Sherman Sherman's Wartime Record

[trice]

More recently Frank Varney has dissected Grant's Memoirs in relation to Rosecrans and others and comes to a conclusion even harsher than Conger's. Varney has been attacked by a small group of Grant partisans on this site. He is a Cornell PhD and a college professor something his critics on this site aren't.

Frank Varney and I played on the same Little League team. I have read his first book and will be reading his second when it is published; I was at a lecture he gave in our old hometown library a few years back. It was interesting and he has done a lot of research I was glad to see, but I don't think he and I agree 100% on Grant and Rosecrans. He's moved back to New York now, maybe 200 miles apart, so maybe I'll run into him again one of these days.

On Rosecrans and Grant: I have been a Rosecrans' fan ever since I read William Lamers' The Edge of Glory 40+ years ago. Rosecrans had some brilliant moments and some bad ones. He played a big part in creating some of his own problems. Grant had his own problems -- but there is no general in the Civil War with a better record of success than Ulysses S. Grant.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Army commanders are involved in all three, often simultaneously. As far as battles go, you will sometimes see their part described as "Grand Tactics". This is what a battle like Gettysburg, either Bull Run, Shiloh, Stones River, Chickamauga, Wilderness, etc. is for an army commander.

Take a look at what Sherman does. He does not actually want to get into a big battle. He tells Grant before the Atlanta Campaign starts that he wants to get down to Atlanta without a big battle. He does what he can to ensure that he will not have to fight one. If you look, you will see that he never commits his whole force to a combat. He attacks with only a small portion of what he could bring to bear. He nibbles at the edges instead of striking at the heart. When an opportunity for a big tactical success arises, he does not commit to it, he never puts in enough force to smash the enemy (and he blames McPherson for letting such a big opportunity slip away when Sherman should have shouldered the responsibility.) He is still doing the same thing at Bentonville in 1865, or he would have destroyed Johnston's army on March 21.

His excellence at operational matters, his "indirect approach", his mastery of supply issues and his methodical destruction of the Confederate RR system in and around Atlanta all lead to the fall of that city -- but his obsession with destroying the RR and his squeamishness about targeting the enemy army lets Hardee/Hood escape with the AoT intact as a fighting force. Sherman should have crushed Hardee at Jonesboro, but was slow moving troops into position because he was using them to destroy track (on a RR already cut).

His approach was methodical and secure, often described as brilliant and innovative -- but part of that was the failure of Johnston to act aggressively against him. IIRR, Castel felt that Sherman benefitted from that, because Sherman's confidence grew with his constant success in the campaign. A different foe might have bedeviled Sherman up in north Georgia, threatened him, smacked him in the nose a time or two. Johnston let Sherman have the initiative -- Sherman kept it and used it.

So if I'm understanding your take on Sherman, his "indirect approach" is all about avoiding battle and putting more emphasis on the maneuvering, and destroying the resources of the enemy. But his approach was ultimately flawed because it let the enemy escape unharmed.

Similar to Rosecrans and Tullahoma?

 

[trice]

Also, was he really tactically "mediocre-to-just-plain-bad" in these situations or are you just reacting to the outcome? Chickasaw for example being a defeat, are you then assuming he must have been tactically bad? To me the problem with Chickasaw seems to be operational ("the movements that get you into tactical combat with the enemy") or strategic ('maneuvering and decision-making")-- I don't see how different tactical management would really have mattered; it just wasn't a good place to attempt an attack.

I have studied Chickasaw. He made a very bad tactical decision there and suffered many casualties for no benefit. Sherman, questioned on the attack plan by his commanders on December 29: "We will lose 5,000 men before we take Vicksburg, and may as well lose them here as anywhere else." Actual Union casualties that day seem to have been 208 killed, 1,005 wounded, and 563 captured or missing.

What is it Sherman did at Chickasaw that makes you think he was any good at offensive tactical issues? What makes you think Sherman at Chickasaw was any better than, say, Burnside at Fredericksburg?

 

[NedBaldwin]

What is it Sherman did at Chickasaw that makes you think he was any good at offensive tactical issues?

Didnt say i thought that based on Chickasaw.
What i do think is that tactically Chickasaw was a no win situation.
His bad decision was fighting there at all, a strategic decision not a tactical one.

 

[trice]

So if I'm understanding your take on Sherman, his "indirect approach" is all about avoiding battle and putting more emphasis on the maneuvering, and destroying the resources of the enemy. But his approach was ultimately flawed because it let the enemy escape unharmed.

Nope.

I am concentrating on seeing all of Sherman accurately. He was exceptionally good at operational matters. His "indirect approach" is based on moving in a manner that disguises the actual destination so that the enemy cannot be sure of your objective (usually because you are moving on a point that might threaten two or more other points, delaying a decision on where to concentrate against you). Sherman was very good at this and later convinced Edward Bruce Hamley (British head military professor at Sandhurst) to revise his 1866 textbook The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated because of it. (Hamley had more-or-less dismissed the American Civil War as containing nothing new to be learned -- Sherman engaged him in a letter debate on the subject.)

OTOH, Sherman was not good at tactical offensive matters. He tried to avoid major battles and several times missed major opportunities to take advantage of Confederate mistakes and weaknesses by a failure to be aggressive. Example: what happens during the Battle of Atlanta if Sherman orders Thomas to attack while Hood has two corps off fighting McPherson? What happens if Sherman concentrates on destroying Hardee at Jonesborough instead of ripping up RR track at the end of August?

Neither one of those examples requires the "Indirect Approach" to be flawed. Both of them require Sherman to make a bolder choice, to risk more, to actually put the destruction of the enemy army higher on his priority list.

A man can be good overall and still have weaknesses or blind-spots. He can also be really good at one thing and really bad at most others. It is very rare that a man is really good at every aspect of his profession.

Similar to Rosecrans and Tullahoma?

I don't think so.

Rosecrans campaign ran into a week-long rain storm (same system that is up in MD-PA as Lee tries to retreat from Gettysburg). Rosecrans moved very aggressively and probably would have had greater success if he had better weather.

Sherman deliberately had his troops rip up RR track (on a RR that was already cut and not operating) instead of pursuing and attacking the enemy.

 

[trice]

Didnt say i thought that based on Chickasaw.
What i do think is that tactically Chickasaw was a no win situation.
His bad decision was fighting there at all, a strategic decision not a tactical one.

So you agree with me that he made a very bad tactical decision at Chickasaw Bayou -- but want to attack me for saying it?

 

[NedBaldwin]

So you agree with me that he made a very bad tactical decision at Chickasaw Bayou -- but want to attack me for saying it?

Huh? I'm confused by what you are saying.

I did not agree that he made a very bad tactical decision.
I brought up the difference between tactical and operational and strategic decisions because his tactical decisions at Chickasaw don't seem to me to be the problem. If the operational purpose is to capture the confederate position at the base of the bluffs, a tactical plan of attack must be made with that purpose in mind and the one that was made seems sensible for that purpose (though I would argue tactical mistakes were made by subordinates like the screw up with the pontoon bridge or Thayer brigade getting redirected). But given the terrain and the opposition, the operational purpose does not seem sensible to me - seems to me that the very bad decision was being there in the first place.

 

[trice]

Huh? I'm confused by what you are saying.

I did not agree that he made a very bad tactical decision.
I brought up the difference between tactical and operational and strategic decisions because his tactical decisions at Chickasaw don't seem to me to be the problem. If the operational purpose is to capture the confederate position at the base of the bluffs, a tactical plan of attack must be made with that purpose in mind and the one that was made seems sensible for that purpose (though I would argue tactical mistakes were made by subordinates like the screw up with the pontoon bridge or Thayer brigade getting redirected). But given the terrain and the opposition, the operational purpose does not seem sensible to me - seems to me that the very bad decision was being there in the first place.

Sherman was the man responsible for the decision to attack. It was a bad decision that incurred heavy casualties. You have indicated you understand that. Why do you think that was somehow praiseworthy?

 

[NedBaldwin]

Sherman was the man responsible for the decision to attack. It was a bad decision that incurred heavy casualties. You have indicated you understand that. Why do you think that was somehow praiseworthy?

Huh what? I've said the bad decision was being there and having the goal of capturing the confederate position. Never said that was praiseworthy.

 

[Georgia Sixth]

Sherman's war time record:
Went to Meridian, lit matches.
Went to Atlanta, lit matches.
Went to Milledgeville, lit matches.
Went to Savannah, matches wet.
Went to Columbia, lit matches.
Went to Bennet's Farm, drank whiskey.
Afterwards, came to Texas, nearly got scalped.

 

[Irishtom29]

Sherman's war time record:
Went to Meridian, lit matches.
Went to Atlanta, lit matches.
Went to Milledgeville, lit matches.
Went to Savannah, matches wet.
Went to Columbia, lit matches.
Went to Bennet's Farm, drank whiskey.
Afterwards, came to Texas, nearly got scalped.

Well then, it seems fire is very a useful tool suppressing rebellion, as events showed.

Sherman confronted the hostile Kiowas nose to nose at Fort Sill, at considerable risk.

 

[tony_gunter]

Sherman was the man responsible for the decision to attack. It was a bad decision that incurred heavy casualties. You have indicated you understand that. Why do you think that was somehow praiseworthy?

Sherman wasn't the man responsible for the decision to attack. It came down as a direct order from Lincoln and Halleck. Grant so disliked the idea that he called Sherman to his HQ in Oxford to discuss disobeying the order. When Sherman says "We will lose 5,000 men before we take Vicksburg, and may as well lose them here as anywhere else" I think he's expressing frustration about being at Chickasaw Bayou in the first place.

 

[trice]

Sherman wasn't the man responsible for the decision to attack. It came down as a direct order from Lincoln and Halleck. Grant so disliked the idea that he called Sherman to his HQ in Oxford to discuss disobeying the order. When Sherman says "We will lose 5,000 men before we take Vicksburg, and may as well lose them here as anywhere else" I think he's expressing frustration about being at Chickasaw Bayou in the first place.

Sherman is the man making the decision. On December 29, 1862 Sherman is the man who can say what to do. Sherman is the man who says to attack. No one else.

Sherman could have decided not to attack and try another approach. Sherman did make that decision on December 30. While he was looking for one, McClernand arrives.

 

[David Moore]

Frank Varney and I played on the same Little League team. I have read his first book and will be reading his second when it is published; I was at a lecture he gave in our old hometown library a few years back. It was interesting and he has done a lot of research I was glad to see, but I don't think he and I agree 100% on Grant and Rosecrans. He's moved back to New York now, maybe 200 miles apart, so maybe I'll run into him again one of these days.

On Rosecrans and Grant: I have been a Rosecrans' fan ever since I read William Lamers' The Edge of Glory 40+ years ago. Rosecrans had some brilliant moments and some bad ones. He played a big part in creating some of his own problems. Grant had his own problems -- but there is no general in the Civil War with a better record of success than Ulysses S. Grant.

Those are all opinions, the opinions one would get from reading the books written about Grant for most of the 20th century. It is what one would write in an essay test and one would get a high grade.
However there was and is another interpretation of the careers of the various generals discussed on this thread. I can think of no better book to be introduced to alternative interpretations than Victors in Blue by Castel. However there is no reason to do so and there certainly is no reason to get into heated arguments about events of 150 years ago. Ultimately one reads for oneself.
It is a pity I think that Rosecrans and Thomas are not only unknown to almost everyone but even criticized for their CW careers.
I'll ask you the question I've asked before on this site: Do you have any evidence that Grant or any other Union general could have done what Rosecrans and Thomas did in the summer of 1863 in crossing rivers and mountains with no naval support and relying on a single rail line?
Did Grant have any engineering experience much less in a mountains terrain? Did he show any signs of innovation in things like cartography and outfitting and transportation?
Grant shows up at Chattanooga and carries out a plan that Rosecrans had created and started (building of pontoons and boats.)
Yet Grant gets the credit for opening the cracker line. Truth also demands that it be told that according to Rawlins Grant later got drunk in Chattanooga as he had in New Orleans after Vicksburg. Not much of a record of success in my opinion.
Grant partisans don't like to hear these things and attack those who write about them. Or they simply ignore them.

 

[trice]

Huh what? I've said the bad decision was being there and having the goal of capturing the confederate position. Never said that was praiseworthy.

Sherman is the man on the spot making the decision. He could have decided not to attack. He did decide to attack. He owns it.

 

[trice]

Those are all opinions, the opinions one would get from reading the books written about Grant for most of the 20th century. It is what one would write in an essay test and one would get a high grade.
However there was and is another interpretation of the careers of the various generals discussed on this thread. I can think of no better book to be introduced to alternative interpretations than Victors in Blue by Castel. However there is no reason to do so and there certainly is no reason to get into heated arguments about events of 150 years ago. Ultimately one reads for oneself.
It is a pity I think that Rosecrans and Thomas are not only unknown to almost everyone but even criticized for their CW careers.
I'll ask you the question I've asked before on this site: Do you have any evidence that Grant or any other Union general could have done what Rosecrans and Thomas did in the summer of 1863 in crossing rivers and mountains with no naval support and relying on a single rail line?
Did Grant have any engineering experience much less in a mountains terrain? Did he show any signs of innovation in things like cartography and outfitting and transportation?
Grant shows up at Chattanooga and carries out a plan that Rosecrans had created and started (building of pontoons and boats.)
Yet Grant gets the credit for opening the cracker line. Truth also demands that it be told that according to Rawlins Grant later got drunk in Chattanooga as he had in New Orleans after Vicksburg. Not much of a record of success in my opinion.
Grant partisans don't like to hear these things and attack those who write about them. Or they simply ignore them.

There are good things to be said about Thomas and Rosecrans, just as there are bad ones. The same is true of Grant and Sherman. I think you need to try to see all of these people instead of only the side you want.

As to "Did Grant have any engineering experience much less in a mountains terrain? Did he show any signs of innovation in things like cartography and outfitting and transportation?", the answer is that Grant had a lot of practical experience in matters like that. If you want to talk about issues like this, stop and take a long look at the record. When the war is over, Grant has triumphed on the rivers and in the mountains. He has triumphed at siege warfare. He has captured three separate Confederate armies. He has managed a massive war effort that crushed the enemy and ended the war. He has defeated the best the Confederacy had. He has managed his supply situation better than they did. Grant used others as he should have, when needed; his engineering skills were sufficient to take Vicksburg. Those are things you cannot say about Rosecrans.

 

[tony_gunter]

Sherman is the man making the decision. On December 29, 1862 Sherman is the man who can say what to do. Sherman is the man who says to attack. No one else.

Sherman could have decided not to attack and try another approach. Sherman did make that decision on December 30. While he was looking for one, McClernand arrives.

Sherman was ordered to assault Vicksburg from the river. Chickasaw Bayou represented the best opportunity to do so. If you're suggesting that Sherman disobey a direct order that came down through Halleck from President Lincoln himself, I think you've got the wrong Sherman.

Chickasaw Bayou highlights the trait that probably gave Grant the most comfort with Sherman: give him an order and he will carry it out, regardless of what he thinks of it. You certainly can't say the same for McPherson.

 

[tony_gunter]

I'll ask you the question I've asked before on this site: Do you have any evidence that Grant or any other Union general could have done what Rosecrans and Thomas did in the summer of 1863 in crossing rivers and mountains with no naval support and relying on a single rail line?
Did Grant have any engineering experience much less in a mountains terrain? Did he show any signs of innovation in things like cartography and outfitting and transportation?

I'm not a fan of Sherman, but this is a rather outlandish assertion. Murfreesboro to Pelham is 50 miles. There's one river that's no larger at the crossings than 14 Mile Creek in Mississippi where Sherman crossed. There is one range of foothills, little higher in most places from the surrounding ground than the Chickasaw Bluffs at Port Gibson. Grant was moving with *zero* rail lines, crossed three rivers (and three creeks as large as Duck River), and covered twice the distance in the march from Bruinsburg to Vicksburg, utilizing donkey carts and carriages for materiel.

 

[David Moore]

There are good things to be said about Thomas and Rosecrans, just as there are bad ones. The same is true of Grant and Sherman. I think you need to try to see all of these people instead of only the side you want.

As to "Did Grant have any engineering experience much less in a mountains terrain? Did he show any signs of innovation in things like cartography and outfitting and transportation?", the answer is that Grant had a lot of practical experience in matters like that. If you want to talk about issues like this, stop and take a long look at the record. When the war is over, Grant has triumphed on the rivers and in the mountains. He has triumphed at siege warfare. He has captured three separate Confederate armies. He has managed a massive war effort that crushed the enemy and ended the war. He has defeated the best the Confederacy had. He has managed his supply situation better than they did. Grant used others as he should have, when needed; his engineering skills were sufficient to take Vicksburg. Those are things you cannot say about Rosecrans.

A victory well behind Grant's own schedule and at an unanticipated and horrific cost in lives and suffering
Without Atlanta falling the war probably continues for another year or so and Lincoln is defeated with who knows what that repercussions. Atlanta doesn't fall unless Chattanooga is taken and held. Chattanooga isn't taken without the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns.
Rosecrans is criticized for not moving more quickly in Tennessee ( he did move more quickly than Sherman did on Atlanta ) yet Rosecrans wasn't given time to relax in New Orleans like Grant did after Vicksburg.
Give Victors in Blue a look.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Sherman was ordered to assault Vicksburg from the river. Chickasaw Bayou represented the best opportunity to do so. If you're suggesting that Sherman disobey a direct order that came down through Halleck from President Lincoln himself, I think you've got the wrong Sherman.

Chickasaw Bayou highlights the trait that probably gave Grant the most comfort with Sherman: give him an order and he will carry it out, regardless of what he thinks of it. You certainly can't say the same for McPherson.

And perhaps that's a significant reason why Sherman and Grant rose while other generals fell. It wasn't just about being able to operate independently, but to additionally be a good subordinate to both the military leadership and the political leadership.

McClellan, McClernand, Rosecrans, Hooker, etc were not very good subordinates.