Sherman Sherman's Wartime Record

Agreed that his combat record was not notable. All his actions up to that point were cavalry raid type things with little combat. But saying "He didn't know anything about waging a war, and was nothing but an administrator" is too much.

Of course Hurlbut would complain -- he was replaced in Memphis by Washburn becuase he hadnt dealt with Forrest and then Forest embarrassed Washburn too.

Grant's situation by early April 1863 had lots of people grumbling. For example Sherman proposed to Grant that they retreat to Memphis and start over. So Cad wasnt some isolated voice when he expressed concern. When Cad wrote "All Grant's schemes have failed. He knows that he has got to do something or off goes his head." he was saying what was a pretty standard, not wrong, statement of the situation. When Cad wrote "My impression is that he intends to attack in front." his impression/prediction was wrong; but Grant had actually given that impression to people -- saying he was considering doing that. Whether he actually thought about it or was just engaged in spreading false-intel becuase he knew it would leak is another story. When Cad wrote "Grant is a good fighter." I dont think his prediction was wrong. When Cad wrote "The fleet has backed out of the Yazoo Pass. That should have been an overwhelming success, and I am mortified and humiliated at its miscarriage" he was not wrong -- Yazoo Pass expedition did not go well. And when Cad wrote "I hear that he says he has a plan of his own which is yet to be tried in which he has great confidence." he was also not wrong.

As I see it, the main problem with Cad's letter is that he was writing this stuff from Memphis based on second hand info about what was going on down river and he had just arrived in Memphis from Helena with orders to assume command of cavalry but was clashing with Hurlbut (then in charge in Memphis) over his role
Grant's opinion of Cadwallader Washburn:
CITY POINT, VA., February 4, 1865--5 p. m.
(Received 7. 30 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff:
If General Washburn is not placed in command of West Tennessee I want him to come on to take command at Norfolk. He is one of the best administrative officers we have, and will effectually stop supplies being sent through our lines to the enemy wherever he is. We want such a man at each of the above places.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
 
Grant's opinion of Cadwallader Washburn:
If General Washburn is not placed in command of West Tennessee I want him to come on to take command at Norfolk. He is one of the best administrative officers we have, and will effectually stop supplies being sent through our lines to the enemy wherever he is. We want such a man at each of the above places.
"Administrative."

If Grant had known about the 1863 letter, and then the other brother passing the letter on to Lincoln, he may not have been so complimentary of the Washburn bros.

The Washburn bros lost confidence in Grant during this period, but the only opinion that mattered was Lincolns. And he still continued to support Grant.
 
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Lincoln, 1863:

"I think Grant has hardly a friend left, except myself."​
"What I want, and what the people want, is generals who fight battles and win victories. Grant has done this, and I propose to stand by him."​

The importance of Washburne in Grant's success is overstated. And it's no coincidence that it is particularly overstated by fans of Rosecrans, who had a cabinet secretary as an advocate, and at one point in early '63 sent a letter to Lincoln asking as a "personal favor" to have his rank backdated before every other major general in the west.

Those who use political patronage as a reason, or excuse, for why some generals succeeded and others failed, need to apply some consistent standards to all of the generals.
 
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"Administrative."

If Grant knew about the 1863 letter, and the other brother passing the letter on to Lincoln, he may not have been so complimentary to the Washburn bros.

The Washburn bros lost confidence in Grant during this period, but the only opinion that mattered was Lincolns. And he still continued to support Grant.
Administrative officers are necessary and important to the operations of an army. Grant obviously thought Washburn was very good at it, one of the best the Union had. He wanted him assigned to an important position in an area near the front where he would be responsible for a crucial part of the arrangements for the coming 1865 campaign. Cadwallader Washburn, obviously good at getting things done, went on to co-found the Washburn-Crosby Company, which eventually morphed into General Mills.

I haven't seen any particular comment by Grant on Washburn's abilities as a combat officer. If he had any particular feeling that Washburn would make a good combat officer, Grant or Sherman probably would have kept him as one after his time with XIII and XVI Corps around Vicksburg.

The Washburn brothers from Maine were big-time Republicans who helped build the party in four different states.
 
I haven't seen any particular comment by Grant on Washburn's abilities as a combat officer. If he had any particular feeling that Washburn would make a good combat officer, Grant or Sherman probably would have kept him as one after his time with XIII and XVI Corps around Vicksburg.

After Vicksburg, Washburn went with the XIII Corps to the gulf coast where he commanded divisions during Franklins October advance into central Louisiana and he commanded at the capture of Fort Esperanza on the texas coast in November. He temporary commanded the Corps for a time and then took leave of absence before ending up in Memphis.
He was never in any battle but was noted for his general operational leadership and "administrative" skill
 
"Administrative."

If Grant had known about the 1863 letter, and then the other brother passing the letter on to Lincoln, he may not have been so complimentary of the Washburn bros.
Im not so sure.
Grant knew of Sherman's concerns in 1863, but that didnt stop him from being complimentary of him later.

In response to his brother's letters, Elihu Wasburne took a trip down the river, arrived in time for the crossing and battle of Port Gibson, he rode with Grant, took a look around and decided everything was just fine. March 1863 was a dark time, but once Grant made it to May and once Elihu came to see for himself, his confidence was restored


Even Lincoln had to confess that he had doubted Grant, but that in the end Grant was right:
"When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do, what you finally did -- march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below, and took Port-Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join Gen. Banks; and when you turned Northward East of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right, and I was wrong." [Lincoln to Grant, July 13, 1863]
 
Im not so sure.
Grant knew of Sherman's concerns in 1863, but that didnt stop him from being complimentary of him later.

In response to his brother's letters, Elihu Wasburne took a trip down the river, arrived in time for the crossing and battle of Port Gibson, he rode with Grant, took a look around and decided everything was just fine. March 1863 was a dark time, but once Grant made it to May and once Elihu came to see for himself, his confidence was restored


Even Lincoln had to confess that he had doubted Grant, but that in the end Grant was right:
"When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do, what you finally did -- march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition, and the like, could succeed. When you got below, and took Port-Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join Gen. Banks; and when you turned Northward East of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right, and I was wrong." [Lincoln to Grant, July 13, 1863]
I think the main point is that E. Washburne is held up as the creator and benefactor of Grant. And yet even Elihu lost faith. Ultimately the only Grant benefactor that mattered was Lincoln. Lincoln may have had doubts at times, but he stuck with Grant because he understood that Grant was what the war effort needed.

E. Washburne was not the creator of Grant. He was a fair-weather promoter. His brother was equally insignificant.
 
I think the main point is that E. Washburne is held up as the creator and benefactor of Grant. And yet even Elihu lost faith. Ultimately the only Grant benefactor that mattered was Lincoln. Lincoln may have had doubts at times, but he stuck with Grant because he understood that Grant was what the war effort needed.

E. Washburne was not the creator of Grant. He was a fair-weather promoter. His brother was equally insignificant.
It is significant to note that Grant did not allow these personal feelings to get in the way of requesting Cad. Washburne in 1865. I believe he was well enough informed of his own detractors. His choices were for the benefit of the country war effort, and Lincoln understood it.
Lubliner.
 
Grant's opinion of Cadwallader Washburn:
CITY POINT, VA., February 4, 1865--5 p. m.
(Received 7. 30 p. m.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff:
If General Washburn is not placed in command of West Tennessee I want him to come on to take command at Norfolk. He is one of the best administrative officers we have, and will effectually stop supplies being sent through our lines to the enemy wherever he is. We want such a man at each of the above places.
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
Was there any chance that Grant would say or do anything detrimental about someone close to Elihu Washburn(e)?
Politics then like now determined who rose and who fell.
 
It is significant to note that Grant did not allow these personal feelings to get in the way of requesting Cad. Washburne in 1865. I believe he was well enough informed of his own detractors. His choices were for the benefit of the country war effort, and Lincoln understood it.
Lubliner.
And I don't want to understate E Washburne's assistance to Grant's career. But the false claim that we hear over and over, is that nothing mattered except having a politician advocate, and that Grant's success was solely a result of Washburne and nothing to do with Grant's abilities.

Washburne was also an advocate for other Illinois generals, such as Hurlbut and McClernand. Yet they did not become Lt Generals. Support from a politician could only go so far. Performance and results mattered.
 
And I don't want to understate E Washburne's assistance to Grant's career. But the false claim that we hear over and over, is that nothing mattered except having a politician advocate, and that Grant's success was solely a result of Washburne and nothing to do with Grant's abilities.

Washburne was also an advocate for other Illinois generals, like Hurlbut and McClernand. Yet they did not become Lt Generals. Support from a politician could only go so far. Abilities and results mattered.
I believe the change occurred in August 1862. Halleck took over administration of the army and promotions were based on production after that. The basic concept of accountability was introduced.
 
And I don't want to understate E Washburne's assistance to Grant's career. But the false claim that we hear over and over, is that nothing mattered except having a politician advocate, and that Grant's success was solely a result of Washburne and nothing to do with Grant's abilities.

Washburne was also an advocate for other Illinois generals, such as Hurlbut and McClernand. Yet they did not become Lt Generals. Support from a politician could only go so far. Performance and results mattered.
Id also emphasize what I alluded to before -- when doubts were raised in the spring of 1863 about Grant, Elihu went to the front to see for himself. He met with Grant, McClernand, Logan etc; he watched the bombardment of Grand Gulf, the crossing of the river, the battle of Port Gibson; and he came away impressed not just with Grant but with the truth of the challenge he faced -- thus when Elihu advocated for Grant it was based on first hand knowledge of Grant's talent and performance not just home town boosterism
 
Was there any chance that Grant would say or do anything detrimental about someone close to Elihu Washburn(e)?
Politics then like now determined who rose and who fell.
The Washburns were not that important.

Here in 1865, Grant is requesting Cadwallader Washburn for a position that could be important to the success of Grant's next campaign (Five Forks-Appomattox). Grant would not have put someone in that spot for political reasons. He might have put a politically connected man in a position because of politics (or left him in one) -- but he would not have done it to a spot that might hamper his own 1865 campaign that way.

It is also worth noting that Grant did not want Butler or Sigel in command at the start of 1864, but worked around that because of Election Year politics for Lincoln. Sigel's failure at New Market led to his replacement. After the 1864 Election was over and done, Ben Butler is replaced. Cadwallader Washburn had less political pull than that, but he truly was an efficient and capable administrator who knew how to run an organization -- and that was exactly what Grant wanted.

After the war, Cadwallader Washburn started and ran the company we know today as General Mills. Grant simply recognized the ability in the man.
 
The Washburns were not that important.

Here in 1865, Grant is requesting Cadwallader Washburn for a position that could be important to the success of Grant's next campaign (Five Forks-Appomattox). Grant would not have put someone in that spot for political reasons. He might have put a politically connected man in a position because of politics (or left him in one) -- but he would not have done it to a spot that might hamper his own 1865 campaign that way.

It is also worth noting that Grant did not want Butler or Sigel in command at the start of 1864, but worked around that because of Election Year politics for Lincoln. Sigel's failure at New Market led to his replacement. After the 1864 Election was over and done, Ben Butler is replaced. Cadwallader Washburn had less political pull than that, but he truly was an efficient and capable administrator who knew how to run an organization -- and that was exactly what Grant wanted.

After the war, Cadwallader Washburn started and ran the company we know today as General Mills. Grant simply recognized the ability in the man.
Are you saying both Washburn(e)s weren’t important? Cadwallader certainly wasn’t but without Elihu there is no General Grant and certainly no LtGen Grant.
 
Cadawallader’s main importance today is the very frank assessments he made of Grant and his armyin letters to his brother Congressman Washburne. Someone posted a sentence from a letter but there’s much more of course. If I get a chance I may post links to the entire letters which are in the Grant Papers. Of course none of this will change opinions of the Grant “True Believers”
 
Before the Atlanta Campaign? What would you even judge it by?

Shiloh: defensive badass.

Chickasaw Bayou: sent on a fool’s errand by Lincoln and Halleck.

Arkansas Post: skilled maneuver to take fortified position.

Vicksburg: relatively minor role played until the siege.

Jackson: another siege.

Chattanooga: sent to turn a position that didn’t exist.

Meridian: Sherman at his best, rapid movements to destroy materiel.

That’s about it. Why are you excluding the Atlanta Campaign?
Albert Castel -who studied Sherman more than anyone on this site - said Sherman was a general who didn’t like to fight. Check out Castel’s essay “Prevericating through Georgia “ about his Memoirs. Those new to this site should not let their questions be struck down by a few posters whose main purpose is to stifle opinions they dont like. Be brave. Investigate. All real history is revisionist history.
 
Cadawallader’s main importance today is the very frank assessments he made of Grant and his armyin letters to his brother Congressman Washburne. Someone posted a sentence from a letter but there’s much more of course. If I get a chance I may post links to the entire letters which are in the Grant Papers. Of course none of this will change opinions of the Grant “True Believers”
Or change the opinions of the Grant True Haters.

Would be fun to start a new thread and post the entirety of the letters. Include the one where Cad writes to Elihu that "Grant is the only regular Army Genl worth a cuss". Very frank assessments indeed.
 
Are you saying both Washburn(e)s weren’t important? Cadwallader certainly wasn’t but without Elihu there is no General Grant and certainly no LtGen Grant.
No. I am saying they were not important enough that Grant would have risked putting Cadwallader into that position because of their connections.

Cadwallader had done an excellent job in late 1864 cracking down on the illegal trading in the Mississippi. Grant wanted him to do exactly that in Norfolk in 1865 as Grant was getting ready for his Spring campaign to end the war.
 
Albert Castel -who studied Sherman more than anyone on this site - said Sherman was a general who didn’t like to fight. Check out Castel’s essay “Prevericating through Georgia “ about his Memoirs. Those new to this site should not let their questions be struck down by a few posters whose main purpose is to stifle opinions they dont like. Be brave. Investigate. All real history is revisionist history.
Sherman had a generally poor record in tactical offensive situations. He understood this about himself, IMHO. On the tactical defensive he was a grim fighter who seemed to get more steady as the situation got more difficult.

Sherman also understood how difficult the tactical offensive had become in the age of the rifle.

For both of those reasons, he seems to have shied away from fully committing his forces to an attack once he was in complete command. Throughout the Atlanta Campaign, the March to the Sea, and the March through the Carolinas you can find examples where he should simply have struck harder, with more of his force. It is still true in his very last battle, at Bentonville, when he could have wiped out Joe Johnston on March 21st by throwing more troops in to support Mower's attack (Sherman ordered them to retreat instead).

Sherman won by using his superior skill at the operational level to offset his poor tactical skill. He fought a war of movement (his "indirect approach") that avoided large pitched battles. He concentrated on maneuver and the destruction of Confederate RRs and infrastructure, crippling their ability to oppose him.
 
The Washburns were not that important.

Here in 1865, Grant is requesting Cadwallader Washburn for a position that could be important to the success of Grant's next campaign (Five Forks-Appomattox). Grant would not have put someone in that spot for political reasons. He might have put a politically connected man in a position because of politics (or left him in one) -- but he would not have done it to a spot that might hamper his own 1865 campaign that way.

It is also worth noting that Grant did not want Butler or Sigel in command at the start of 1864, but worked around that because of Election Year politics for Lincoln. Sigel's failure at New Market led to his replacement. After the 1864 Election was over and done, Ben Butler is replaced. Cadwallader Washburn had less political pull than that, but he truly was an efficient and capable administrator who knew how to run an organization -- and that was exactly what Grant wanted.

After the war, Cadwallader Washburn started and ran the company we know today as General Mills. Grant simply recognized the ability in the man.
The family was successful. And the Mainers as a group were influential. But there was nothing particular about Washburn. Grant made a lot of friends, and a few enemies along the way. Washburn's influence was through is friend William Seward. But Grant's chief defender seem to have been Stanton. Getting Grant back into the game was probably one thing that Stanton and Halleck agreed on, for the sake of soldiers in the western armies.
 
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