Sherman Sherman's Wartime Record

[DanSBHawk]

Cadawallader's main importance today is the very frank assessments he made of Grant and his armyin letters to his brother Congressman Washburne.

No, not even close. Cad was a successful businessman and a governor. The letter was not his "main importance."

 

[Lubliner]

Sherman had a generally poor record in tactical offensive situations. He understood this about himself, IMHO. On the tactical defensive he was a grim fighter who seemed to get more steady as the situation got more difficult.

Sherman also understood how difficult the tactical offensive had become in the age of the rifle.

For both of those reasons, he seems to have shied away from fully committing his forces to an attack once he was in complete command. Throughout the Atlanta Campaign, the March to the Sea, and the March through the Carolinas you can find examples where he should simply have struck harder, with more of his force. It is still true in his very last battle, at Bentonville, when he could have wiped out Joe Johnston on March 21st by throwing more troops in to support Mower's attack (Sherman ordered them to retreat instead).

Sherman won by using his superior skill at the operational level to offset his poor tactical skill. He fought a war of movement (his "indirect approach") that avoided large pitched battles. He concentrated on maneuver and the destruction of Confederate RRs and infrastructure, crippling their ability to oppose him.

It is interesting that Sherman used an entirely different approach to combat than Grant. Some people would be willing to assume Sherman tactics were more successful than Grant tactics if the reproach against Sherman's march was not so vilified.
Lubliner.

 

[tony_gunter]

Ironically, part of his meltdown included an accurate appraisal of the real size and scope of the war.



Yet McPherson's inexperience led him to several mistakes during the campaign.

Probably would have been better for McPherson to be Sherman's Chief of Staff, but (IIRC) he was chomping at the bit for field command.

To the contrary, usually when people point out mistakes made by McPherson, there are good explanations for what happened that were missed by historians. Histories of Raymond are the absolute worst about doing this. Raymond represents McPherson at his most brilliant, any history that claims otherwise hasn't done their homework. Port Gibson as well, although he only had a brigade at that engagement.

For example: Canton expedition. I found primary source information that McPherson captured the commander of the Hinds County militia in civilian clothing. Being captured behind enemy lines in civilian clothing, of course, could be punished by summary execution. But that colonel not only survived the war, there's no record of him ever showing up as captured, which seems to suggest he provided McPherson information on troop strengths in the area and in return McPherson released him. The troops McPherson was supposed to divert to the central Mississippi area of operations *were already in the area* and McPherson was deep in enemy territory, outnumbered, with the same dangerous mix of cavalry and infantry that got Sturgis' command destroyed at Brice Crossroad.

 

[David Moore]

Sherman had a generally poor record in tactical offensive situations. He understood this about himself, IMHO. On the tactical defensive he was a grim fighter who seemed to get more steady as the situation got more difficult.

Sherman also understood how difficult the tactical offensive had become in the age of the rifle.

For both of those reasons, he seems to have shied away from fully committing his forces to an attack once he was in complete command. Throughout the Atlanta Campaign, the March to the Sea, and the March through the Carolinas you can find examples where he should simply have struck harder, with more of his force. It is still true in his very last battle, at Bentonville, when he could have wiped out Joe Johnston on March 21st by throwing more troops in to support Mower's attack (Sherman ordered them to retreat instead).

Sherman won by using his superior skill at the operational level to offset his poor tactical skill. He fought a war of movement (his "indirect approach") that avoided large pitched battles. He concentrated on maneuver and the destruction of Confederate RRs and infrastructure, crippling their ability to oppose him.

I'm hoping you would acknowledge that Castel's opinions, based on decades of academic level research, are worth noting if not accepting. I'm also hoping that you acknowledge that Sherman's Memoirs are not to be taken uncritically.

 

[David Moore]

The family was successful. And the Mainers as a group were influential. But there was nothing particular about Washburn. Grant made a lot of friends, and a few enemies along the way. Washburn's influence was through is friend William Seward. But Grant's chief defender seem to have been Stanton. Getting Grant back into the game was probably one thing that Stanton and Halleck agreed on, for the sake of soldiers in the western armies.

The only Washburn worth knowing is Elihu. He was a very powerful figure in Washington and as a member of the legislative branch didn't need to worry about approval or support of those in the executive branch. Without Elihu, living in and representing Galena Illinois at the outbreak of the war, no one would know Ulysses Grant, also living in Galena at the outbreak of the war, today.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

To the contrary, usually when people point out mistakes made by McPherson, there are good explanations for what happened that were missed by historians. Histories of Raymond are the absolute worst about doing this. Raymond represents McPherson at his most brilliant, any history that claims otherwise hasn't done their homework. Port Gibson as well, although he only had a brigade at that engagement.

I was specifically referring to McPherson in the Atlanta Campaign. Albert Castel points out a number of times he was excessively cautious and let opportunity slip through his grasp.

Not terrible, just inexperienced.

 

[tony_gunter]

I was specifically referring to McPherson in the Atlanta Campaign. Albert Castel points out a number of times he was excessively cautious and let opportunity slip through his grasp.

Not terrible, just inexperienced.

Ah! Yeah, not all that familiar with the Atlanta Campaign so I'm not sure what incidents you're referencing. All I know is that the same assertions made about him in Mississippi were wildly inaccurate.

 

[trice]

I'm hoping you would acknowledge that Castel's opinions, based on decades of academic level research, are worth noting if not accepting. I'm also hoping that you acknowledge that Sherman's Memoirs are not to be taken uncritically.

I recall reading Castel's work (way back; the Civil War group I was with then was preparing for our tour of the Atlanta Campaign, so we were all reading and discussing Castel's great work on it in preparation). Castel participated in an online Q&A session with us one night before the tour. Good stuff.

When you talk about major Civil War generals and memoirs, the gold standard for accuracy is probably Grant -- and there are parts of Grant's work that need to be understood with skepticism (Shiloh, Chattanooga particularly), Sherman's is below that. Drop down a notch or two on the scale to Sheridan. If you are looking for the bottom, try Joe Johnston and John Bell Hood -- they might be it. Longstreet's is sometimes an enigma to me, so I am not sure where to rank his work -- probably higher than Sheridan, certainly higher than Johnston and Hood.

Grant's is written from his perspective, and he surely whistles past some parts of his career, but he made a very real attempt to research and fact-check what he wrote. The latter part of his work was rushed by the fact that he was dying, so the research and fact checking there suffered a bit. Like all works, Grant's work needs to be understood in terms of his position and times. In particular, when evaluating any of the Civil War memoirs, we need to start by checking the publication date of the memoir against the publication date of the relevant volumes of the Official Reports.

What type of conflict do you see between my post and Castel?

 

[trice]

It is interesting that Sherman used an entirely different approach to combat than Grant. Some people would be willing to assume Sherman tactics were more successful than Grant tactics if the reproach against Sherman's march was not so vilified.
Lubliner.

Hmm. I treat these terms differently than you are using them here.

Generally, military usage would break things out in three levels like this:

• tactical level (small)
• operational level (middle)
• strategic level (big)

The tactical level is basically the nitty gritty of direct combat with the enemy, face to face, unit to unit, regiments against regiments, brigades against brigades, etc.

The operational level is above the tactical level and contains it. This is more about the movements that get you into tactical combat with the enemy. Generally, this is about moving larger units, often both in-contact with the enemy and out-of-contact with the enemy.

The strategic level is above the operational level and includes it. This is very high-level maneuvering and decision-making.

There are of course gradients within all that and actions that can be spread across more than one.

Sherman was very good at the operational and strategic levels. He was not-so-good at the tactical level. He was good at the defensive side of tactical situations because he became more determined and grim when he was attacked and things narrowed to simple decisions. On the tactical offensive (when he attacked other people) he was mediocre-to-just-plain-bad (see Chickasaw Bluffs, Chattanooga, the Atlanta Campaign, anything up to and including Bentonville). He avoided getting into these situations in 1864-5, avoided large set-piece battles, and concentrated on doing what he did well (the operational and strategic level).

Grant was much better on the tactical offensive than Sherman was, if only because he was willing to close with the enemy and fight him. Sherman wanted to avoid that, IMHO because he did not believe he was good at it.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Once he reached army and army group commander (post Vicksburg), how much was Sherman really involved in the tactical level? Isnt that what subordinates are for?

Hmm. I treat these terms differently than you are using them here.

Generally, military usage would break things out in three levels like this:

• tactical level (small)
• operational level (middle)
• strategic level (big)

The tactical level is basically the nitty gritty of direct combat with the enemy, face to face, unit to unit, regiments against regiments, brigades against brigades, etc.

The operational level is above the tactical level and contains it. This is more about the movements that get you into tactical combat with the enemy. Generally, this is about moving larger units, often both in-contact with the enemy and out-of-contact with the enemy.

The strategic level is above the operational level and includes it. This is very high-level maneuvering and decision-making.

There are of course gradients within all that and actions that can be spread across more than one.

Sherman was very good at the operational and strategic levels. He was not-so-good at the tactical level. He was good at the defensive side of tactical situations because he became more determined and grim when he was attacked and things narrowed to simple decisions. On the tactical offensive (when he attacked other people) he was mediocre-to-just-plain-bad (see Chickasaw Bluffs, Chattanooga, the Atlanta Campaign, anything up to and including Bentonville). He avoided getting into these situations in 1864-5, avoided large set-piece battles, and concentrated on doing what he did well (the operational and strategic level).

Grant was much better on the tactical offensive than Sherman was, if only because he was willing to close with the enemy and fight him. Sherman wanted to avoid that, IMHO because he did not believe he was good at it.

 

[NedBaldwin]

....On the tactical offensive (when he attacked other people) he was mediocre-to-just-plain-bad (see Chickasaw Bluffs...

Also, was he really tactically "mediocre-to-just-plain-bad" in these situations or are you just reacting to the outcome? Chickasaw for example being a defeat, are you then assuming he must have been tactically bad? To me the problem with Chickasaw seems to be operational ("the movements that get you into tactical combat with the enemy") or strategic ('maneuvering and decision-making")-- I don't see how different tactical management would really have mattered; it just wasn't a good place to attempt an attack.

 

[wausaubob]

Sherman's corp shined during the Vicksburg. His force made it to Jackson. It temporarily disabled the city. Then two divisions crossed the Big Black and followed the cavalry to occupy the heights overlooking the Yazoo river.
Same thing at Chattanooga. Sherman's army got there. The plan to attack the north end of Missionary Ridge obviously did not work. But Bragg had to shift eastward, and he could not reinforce Longstreet's threat against Knoxville.
Sherman's force was the only one at Knoxville that had to march most of the way with their own wagon trains. Hooker's two corps road the trains most of the way to Chattanooga. And Hooker had time to check out his assignments. Thomas' force was already in Chattanooga and did not even have to march far to get into position to assault Missionary Ridge.

 

[wausaubob]

Sherman and Thomas Jackson used the principal that the army that gets to its destination ahead of time, wins or forces the enemy to react.

 

[David Moore]

I recall reading Castel's work (way back; the Civil War group I was with then was preparing for our tour of the Atlanta Campaign, so we were all reading and discussing Castel's great work on it in preparation). Castel participated in an online Q&A session with us one night before the tour. Good stuff.

When you talk about major Civil War generals and memoirs, the gold standard for accuracy is probably Grant -- and there are parts of Grant's work that need to be understood with skepticism (Shiloh, Chattanooga particularly), Sherman's is below that. Drop down a notch or two on the scale to Sheridan. If you are looking for the bottom, try Joe Johnston and John Bell Hood -- they might be it. Longstreet's is sometimes an enigma to me, so I am not sure where to rank his work -- probably higher than Sheridan, certainly higher than Johnston and Hood.

Grant's is written from his perspective, and he surely whistles past some parts of his career, but he made a very real attempt to research and fact-check what he wrote. The latter part of his work was rushed by the fact that he was dying, so the research and fact checking there suffered a bit. Like all works, Grant's work needs to be understood in terms of his position and times. In particular, when evaluating any of the Civil War memoirs, we need to start by checking the publication date of the memoir against the publication date of the relevant volumes of the Official Reports.

What type of conflict do you see between my post and Castel?

We are at the heart of a really irreconcilable divide: Grant/Sherman vs Rosecrans/Thomas. All of these generals were in important campaigns in 1862-63. This really isn't the place to get into the hows and whys of what happened afterwards. Anyone interested in the Western theater knows what happened. The why is very contentious. I would contend that Grant and Sherman benefitted from the work done by Rosecrans and Thomas in middle Tennessee in 1863. Additionally Grant probably survived 1862 because of Rosecran's fighting in northeast Mississippi in the fall of 1862. Even Elihu Washburne couldn't have saved Grant if Rosecrans had been defeated at Corinth.
Sherman's fate was tied to Grant's.
These points have produced heated discussions on this site. I have no desire to revisit them. I would recommend Castel's Victors in Blue (his last book) for his opinions about the four generals mentioned above. He is not a fan of Sherman. His use of the word "prevaricating" reveals what he thinks of Sherman's account of his military career.
As far as Grant's Memoirs they were described by Arthur Conger as "campfire stories" in a book written nearly a century ago.
More recently Frank Varney has dissected Grant's Memoirs in relation to Rosecrans and others and comes to a conclusion even harsher than Conger's. Varney has been attacked by a small group of Grant partisans on this site. He is a Cornell PhD and a college professor something his critics on this site aren't.
Read the very readable, not to mention scholarly, Victors in Blue and I think it will change the way you look at Union Civil War generals.

 

[David Moore]

Btw I have written a biography of Rosecrans and have researched him for over 35 years. This seems to have disqualified me as being an authority on him by some Grant partisans on this site. Most boast they have not and don't intend to read my book. Easier I suppose to criticize what they think is in the book than what is actually in it.

 

[David Moore]

One more thing before I retire for the evening. There will be a new Rosecrans biography coming out next year hopefully by William Kurtz who has a PhD from UVA ( indicating deep scholarly research using original sources etc).) There will be an emphasis on Rosecrans' early and public anti- slavery opinions that he announced before any other successful Union general. It will also deal with his interesting and at times difficult non military life. Albert Castel's final wish was that a "young, talented and brave ( Brave!)"
historian would write a biography of Rosecrans. Hopefully there will be many in the coming decades.

 

[NedBaldwin]

More recently Frank Varney has dissected Grant's Memoirs in relation to Rosecrans and others and comes to a conclusion even harsher than Conger's. Varney has been attacked by a small group of Grant partisans on this site. He is a Cornell PhD and a college professor something his critics on this site aren't.

And repeatedly the flaws in his book have been pointed out
Yet because you are enamored but his conclusions you swoon over his book, undercutting any claim to valuing research and facts.

The idea of this irreconcilable divide is an invention of modern partisan authors

 

[NedBaldwin]

urvived Even Elihu Washburne couldn't have saved Grant if Rosecrans had been defeated at Corinth.
Sherman's fate was tied to Grant's.

If Rosecrans had been defeated, it would be Rosecrans who would need saving; Grant would have been fine.

And Sherman's friendship with Halleck ensured his fate was not tied to Grant

 

[trice]

Once he reached army and army group commander (post Vicksburg), how much was Sherman really involved in the tactical level? Isnt that what subordinates are for?

Army commanders are involved in all three, often simultaneously. As far as battles go, you will sometimes see their part described as "Grand Tactics". This is what a battle like Gettysburg, either Bull Run, Shiloh, Stones River, Chickamauga, Wilderness, etc. is for an army commander.

Take a look at what Sherman does. He does not actually want to get into a big battle. He tells Grant before the Atlanta Campaign starts that he wants to get down to Atlanta without a big battle. He does what he can to ensure that he will not have to fight one. If you look, you will see that he never commits his whole force to a combat. He attacks with only a small portion of what he could bring to bear. He nibbles at the edges instead of striking at the heart. When an opportunity for a big tactical success arises, he does not commit to it, he never puts in enough force to smash the enemy (and he blames McPherson for letting such a big opportunity slip away when Sherman should have shouldered the responsibility.) He is still doing the same thing at Bentonville in 1865, or he would have destroyed Johnston's army on March 21.

His excellence at operational matters, his "indirect approach", his mastery of supply issues and his methodical destruction of the Confederate RR system in and around Atlanta all lead to the fall of that city -- but his obsession with destroying the RR and his squeamishness about targeting the enemy army lets Hardee/Hood escape with the AoT intact as a fighting force. Sherman should have crushed Hardee at Jonesboro, but was slow moving troops into position because he was using them to destroy track (on a RR already cut).

His approach was methodical and secure, often described as brilliant and innovative -- but part of that was the failure of Johnston to act aggressively against him. IIRR, Castel felt that Sherman benefitted from that, because Sherman's confidence grew with his constant success in the campaign. A different foe might have bedeviled Sherman up in north Georgia, threatened him, smacked him in the nose a time or two. Johnston let Sherman have the initiative -- Sherman kept it and used it.

 

[Lubliner]

Back to the tactical, operational, and strategic level, the abilities of both Sherman and Grant were brought into fruition in the 1864 campaigns by the generals they opposed. Grant had to be hard hitting and directly confrontational against Lee. This tactical ability could not have been used against Joe Johnston. Sherman knew Johnston was elusive, and Grant knew Lee was bold. As in regards to Chickasaw Bluffs previous to Vicksburg, that was a strategic operation that was given to Sherman. He didn't conceive it, did he?
And the venture prior to Shiloh when he was requested to cut the rails between Iuka and Corinth, but the rains were too severe, flooding the land; that can't be held against his tactical ability either. I was mainly trying to view the success of Grant vs. Sherman in that 1864 campaign; which general was more successful given the opposition. I think Sherman was, and believe more would see it that way if the judgements against his hard war policy were not so prevalent. [This was written without my reading the post above].
Lubliner.