Question on Repeaters

[Saphroneth]

Please note, I specified Ripley's reluctance to deplore breechloading rifles because they would be used by infantry. Ripley had long favored breechloading carbines, a cavalry firearm.

So? Where could he have procured more breechloading rifles with his orders? What kind of breechloading rifle did he not saturate with orders?

(For context, Berdan's 2,000 Sharps rifles cost the Union considerably more than 2,000 Sharps carbines, because the rifle was a trickier piece of work and needed a longer barrel. My understanding is that the estimate in Arming the Union is that the 2,000 Sharps rifles cost about 6,000 Sharps cabines to produce.)

 

[CW Watch & Sword Guy]

Similarly, Pious Cause Mythologists have long ignored the fact that Buford's single-shot breechloading carbines had a much quicker firing rate than Rebel muzzleloaders. The stationary Rebel infantrymen could shoot at best three rounds a minute whereas Buford's men could fire as many as nine rounds per minute. Moreover, the reloading procedure required Confederate infantrymen to stand thereby presenting a larger target than Buford's Yankee cavalrymen who could remain prone.

The carbines may have had a higher rate of fire, but they had shorter range as well, and roughly every fourth cavalryman was engaged holding the unit's horses. But Johan's point remains valid that single-shot carbines are not the repeaters that various sources claim. Most infantrymen would rather have faced dismounted cavalry, even with their carbines, than infantry.

 

[Saphroneth]

The funny thing about it is that late-war Union cavalry did dominate the fighting, but it wasn't with the breechloader carbine... it was with the saber, as pioneered in Union use by Minty. (This is totally in line with what a professional soldier of the era would expect - it takes years to properly train a cavalryman, and the saber was the superior weapon for a mounted melee or for attacking enemy infantry.)

 

[redbob]

So? Where could he have procured more breechloading rifles with his orders? What kind of breechloading rifle did he not saturate with orders?

(For context, Berdan's 2,000 Sharps rifles cost the Union considerably more than 2,000 Sharps carbines, because the rifle was a trickier piece of work and needed a longer barrel. My understanding is that the estimate in Arming the Union is that the 2,000 Sharps rifles cost about 6,000 Sharps cabines to produce.)

The modifications that Berdan required such as the set triggers ran the price up and these changes caused a delay in Sharp's being able to deliver their other weapons.

 

[johan_steele]

Edited, inflammatory Similarly, some long ignored the fact that Buford's single-shot breechloading carbines had a much quicker firing rate than Rebel muzzleloaders. The stationary Rebel infantrymen could shoot at best three rounds a minute whereas Buford's men could fire as many as nine rounds per minute. Moreover, the reloading procedure required Confederate infantrymen to stand thereby presenting a larger target than Buford's Yankee cavalrymen who could remain prone.

Cav vs Infantry in the ACW rarely came out on top. As has been noted one in four of the Cav were forced to hold horses. Cav units rarely if ever approached the numbers of the Infantry and a determined Infantry assault usually swept aside the Cav w/ relative ease.

The advantage Cav typically had was superior mobility which Buford used skillfully at Gettysburg.

Griffith's work is priceless for understanding how and why things were done during the ACW; a worthwhile read.

Pickett was right as to why the CS lost at Gettysburg, the US soldier had something to do with it.

Wars are won by the least incompetent army, the ACW is merely more proof that such is true.

Edited. Personal Attack

 

[Philip Leigh]

The carbines may have had a higher rate of fire, but they had shorter range as well.

A large majority of the Civil War firearm casualties were inflicted well within the range of cavalry carbines.*

and roughly every fourth cavalryman was engaged holding the unit's horses. But Johan's point remains valid that single-shot carbines are not the repeaters that various sources claim.

The significant point is that he failed to mention that Buford's carbines provided a substantial firing rate advantage over the Confederate muzzleloaders.

* Earl Hess, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 105-06

 

[CW Watch & Sword Guy]

A large majority of the Civil War firearm casualties were inflicted well within the range of cavalry carbines.*



The significant point is that he failed to mention that Buford's carbines provided a substantial firing rate advantage over the Confederate muzzleloaders.

* Earl Hess, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 105-06

That many casualties were inflicted within the range of carbines does not refute the point that longer range muskets conferred an advantage. And Johan's point was that some commentators exaggerated the firing rate advantage of Buford's troopers. Buford's men had several disadvantages as well, such as less artillery support than their attackers, which Johan didn't mention either - again, because it wasn't relevant.

 

[Rio Bravo]

One of the Army's contracts called for 34,500 Spencer carbines at $25.00 each to be delivered in 1864 and by June 30, 1866; 94,196 Spencer Carbines, 13,171 Spencer Rifles and 58,000,000 Spencer cartridges had been delivered. There are accounts of Confederates using captured Spencer's, but when the ammunition for them was expended; they were discarded. The Model 1865's Spencer stabilizer cut offs were easily removed making them rapid fire again instead of a single shot.

Redbob- My Avatar, Capt. Joseph Banks Lyle of the 5th South Carolina Infantry, picked up a discarded Spencer Carbine ( which was unloaded), during the battle of Williamsburg Road, and single-handedly Captured 550 Union Soldiers.
It was one of the most incredible feats of personal valour witnessed during the entire war !
https://www.fold3.com/page/915-confederate-medal-of-honor#description

 

[JOHN42768]

The Repeater ,weather rifle or carbine, had to prove it's worth. It definitely accomplished this task. Also mindset had to be overcome and it eventually was also accomplished. At the onset of the War decent firearms were in short supply and high demand. Most of the weapons in armory stores were outdated.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Similarly, some have long ignored the fact that Buford's single-shot breechloading carbines had a much quicker firing rate than Rebel muzzleloaders. The stationary Rebel infantrymen could shoot at best three rounds a minute whereas Buford's men could fire as many as nine rounds per minute. Moreover, the reloading procedure normally required Confederate infantrymen to stand thereby presenting a larger target than Buford's Yankee cavalrymen who could remain prone.

This isn't actually strictly true - it was quite possible to reload a muzzle loader lying down, though it was slower.

Thus the Confederate infantryman had a choice of providing Buford an even greater firing rate advantage by presenting a lower profile target during a cumbersome prone reloading process or leaving Buford with a three-to-one firing rate advantage by reloading in a standing position . . . an unwelcome choice.

 

[johan_steele]

It's rather clear the OP's question has been answered. A breach loading carbine such as the Sharp's, Burnside etc is not a repeating rifle like the Henry or Spencer. Both offer a significant advantage over a muzzle loading rifle musket.

The US had more of all of the above than the CS.

 

[redbob]

So? Where could he have procured more breechloading rifles with his orders? What kind of breechloading rifle did he not saturate with orders?

(For context, Berdan's 2,000 Sharps rifles cost the Union considerably more than 2,000 Sharps carbines, because the rifle was a trickier piece of work and needed a longer barrel. My understanding is that the estimate in Arming the Union is that the 2,000 Sharps rifles cost about 6,000 Sharps cabines to produce.)

Even today, a Sharp's or Spencer Rifle is a much more expensive proposition to own than a carbine of the same marque.

 

[Saphroneth]

Thus the Confederate infantryman had a choice of providing Buford an even greater firing rate advantage by presenting a lower profile target during a cumbersome prone reloading process or leaving Buford with a three-to-one firing rate advantage by reloading in a standing position . . . an unwelcome choice.

Well, given that being behind cover when reloading means they're not a target, it does obviate the possible risk there - it means only becoming a target when firing, which means the casualty rate should actually be broadly comparable. (Both sides are vulnerable when firing, and only then). Unless the muzzle loader side's men are each getting the focused attention of several breech loader men when they rise to fire, and that can easily be prevented by synchronizing their firing exposure using drill.

That being said, that only really applies in skirmish combat where both sides were dispersed and taking cover. In a straight up linear combat the breechloader doesn't really get to provide that benefit, which is why the combat in the western theatre of the Austro-Prussian War (Bavarians with muzzle loaders versus Prussians with breech loaders, with the Bavarians employing normal linear tactics) the breechloader advantage was not all that great.

(Though in the eastern theate battles the breechloader showed that it was enormously potent against troops making a bayonet charge.)

 

[O' Be Joyful]

Thus the Confederate infantryman had a choice of providing Buford an even greater firing rate advantage by presenting a lower profile target during a cumbersome prone reloading process or leaving Buford with a three-to-one firing rate advantage by reloading in a standing position . . . an unwelcome choice.

The military term for repeatedly and foolishly assailing an enemy force that possesses superior short range firepower is Tough Sh...err Luck. But, most of us do not understand the belaboring your supposed point.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Union Ordnance Chief James Ripley* was reluctant to adopt breech-loading rifles out of concern that the soldiers would consume ammunition too rapidly. This actually happened early in the fighting at the February 1864 Battle of Olustee in Florida when the Spencer-armed Seventh Connecticut got too far ahead of the rest of the army and was forced to withdraw for want of ammunition.**

*Ripley was replaced in September 1863, three months after John Wilder's Lightning Brigade first demonstrated the Spencer's effectiveness at the Battle of Hoover's Gap.

** Willam Nulty, Confederate Florida, (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1990), 133-36, 152

Actually Ripley ordered so many breechloaders in the first part of the war that the companies producing them were swamped. He focused on muzzle loaders because they could be produced.

I originally responded to the above remark below. . .

Please note, I specified Ripley's reluctance to deploy breechloading rifles, which would be used by infantry. Ripley had long favored breechloading carbines, a cavalry firearm.

. . . to which I amend:

Although a small number may have been produced as rifles, every firearm order and eventually delivered that you list below was chiefly a carbine except the Spencer. Additionally, only after Assistant Commerce Secretary Thomas Scott order him, did Ripley reluctantly order the 10,000 Spencer rifles. Thus, your list documents Ripley's preference to deploy breechloaders in the cavalry instead of the infantry.

Per Cerebropetrologist on AH.com:

• Sharps- 6,000 carbines ordered 4 July 1861; contracted to 'supply this department with Sharp's carbines to the utmost capacity of your factory until further orders' on 21 December 1861, with further such orders being made for 3 months from 26 June 1862, 9 September 1862, and 19 December 1862; 1,000 rifles ordered 27 January 1862, 1,000 more ordered 6 February 1862; 2,000 rifles and 22,933 carbines delivered by January 1863.
• Burnside- 800 ordered 16 July 1861, 7,500 ordered 27 August 1861, 2,500 ordered 21 November 1861; 5,244 weapons delivered by January 1863.
• Smith's- 10,000 ordered on 27 August 1861, 7,000 delivered by January 1863.
• Gallagher- 5,000 ordered 17 September 1861; 5,000 more ordered 22 September 1862; 7,162 delivered by January 1863.
• Marsh- 25,000 ordered 14 October 1861, none ever delivered.
• Merrill/Jenks- 600 ordered 25 October 1861; 5,000 ordered 24 December 1861; 1,400 ordered 28 November 1862; 5,901 delivered by January 1863.
• Gibbs- 10,000 ordered 13 December 1861, first delivery of 550 made 30 May 1863.
• Cosmopolitan/Union/Illinois- 1,140 ordered 23 December 1861, order completed 2 July 1862; 2,000 more ordered 4 August 1862, with 1,000 delivered 11 April 1863.
• Spencer- 10,000 ordered 26 December 1861; 600 delivered by January 1863.

 

[Saphroneth]

Although a small number may have been produced as rifles, every firearm order you list below was a chiefly a carbine except the Spencer.

That's false, then, because the Marsh was a breechloading conversion of the Springfield rifle. Note that none of these were ever delivered, though he ordered 25,000.


Was there any production capacity which could have been used for breechloading rifles which Ripley failed to take up? Was there a way he could have produced sufficient breechloading rifles to equip any significant fraction of troops, and if he had what would it have done to the Union's cavalry equipment?

Total carbine procurement in the first fifteen months of the war was about 42,000, of which the Sharps (the type which unambiguously did prevent carbine manufacture) was 13,000. This means that having Sharps produce rifles instead of carbines would have produced perhaps as many as a division's worth of additional rifles but would have cut the Union's supply of cavalry carbines by roughly a third. The Merrill was also a rifle which might have been available (with some Merrill rifles being historically produced), but the diversion of production would have cut the number of cavalry carbines by another 2,500 in exchange for a smaller quantity of rifles.


If Ripley had wanted breechloaders to be anything like the standard infantry arm, then he would have had to place orders with Sharps, Spencer and Merrill for infantry rifles instead of their cavalry carbine orders (thus crippling the ability of the Union to raise cavalry regiments, something they had a lot of trouble with historically) and even then the expected number of breechloaders available by early 1863 would be almost negligible compared to the size of the armies Ripley knew the Union would have to field.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Well, given that being behind cover when reloading means they're not a target, it does obviate the possible risk there - it means only becoming a target when firing, which means the casualty rate should actually be broadly comparable. (Both sides are vulnerable when firing, and only then). Unless the muzzle loader side's men are each getting the focused attention of several breech loader men when they rise to fire, and that can easily be prevented by synchronizing their firing exposure using drill.

That being said, that only really applies in skirmish combat where both sides were dispersed and taking cover. In a straight up linear combat the breechloader doesn't really get to provide that benefit, which is why the combat in the western theatre of the Austro-Prussian War (Bavarians with muzzle loaders versus Prussians with breech loaders, with the Bavarians employing normal linear tactics) the breechloader advantage was not all that great.

(Though in the eastern theate battles the breechloader showed that it was enormously potent against troops making a bayonet charge.)

I am more persuaded by the assessment of Confederate Brigadier General E. Porter Alexander who wrote, "There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been armed from the first with even the breechloaders available in 1861 the war would have been terminated in a year."*

* E. Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), 53

 

[Saphroneth]

I am more persuaded by the assessment of Confederate Brigadier General E. Porter Alexander who wrote, "There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been armed from the first with even the breechloaders available in 1861 the war would have been terminated in a year."*

Wow, that's... really not a very impressive piece of analysis on the part of EP Alexander. Since, you know, it'd mean that the size of the Union army by the middle of 1862 would only be about 30,000, and that pro-rata the Army of the Potomac would consist of about 6,000 PFD.

If the Union had access to a magic supply of adequate breechloaders sufficient to equip their entire historical army? Sure, maybe. But nowhere in the world had that many breechloaders. (And that's the thing which Ripley had to be aware of, and is why - while he did order more breechloaders than the market could actually provide - he focused mainly on getting as many rifle-muskets as possible from every possible source.)

 

[Philip Leigh]

Wow, that's... really not a very impressive piece of analysis on the part of EP Alexander. Since, you know, it'd mean that the size of the Union army by the middle of 1862 would only be about 30,000, and that pro-rata the Army of the Potomac would consist of about 6,000 PFD.

If the Union had access to a magic supply of adequate breechloaders sufficient to equip their entire historical army? Sure, maybe. But nowhere in the world had that many breechloaders. (And that's the thing which Ripley had to be aware of, and is why - while he did order more breechloaders than the market could actually provide - he focused mainly on getting as many rifle-muskets as possible from every possible source.)

You overlook the possibility that a more proactive federal government could have helped private industry accelerate the production of breechloaders. Capital advances, for example, could be used to more quickly set up production lines. Similarly, mandatory settlement the patent dispute between Henry and Winchester could have put more Henry's in the field. Such policies, however, would require a change in leadership, starting with an Ordnance Chief who appreciated the value of innovative firearms. Alexander Dyer, who took over the post in September 1864, had a much greater appreciation of weapons technology, which he exhibited no later than August 1861.

 

[E_just_E]

Folks, this thread has been going far away from its original reason, which is an interesting one:

"soldiers using something other than a rifled musket in an infantry unit."

Nothing to do with Cavalry, Cavalry vs. Infantry, Buford, the Battle of Gettysburg, Union vs. Confederate ammunition, or what if questions about the duration of the war.

Please stay on subject.

I don't want to delete 90% of the posts that are irrelevant. However, next irrelevant post will be deleted, and locking and thread bans will follow.

Posted as a moderator