So it's the end...

[E_just_E]

I believe, and correct me if I am wrong, that the purpose of the "invasion of Harrisburg" was to instill in the populace of Pennsylvania the fear of God as well as destroying the railroad network that was supplying Meade's Army with material goods from Pennsylvania as well as the New England states. According to Charles Marshall of Lee's staff the main purposes of his Northern invasion was to allow the farmers of Virginia to gain a respite from the spoils of war that ravaged that state for two very long years while giving them enough time to plant crops for the fall harvest in order for his army to gain vital logistical supplies once they recrossed the Potomac River back into Virginia. The other purpose as I stated earlier was to destroy and or disrupt the major railroad hub structure that was stationed in the Harrisburg area thereby damaging the major logistical artery of the Army of the Potomac. Remember the words of Napoleon, "an army marches on its stomach."

The invasion of the North did not happen alone. At the point that Lee's army crossed the Mason Dixon Line, Alexander Stephens was on a boat to Washington with truce papers. Not logistics. Those had to happen and they happened. The purpose of it was to threaten major Eastern cities and put pressure on Lincoln to have a truce and an end to the war and accept the confederate government.

 

[E_just_E]

Would it be better for Lee to follow Ewell to Harrisburg and then to Baltimore as opposed to Philadelphia? Philadelphia was strongly pro-Union while Baltimore and parts of eastern Maryland were pro-slavery and therefore pro-Confederate and would pose more of an immediate threat to Washington, D.C.. due to its proximity. Just a thought.

There was the whole AoP to defend Baltimore. There was nothing up North.

 

[Deleted User CS]

It seems to me the whole concept of the 'invasion' of the North was nonsense. Reading dianes post and then Carronades, Lee was putting himself in a no win situation the moment he crossed into Pennsylvania.

Lee had no choice but to venture into Northern territory since his army desperately needed the logistical support the lush and plentiful farms of Pennsylvania would provide his starving army. Once again the words of Napoleon: "an army marches on its stomach."

 

[diane]

Lee didn't intend to fight at Gettysburg but knew it would be somewhere in the vicinity of Harrisburg. He didn't reckon on the AoP showing an alacrity it had never shown before, and he thought the commander was still Hooker. As noted, Confederate authorities were planning to propose a peace with recognition following the win in Pennsylvania - and, had it fallen out that way they might well have gotten some form of it. A win would have meant the Confederates could go where they wished, threaten the Northern capital and major cities, and keep their boundaries safe from invasion.

 

[Deleted User CS]

Given that the Confederates were in a ' Northern' state and if the AoNV had moved towards Washington, wouldn't Meade have had to attack Lee anywhere Lee chose? This is surmising that Lee could have successfully disengaged from his positions around Gettysburg.

I think any move by Lee towards Washington, D.C. would have prompted Lincoln as well as the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to immediately issue orders to Meade to attack Lee's army at any cost while keeping his army between Lee and Washington, D.C. If Lee had disengaged from Gettysburg on the night of the first day, as suggested by Longstreet, Lee certainly, in my humble opinion, would have the upper hand in a strategic sense and would have forced Meade to re-evaluate his strategy and basically put the Army of the Potomac completely on the defensive. Napoleon as well as Frederick the Great were proponents of always fighting battles on ground or terrain of their choosing in order to allow their forces freedom of movement around the battlefield the whole time placing their opponents in difficult or complex defensive positions.

 

[thomas aagaard]

But that is not the same at getting your way and being able to fight on ground of you choosing all the time.

Also look at the road network. There was no way for Lee to go around the right flank of the union army...
Soldiers can march ofroad if needed for a short distance... the supply and artillery train can't.

 

[E_just_E]

But that is not the same at getting your way and being able to fight on ground of you choosing all the time.

Also look at the road network. There was no way for Lee to go around the right flank of the union army...
Soldiers can march ofroad if needed for a short distance... the supply and artillery train can't.

He did not have to go around the right flank. Just go Left (aka West) and then North. And there were enough supplies and a whole more to take after they crossed the river.

 

[thomas aagaard]

But that was what Longstreet suggested and it was his suggestion "christian soldier" mentioned.

And I already pointed out why the West, then north idea would not work...
The length of the ANV marching down one road = many, many miles.
(I am sure someone can come up with an number for ANV... the only number I got at hand is from an small Federal army in 64, and it is 25 Miles for 26.000men including artillery and supply train)

But it is simple mathematics. There is a limit to how many men you can march down a road at the same time...

This would result in the leading element of the AoP getting to Carlisle way before the rear of the ANV getting there... so the fight would just have been there... but this time with Lee risking getting cut off. (something I don't think he would have risked)