So it's the end...

[alexjack]

...of the second days fighting at Gettysburg. Lee summons his generals for a council of war and they tell him to attack the Federal position head on the following day would be foolish. Lee agrees and decides not to attack Meade. What does he do next?

 

[David Knight]

How about nothing and see if the Union forces can be tempted from the high ground?

 

[James S.]

What about Lee pulling back to ground of their choosing, does the Union attack him then?

 

[alexjack]

What about Lee pulling back to ground of their choosing, does the Union attack him then?

Given that the Confederates were in a ' Northern' state and if the AoNV had moved towards Washington, wouldn't Meade have had to attack Lee anywhere Lee chose? This is surmising that Lee could have successfully disengaged from his positions around Gettysburg.

 

[E_just_E]

...of the second days fighting at Gettysburg. Lee summons his generals for a council of war and they tell him to attack the Federal position head on the following day would be foolish. Lee agrees and decides not to attack Meade. What does he do next?

March Full Force against a barely defended Harrisburg and let the Federals play catch all the way to Philly, after he crosses the Susquehanna and burns those 2 bridges

 

[David Knight]

Well the AoNV did disengage succesfully in much worse state a couple of days later.

 

[diane]

Given that the Confederates were in a ' Northern' state and if the AoNV had moved towards Washington, wouldn't Meade have had to attack Lee anywhere Lee chose? This is surmising that Lee could have successfully disengaged from his positions around Gettysburg.

Lee's objective would be changed then, wouldn't it? Primarily he was looking to show the Confederacy could drive the enemy home and keep him out of Virginia, as well as giving the Virginia countryside a rest and his animals some food. But he hadn't enough force to keep anything he acquired in Pennsylvania or Maryland.

 

[Carronade]

Given that the Confederates were in a ' Northern' state and if the AoNV had moved towards Washington, wouldn't Meade have had to attack Lee anywhere Lee chose? This is surmising that Lee could have successfully disengaged from his positions around Gettysburg.

He'd have to do something, but he wouldn't have to attack exactly where or how Lee wanted him to. That's the flaw with these "Longstreet strategy" discussions - the idea that all the Confederates have to do is find themselves a Cemetary Ridge or Marye's Heights and the Yankees will obligingly hurl themselves to destruction upon it.

If the Confederates dig in to some fixed position, they hand the initiative back to Meade. Depending on the exact situation, he might find a better way to assault the position or maneuver himself to block a potential advance on Washington and hopefully threaten Lee's supply lines as well. Let's not forget that after two days' fighting, the rebels already have a long train of wounded and will need resupply of ammunition and other essentials before long. They're also less able to forage for supplies with the Union army in proximity. Meade meanwhile can receive supplies and reinforcements and evacuate casualties, and he'll have better information of his opponent's situation and activities than when they were operating in Confederate territory.

 

[alexjack]

It seems to me the whole concept of the 'invasion' of the North was nonsense. Reading dianes post and then Carronades, Lee was putting himself in a no win situation the moment he crossed into Pennsylvania.

 

[David Knight]

Invasion was a political move to force a defeat on the AoP to 'defeat public opinion'. The only other way the AoNV could move into the Union Territory was as a Raid in the mould of Henry V'ss Agincourt Campaign. Invade France defeat the Army and retreat back to Calais and English held territory.

 

[E_just_E]

It seems to me the whole concept of the 'invasion' of the North was nonsense. Reading dianes post and then Carronades, Lee was putting himself in a no win situation the moment he crossed into Pennsylvania.

Not exactly. His decision to recall Ewell from outside Harrisburg to Gettysburg, instead of following him to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, was the biggest mistake of that campaign.

 

[alexjack]

Not exactly. His decision to recall Ewell from outside Harrisburg to Gettysburg, instead of following him to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, was the biggest mistake of that campaign.

Could you expand on that for me please E_just_E?

 

[E_just_E]

Could you expand on that for me please E_just_E?

This is probably the best reference on the matter.

In one paragraph: Lee send Ewell's Corps to PA to lead the invention, along with Albert Johnston's Cavalry (about 1400 men) in support to see whether he can attack Harrisburg. Ewell sent Early's division to see if they can cross the Susquehanna at Springtown (E of York, they occupied York) and his mainstream army, stationed at Carlisle, while Johnston was trying to figure an approach to Harrisburg and reconnoiter their defenses. Harrisburg was defended by Militia, mainly from NY, and were about a couple of thousand or so and were weekend warriors who were unfit for Union Army duty (they were part of the Army of Susquehanna, under Darius Couch.) After the Springtown bridge was burned by the AoS troops, the only approach to Harrisburg was face on from the W. Side of the river through the 2 bridges. 25000 Confederate Veterans vs 2000 Union Weekend Warriors. Slam Dunk. The rest of Lee's troops were a day ahead of the Union troops, so conceptually, Ewell could get across the river at Harrisburg with ease, wait for the rest of the Confederate Army, burn the bridges at Susquehanna, leaving only Union Militia to protect Cities like Lancaster, Philadelphia and New York from 70,000 Confederate Soldiers. And a river between them and the Union Army. And A. Stephens on his way to Washington with truce papers that would have ended the war. Before that could happen, for some unexplained reason, Lee changed his mind and told Ewell to converge in Gettysburg (and he did late in Day 1.) The order to leave Carlisle for South was about a day before Heth's groups started the battle of Gettysburg.

 

[thomas aagaard]

March Full Force against a barely defended Harrisburg and let the Federals play catch all the way to Philly, after he crosses the Susquehanna and burns those 2 bridges

They would need to march across the front of their enemy, within artillery range. With a town in the way splitting the army up in parts. Simply way to risky...

Also he would run out of supplies (can't forage when in contact with the enemy) and ammo for his artillery.

Any movement would have to be away from the enemy.

 

[E_just_E]

They would need to march across the front of their enemy, within artillery range. With a town in the way splitting the army up in parts. Simply way to risky...

Also he would run out of supplies (can't forage when in contact with the enemy) and ammo for his artillery.

Any movement would have to be away from the enemy.

There was not much artillery (or even people who knew how to use it) that side of Susquehanna...

 

[thomas aagaard]

Missing the point. Disengaging to the north was not practical. The town and road north was within range of Union artillery on Cemetery hill and way to close to the union positions. If Lee had tried to move his hole army including wagon train true Gettysburg and north he would have risked getting attacked with half his army north of town and the other south of it.. and the south part destroyed alone.

 

[E_just_E]

Missing the point. Disengaging to the north was not practical. The town and road north was within range of Union artillery on Cemetery hill and way to close to the union positions. If Lee had tried to move his hole army including wagon train true Gettysburg and north he would have risked getting attacked with half his army north of town and the other south of it.. and the south part destroyed alone.

Not really if done in the middle of the night and moved West to Chambersburg and then North via the main road to Harrisburg (what is now US-81.) That whole area was free of Union troops. Could have left a couple of brigades for decoy around as well.

 

[thomas aagaard]

Even if Meade would not know the rebs was going north until they reached Chambersburg, Most of his army would still be in Gettysburg. And they would be able to march north to Carlisle faster than the rebs could get their from Chambersburg,

Lee had a huge wagontrain with supplies and wounded... the AoP did not have to bring their wounded and could get supplies locally since they where in friendly territory. Again something that would improve their speed. They still had a lot of cavalry that was ready for a fight.

Most likely Lee would find federal forces waiting for him at Carlisle...

Even if he managed to get some of his forces past Carlisle the rest would have to stop and fight. (since it would take a day from the first men leave gettysbrg to the last do... so he would never get the entire army true Carlisle in time)
By then you can be sure every single federal militia man would be on his way to Harrisburg and every bridge the area ready to be blown...
If Lee went on he would risk getting stooped by the Susquehanna and forced to fight it out with his back to the river...

Yes Lee was a gambler, but this would not work... not in Pennsylvania.

 

[Deleted User CS]

I believe, and correct me if I am wrong, that the purpose of the "invasion of Harrisburg" was to instill in the populace of Pennsylvania the fear of God as well as destroying the railroad network that was supplying Meade's Army with material goods from Pennsylvania as well as the New England states. According to Charles Marshall of Lee's staff the main purposes of his Northern invasion was to allow the farmers of Virginia to gain a respite from the spoils of war that ravaged that state for two very long years while giving them enough time to plant crops for the fall harvest in order for his army to gain vital logistical supplies once they recrossed the Potomac River back into Virginia. The other purpose as I stated earlier was to destroy and or disrupt the major railroad hub structure that was stationed in the Harrisburg area thereby damaging the major logistical artery of the Army of the Potomac. Remember the words of Napoleon, "an army marches on its stomach."

 

[Deleted User CS]

Not exactly. His decision to recall Ewell from outside Harrisburg to Gettysburg, instead of following him to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, was the biggest mistake of that campaign.

Would it be better for Lee to follow Ewell to Harrisburg and then to Baltimore as opposed to Philadelphia? Philadelphia was strongly pro-Union while Baltimore and parts of eastern Maryland were pro-slavery and therefore pro-Confederate and would pose more of an immediate threat to Washington, D.C.. due to its proximity. Just a thought.