The Battle for Jericho Ford

[CW3O]

A few years of war had certainly evolved Union leadership at all levels. Hard to imagine such a tactical recovery and decisive leadership at all levels of command earlier in the war.

 

[1SGDan]

Conclusion and Assessment
Defeat of their bold attack was demoralizing for the Confederate troops involved. As the 3rd Corps moved south to join Lee's defense at Ox Ford dozens chose to remain behind. On the morning of the 24th advancing Union skirmishers found nearly 200 members of Lowrence's brigade still asleep on the railroad bank. They were gobbled up as captives. The roots of the Confederate defeat at Jericho Ford can be found in two key errors. First and easily the most egregious was the horribly flawed reconnaissance report. In a massive understatement of the obvious the historian of McGowan's (Brown's) Brigade wrote:

"General Lee's scouts had been miserably deceived."

What was reported as two brigades of cavalry spending a leisurely afternoon on the south shore of the North Anna was actually the entire Union 5th Corps of infantry. The faulty report encouraged the adoption of a plan of attack. The erroneous report should have been partially dispelled when Wilcox met with Brown. While the Confederate cavalry reported Union cavalry had crossed Brown's men had actually engaged the Federal forces there. They most certainly would have known that they were opposed by infantry in their brief skirmish. It is hard to believe that Brown did not impart this knowledge on Wilcox when they discussed the situation at the ford. Any change of status should have been a red flag for Wilcox and should have required, at the very least, further investigation. A leader's reconnaissance would have revealed the real nature of the situation and may have changed the outlook considerably. Instead Wilcox plowed ahead with his original plan unchanged. Failure to execute this basic principle of combat leadership threw his 5000-6000 troops into the breach against 15,000 Union soldiers.Confederate losses in the failed attack approached 18% of those engaged. McGowan's (Brown) Brigade suffered 211 casualties (18k, 136w, 57m) while the veteran 35th Georgia lost 59 men. Total losses were 730. These were men the Confederates could ill afford to lose. Union losses were reported at 377. It could have, and should have been, avoided.

There were other Confederate errors that led to the defeat at the ford. The crossing should have been contested from the outset. Greater emphasis should have been placed on securing a crossing in such close proximity to the Confederate main body. As Lee is said to have remarked to Hill after the fact;

"General Hill, why did you let those people cross here? Why didn't you throw your whole force on them and drive them back as Jackson would have done?"

The Union errors involved a nonchalant attitude by some the units involved regarding their role in the defense. Assuming away the capabilities of your enemy is never a good plan. Despite the late hour, Cutler's men should have assumed their assigned places in the Federal line before any other actions were taken. Security is always the first priority of action. Their failure to adhere to this principle allowed the Confederates their initial success.

On the positive side this was a good performance by Warren. He was decisive in sorting out the tangle at Mount Caramel Church and seizing the discovered crossing without orders. He made good use of his combat support troops, calling up his engineers to bridge the stream. This seemingly insignificant order allowed the passage of the artillery that played such a critical role in the battle, highlighting the importance of well-trained support troops.
Several interesting questions arise from this affair.

• Had Grant and Meade exercised a more aggressive approach and pushed 5th and 6th Corps forward what would have been the result? Two Federal Corps pushing south against a strung out Army of Northern Virginia 3rd Corps may have caused havoc.
• Again at the conclusion of the hour long battle had 5th Corps pursued aggressively forward in the counterattack followed by 6th Corps* they may have destroyed Wilcox's badly disorganized and demoralized division. As they met Heth coming forward fresh troops from 6th Corps could have assumed the fight.

As it was simply holding the crossing allowed time for Lee to assemble his masterful defense at Ox Ford. Jericho Ford was only used for a poorly thought out and weak test of Lee's defense by Ledlie's division of 9th Corps that crossed at the uncovered crossing at Quarles Mills. An excellent opportunity was lost.

*6th Corps orders to move upstream had been rescinded and they were poised on the north shore directly behind Warren.

 

[1SGDan]

Wilcox's Division: MG C.M. Wilcox
Lane's Brigade: BG J.L. Lane
7th North Carolina
18th North Carolina
28th North Carolina
33rd North Carolina
37th North Carolina
Scales' Brigade: BG A.M. Scales
13th North Carolina
16th North Carolina
22nd North Carolina
34th North Carolina
38th North Carolina
McGowan's Brigade: BG S. McGowan
1st South Carolina (Provisional Army)
12th South Carolina
13th South Carolina
14th South Carolina
1st South Carolina (Orr's Rifles)
Thomas' Brigade: BG E.L. Thomas
14th Georgia
35th Georgia
45th Georgia
49th Georgia

 

[Ray Ball]

View attachment 54467

Outstanding 1SGDan!

 

[Ray Ball]

Conclusion and Assessment

1SGDan, I feel it important to tell you that I continue to find your threads among the most readable and intelligent sources of information. Our shared affinity for the Engineers aside, you are an excellent writer and researcher.[/QUOTE]

 

[1SGDan]

1SGDan, I feel it important to tell you that I continue to find your threads among the most readable and intelligent sources of information. Our shared affinity for the Engineers aside, you are an excellent writer and researcher.

Thank you!
It should also be noted that the adaptation to the much smaller canvas boat configuration from the very bulky wooden pontoon allowed the success of the engineers in this instance and during this campaign. The larger wooden boats would not have been able to move forward quickly on the crowded roads. By constantly evaluating their own performance the engineers had made the switch to primarily canvas trains prior to the start of the campaign. LTC Ira Spaulding, commanding the 50th New York Engineers, commenting on the rapid movement capabilities of these boats, which were thought to be "useless" at the beginning of the war;

"The superiority of the canvas train as now organized for rapid movement was then shown."

From April 29th to June 23rd the bridge trains laid 38 pontoon bridges totaling 6458 feet in length besides all their other work on fixed spans, road repairs, etc.

 

[CW3O]

Thank you!
It should also be noted that the adaptation to the much smaller canvas boat configuration from the very bulky wooden pontoon allowed the success of the engineers in this instance and during this campaign. The larger wooden boats would not have been able to move forward quickly on the crowded roads. By constantly evaluating their own performance the engineers had made the switch to primarily canvas trains prior to the start of the campaign. LTC Ira Spaulding, commanding the 50th New York Engineers, commenting on the rapid movement capabilities of these boats, which were thought to be "useless" at the beginning of the war;

"The superiority of the canvas train as now organized for rapid movement was then shown."

From April 29th to June 23rd the bridge trains laid 38 pontoon bridges totaling 6458 feet in length besides all their other work on fixed spans, road repairs, etc.

Neat side bar.

A change in equipment makes a battlefield difference!

 

[1SGDan]

When Warren departed Spotsylvania he had forgotten to send orders to his train, commanded by Van Brocklin, and they were left behind. When he realized the error he sent back orders for the train to move to the front of the corps march
(another change in TTPs prior to this campaign they typically marched at the rear.) By the time they reached Guinea Station Van Brocklin had passed nearly the entire Corps despite the poor overcrowded roads. That would have been impossible with wooden boats.

 

[1SGDan]

OOPs almost forgot.

Bibliography
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Volume 36
Staff Ride for the Overland Campaign; Curtis King, William Robertson, and Steven Clay
To the North Anna River, Grant and Lee May 13-25, 1864; Gordon C. Rhea
History of the Seventy-Sixth Regiment New York Volunteers; L. F. Smith
Memories of the Civil War; Henry B. James (32nd Massachusetts)
Marches, Bivouacs, Battles, Incidents of Camp Life and History of our Regiment During It's Three Years Term of Service, (History of the Second Pennsylvania Reserves); E. M. Woodward
Under the Maltese Cross : Campaigns of the 155TH Pennsylvania Regiment; Edited by Charles F. McKenna
The History of the Ninth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; Daniel G. MacNamara
Service with the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers; Rufus Dawes
Musket and Sword, A History of the 22nd Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; Edwin Clark Bennett
The history of a brigade of South Carolinians, known first as "Gregg's," and subsequently as "McGowan's Brigade"; J. F J. Caldwell,
The story of the Thirty-Second Massachusetts Infantry; Francis J. Parker
Army Life: A Private's Reminiscences of the Civil War; Theodore Gerrish (20th Maine)
History of the Eighty -Third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, A. M. Judson
Internet Resources
http://emergingcivilwar.com/2014/05/23/edward-thomas-georgia-brigade-at-the-battle-of-jericho-mills-on-may-23-1864/

 

[CW3O]

When Warren departed Spotsylvania he had forgotten to send orders to his train, commanded by Van Brocklin, and they were left behind. When he realized the error he sent back orders for the train to move to the front of the corps march
(another change in TTPs prior to this campaign they typically marched at the rear.) By the time they reached Guinea Station Van Brocklin had passed nearly the entire Corps despite the poor overcrowded roads. That would have been impossible with wooden boats.

Change in equipment, change in TTP and improved tactical leadership at all levels of command, it is the sort of evolution seen in the military during most wars.

 

[CW3O]

"General Lee's scouts had been miserably deceived."

Have been mulling this over for awhile, and can't seem to get a grip on this. What deception was there? From what you have provided and some brief reading on the side I see no Union attempt at deception. Just a plain ole fording of a river by men on foot to begin with. General Lee's scouts were just plain wrong, and nearly criminally so in my mind. How does one mistake a corp of infantry for two brigades of cavalry? The absence of horses alone should have given it away. Was the historian of McGowan's Brigade cutting them some slack and offering an out because of the Lee name?

 

[1SGDan]

"General Lee's scouts had been miserably deceived."

Have been mulling this over for awhile, and can't seem to get a grip on this. What deception was there? From what you have provided and some brief reading on the side I see no Union attempt at deception. Just a plain ole fording of a river by men on foot to begin with. General Lee's scouts were just plain wrong, and nearly criminally so in my mind. How does one mistake a corp of infantry for two brigades of cavalry? The absence of horses alone should have given it away. Was the historian of McGowan's Brigade cutting them some slack and offering an out because of the Lee name?

I am not sure why they felt this way. Col Brown had ample opportunity to clarify the situation at his meeting with Wilcox. In my reading of the situation Bad intelligence and inability to adjust to new information (if indeed Brown gave Wilcox his view of the situation) led to Bad decision making led to Bad defeat.

 

[CW3O]

Intelligence failures are blamed for many military setbacks, this was worse than bad intelligence, and certainly falls into the "intelligence failure" category. Had the Union been trying to decieve they couldn't have hoped for a better result. My issue was why it was categorized as a "deception" instead of an outright failure. It is possible that the historian of McGowan's Brigade didn't have all the details when he catergorized it the way he did.

 

[1SGDan]

I suppose it is possible but generally these types of regimental histories were written with contributions from as many surviving members as possible. I suspect it is more likely that a bad deed could not be undone so they glossed over it.

 

[Carronade]

"General Lee's scouts had been miserably deceived."

Perhaps the writer meant something along the lines of "Their eyes deceived them." Maybe not very good wording in this context.

Another excellent series, Dan, thanks!

 

[donna]

Very interesting. An excellent thread.

 

[1SGDan]

Outstanding 1SGDan!

Ray
You may want to check this out. This links you to a voluminous diary of Capt Folwell 50th NY engineers. I just stumbled on it and it is outstanding.
https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/node/697406/697407
Enjoy
Dan

 

[Ray Ball]

Ray
You may want to check this out. This links you to a voluminous diary of Capt Folwell 50th NY engineers. I just stumbled on it and it is outstanding.
https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/node/697406/697407
Enjoy
Dan

Will do Top- Hooah

 

[screnshaw]

I really enjoyed this. My gg grandfather was there in Thomas' brigade, a body that seemed to have been in the thick of most of the battles of the ANV, but has strangely received very little history over the years.

 

[Sgtredleg]

I really enjoyed this. My gg grandfather was there in Thomas' brigade, a body that seemed to have been in the thick of most of the battles of the ANV, but has strangely received very little history over the years.

Some of my ancestors were in the 35th Georgia of Thomas' Brigade. A great work is Fox's book of the 35th Georgia Regiment. However, I agree that comparative to their actions, little seems to have been recorded overall.