Tactics Question

[Andy Cardinal]

Can any of you tactical experts describe what it means for a regiment deployed in line of battle to "change front to rear on the tenth company"?

Change front to rear seems to me to be just turn around and face the other direction, but "on the tenth company" may mean the maneuver is more complicated than that.

In the particular example from Antietam, they 3rd North Carolina is generally facing north in the cornfield abd has to execute this maneuver when the 128th Pennsylvania attacks them through the east woods, which takes place between the depictions of these 2 maps (Carman-Cope 7:30 and 8:00).

7:30​

8:00
​

Thanks

 

[Lampasas Bill]

I think it's more complicated than a simple "about face." If I remember correctly, the idea was to reconfigure the company from front to rear without inverting the line of battle. While facing north, the 1st company would be on the right while the 10th company would be on the left of the regiment. Changing front to the rear would result in the regiment facing south in the same order, with the 10th company still on the left of the regiment and the 1st company on the right. The command "on the 10th company" would indicate that the 10th company would simply wheel in place and the others companies would reposition themselves to its right. I couldn't begin to tell you how this was done, but I presume the companies would move independently. Someone, please correct me if I'm wrong! Now that I think of it, it seems like a pretty complicated operation to perform on a battlefield.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think it's more complicated than a simple "about face." If I remember correctly, the idea was to reconfigure the company from front to rear without inverting the line of battle. While facing north, the 1st company would be on the right while the 10th company would be on the left of the regiment. Changing front to the rear would result in the regiment facing south in the same order, with the 10th company still on the left of the regiment and the 1st company on the right. The command "on the 10th company" would indicate that the 10th company would simply wheel in place and the others companies would reposition themselves to its right. I couldn't begin to tell you how this was done, but I presume the companies would move independently. Someone, please correct me if I'm wrong! Now that I think of it, it seems like a pretty complicated operation to perform on a battlefield.

Thanks for this explanation. I figured it was way more complicated than a simple about face.

Any further expanation/description would be much appreciated.

 

[RedRover]

As was noted, the 10th company of a regiment was its' left-most.

From Hardee's rifle and light infantry tactics, a "change of front perpendicularly to the rear" on the left (10th) company would have been done in something like this manner; Note that these sketches are VERY crude and just to show the process...

The colonel tells the captain of the 10th Company, who has it "about-face" (turn rearward), and wheel to the right on fixed pivot so far as the colonel requires to fix the axis of the new line...

When the 10th Company is on the new line approved by the colonel, it halts and faces front:

By this method, the new line can be at ANY angle to the rear of the existing one...along the extension of the new line of the 10th company...

The colonel next communicates to the rest of the regiment to form rearward on the 10th company...
The order would be something like "Change of front to the rear, on tenth company…Battalion, about—Face.
(At which all companies but the 10th face about, or to their rear.)

Then, "By company, right half wheel. March (or double-quick—march…)
Each captain positions in front and center, and then each wheel right…

When the regimental commander judges they have wheeled enough, he orders, "Forward, March…"
at which they cease to wheel, and march forward toward the new line of battle…

The second company in line from the left (the 9th), arriving opposite the right of the 10th, turns right (a form of rapid wheel), and halts before coming on line. As all its files form, it is faced about, and dresses on the right of the 10th company.

Each successive company executes the above, and "fronts" (turns to their correct front) as it arrives opposite the right of the company preceding; reforming the line of battle in the new direction, and to the rear of their former one.

Compare the above with the accounts of the 3rd at Antietam, and their movement becomes evident... it was necessary as they were receiving a flanking fire from their right, and turned to face it, as Col. De Rossett states:

Per Col. De Rossett of the 3rd NC:

" We were in position near the 'East Wood,' having gone into action through the yard of the Mumma house (which was set fire to by my orders), and for an hour were fighting three lines of Federals, when a division, in column of battalion, came up, and, halting within one hundred yards of my right company, the right of the brigade, opened fire, enfilading my command and causing the heavy loss sustained in so short a time. This necessitated a prompt change of front on my part, and while this was being done I was disabled and carried off the field, not, however, before I had the satisfaction of seeing my brave men held well in hand by my senior captain, S. D. Thruston, who was soon after promoted."
From Century Magazine, 1887.
Col De Rossett account...

And a comment from Capt. Thruston:

D.H. Hill, North Carolina...


Capt. J.C. Key's account from among the Georgians to the left of the North Carolinians of the Ripley-Doler Brigade at Sharpsburg, from Confederate Veteran:

and...

Confederate Veteran, "Georgians and Tar Heels at Sharpsburg..."

Best,

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

 

[John Winn]

Frankly I can't imagine trying to do something that complicated while receiving fire and negotiating challenging terrain. Any who did manage to do that are to be commended.

 

[RedRover]

Frankly I can't imagine trying to do something that complicated while receiving fire and negotiating challenging terrain. Any who did manage to do that are to be commended.

I notice in Capt. Key's account, that the movement was so rapid and disorderly looking, that many took it for a retreat (particularly under a flanking fire). Probably carried out faster than it takes to read the accounts...

The description above is from the drill manual. Well drilled troops might have "understood" the command, or maybe even the necessity of it before it was given.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

 

[Lubliner]

We should remember while in camp these troops practiced many hours a day at these maneuvers, not only company and regimental details, but also by battalion and brigade. Supposedly some were able to get it down as a second nature, but what boggles me is the fact with casualties leaving gaps, how the formation could be so well understood.
Lubliner.

 

[Seduzal]

It seems very complicated to me ! But I guess with practice it would become second natural.

 

[Cavalier]

Very interesting topic. Seems to underscore the importance of discipline and drill on the Victorian battlefield.

John

 

[RedRover]

Very interesting topic. Seems to underscore the importance of discipline and drill on the Victorian battlefield.

John

Yes, that is the measure of military skill in the period... the drill. The troops were inspected periodically, and the officers held accountable that they knew the drill, and their men could execute the commands.

Secondly, in the drill the regiment's "line" is technically the straight line between the left and right guides, or markers, of a regiment (the color bearer in the center of that line). The latter are placed at the behest of the regimental commander, who adjusts them, or not, as necessary. The constant drill was to habituate the soldiers, even the whole companies, etc. to maintain themselves, or "toe the line" on the line established by the colonel, and fixed/marked by the markers and colors.

On parade, some regiments might be so well drilled as to march in line of battle handsomely, and others just "ganging by like flocks of sheep" (as some CSA units at Dalton were described in '64), but in either condition, the unit's "line" was between the left and right guides, etc.

Now, we come to battle conditions. The principal drill manual was Hardee's "rifle and light infantry" which allowed for movements in line in quick, double-quick time, or even a run when necessary. Such makes it hard for the men to remain exactly in their places (on the "line"). Add woods, fences, road beds, bushes, gunfire and casualties, etc., and the training kicks in while the alignment of the men are disordered. But where they knew their places, recognized their commands, what appeared to be "disorder" compared to the "drill manual" was only cosmetic. Gen. Sherman commented about this regarding the Battle of Resaca as I recall. After the war Gen. D.H. Hill commented of the Confederate riflemen generally:

"Of the shoulder-to-shoulder courage, born of drill and discipline, he knew nothing, and cared less. Hence, on the battlefield, he was more a free lance than a machine. Who-ever saw a Confederate line advancing that was not crooked as a ram's horn? Each ragged Rebel yelling on his own hook and aligning on himself."

By the above, Gen. Hill did not mean that they were an untrained mob, but perhaps too quick to abandon parade ground alignment in their maneuvers...

Reading the official reports (compared to the drill manuals) it was frequently the case that the physical position of the men was not always exactly on the units' "line" as established by its commander. And indeed not in every case was the line marked by the guides and colors even straight. So long as they were able to advance the line, defend it, withdraw it, extend or condense it; always keeping the enemy from breaking through it, no matter. An officer's official report speak generally of "the line" because they cannot describe each man, each incident in a couple of pages. The reporting officers were responsible to drill the men, and to form line in battle, and report the physical movements of their unit in terms of the "maneuvers" found in the drill regardless of the manner performed.

And if in action a colonel saw his men could not maintain his line because it was outflanked, casualties, (or even no one left to defend it) etc. he must establish another, which is what Col. De Rosset did with the 3rd at Antietam in the circumstance noted above.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

 

[Cavalier]

I hate to disagree with an expert like General D.H. Hill but I don't see how a group of soldiers who were "more a free lance than a machine" could have accomplished the maneuver described above, much less accomplished it under fire. Of course that's just an opinion from someone who never attempted it or had even seen it attempted.

John

 

[RedRover]

I hate to disagree with an expert like General D.H. Hill but I don't see how a group of soldiers who were "more a free lance than a machine" could have accomplished the maneuver described above, much less accomplished it under fire. Of course that's just an opinion from someone who never attempted it or had even seen it attempted.

John

I believe General Hill was speaking specifically of combat, and in the full quote notes they were excellent soldiers and fantastic light infantry (and they drilled alot in camp). I take his comment to mean generally following the spirit if not the letter of their commander's orders in action. However, the old general further commented that the Southern soldiers generally were sometimes quick to assume their orders in worst cases:

The 3rd North Carolina's change of front after being flanked and under a heavy and deadly fire, is remarkable, but it was not accomplished by the men moving with "parade-ground" alignment. But it WAS accomplished even if not perfectly according to the drill book, and Col. De Rosset was wounded in conducting it, and Capt. Thruston succeeded in forming the new line and opening fire again. (which is the proof the "change of front" was accomplished).
Contrast with the 128th Pennsylvania, the federal outfit that flanked them while yet in a column of divisions (with a two company front; the other divisions (each of two companies) stacked behind to move compactly over broken ground...); As the 3rd changed front, the 128th attempted to deploy into line of battle... the result from the Official Report of the battle by Major Wanner of the 128th:

"...we were formed in column of divisions and marched toward the scene of action about 6 o'clock, and when in front of the enemy General Mansfield commanded the colonel to deploy his regiment, but as the regiment was new and inexperienced (having been in existence but five weeks), and being within range of the enemy, who were concealed in a corn field in front of us, about 60 or 70 yards distant, thus bringing us under fire immediately, there was much confusion in accomplishing the movement. Before they could be deployed, in fact very soon after giving the order, Colonel Crosdale was killed by a ball through the head, and about the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Hammersly was wounded in two places in the arm. I endeavored to finish the deployment, but it being the first time the regiment had been under fire, I found it impossible to do so in the excitement and confusion. At the suggestion of Colonel Knipe, of the Forty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, I ordered the regiment to charge into the corn-field and dislodge the enemy, while the regiment on our right was charging into the woods. They started off in gallant style, cheering as they moved, and penetrated the corn field, but, in consequence of the overpowering numbers of the enemy concealed, were compelled to fall back, which they did in tolerable order."

So both the 3rd NC and 128th NC were maneuvering under fire, their colonels disabled or killed in managing them, and the men excited and disordered. The difference was there is no reference to "confusion" among the veteran 3rd NC which completed their new deployment under fire, while the new 128th PA suffered by it and could not complete theirs.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

 

[Lampasas Bill]

I believe the key to the 3rd NC's redeployment under fire was the action of that 10th company. As long as that company was able to move into the position ordered by the colonel, it could serve as the left guide for the new line. The rest of the regiment very likely broke like a covey of quail and sorted themselves out to the right of the 10th company.

 

[RedRover]

I believe the key to the 3rd NC's redeployment under fire was the action of that 10th company. As long as that company was able to move into the position ordered by the colonel, it could serve as the left guide for the new line. The rest of the regiment very likely broke like a covey of quail and sorted themselves out to the right of the 10th company.

I suspect you may be correct.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I believe General Hill was speaking specifically of combat, and in the full quote notes they were excellent soldiers and fantastic light infantry (and they drilled alot in camp). I take his comment to mean generally following the spirit if not the letter of their commander's orders in action. However, the old general further commented that the Southern soldiers generally were sometimes quick to assume their orders in worst cases:

View attachment 406019

The 3rd North Carolina's change of front after being flanked and under a heavy and deadly fire, is remarkable, but it was not accomplished by the men moving with "parade-ground" alignment. But it WAS accomplished even if not perfectly according to the drill book, and Col. De Rosset was wounded in conducting it, and Capt. Thruston succeeded in forming the new line and opening fire again. (which is the proof the "change of front" was accomplished).
Contrast with the 128th Pennsylvania, the federal outfit that flanked them while yet in a column of divisions (with a two company front; the other divisions (each of two companies) stacked behind to move compactly over broken ground...); As the 3rd changed front, the 128th attempted to deploy into line of battle... the result from the Official Report of the battle by Major Wanner of the 128th:

"...we were formed in column of divisions and marched toward the scene of action about 6 o'clock, and when in front of the enemy General Mansfield commanded the colonel to deploy his regiment, but as the regiment was new and inexperienced (having been in existence but five weeks), and being within range of the enemy, who were concealed in a corn field in front of us, about 60 or 70 yards distant, thus bringing us under fire immediately, there was much confusion in accomplishing the movement. Before they could be deployed, in fact very soon after giving the order, Colonel Crosdale was killed by a ball through the head, and about the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Hammersly was wounded in two places in the arm. I endeavored to finish the deployment, but it being the first time the regiment had been under fire, I found it impossible to do so in the excitement and confusion. At the suggestion of Colonel Knipe, of the Forty-sixth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, I ordered the regiment to charge into the corn-field and dislodge the enemy, while the regiment on our right was charging into the woods. They started off in gallant style, cheering as they moved, and penetrated the corn field, but, in consequence of the overpowering numbers of the enemy concealed, were compelled to fall back, which they did in tolerable order."

So both the 3rd NC and 128th NC were maneuvering under fire, their colonels disabled or killed in managing them, and the men excited and disordered. The difference was there is no reference to "confusion" among the veteran 3rd NC which completed their new deployment under fire, while the new 128th PA suffered by it and could not complete theirs.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

I believe the confusion referenced in the accounts above have to do with efforts to pass around the burning Mumma buildings. Ripley's brigade advanced past the farm toward the East Woods. Finding a Confederate force already there (5th Texas, 4th Alabama, 21st Georgia) and eith Hood's division retreating from the cornfield, they were redirected there. They then helped repulse the 19th Indiana & 7th Wisconsin back to the Hagerstown Pike before advancing into the cornfield and driving back the Pennsylvania Reserves. It was at this point (if I have the sequence correct) that the 128th Pennsylvania made their charge.

The 128th Pennsylvania advanced in column by division until they reached what is now called Croasdale Knoll. They were under fire (I'm not sure who from) when Mansfield ordered them to deploy into line. He was wounded almost immediately afterward. Colonel Croasdale was killed a he gave them order and the lieutenant colonel wounded. Major Wanner, probably due to his own and his men's inexperience, couldn't complete the deployment and the regiment moved forward in a confused mass. Colonel Knipe came over and got then into line before they hit the cornfield, which the caused then 3rd North Carolina to execute the change from front to rear on the tenth company.

The maneuver was executed successfully, despite DeRosset's wounding. This shows a high level of training and discipline on the part of the North Carolinians.

 

[Cavalier]

@RedRover Thank you for all this! Your post above contains facinating details. The Union regiment is so new they have difficulty deploying from column of divisions into line of battle and their Colonel and Lieut. Colonel are out of the action.

I can't imagine all that was involved with commanding a regiment in battle in that era.

The spirit if not the letter I can understand.

John

 

[CaptSpook]

As was noted, the 10th company of a regiment was its' left-most.
View attachment 405926
From Hardee's rifle and light infantry tactics, a "change of front perpendicularly to the rear" on the left (10th) company would have been done in something like this manner; Note that these sketches are VERY crude and just to show the process...

The colonel tells the captain of the 10th Company, who has it "about-face" (turn rearward), and wheel to the right on fixed pivot so far as the colonel requires to fix the axis of the new line...
View attachment 405928


When the 10th Company is on the new line approved by the colonel, it halts and faces front:


View attachment 405929

By this method, the new line can be at ANY angle to the rear of the existing one...along the extension of the new line of the 10th company...
View attachment 405944



The colonel next communicates to the rest of the regiment to form rearward on the 10th company...
The order would be something like "Change of front to the rear, on tenth company…Battalion, about—Face.
(At which all companies but the 10th face about, or to their rear.)
View attachment 405930
Then, "By company, right half wheel. March (or double-quick—march…)
Each captain positions in front and center, and then each wheel right…
View attachment 405931
When the regimental commander judges they have wheeled enough, he orders, "Forward, March…"
at which they cease to wheel, and march forward toward the new line of battle…

The second company in line from the left (the 9th), arriving opposite the right of the 10th, turns right (a form of rapid wheel), and halts before coming on line. As all its files form, it is faced about, and dresses on the right of the 10th company.
View attachment 405932
Each successive company executes the above, and "fronts" (turns to their correct front) as it arrives opposite the right of the company preceding; reforming the line of battle in the new direction, and to the rear of their former one.
View attachment 405933

Compare the above with the accounts of the 3rd at Antietam, and their movement becomes evident... it was necessary as they were receiving a flanking fire from their right, and turned to face it, as Col. De Rossett states:

Per Col. De Rossett of the 3rd NC:

" We were in position near the 'East Wood,' having gone into action through the yard of the Mumma house (which was set fire to by my orders), and for an hour were fighting three lines of Federals, when a division, in column of battalion, came up, and, halting within one hundred yards of my right company, the right of the brigade, opened fire, enfilading my command and causing the heavy loss sustained in so short a time. This necessitated a prompt change of front on my part, and while this was being done I was disabled and carried off the field, not, however, before I had the satisfaction of seeing my brave men held well in hand by my senior captain, S. D. Thruston, who was soon after promoted."
From Century Magazine, 1887.
Col De Rossett account...

And a comment from Capt. Thruston:
View attachment 405939
D.H. Hill, North Carolina...


Capt. J.C. Key's account from among the Georgians to the left of the North Carolinians of the Ripley-Doler Brigade at Sharpsburg, from Confederate Veteran:
View attachment 405936
and...
View attachment 405941

Confederate Veteran, "Georgians and Tar Heels at Sharpsburg..."

Best,

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

Excellent explanation and illustrations!

The closest period instructions I could find is in US Infantry Tactics for the Instruction, Exercise, and Manieuvres (sic) of the United States Infantry, May 1, 1861. Philadelphia: Lippincott. The instructions in its School of the Battalion, Part-V, deals with maneuvers to changes from line in front to other directions, including rearward (Para 760-774). Col. De Rossett very likely would have trained his regiment thoroughly in the days leading up to the battle to pull off such a movement under such intense fire.

 

[RedRover]

Excellent explanation and illustrations!

The closest period instructions I could find is in US Infantry Tactics for the Instruction, Exercise, and Manieuvres (sic) of the United States Infantry, May 1, 1861. Philadelphia: Lippincott. The instructions in its School of the Battalion, Part-V, deals with maneuvers to changes from line in front to other directions, including rearward (Para 760-774). Col. De Rossett very likely would have trained his regiment thoroughly in the days leading up to the battle to pull off such a movement under such intense fire.

Yes, by the "change of front" method in the tactics books (Casey's US or Hardee's Confederate editions) the colonel decides on which company to change front on. Notice the account quoted that the line of the 1st and 3rd NC regiments had to change front of 10 companies... the ten companies of the 3rd, meaning these two regiments were now positioned at an angle to each other after the movement...

A colonel could change the front of his regimental line by any of his companies, creating an angular line. For example, a change of front rearward on the 4th company (rather than the 10th as in the example of this thread) would do something like this:

And a historical example of this is the 7th Ohio Volunteers at the Battle of Port Republic, VA, in June, 1862:

From George L. Wood, "The Seventh Regiment" (1865).


From the tactics, regiments could change front FORWARD by the same means. For example, a change of front forward, on the 10th Company, would have the left company wheel left (without about-facing) to fix the new axis, and the rest of the regiment half-wheeling left (by companies), and advancing directly to the new line, etc.

These "change of front" movements are especially important in cases where there was no way a regiment could simply wheel forward or backward to achieve the repositioning... particularly under heavy fire, etc.


J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

 

[CaptSpook]

More great points from someone who knows his School of the Battalion.

It makes me wonder how many Officers and NCOs made it past the School of the Soldier and 'Company to learn the more complicated maneuvers en masse, particularly at the beginning of the war. I suppose this is why in 1861 West Point (and other military school) grads were in such high demand on both sides.

 

[neyankee61]

In the Wilderness, Col Robert McAllister divided his brigade into 2 lines as it advanced into the woods on the second day.Col William Sewell was in charge of second line which consisted of the 5th, 6th and 11th NJ. The brigade was the far left of the Union line.
About 11:30 Sewell heard movement off to his left and ordered his line to meet the threat. The order was "Change front on the right company right regiment" This meant the right company of the 5th NJ marched forward at an left oblique and the other companies would align on it. The other 2 regiments would then align on the 5th. The entire line would now face south.
McAllister now ordered his front line to "About face, left wheel by regiments." This required the men to turn their backs on enemy in front and wheel to meet the Longstreet's attack. If done correctly the brigade would present a solid front. All this was done under fire left right and in front in the dense woods