The Battle for Jericho Ford

[1SGDan]

Introduction
To the casual Civil War enthusiast a study of the Overland Campaign can be dominated by the bloody stalemates in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House or the tragic assaults at Cold Harbor. While these struggles have certainly earned their place in the pantheon of historic battles they are interspersed with several lesser fights that offer an interesting look at command decision making. One such affair preceded Robert E. Lee's brilliant defense at Ox Ford on the North Anna River. The battle for Jericho Mills highlights the interrelationship between reconnaissance, intelligence evaluation, planning, and execution of tactical operations.

As the Army of the Potomac sidled away from the horrific struggle at Spotsylvania Court House they were shadowed by the Army of Northern Virginia. As the two armies staggered south they paralleled each other until they reached opposite sides of the North Anna River. Both commanders lacked full knowledge of what lie ahead or the intention of the enemy. The eyes of both armies, the cavalry, had been drawn away to face each other in a fight for mounted supremacy. The resulting battle at Yellow Tavern cost Lee his magnificent cavalry commander, Jeb Stuart, and left both Grant and Lee somewhat short of reconnaissance assets. Lacking adequate intelligence Lee was forced to make the best possible guess at the intent of the Union forces. With the information available Lee formulated a prediction of the most likely course of Federal action. Lee postulated that Grant would continue his march until he crossed the Pamunkey River and then strike westward to interject himself between the Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederate capital. Such a move, if successful, would force Lee to attack him while he had the advantage of a prepared defense on ground of his own choosing. It was not a promising prospect. Lee was marching with all available speed to intercept him and prevent such a scenario. The march left the Army of Northern Virginia badly stretched out. Trailing the march were A.P. Hill's 3rd Corps troops. Acting as rear guard was the division of MG Cadamus A. Wilcox. Across the river the Army of the Potomac was preparing to operate in a completely unexpected manner. They were headed directly for the North Anna River

 

[ErnieMac]

I read Gordon Rhea's To the North Anna River a number of years ago. I'm looking forward to your analysis which I anticipate will be as well done as you other threads.

 

[1SGDan]

Preliminary Movements
Contrary to Lee's belief the Army of the Potomac was headed for the North Anna Crossings in two columns. Warren (5th Corps) and Wright (6th Corps) were headed almost directly south on the Telegraph Road from Harris's Store. Several miles to the east Hancock (2nd Corps) followed by Burnside (9th Corps) were moving southwest from the vicinity of Milford Station. The Union forces were to consolidate at Mount Carmel Church and force a crossing of the river. The intricately planned movement began to fall apart almost immediately. Poor maps and overcrowding on the main roads the Federal units became entangled in a confused jumble at the meeting point. Ever the engineer, Warren, declared that his "erroneous "maps were of no use and finally abandoned them and sent staffer Major Washington Roebling on a reconnaissance of the local roads searching for a means to untangle the Federal army. After an hour long ride Roebling returned to find Warren consulting with 2nd Corps staff officers over the best alternatives. After describing the results of Roebling's scout it was resolved that 2nd Corps would continue directly south on the Telegraph Road followed by 9th Corps. Warren and Wright would seek out a crossing further up river. Although a location Jericho Bridge was shown on the available map an inquiry of locals revealed no one knew of such a place. There was, however, a ford located at Jericho Mills they were told. An elderly black man was found that had visited the crossing decades earlier. With no other options available he was brought along as a guide.

Departing Mount Carmel Church about noon, 5th Corps moved west for about three miles before their guide pointed out a barely discernable path off the main road. The path led to the ford the guide instructed Warren. With nothing left to go on Warren veered from the main road. The guide's memory proved flawless and the east bank of the North Anna was gained with nothing more than a handful of mounted Confederates in their path. As the enemy videttes scampered away Warren had gained his crossing unopposed.

On May 21-22 the Army of Northern Virginia also left Spotsylvania in separate columns. Unopposed and familiar with the terrain the movement went considerably more smoothly than the Federal effort. Two of Lee's Corps, 1st and 2nd, moved east to Mud Tavern and then south on the Telegraph Road, the very road now being used by the enemy forces. McGowan's South Carolina Brigade recorded:

"Soon after dark (on the 21st) we were again put in motion, eastward and southward, marching rapidly until about midnight. It was now well understood that Grant had abandoned the direct attack on Spotsylvania and was continuing the movement by the left flank towards Richmond.

Hill's 3rd Corps moved southeast toward Chilesburg and then turned south. By the morning of the 22nd the Confederate 3rd Corps column had crossed the North Anna River at Island Ford several miles above Jericho Mills. The march continued south to Noel Station where they spent the night. The 14th South Carolina was deployed as pickets at the river, "but there was no collision with the enemy. "

Hill's men represented the trail end of the Confederate army. They had the responsibility of maintaining rear security. Lack of action in this area allowed them to rest and recoup. On May 23rd the anticipation was that they would enjoy this respite for another day. As the march resumed A.P. Hill, fearing the possibility of pursuit instructed Cadamus Wilcox to form a rear guard. Accordingly McGowan's brigade of South Carolinians *, under Colonel Joseph Brown, was counter-marched to the vicinity of the Jericho Mills ford.

"On arriving near our last night's bivouac were again halted for two or three hours. It was now noon. During this time the rest of the Corps' artillery and baggage train passed us."

The passage of the long lines of wagons seemed to assure the promised rest until "cavalry reported the advance of the enemy from Jericho Ford on the North Anna." Clearly any hope of a leisurely afternoon was now gone. Reacting to the reported threat Colonel Brown sent his largest regiment (Orr's Rifles) forward as skirmishers while the remainder of the brigade formed a line behind the embankment of the Virginia Central Railroad.

"There was no longer any doubt of battle."



* (1st SC, 12th SC, 13th SC , 14th SC and Orr's Rifles)

 

[BillO]

YaY!

 

[1SGDan]

I read Gordon Rhea's To the North Anna River a number of years ago. I'm looking forward to your analysis which I anticipate will be as well done as you other threads.

Rhea is an invaluable resource but I use multiple sources to avoid parroting. A bibliography will be presented at the end.

 

[CW3O]

Good to see another of your excellent studies.

As you mentioned this campaign is most often thought of as a few big events (Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania, etc..) but included dozens of smaller actions which were significant, to both commands and even more so to the men that fought in them.

 

[1SGDan]

Battle Joined
Across the North Anna Warren was indeed closing on the ford with his entire Corps. He was unaware of any significant enemy presence but understood the value of seizing the crossing. He immediately ordered BG Charles Griffin's division to ford the river. The lead brigade, under Colonel Jacob Sweitzer, splashed into the river at about 1400. The 22nd Massachusetts led the way holding their weapons and cartridge boxes high to keep them dry.

"Our regiment was in advance as skirmishers, and entered the stream; it was about three feet deep and rapid, but not over fifty yards wide. As we emerged we were confronted by a steep bank thirty feet high and covered with undergrowth.
"
Everyone emerged soaked to the waist and scrambled to the top of the hill on the opposite bank. At the crest they were greeted by an old woman who formed the first line of resistance. She pleaded with the Bay Staters not to disrupt her garden as they attempted to form a line. Sympathetic to the woman's plight the regimental commander, Colonel William Tilton, ordered his men to keep between the rows. Their stay amid her vegetables was short lived when Confederate troops were spotted in the tree line across an open field. After calling for the rest of the brigade to come forward, Tilton pushed his men to a fence line at the edge of the trees. Wanting a clearer picture of what he was facing a volunteer was sought to scout into the trees. Private Charles Alger stepped forward. The intrepid Alger moved forward:

"He stepped forward ten paces and stood behind a tree not over eight inches in diameter. I watched him intently believing the Confederates must have pickets in a cover so near the ford. Alger aimed deliberately and fired, and standing fast without even glancing to the rear commenced to load. His shot brought a volley from about fifty of the enemy, and we returned it."

The volley was joined by the 9th Massachusetts who completed their crossing and had just come on line. The outnumbered enemy skirmishers fell back. Tilton opted for pursuit until they emerged from the trees to find the rest of McGowan's Brigade well protected behind the protection of the rail embankment. Tilton wisely called off the pursuit and awaited instructions while the men began assembling makeshift protective works.

As the opposing skirmishers clashed in the trees Warren was reporting his successful and uncontested crossing. His 1330 message, arrived at Meade's headquarters at 1400, and asked for instructions on what course of action to take once across the river. Meade deferred the decision to Grant who ordered that Warren was to "cover and hold Jericho Ford". Wright's VI Corps, behind Warren, was to move upstream in search of another crossing. When the message was funneled back through Meade he added "Pass your entire Corps across the river and entrench yourself." The units already across began the effort immediately. The 32nd Massachusetts reported:

"We were directed to fell trees and erect another line of works. The men worked with great zeal."

To ease the crossing of his Corps Warren called for his pontoon train. Captain Van Brocklin arrived at the crossing with his train of canvas boats at 1510. The site was far from an ideal location for a bridge. While the width, depth and current of the stream posed no real problems for the experienced bridge builders the opposite bank did. The bank was much higher than the level of the water and rose sharply away from the river. The 83rd Pennsylvania reported:

"The banks at this ford are very high, and rocky, and the descent to the river was by a narrow, steep road."

The exit from the bridge at the far abutment would be difficult for artillery and wagons. While the bridge was being assembled another crew of 50th New York Engineers worked feverishly to cut away the bank to ease the transition. The work nearly initiated a brawl when an engineer accidently cut the face of a passing infantryman with his axe. The engineer intelligently declined the fight when he realized his axe was no match for a bayoneted musket. Despite the obstacles the bridge was completed by 1600 and artillery rumbled across.

 

[CW3O]

"arrived at the crossing with his train of canvas boats at 1510."
"the bridge was completed by 1600 and artillery rumbled across."
"and artillery rumbled across."
Fifity minutes! By the fact that the artillery was able to pass this must have included cutting down the opposite bank. While not a major obstacle this is still great work by the engineers.

 

[1SGDan]

"arrived at the crossing with his train of canvas boats at 1510."
"the bridge was completed by 1600 and artillery rumbled across."
"and artillery rumbled across."
Fifity minutes! By the fact that the artillery was able to pass this must have included cutting down the opposite bank. While not a major obstacle this is still great work by the engineers.

This will prove to be VERY important!

 

[1SGDan]

Confederate Attack
While the Union commanders were solidifying their plans the Confederates were also reacting to the small confrontation at the ford. Colonel Brown decided to back away from the ford to seek the help of the rest of the division. After a two or three mile march they encountered Wilcox marching in the opposite direction. The spooked horsemen that had originally been chased away from the ford site were members of MG W.H.F. Lee's division of cavalry. They had relayed there encounter to Lee who in turn informed Hill. Hill sent orders for Wilcox to "attack at once." As Brown and Wilcox conferred Lee himself arrived and reported that two brigades of cavalry had crossed and were now camped on the south bank. The enemy he explained could be routed with "no great work "by a division of infantry. Hill's order now seemed entirely appropriate. Wilcox organized his units into a line of battle. BG James Lane's North Carolina brigade formed the right, McGowan's (Brown) Brigade the center, and BG Edward Thomas's Georgians fell in on the left. Wilcox left his other Tar Heel Brigade, under Colonel William Lowrence as a reserve hoping to use them to move around the Federal right. LTC William Pegram's Artillery Battalion would add fire support from 16 guns to their effort.

Warren was also making preparations in accordance with his orders. Those units already across began to fortify their positions. Griffin's division formed the center while BG Samuel Crawford's division formed the left anchoring that portion of the Federal line against the river. The remaining division, under BG Lysander Cutler, crossed on the newly finished pontoon bridge around 1700. The bridge also allowed several artillery batteries (24 guns) to cross the otherwise impassable river. Those batteries that did not cross were placed on high ground on the north shore to fire enfilade across the front of the Union line.

While the artillery was being placed Cutler's division halted at the top of the hill to rest. There was no expectation of action this late in the day and a general lack of urgency prevailed. Rather than remaining prepared to move they began making fires. The 155th Pennsylvania reflected the attitude of the Union line:

"Towards sunset, after the men had their suppers cooked, and were engaged in eating, and non-combatants were peacefully bivouacked in the midst of the troops, not expecting battle."

The delay in Cutler's movement left the right wing of the Federal defense open to the river, which formed a loop around Warren's position. Around 1800 Cutler finally began moving his men into position to complete the Union Line. It was precisely at this moment that Wilcox initiated his attack.

"About 6 p. m., the yells of the enemy were heard, as they crossed the fields in front, their advance being preceded by the flight of hogs and cattle, sheep and fowl, from the farms, in and through the lines of the Brigade pickets."

For the Confederate troops opposing the Federal left (Lane and Brown) the attack was short lived. Skirmishers from the 22nd Massachusetts, 91st Pennsylvania, and 95th New York were quickly driven in. An opening salvo from Pegram's artillery pieces created a moment of panic and disorganization among the Federal defenders who were busy getting their evening meal, but they were quick to recover. Diving for their defensive works they returned fire. As the returning skirmishers cleared the field of fire the Union guns (20) roared into action. Two batteries took the enemy straight on while three stationed across the river added fire across the front. Coupled with the devastating volleys from behind the works the Confederate line wavered. Then the 37th North Carolina collapsed. Lane was forced to back his brigade back into the trees. His line was reorganized and a second attempt was made. Again the 37th North Carolina quit the field. Lane again retired his brigade. With the infantry gone the weight of the Union guns turned on Pegram's pieces. They were forced to back onto the reverse slope to seek cover after heavy losses. On the Confederate right the attack was going nowhere.

 

[CW3O]

Cutler and his division seem to have made a serious potential blunder here. During late May the days are as long as they get and it stays light well into the evening. Not rapidly securing the one section of the bridgehead perimeter cannot be good. I am sure you will let us know how it played out.

The engineers rapid work payed off rather quickly on the left.

 

[Carronade]

Dan, good to see you back in action with another interesting series. It's good to remember that the Overland was a campaign of maneuver, not just Mule Shoes and Cold Harbors.

 

[CW3O]

As Brown and Wilcox conferred Lee himself arrived and reported that two brigades of cavalry had crossed and were now camped on the south bank. The enemy he explained could be routed with "no great work "by a division of infantry.

Do you have any idea where Lee might have gotten this idea? From what you have provided I see little evidence of Union Cavalry involvement at the ford. Lee's cavalry had reported, " the advance of the enemy from Jericho Ford on the North Anna." I presume the confederate cavalry could tell the difference between cavalry and infantry. It must have been an unpleasant surprise to the 37th NC and other units to find entrenched infantry well supported by artillery. Any reports from Confederate units, on this obvious intelligence failure?

 

[1SGDan]

As Brown and Wilcox conferred Lee himself arrived and reported that two brigades of cavalry had crossed and were now camped on the south bank. The enemy he explained could be routed with "no great work "by a division of infantry.

Do you have any idea where Lee might have gotten this idea? From what you have provided I see little evidence of Union Cavalry involvement at the ford. Lee's cavalry had reported, " the advance of the enemy from Jericho Ford on the North Anna." I presume the confederate cavalry could tell the difference between cavalry and infantry. It must have been an unpleasant surprise to the 37th NC and other units to find entrenched infantry well supported by artillery. Any reports from Confederate units, on this obvious intelligence failure?

Rooney Lee's men were the ones shooed away from the ford on Warren's approach. There is no accounting for why this got reported this way but the failure is integral to the story. Unfortunately there are no Confederate reports regarding this affair.

 

[1SGDan]

 

[1SGDan]

King of Battle
While the Confederate assault on the Federal left was stalled the right proved to be a different story. Thomas's Georgians struck the lead elements of Cutler's division just as they arrived on the scene. The incomplete Union line was open just as Wilcox had hoped. Lowrence's North Carolinians grossly overlapped Warren's line adding a severe enfilading fire into the newly arriving Iron Brigade. The famed Midwestern warriors began to falter. Starting on the far right the regiments began to dissolve into a panic stricken dash for the rear. On the extreme left of the brigade the 6th Wisconsin held firm as the commander, Colonel Rufus Dawes, sought the reason for the lack of response from the brigade right. Adjutant Edward Brooks was sent out to find out why. He returned a short time later with the sad news that the other brigade regiments had been routed. Dawes refused his regiment at the end of Sweitzer's line and reported:

This out-flanked us on the right. I had the regiment change front to throw my line facing the enemy on our flank, and while doing so a regiment of the first division broke and ran. They ran through our ranks and broke the regiment. I called a rally on the colors just outside the woods, and every man of our regiment fell into his proper place.

But this display of discipline could not overcome enemy pressure and disorganization. Dawes was forced to back his unit away. This of course uncovered the right of Sweitzer's brigade. The 4th Michigan and a portion of the 9th Massachusetts broke. It appeared very much as though the Union position would be rolled up from right to left. At the very least if Lowrence and Thomas wheeled to the right they would cut off any escape via the bridge. In a matter of moments the only unit left on the Federal right was Captain Charles Mink's Battery H 1st New York Light Artillery. There was only several hundred yards separating Mink's pieces from the enemy. Fortunately the corps chief of artillery, Colonel Charles Wainwright had been watching the developing situation and had ordered Battery D 1st New York Light Artillery and Battery C Massachusetts Light Artillery, no longer needed on the Federal left to join Mink. They rolled into position at the critical moment. Wainwright would later write:

"It was time to show what artillery could do."

By this time Cutler's Third Brigade (Colonel Edward Bragg) was also dissolving and the three batteries were all that stood between Wilcox and a stunning victory. Only Cutler's Second Brigade, Under Colonel William Hoffman remained an organized unit. Hoffman understood the importance of the artillery and threw back his left which was masking their fire. The 76th New York recorded:

The Second Brigade, under a heavy musketry fire, changed front to the rear on the left battalion, and formed a new line. This was necessary to enable Captain Mink's battery, which had been brought up and was occupying the ground between our right and the river, to open fire.

With no friendly troops in their front the Federal pieces were free to blaze away. And blaze away they did. Firing canister and short fused case shot the gunners attempted to hold back the Rebel surge. Other batteries joined in from other portions of the field directed by Wainwright so as to not fire into friendly forces. The crews had become the primary targets for the advancing enemy troops and the crews were falling fast. Preparations were made to spike the guns. Wainwright's men instead held to their pieces and kept up a steady fire. He reported:

"The behavior of all these batteries was admirable and their firing excellent. By it the attack of the enemy was repulsed and our infantry enabled to reform. Their losses were severe."

Encouraged by the bravery of the crews and the carnage being inflicted by their action troops began to rally around them. The added fire from musketry helped slow the Confederate advance long enough for the Union numerical superiority to come into play. Griffin's last brigade, under BG Joseph Bartlett, had been held in reserve but was now summoned forward.

 

[CMWinkler]

As always, your histories are first rate. Great work, Top.

 

[CW3O]

A poor decision by Cutler's troops to have dinner before properly occupying the bridgehead perimeter came home to roost.
The work of the Engineers, so hastily completed, which made possible the passage of artillery into the bridgehead also came to the forefront.
Excellent command and control of the artillery by Wainwright and infantry by Hoffman , along with very brave men manning the guns saved the day.

How many guns and of what type were assigned to Battery H and BatteryD, New York Light and Battery C, Massachusetts Light? Seems a remarkable feat that these guns, virtually alone, halted this charge.

 

[1SGDan]

The two NY batteries were recruited from the area around present day Fort Drum. The total number of guns on Mink's line was probably 12. There were other batteries firing from other locations as well. Given the heavy use of canister I suspect that these were smooth bore pieces. Perhaps one of our artillery mavens can help us out here.

 

[1SGDan]

Counterattack
With the impetus of their bold attack stalled by the Union guns it was time for the Confederate forces to realize their own difficult predicament. Their rapid advance at the collapse of the Iron Brigade left their right flank unconnected. The supporting forces were stymied in front of those Federal units that had prepared defenses. Thomas's Georgians, Lowrence's Tar Heels, and two regiments of McGowan's Brigade* (1st and 12th SC) had advanced far enough to be totally exposed on the right. It was exactly then that the regrouped Union infantry chose to strike back.

The Brigade of BG Joseph Bartlett was called forward from a reserve position behind the Federal center. As the brigade approached the fight Bartlett split his command. Four regiments (20th ME, 18th MA, 44th NY, and 118th PA) were sent to bolster Sweitzer's faltering refused line. One soldier in the 20th Maine recalled the advance:

"For a moment it seemed as if this was a most serious disaster. The rebels rushed on, following up the advantage they had thus gained, while our brigade was ordered in at a "double-quick" to check them. It was a critical moment."

The remaining three regiments (83rd PA, 16thMI, and 1st MI) split off from the rest to attack the flank of the Confederates pressing in on the Union artillery. It was going to be a test of strength. The 83rd Pennsylvania recorded the moment:

"By the flank we went again on the full run, and had just reached the right of Sweitzer's line when the rebel brigade made their appearance, marching also by the flank. Here, then, was the unusual spectacle of two brigades coming at each other headfirst. Simultaneously the Eighty-Third and the leading regiment of the rebel brigade pitched into each other, like two rams, and the Eighty-Third proved to have the hardest head of the two. We smashed in their flank at one blow, and this threw the rest of their brigade into such a panic that they turned and fled without firing over a dozen shots."

The first units to feel the brunt of the counterattack were the two understrength regiments that had opportunistically joined the flanking movement. The 300 stalwart South Carolinians made an effort at a stand but were quickly dispersed into a retreat under the power of the Federal blow. The collapse of Brown's **men left the flank of Thomas and Lowrence wide open. Federal guns across the river shifted their fire to support the initial success of the counterattack. Pounded from front and flank by Union guns and the increased musketry of the fresh troops and the ever growing number of men rallying from the early rout the Confederate line began to give way. Thomas's Georgians were next to collapse. Unable to drive forward they backed to the safety of the railroad embankment. Their departure left Lowerence's Tar Heels the sole target for the Federals. There was no point in remaining and they too backed away. The Union forces charged forward in pursuit and in doing so nearly cut off Lane and Brown's men. At the last instant they realized the danger and they too retreated from the maelstrom. A late effort to support Wilcox with Heth's division failed to arrive in a timely manner and offered little more than another target for the Federal guns. The Federal victory was concluded when the last of the enemy retreated into the trees chased by solid shot from the Union batteries.

*These two regiments on the left of Brown's Line had surged into the gap left by the retreating Iron Brigade troops separating themselves from their brigade mates.
** Brown was captured in the ensuing rout.