Niagara was deeper. (Which sort of by itself points to how the depth of the Scorpion and Wivern is clearly not outside the bounds of possibility for a warship...)

Th e draught was 17ft on heavy load, but their top speed was 10 knots. That is what this thread is all about - how WERE they going to use them? They were better than most US monitors speed wise but with a much deeper draught - Monitor 6kt, 10ft. They were more sea-craft than esturine - but not terribly good ones. If they stood off there were the US Navy Susquehanna-Class frigate that were faster with the same draught. Certainly for esturine work, the manoeverability of sidewheel frigates would be a great advantage. Why a n ironclad ram? Were they going to ram the blockading ships?

 

[Saphroneth]

If they stood off there were the US Navy Susquehanna-Class frigate that were faster with the same draught.

Susquehanna was certainly deeper than the Laird Rams, though? Several feet deeper, in fact.

You might also be assuming maximum performance from the Susquehanna at a point when she's a really quite old ship. Her class doesn't perform very well when she's new, either - the Powhatan (her sister ship) struggled to reach 7.5 knots under steam, and Perry explicitly said the Susquehanna was as bad as the Powhatan.

Why a n ironclad ram? Were they going to ram the blockading ships?

The ram, of course, is because of the Virginia sinking a ship in one blow, because the damage is done below the waterline - it's an actual risk for the Union's slower ironclads if they try to challenge her in deeper water. The provision of a ram is pretty common for ironclad warships in the period from 1862 through to the 1880s.

It's a way of damaging and sinking ships that might otherwise be impossible to damage.

That is what this thread is all about - how WERE they going to use them?

There's plenty of things they could do. One of them is to counter-blockade the Union (this is actually pretty destructive to the Union if it interrupts supplies to one of the Union's water-supplied field armies for an uncertain period of time - does Grant begin marching north straight off or does he risk the loss of his entire army if the Navy can't reopen the supply lanes promptly?) and another is to defeat the blockade of a Confederate port by fighting or chasing off the ships of force that sustain the blockade and permitting the destruction or rout (by Confederate gunboats) of the Union gunboats running the blockade.

Obviously they can't do both of these things at once, but both are useful things that they could do. It's within their capabilities as warships.

 

[G Low]

Here is the informative American Civil War Society of the United Kingdom's description of the Laird Ram timeline.

Link:

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

The Laird rams drew 15'.

A Chart of the entrance of Cape Fear River

Relief shown by hachures. Depths shown by soundings. Oriented with north toward the upper left. Includes "Tide Scale at Smithville." Available also through the Library of Congress Web site as a raster image. LC copy imperfect: Discoloration and staining on bottom of all sheets. Torn along edges...

www.loc.gov

This historic tide map of the mouth of the Cape Fear River is indicative of the challenges the Lairds would have faced " …cruising up & down …" the coast.

The bar at entrance of the Savannah River was 12'.

View attachment 549646
Charleston Harbor

The natural depth of the entrance to Charleston Harbor was 12' at high tide.

The channels were dredged to 17' before the war. Silting up during the war meant that the channels were shallower.

10'6" was the draft of a Monitor (+/-).

The waters the eastern seaboard off the Carolinas are known as the "graveyard of the Atlantic for good reason. Not only are there days long violent storms, the shoreline is constantly changing.

At high tide the channel between Dafuskie & Hilton Head Islands adjacent to the mouth of the Savannah River only leaves a narrow beach on both sides of the channel. At low tide, it looks like the ocean has all bit disappeared. It is possible to walk & wade across between the islands.

What, you may ask would a ram unable to enter a harbor except at spring tide, if that, get resupplied, refit & refurbished? As we know the CSS Virginia could not threaten Washington because of her 21' draft. The Lairds would have had similar problems. Where would the Lairds have gone during hurricane season… Havana?

Distance between cape Cod & Florida Keys (+/-) 1,500 miles. Combined radius of control Laird Rams (+/-) 4 miles.

Like all raiders, the Lairds would have been dependent on captured coal. Speed comes at a price, in this case tons of coal. City Class gunboats burnt a ton of coal/hour.

Metallurgy of the day meant that after cruising for several days or weeks, engine overhauls were mandatory. Where were the Laird's going to lay up for extended periods of time doing periodic maintenance?

Just what two vessels commanding (+/-) a four mile circle along 1,500 miles of coastline without a base could possibly accomplish escapes me. It would have taken every breath the crew took just to keep the Laird's seaworthy.

So what you are saying is that buying these two vessels would be a heck of a waste of the Confederacy's cotton picking money, right?

 

[Saphroneth]

So what you are saying is that buying these two vessels would be a heck of a waste of the Confederacy's cotton picking money, right?

A lot of the question is - what else do you do with it? One of the benefits of the Rams (conceptually) is that in reducing the effectiveness of the Union blockade they have the potential to make it much easier to import things - and to do so more cheaply, meaning that the CSA can import more other things. It means their money goes further.

 

[Rhea Cole]

So what you are saying is that buying these two vessels would be a heck of a waste of the Confederacy's cotton picking money, right?

I defer to the profound wisdom of the ladies who created the "gunboat quilts."

The gunboat quilts were elaborate works of art that were auctioned to raise money to pay for gunboats. It did not take the ladies long to conclude that was a colossal waste of time & money.

The proceeds from the quilts were redirected to soldier's relief.

I am hardwired to defer to the wisdom of Southern ladies. It has never steered me wrong. I have yet to see anything that has made me question the lady's harsh judgment:

The gunboats were a waste of money.


Link:

The Gunboat Quilts

One of the "Gunboat Quilts" attributed to Martha Jane Singleton Hatter Bullock (1815-1896). 66" x 66" Collection of the Birmin...

civilwarquilts.blogspot.com

 

[G Low]

I defer to the profound wisdom of the ladies who created the "gunboat quilts."
View attachment 551207

The gunboat quilts were elaborate works of art that were auctioned to raise money to pay for gunboats. It did not take the ladies long to conclude that was a colossal waste of time & money.

The proceeds from the quilts were redirected to soldier's relief.

I am hardwired to defer to the wisdom of Southern ladies. It has never steered me wrong. I have yet to see anything that has made me question the lady's harsh judgment:

The gunboats were a waste of money.


Link:

The Gunboat Quilts

One of the "Gunboat Quilts" attributed to Martha Jane Singleton Hatter Bullock (1815-1896). 66" x 66" Collection of the Birmin...

civilwarquilts.blogspot.com

Yes but definitely some real nice quilts came out…

 

[Bryce]

It is well-known to students of the ACW that a diplomatic crisis erupted in 1863 over the two ram warships under construction by Jonathan Laird in Liverpool. U.S. ambassador Charles Francis Adams was making veiled threats that war would develop if the ships were delivered to the Confederacy, and Confederate agent James Bulloch was trying to pull off a scheme to sneakily "transfer" the ships to Egypt and then to the Confederacy. As it was, it was a near-run thing.

Had the Laird Rams become the CSS Mississippi and North Carolina, what kind of damage could they have done to the blockade? Other than New Ironsides, what ships did the Union have that could stand up to them?

The big question is could they have stood up to battling one of the new ironclad monitors like the Onondaga?

 

[Saphroneth]

The big question is could they have stood up to battling one of the new ironclad monitors like the Onondaga?

Given the Onondaga's armour was installed the wrong way around...? Probably better than the raw stats would suggest.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The big question is could they have stood up to battling one of the new ironclad monitors like the Onondaga?

The Monitors, however capable, did not engage in the glorious broadside at pistol shot single combat of yore. The question is how would a Laird react to an attack by a flotilla 12 Monitors & spar torpedo boats in 1865?



Link:

Battleship Photo Index USS ONONDAGA

 

[Saphroneth]

The Monitors, however capable, did not engage in the glorious broadside at pistol shot single combat of yore.

...

That is literally what Monitor did to Virginia, the two ships engaged at such close range that at one point they actually bumped into each other.

The question is how would a Laird react to an attack by a flotilla 12 Monitors & spar torpedo boats in 1865?

12 Monitors? That's an awfully large percentage of the total Union ironclad fleet right there... by my count the Union mustered four ironclads for Fort Fisher, a port attack very late in the war which they'd planned for a long time, and four for Mobile Bay.

In fact I think 12 Monitors is almost the entire US monitor inventory as of the end of the war, concentrated in one place - which means at the very least that they should be facing both Lairds.

 

[rebelatsea]

I have always doubted that had the two turretships reached southern waters they would have retained their rig, as the CSN lagged seamen trained in sail. More likely reduced to steadying sail only. Under steam they had a range of 1,390 miles at 10 knots.

As an aside, there was a proposal to construct wooden versions in Canada using engines, armour and guns sent out from the UK.
Drawings were prepared by Lairds for the Admiralty. I have not been able to locate copies of these.

The interesting thing is that Both secretary Mallory and John M Brooke knew of this via John Laird and CDR Bullock. Mallory was in favour of obtaining the plans but Brooke disliked turrets and said no. ( he also saw no advantage in breech loaders at this stage of development, but Catesby Ap R Jones at Selma and Constructor William Wagner at Montgomery were discussing an ironclad with RBL in 1864)
John L Porter was so far as I can tell never informed, but James H Warner at Columbus and William Williamson at Richmond were, so I can't believe that Porter wasn't asked for an opinion.

James H Warner was informed as he would have to provide the engines and machinery if they couldn't be run through the blockade.

 

[rebelatsea]

Given the Onondaga's armour was installed the wrong way around...? Probably better than the raw stats would suggest.

Had they had the 9"MLR and ammunition, they may have done very well, but the turrets weren't big enough in diameter for anything other than the single banded Brooke 7"mlr, which I don't think would penetrate Onondaga's turrets.
However if Charleston based, and re armed with Easons 10" rifled Columbiads, it might have been a different story.

Here is the informative American Civil War Society of the United Kingdom's description of the Laird Ram timeline.

Link:

Laird Rams For The Confederacy

acws.co.uk

The Laird rams drew 15'.

A Chart of the entrance of Cape Fear River

Relief shown by hachures. Depths shown by soundings. Oriented with north toward the upper left. Includes "Tide Scale at Smithville." Available also through the Library of Congress Web site as a raster image. LC copy imperfect: Discoloration and staining on bottom of all sheets. Torn along edges...

www.loc.gov

This historic tide map of the mouth of the Cape Fear River is indicative of the challenges the Lairds would have faced " …cruising up & down …" the coast.

The bar at entrance of the Savannah River was 12'.

View attachment 549646
Charleston Harbor

The natural depth of the entrance to Charleston Harbor was 12' at high tide.

The channels were dredged to 17' before the war. Silting up during the war meant that the channels were shallower.

10'6" was the draft of a Monitor (+/-).

The waters the eastern seaboard off the Carolinas are known as the "graveyard of the Atlantic for good reason. Not only are there days long violent storms, the shoreline is constantly changing.

At high tide the channel between Dafuskie & Hilton Head Islands adjacent to the mouth of the Savannah River only leaves a narrow beach on both sides of the channel. At low tide, it looks like the ocean has all bit disappeared. It is possible to walk & wade across between the islands.

What, you may ask would a ram unable to enter a harbor except at spring tide, if that, get resupplied, refit & refurbished? As we know the CSS Virginia could not threaten Washington because of her 21' draft. The Lairds would have had similar problems. Where would the Lairds have gone during hurricane season… Havana?

Distance between cape Cod & Florida Keys (+/-) 1,500 miles. Combined radius of control Laird Rams (+/-) 4 miles.

Like all raiders, the Lairds would have been dependent on captured coal. Speed comes at a price, in this case tons of coal. City Class gunboats burnt a ton of coal/hour.

Metallurgy of the day meant that after cruising for several days or weeks, engine overhauls were mandatory. Where were the Laird's going to lay up for extended periods of time doing periodic maintenance?

Just what two vessels commanding (+/-) a four mile circle along 1,500 miles of coastline without a base could possibly accomplish escapes me. It would have taken every breath the crew took just to keep the Laird's seaworthy.

Interested parties would do better to read the relevant chapter in "British Battleships" by Oscar Parkes and "The Southern Iron Navy" by Myself, for the origin and technical details of the Laird turretships - which were so terrible that variations were built in an for many nations navies.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Had they had the 9"MLR and ammunition, they may have done very well, but the turrets weren't big enough in diameter for anything other than the single banded Brooke 7"mlr, which I don't think would penetrate Onondaga's turrets.
However if Charleston based, and re armed with Easons 10" rifled Columbiads, it might have been a different story.

Interested parties would do better to read the relevant chapter in "British Battleships" by Oscar Parkes and "The Southern Iron Navy" by Myself, for the origin and technical details of the Laird turretships - which were so terrible that variations were built in an for many nations navies.

Help me out here. I have lost the point of this thread. Strategically, what was the part that a couple of ships, however capable, were going to play in the waning days of the Confederacy? Sherman's army group sweeping up the coast taking the only deep water ports south of the Chesapeake made any attempt to… do what exactly?

As everyone knows I am fond of using graphics to enhance our discussions. On the NavSource link the commissioned USN vessels are in the three columns on the left. CSA commissioned vessels are in the short column on the right.

Link:

NavSource "Old Navy" Steam and Sail Index

Civil War Era Monitors

Link:

NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive

Versus:

1 maybe 2 Laird rams arriving in the winter of 1864 (+/-).

All of the pieces are here on the board. Arrange them as ye please my British friends. Kindly share with us your strategic campaign.

Note:
No kidding, I cannot see any arrangement of two wonder weapon cards rams that makes any difference whatsoever to the outcome of the war. In fact, had the Lairds inflicted some damage, it would have been reflected in the reparations paid by Great Britain. After the rams surrendered, the USN would have sold them to Japan. (Re: CSS Stonewall)

Thus, netting a tidy profit for the U.S. Government.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Following the logic of this thread, why only half measures? The 8" rifled Rodman is (+/-) the same sized as the Brookes. Why not go all the way & install 20" cannon? If bigger guns would have "…made it more effective…" imagine the magic one of these puppies would have performed!

 

[Bruce Allardice]

The actual damage a laird ram or two could inflict is open to question, even assuming they'd be capable of reaching the U.S. in effective combat capacity.
The performance of a similar ship built by Laird just a year later, the Huascar, in the War of the Pacific, showed that even when in combat with a wooden frigate, the few big guns were ineffective at long range. The Chilean frigate blew one of its boilers and slowed down so much that the Huascar was able to ram and sink it.
Similarly, in the 1866 Battle of Lissa, the turreted ram Affondatore proved remarkably ineffective in dealing out punishment.