Shiloh troop strength numbers

[Billy1977]

Hello everybody, I was wondering if someone here could clear up a question I have about Grant's numbers present at Shiloh. It says here

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/hh/10/hh10b.htm

that Grant's Army of the Tennessee had a total of 39,830 men at Pittsburg Landing in addition to the 7,564 men of Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing. Is that correct? That would give Grant a total of no less than 47,394 men, several thousand more than Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston's Confederate force which the same source says numbered 43,968.

https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/hh/10/hh10e.htm

If that is the case then the only way Johnston's Confederates could be confident of having any numerical advantage at all was if they could somehow assume that Lew Wallace's division wouldn't make it to Pittsburg Landing in time. Now we know that Lew Wallace's men actually didn't make in there in time to participate in much if any of the first day's fighting but that was because of Wallace's decision to countermarch which took too long and there was no way that Johnston could have known that would occur. So what I'm saying is that without Lew Wallace making that decision and taking far too long to arrive there would have been very little time that Johnston's Confederates would have had any numerical advantage at all. I'm asking if Grant's numbers are correct because I had always thought that the figure of 39,830 men included Lew Wallace's division. I guess that's not correct? The 39,830 was just the five divisions (Sherman, McClernand, W.H.L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Prentiss) which were already at Pittsburg Landing then?

 

[rpkennedy]

From the ORs:

First Division (from April 5 return): 7028 effectives
Second Division (from April 5 return): 8708 effectives
Third Division (from April 4 return): 7564 effectives
Fourth Division (from April 5 return): 7302 effectives
Fifth Division (from April 5 return): 8830 effectives
Sixth Division (from April 5 return): 5463 effectives

Total: 44895 effectives

There were a handful of regiments that were counted because they were new and this doesn't count all of the artillerymen. 47000 and change should be pretty close.

R

 

[Billy1977]

Thanks RPKennedy. Now that I think about it, when Beauregard hesitated Johnston did in fact say "I'd fight them if they were a million" so I guess the whole thing didn't really hinge on having a numerical advantage of a few thousand.

 

[TFSmith121]

In Shiloh: The Battle that Changed the Civil War, Larry Daniel, using the OR and additional sources, lists 48,984 present for duty under Grant's command (six divisions, each roughly 8,000 strong; 18 brigades total); 17,918 under Buell's (one division at close to full strength (3 brigades and divisional artillery), and detachments from three others, with seven brigades between the three detachments ; and 44,699 under Johnston, with 16 brigades split among four divisions and two division equivalents.

If one tries to fit the above into equivalent formations, it's about eight US division equivalents of ~8,000 each (67,000 total), plus some corps and army troops, facing about five rebel division equivalents (~8,000 each) and a couple of separate brigades.

Even with the split command, those are not odds that look good for the rebellion.

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

Grant in his memoirs gave the strength of his army at Pittsburg Landing as 33,000 effectives, of whom only 25,000 fought and the rest ran away, with Wallace bringing in 5,000. Sherman in his memoirs says 32,000.

Grant of course was defending his claims he was heavily outnumbered, having claimed that the Confederates brought in 100,000 in 168 regiments.

He was probably about right for his effectives.

I looked into this a while back:

Army of West Tennessee
1st Division: 5,877 enlisted infantrymen = ca. 4,700 combatants
2nd Division: 7,469 = 5,975
4th Division: 6,597 = 5,280
5th Division: 7,477 = 5,980
6th Division: 5,060 = 4,050
= 26,000 (25,985) combatant infantry and 112 guns
Cavalry: 2,207 enlisted = ca. 1,300 sabres

Reinforcements
3rd Division, AoWT: 6,496 = 5,200 (11 guns)
2 unassigned regiments: 1,440 = 1,150
2nd Division, AoO: 8,674 = 6,940 (6 guns)
4th Division, AoO: 5,322 = 4,260
5th Division, AoO: NK = 3,825 engaged, say 3,700 infantry (10 guns)
6th Division, AoO: NK = 2,000 infantry engaged (excluding unengaged brigade)
= 23,375 combatant infantry and 27 guns reinforcing

Rebels turned up with 37,107 enlisted infantry and artillery or about 35,000 infantry and 128 guns, and 4,115 cavalry, and by Grant these are reckoned as "effectives". Grant is however wrong, as the Confederate army in question did not change definitions to match those of the Army of Northern Virginia (which reckoned only combatants in their returns) until Joe Johnston took over (him having set the ANV method of only reporting combatants in the first place). The rebs likely had about 28,000 combatant infantry on the field on the 6th, and 20,000 on the 7th.

On the first day numbers are a moderate advantage in numbers of combatants and guns to the Confederates, with a large advantage to the Federals on the 2nd day, largely due to Buell's forces arriving.

 

[TFSmith121]

The orders of battles from Daniel's Shiloh:The Battle that Changed the Civil War (Simon & Schuster, 1997) lists the following present for duty:

Army of the Tennessee (Grant)
1st Division (McClernand) 6941
2nd (W. Wallace) 8408
3rd (L. Wallace) 7564
4th (Hurlbut) 7825
5th (Sherman) 8580
6th (Prentiss) 7545
Unassigned - 2031
Total - 48,894

Army of the Ohio detachment (Buell)
2nd Division (McCook) 7552
4th Division (-) (Nelson) 4541
5th Division (-) (Crittenden) 3825
6th Division (-) (Wood) 2000
Total - 17,918

Army of the Missisippi (Johnston/Beauregard)
1st Corps (Polk) 9404
2nd Corps (Bragg) 16,279
3rd Corps (Hardee) 6758
Reserve (Breckinridge) 7211
Cavalry - 4316
47th Tenn - 731
Total - 44,699

Best,

 

[67th Tigers]

The orders of battles from Daniel's Shiloh:The Battle that Changed the Civil War (Simon & Schuster, 1997) lists the following present for duty:

Army of the Tennessee (Grant)
1st Division (McClernand) 6941
2nd (W. Wallace) 8408
3rd (L. Wallace) 7564
4th (Hurlbut) 7825
5th (Sherman) 8580
6th (Prentiss) 7545
Unassigned - 2031
Total - 48,894

These are indeed the PFD, which is not the same as effectives.

Army of the Ohio detachment (Buell)
2nd Division (McCook) 7552

Not PFD, a slightly different measure the division had 9,118 PFD. The number quoted is "engaged".

4th Division (-) (Nelson) 4541

By the same measure as the above they had 5,535 PFD. The number is "engaged"

5th Division (-) (Crittenden) 3825
6th Division (-) (Wood) 2000

PFD is unknown, both these numbers are "engaged". Here Daniel has mixed up two different sets of numbers.

Army of the Missisippi (Johnston/Beauregard)
1st Corps (Polk) 9404
2nd Corps (Bragg) 16,279
3rd Corps (Hardee) 6758
Reserve (Breckinridge) 7211
Cavalry - 4316
47th Tenn - 731
Total - 44,699

These are PFD.

I personally get slightly annoyed when authors mix up categories of strength and fail to understand the nuances.

 

[TFSmith121]

The primary evidence was written by hand more than 150 years ago and the numbers provided in the US OR are from two different armies for PFD and those from the rebel OR are at best estimates based on "effective" numbers, which obscures the reality that even a musician or quartermaster could pick up a weapon or manhandle a shell. In either case, you are expecting far too much certainty.

The OR estimate for Grant's command is on p. 112, Vol. X, which gives 44,895 PFD; Buell's command is not even listed to that level of detail. In his own words, Buell speaks of 25,000 reinforcements, including L. Wallace's division. The rebel OR lists 40,335 effectives, which is a different definition than present for duty... which is an example of why pretending there's something to discern here other than the rebels attacked an equally-sized force on Day One and lost, and Grant et al counter-attacked on Day Two with a larger force (by any definition) and won is ultimately an empty exercise.

And considering Daniel's work has been published by both LSU and UNC, along with S&S, presumably his estimates passed muster with their editors and peer reviewers - and certainly were subject to more review than that provided by random internet opinions.

Best,

 

[nitrofd]

Stacey Allen,the park historian agrees with the figures that the union had 65,000 men and the CSA had 45,000 men at Shiloh with combined casualties of 23,746.ax well respected as he is I feel you should go with his which by the way are almost identical to Larry Daniels figures.

 

[TFSmith121]

Stacey Allen,the park historian agrees with the figures that the union had 65,000 men and the CSA had 45,000 men at Shiloh with combined casualties of 23,746.ax well respected as he is I feel you should go with his which by the way are almost identical to Larry Daniels figures.

Thank you for the thoughtful post.

Best,

 

[Carronade]

Thanks RPKennedy. Now that I think about it, when Beauregard hesitated Johnston did in fact say "I'd fight them if they were a million" so I guess the whole thing didn't really hinge on having a numerical advantage of a few thousand.

I doubt anyone on either side knew exactly how many men they or their opponents would have on the day. The Confederates concentrated troops from multiple locations - a very impressive operation IMO - and even if they didn't know the exact matchup, they had assembled a force capable of inflicting a significant defeat on their enemy. It was clearly the best opportunity they were going to have.

 

[TFSmith121]

I doubt anyone on either side knew exactly how many men they or their opponents would have on the day. The Confederates concentrated troops from multiple locations - a very impressive operation IMO - and even if they didn't know the exact matchup, they had assembled a force capable of inflicting a significant defeat on their enemy. It was clearly the best opportunity they were going to have.

Not really; Johnston was feeling political pressure after the multiple defeats (Mill Springs, Fort Donelson, Island Number 10, liberation of Nashville) the rebels had suffered in the theater and his poorly-conceived, planned, led, and executed attack reflected that ... Losing Nashville was a huge blow (it was the second-most industrialized city in the south, and the largest "Western" city after New Orleans.)

The attack went off half-cocked and failed, as one would expect.

A far better strategy would have been to remain on the defensive, especially since once away from the rivers, both Grant and Buell would have had much more challenging supply lines than Johnston et al.

best,

 

[Billy1977]

I was just thinking a moment ago, would it have been possible on the Union side to have Grant's army and Buell's army move simultaneously towards Pittsburg Landing, so that they ended up with both armies there around the same time rather than bringing Grant's army down there and then moving Buell's army down to link up with it? Because the way they did it (I'm guessing) tempted the Confederates to try to hit Grant before the linkup whereas if they had been faced with both armies getting there at the same time it would have likely been much too strong of a force for the rebels to try to attack it at Pittsburg Landing. I realize that Halleck didn't have overall control over both armies until mid-March but could Lincoln and Stanton have coordinated it from Washington, ordering both Grant and Buell to get going at the same time and try to arrive simultaneously?

There's probably a very good (and obvious, at least to others than myself) reason why this would be impossible, I'm just brainstorming here.

 

[rpkennedy]

I was just thinking a moment ago, would it have been possible on the Union side to have Grant's army and Buell's army move simultaneously towards Pittsburg Landing, so that they ended up with both armies there around the same time rather than bringing Grant's army down there and then moving Buell's army down to link up with it? Because the way they did it (I'm guessing) tempted the Confederates to try to hit Grant before the linkup whereas if they had been faced with both armies getting there at the same time it would have likely been much too strong of a force for the rebels to try to attack it at Pittsburg Landing. I realize that Halleck didn't have overall control over both armies until mid-March but could Lincoln and Stanton have coordinated it from Washington, ordering both Grant and Buell to get going at the same time and try to arrive simultaneously?

There's probably a very good (and obvious, at least to others than myself) reason why this would be impossible, I'm just brainstorming here.

Part of the answer is that Buell was awfully slow in his movement from Nashville.

R

 

[Sid J.]

I was just thinking a moment ago, would it have been possible on the Union side to have Grant's army and Buell's army move simultaneously towards Pittsburg Landing, so that they ended up with both armies there around the same time rather than bringing Grant's army down there and then moving Buell's army down to link up with it? Because the way they did it (I'm guessing) tempted the Confederates to try to hit Grant before the linkup whereas if they had been faced with both armies getting there at the same time it would have likely been much too strong of a force for the rebels to try to attack it at Pittsburg Landing. I realize that Halleck didn't have overall control over both armies until mid-March but could Lincoln and Stanton have coordinated it from Washington, ordering both Grant and Buell to get going at the same time and try to arrive simultaneously?

There's probably a very good (and obvious, at least to others than myself) reason why this would be impossible, I'm just brainstorming here.

Halleck and Buell couldn't agree prior to the mid-March reorganization. Halleck seems to have been unwilling to commit to further advance without Buell's support. There were definitely communications issues, and misunderstandings. Unlike Buell, Halleck never made the choice to go forward himself (till after Shiloh). Halleck also felt Cairo was vulnerable to an attack from Columbus and moved troops to counter that until about 3/1, he was also concerned about an attack on Pope's forces.

It wasn't till more than two weeks after Donelson that Halleck let it be known the next move was up the Tennessee, and about two more weeks till they were able to carry that out. He didn't order Buell forward until 3/16 and, never seemed very concerned about the slow pace of the advance. Buells advance was at Columbia (85 miles to Savannah) at that time.

ISTM, Lincoln and Stanton had been expecting McClellan to coordinate Halleck and Buell. Their action here was to put Halleck over Buell:


WAR DEPARTMENT, March 7, 1862.

Major-General HALLECK, Saint Louis, Mo.:

Please send to me the limits of a military department that would place all the Western operations you deem expedient under your command.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

 

[Saruman]

his poorly-conceived, planned, led, and executed attack reflected that

I think Johnston did an amazing job. He advocated concentration from the beginning but was repeatedly denied by Richmond. The concentration at Shiloh could only take place once Floyd and Pillow's blunder at Fort Donelson shocked the Government into action.

As to the attack itself, when you consider the difficulties involved (raw recruits, antiquated weaponry, muddy roads, inexperienced commanders, densely wooded terrain, flooded streams etc) Johnston's effort was most admirable. He was well on his way to routing Grant's army before his unfortunate death stalled the attack.

 

[TFSmith121]

I think Johnston did an amazing job. He advocated concentration from the beginning but was repeatedly denied by Richmond. The concentration at Shiloh could only take place once Floyd and Pillow's blunder at Fort Donelson shocked the Government into action.

As to the attack itself, when you consider the difficulties involved (raw recruits, antiquated weaponry, muddy roads, inexperienced commanders, densely wooded terrain, flooded streams etc) Johnston's effort was most admirable. He was well on his way to routing Grant's army before his unfortunate death stalled the attack.

Not really. Half of Grant's force - including Wallace's fresh division - were in good shape at the end of the first day of the battle, including Webster's 50-gun army-level artillery group. Add the reality of the naval support and Buell's arrival, and the entire rebel operation looks like a mistake, even on Day One.

After the loss of 13,000 men at Donelson to Grant's force, which at the time was only half the strength of the army he had at Shiloh, Johnston didn't have the strength for a successful attack on Grant or Buell when separated; when they concentrated, it was even more of an impossibility.

Johnston should have remained on the defensive; he never had the strength to wage a sucessful offensive against the US forces.

Best,

 

[Saruman]

Not really. Half of Grant's force - including Wallace's fresh division - were in good shape at the end of the first day of the battle, including Webster's 50-gun army-level artillery group. Add the reality of the naval support and Buell's arrival, and the entire rebel operation looks like a mistake, even on Day One.

After the loss of 13,000 men at Donelson to Grant's force, which at the time was only half the strength of the army he had at Shiloh, Johnston didn't have the strength for a successful attack on Gramt or Buell when separated; when they concentrated, it was even more of an impossibility.

Johnston should have remained on the defensive; he never had the strength to wage a sucessful offensive against the US forces.

Best,

That is how it ended on day one, but I think Johnston's death had a catastrophic impact on the Confederate attack and gave the Union commanders a couple of crucial hours to stabilise the line and stud it with Webster's artillery. Had Johnston lived I think Grant's army would have been routed before the arrival of the reinforcements.