Post-War Confederate Military: Organization

[Saphroneth]

Given the US' mobilization policy stemmed from lack of large enough threats to its borders to warrant the need for quick mobilization, the presence of the CSA would shift that policy both north and south to the more European model.

I concur it's quite likely, but there's the "British-European" model and the "Continental-European" model. I think the British one is the closer fit for the prewar US doctrine (given how it focuses on militia and volunteers instead of conscription, at least in peacetime) but the Continental one obviously provides a higher peak mobilization "in the system". Anecdotally the cost difference is actually something of a wash according to contemporary articles, at least in troops per man and comparing the Brit and French systems.

Where it gets really interesting is if one picks the British model and the other the Continental. A properly done British model can beat a properly done Continental one (because the numbers are at least vaguely comparable and the British-style regular forces better trained than the European ones owing to longer service time) but if neither side does it properly then the Continental model provides for much greater numbers.

One might imagine the Confederates going down the kurz et vives route (i.e. focusing on very fast mobilization and high quality forces, intending to win before the Union can mobilize their greater manpower etc.) for the same reasons as Prussia - they'd evaluate their chances in a war of materiel as "no thanks" and try to avoid it. This would manifest as a heavy focus on getting troops across the border with the Union in the east as soon as possible with as large and well-trained a force as can be accomplished and smash the Union's armies when the odds are sane; a lot depends here on how the armies actually develop, though, as it would be equally plausible to see the Confederate plan being "fight a decisive battle in our own territory".

Speaking of the border, I think it's quite likely the CSA at least would invest in border fortifications - they give a lot of freedom of time and space to operate. Exactly where they'd go depends on the rail lines though. (If the rail lines were as per historical and the border was the Rappahanock, then fortifications in the Culpeper and Fredericksburg areas make sense for example; possibly two lines of forts?)
Note here I'm talking about late model forts (1870s and later) rather than "Third System" forts or earlier in concept - not too expensive, allow for economy of manpower and give you important reaction time.

 

[Saphroneth]

Also, Im assuming a second war will break out most likely in the 1880's; basing off of other scenarios, by that point the CSA would enact manumission or emancipation in order to gain allies like Britain and France, but keeping blacks in the field using methods like sharecropping.

Tricky. I could see them doing it (paid, naturally) but it's not something they'd automatically do. 1880s is a plausible time frame for it as it's a "whole new generation" deal, but it's not a given.

Not sure whether or not theyd form black regiments.

This is a fraught topic!

There are several possibilities, though I wouldn't dream of saying they're all equally likely:

1) All Whites.
No black man allowed in the army.
2) White Fight.
Black men serve in the non-fighting echelons of the army, either as slaves or as freedmen. (This is pretty much what the CSA did historically at times.)
3) Free Men Fight.
Some black men serve in the armed echelons of the army as private soldiers or possibly NCOs, but not in consolidated units. There's some evidence that this happened, but it's patchy, and it'd mostly if not entirely consist of black freedmen (who did exist in the South after all).
4) Sepoy regiments.
Some units exist with black ORs and white officers, with the black men being freedmen.
5) Slave-soldiers.
Regiments consisting of black ORs and white officers, with the black men being slaves.
Unlikely even by the standards of the rest of this list! But possible.
6) Segregation.
Regiments consisting of black ORs and officers.
Lest this sound impossible, there was one (a Louisiana militia regiment). It did get disbanded though, so that shows how it might not necessarily be likely.

I consider full integration (i.e. substantial numbers of black men serving as officers and ORs alongside white men in the same regiments) basically a pipe dream and anachronistic - at least for the CSA. With the CSA as the enemy the USA might do it at this time if only to make a point.

On top of all those options, there's also the men from the Indian Territory (and since one of them at least had a general rank, they're clearly able to hold officer rank if only for predominantly Native formations).

 

[thomas aagaard]

Not willing is possible, not able is I think not feasible. 20K troops was achievable by Belgium in 1870, and in 1864 the Danish army was:

What you wrote is not how the danish army looked in 1863... maybe it was the Belgium army you listed?

This is the danish peacetime army. (in danish but I guess you can understand it)

• En bataljon af Den Kongelige Livgarde af fire Kompagnier
• 22 Linje Bataljoner, hver af fire Kompagnier
• 1 Eskadron, Livgarder til Hest
• 2 Eskadroner, Gardehusarer
• 6 Dragon regimenter, hver af 4 eskadroner
• 2 artilleri regimenter (12 batterier i alt, med 8 kanoner)
• 2 ingeniør kompagnier
• 1 bro træn kompagni

Totalt ca. 24.000 soldater

It should be noted that all battalions (800 rank and file), was usually at less than half strength, with the rest of the men being home.
(So at any given time about 10-12.000 men would be in uniform... less during winter)
Men had to serve from age 22 for four years in the line. But they only served 16 month as actual soldiers, the rest they where home and just have to show up in case of mobilization. (or extraordinary big exercises as was done in summer 1863)
Then after four years you served another four in the reserves. and then 8 years in the Reinforcement.

When the army mobilized in late 1863 each battalion was doubled in size and made into a regiment of two battalions. (so 1600 rank and file strong) To manage this both the reserves and reinforcement had to be called up, so the oldest privates was 37 years old... and would not have been in uniform for almost 16 years.

When the army was at its largest on 1st of april 64, it had a total of 55.081 men in combat positions.(that include every one from the commanding general and down. But not military workers, doctors and similar) and another 8034 men who was under training.
a Total of about 75.000 men served as a combatant during the (short) war. Out of a population of a bit less than 1,7 million.

 

[Saphroneth]

What you wrote is not how the danish army looked in 1863... maybe it was the Belgium army you listed?

It said it was the Danish army, but I bow to anyone who has access to a more specialist source than HyperWar.

I know the French peacetime army size was a bit more than 1 in 100 men in uniform (they had over 400K troops peacetime out of a population of under 40M) and the British a bit lower if you only count the regulars.

 

[thomas aagaard]

but I bow to anyone who has access to a more specialist source than HyperWar.

I would say the book "Statistiske Meddelelser" published by the Danish General staff in 1867 is just that.

Fun fact, the book that google used for the scan is marked
Library of Congress
Duplicate Exchanged


Anyway, It should be possible for the CSA to have 1% of the white population in the army in peacetime, especially if the CSA army also drafted slaves for support work.

 

[steve59p]

Given the US' mobilization policy stemmed from lack of large enough threats to its borders to warrant the need for quick mobilization, the presence of the CSA would shift that policy both north and south to the more European model.

That would be a big issue. The US was pretty much secure from foreign threat so was able to get away with a pretty tiny army and navy, the former being used mainly for expanding the state westwards boosted by conscription/volunteers when a bigger war occurred. This latter worked with Mexico because it was so badly lead and with the rebel south because they were facing similar problems. However there is now a state not too greatly smaller in population plus possibly a perceived threat from Britain or Mexico/France depending on how things have developed. As such the north is likely to have a markedly larger peace time military, especially if there is also a strong revanchist element in the north and this will in turn pull up the southern view of desired force levels.

While in theory the south can sustain a larger military, at least while cotton in king, they may be affected by large scale economic damage if the 'independence war' has been long and bloody or overconfidence and cultural desire for a weak central government if its been short and relatively bloodless.

 

[Luke Freet]

While in theory the south can sustain a larger military, at least while cotton in king, they may be affected by large scale economic damage if the 'independence war' has been long and bloody or overconfidence and cultural desire for a weak central government if its been short and relatively bloodless.

Im running under the assumption that the war ends in 1865, after a surprise reverse at Atlanta and the election of McClellan, who will sign a peace deal after taking office in the Spring of 1865.

 

[Saphroneth]

The thing about a weak central government is that it can either stay weak or not - iron law of institutions can take over, and the Constitution (US and probably CS) can turn out to have loopholes large enough to drive a centralized government through. (Commerce clause anyone?)

The Union's got a larger population and a larger industrial base - that's a fact as of Confederate independence. If the Confederates are independent it's either because of overseas assistance (deliberate or not) or because they beat the Union by dint of superiority in quality at some level in the army (privates, small-unit leadership, regimental operations, field command, grand strategy...)

This means that any Confederate military policy will need to address this.

The obvious thing to do is to say "we can't match them in numbers, but we can match them in quality" (the approach taken by the Prussians -> Germans, so it has historical precedent) or to say "we can match them in numbers" (which is basically a national commitment to conscription on a large scale, to get the trained manpower, and also imposes a limit on how long you can fight for before the economy goes nope).

So either way a Confederate war plan is going to be one based on a short war.

Something which is interesting here is the oil. Oil exports were enormous for the US historically, and most of that oil (not all) is in what would become the CSA.

What this means is that I see a few possible models for the timing of a war.

One of them is that the next war is a generation down the line. The CSA's not poor, exactly, but it's not overwhelmingly rich either.
It's tried as best as it can to become an autarky, probably without success (it's hard) and is likely planning on using rail to move troops quickly to develop an attack.
Something interesting to think about here is what's the cause of the war? Before too long the desire to retake a breakaway country goes away - the Union in 1880 is unlikely to say "you know, we'd quite like to reannex a large land area full of a generation of people who've grown up with us as the enemy" so it's likely to be more of a border war - that is, the kind of war which a short sharp strike kurz et vives could actually win.

The second possibility in terms of step-change is a war in the days of the machine gun.
This would be a war when the oil has come along, and so the South is able to spend more money on their military. Who knows what a political mess they'd be, but populations have gone up considerably (n.b. possible Southern immigration policy aimed at attracting "sufficiently white" immigrants from Europe?) and trench warfare might work nicely (though it competes with kurz et vives).

The third possibility is when aircraft and the internal combustion engine have come along. Another step-change, and one which opens the possibility of rapid exploitation... if there's a flank.

What would happen in this war is almost impossible to know. We can't really predict whether Blitzkrieg, Deep Battle or Methodical Battle come about in this world, as they're all a bit contingent on particular situations (and varied considerably depending on how well they were executed and against whom). It'd be almost equally plausible to have the CSA executing a deep-battle breakthrough of an OMG and cutting clear to the Susquehanna as to have them beat themselves silly trying a massive armoured attack against the dug-in guns of the 41st Coloured Regimental Combat Team.
Or for the First Air Strike Force to be sunk in Charleston by a bomber strike flying out of Bermuda, for that matter...

 

[Luke Freet]

I doubt the CSA will go for a weak central government, especially with the tensions between the 2 nations forcing them to HAVE to strengthen their governments.

 

[Saphroneth]

I doubt the CSA will go for a weak central government, especially with the tensions between the 2 nations forcing them to HAVE to strengthen their governments.

You'd be surprised how shortsighted countries can be even when the right choice is obvious, if the interpretation by the decision makers of their own self interest is otherwise. e.g. Japan in the late 30s (where a decision maker making a decision that wasn't "Japan best and can win everything!!!1" would get shot by fired-up junior officers.)

 

[Luke Freet]

You'd be surprised how shortsighted countries can be even when the right choice is obvious, if the interpretation by the decision makers of their own self interest is otherwise. e.g. Japan in the late 30s (where a decision maker making a decision that wasn't "Japan best and can win everything!!!1" would get shot by fired-up junior officers.)

While i dont doubt the South will rest on its laurels and not adapt much in the coming decades, I doubt they'll be so completely closed to debate. Especially considering they only won by the slimmest margins, by a political change in the north, rather than a military victory.

 

[steve59p]

Saphroneh

You mentioned the south possibly encouraging immigration from Europe of desired groups to boost their population. Two points come to mind.
a) The negative is that as I understand it poorer whites were leaving the south for the north in part because the big plantations hogged so much land and could use economy of scale to outproduce the smaller farmers. This was why Lincoln's family ended up in Illinoos after all wasn't it? Unless a solution to this is found, such as none agricultural employment or reducing the power of the great plantations I can't see it working.

b) On the other side if that problem is negated then presumably there could also be a substantial internal growth because young people are less likely to head to the US, whether the north or the west, both because there are local opportunities and because it means entering a different [and quite possibly hostile] country.

Steve

 

[steve59p]

I doubt the CSA will go for a weak central government, especially with the tensions between the 2 nations forcing them to HAVE to strengthen their governments.

You'd be surprised how shortsighted countries can be even when the right choice is obvious, if the interpretation by the decision makers of their own self interest is otherwise. e.g. Japan in the late 30s (where a decision maker making a decision that wasn't "Japan best and can win everything!!!1" would get shot by fired-up junior officers.)

My thoughts was that if the south 'wins' a quick and relatively bloodless war then it would confirm their views of superiority and also the US would be seen as much less of a future threat, at least by those in power so there would be less incentive to change. Also part of the identity of the CSA was over the importance of state power compared to any federal government so that would be a barrier. IIRC I remember reading that late in the war part of the effort to stop the US advances was that one state with a stockpile of boots, blankets etc was refusing to release them to soldiers of another state despite them being desperately needed.

As such, while it might change over time, especially if a clear threat could emerge from the north, I could see the south in such a situation preferring a very weak central government, possibly especially in terms of the military as it would be seen as a way that Richmond [or wherever the central government is] could threaten the liberties of the states.

 

[Luke Freet]

So, this is the current summary of the ACSA order of Battle.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/194JS1uvDrFn8DK3rCy1KRNDpqDXi2iEoEgyABy4Bqew/edit?usp=sharing
The specifics of each particular unit (particular officers in command) is up for debate.

 

[Luke Freet]

Now, current question: Using the living generals and ranking officers who were alive as of July 17th 1864 survive into the ceasefire in March/April 1865, which officers would remain in the regular force and who'd be likely to revert to state troops or demobilized?

 

[Carronade]

Now, current question: Using the living generals and ranking officers who were alive as of July 17th 1864 survive into the ceasefire in March/April 1865, which officers would remain in the regular force and who'd be likely to revert to state troops or demobilized?

Lee had said that he only wished to draw his sword in the defense of Virginia, so I expect he would retire when the threat abated.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

So there's a few points to consider when looking at how an independent CSA would structure its post war army.

The first is obviously the mission. Obviously part of that will be to defend the country from foreign threats, garrison fortifications, aid the civil authority, put down slave/native troubles, and protect sites of national importance. In assuming those roles, the army will obviously be expanding its cavalry structure (6 regiments seems reasonable) while also probably expanding the number of infantry battalions from 6 - 18/20, as well as probably increasing the artillery from 40-60/80 companies.

However, a large army will be anathema to many interests in the CSA. Post war there will be a huge drive for demobilization, and most of the volunteer regiments will simply go home. Expanding the army will be difficult, and so arranging to double the army's previously approved strength will be something that may present some difficulty in filling (but I imagine many officers from the war will be making an impassioned plea for a larger army so the original plan is probably unworkable at 15,000 men). States rights activists and people who remember the armies from the war poorly will want nothing but a smaller army which can't interfere too much.

On the frontier (Texas, Arkansas, ect) there will be army posts to drive off the Comanche, probably Jayhawkers, ect. However, places like Louisiana, South Carolina, Alabama and Georgia probably won't be as welcoming outside the cities thanks to the deprivations of the war by both armies. There will be a need for an armed presence in Virginia of course.

Besides national sentiment, cost is the most important factor to consider. Does the post-war government want to spend money on a larger army? Do they want to buy the latest weapons, what about the navy? Will the states accept any higher taxes to support a larger army?

Essentially, you have to weigh any projected budget against national sentiment and what a government would really want/consider feasible.